Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Conde Lucanor
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Apr 27, 2021 6:53 am Your above is a strawman.

I'll repeat again my position on this issue,

I posted [from quick and hasty search] the article re Transcendental Idealism mainly to counter your claim that Transcendental Idealism is dead.
I have not read the article fully and I did not claim I fully agreed with the authors view.
There's no straw man argument, no misrepresentation of your position. When you posted the link to the article to counter my claim that Transcendental Idealism is dead, you necessarily implied that the article represented the views that correspond to Transcendental Idealism. It was not possible that the article showed what Transcendental Idealism was, but at the same time you could hold back from endorsing it as an accurate representation of Transcendental Idealism. Neither it was possible that you referenced the article as a mere discussion on TI to show that a discussion on a subject implied that a doctrine, which you supposedly did not know what it was about (except its label), was alive and well.

There are plenty of subjects in SEP, for example, ancient atomism. Does that mean that ancient atomism is not a defunct doctrine? How about the entries on physicalism, dualism or eliminative materialism? Does that mean that they are for you doctrines still doing just fine?

You might argue that you endorsed by mere clumsiness an article that you had not read and could not agree with, but acknowledgement of your "mistake" does not exempts you from the consequences, being the main one that a source that you trusted blindly gives a different account of Transcendental Idealism from what you propose.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Apr 27, 2021 6:53 am I did not agree with Stang's view but merely implied the discussion on the topic of TI. If TI is defunct, there would be no such discussion and if mentioned would have qualified TI is defunct.
It's funny that you say that, because at one point I alerted that the article actually confirmed my views, and you replied confidently, as if knowing enough of the content of the article, that I was "likely mistaken", and in complete disbelief challenged me to show which points converged with mine. Was that also the result of another "quick and hasty" action of yours?
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Conde Lucanor
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Apr 28, 2021 6:41 am I would like to establish the truth as posted in this article,
viewtopic.php?p=508929#p508929
before I proceed to answer your other points [otherwise wasting effort].

I have also open a thread re;
Kant's Transcendental Idealism: SEP: By Stang
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32940
so we can zoom into the specifics with reference to the contents,
As I already said, being so obvious, you are clashing with a scholar that has written mostly about Kant. So, you either acknowledge that there's no academic consensus on the interpretation of Kant's CPR (a point you contended earlier), or that you were simply wrong about Kant. Your choice. In any case, you will have to recant once again. BTW, there are plenty of other references that coincide with Stang's account, so you better choose well.

As for the rest of my other points, plenty of them, you can still reply without wasting effort. They have little to do with Stang's article.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Apr 28, 2021 10:22 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Apr 28, 2021 3:15 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Tue Apr 27, 2021 10:18 am

Did you not understand that I'm asking you for what you're claiming are two different definitions of "mind-independent" (or "human condition independent" or "external" or whatever exactly you're going to wind up claiming that there are two different senses of in order to make "x is mind-independent" and "x cannot be 'human condition' independent" not contradictory).

Give the definitions of the different senses in question if you're able to do so, or admit that it's beyond your capabilities (which wouldn't necessarily imply that they're aren't different senses, only that you're not capable of articulating them).
Btw, I am the one who is making the claims and you are one who is misunderstanding my claims.

I don't get how you arrive at "me claiming two different definitions of 'mind-independent' "

This is what I have been claiming;
  • 1. There is an external independent world from my self, i.e. empirical realism. In this case, I see tables, chairs, trees, etc. as independent from my mind, i.e. empirical realism.

    2. But at the same time, the above external_ness in 1 is NOT ultimately independent when it is viewed as subsumed within the human conditions.
    In this case, the reality is the human person cannot never extricate himself from the reality he is part and parcel of - thus cannot be fully independent.
There is only one perspective of independence i.e. 1.

Perhaps you stick to the above 1 and 2 then show me where are there 2 different definition of 'mind independent'?
When I said that "x is mind-independent" and "x cannot be 'human condition' independent" are contradictory,and you responded that they're not contradictory because they're employing two different senses of a term, what term were you referring to? Mind-independent? Independent? External? What?

Tell me what term you were referring to, and then give the two different definitions.
1. When I refer to "x is mind-independent" is saying "the tree" out there is mind-independent, i.e. the existence of the tree is independent of my and all human minds.
This is in one perspective, i.e. empirical realism.

2. But the whole sense/perspective of 1 [independent externality] is not independent of my mind and all human minds, i.e. human conditions.

In terms of Venn Diagrams,
Circle-1 is totally inside the circle-2. i.e. circle-1 is totally subsumed within circle-2.
Below [ignore labels] is an example of total subsumption;

Image
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 3:30 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Apr 27, 2021 6:53 am Your above is a strawman.

I'll repeat again my position on this issue,

I posted [from quick and hasty search] the article re Transcendental Idealism mainly to counter your claim that Transcendental Idealism is dead.
I have not read the article fully and I did not claim I fully agreed with the authors view.
There's no straw man argument, no misrepresentation of your position. When you posted the link to the article to counter my claim that Transcendental Idealism is dead, you necessarily implied that the article represented the views that correspond to Transcendental Idealism. It was not possible that the article showed what Transcendental Idealism was, but at the same time you could hold back from endorsing it as an accurate representation of Transcendental Idealism. Neither it was possible that you referenced the article as a mere discussion on TI to show that a discussion on a subject implied that a doctrine, which you supposedly did not know what it was about (except its label), was alive and well.

There are plenty of subjects in SEP, for example, ancient atomism. Does that mean that ancient atomism is not a defunct doctrine? How about the entries on physicalism, dualism or eliminative materialism? Does that mean that they are for you doctrines still doing just fine?

You might argue that you endorsed by mere clumsiness an article that you had not read and could not agree with, but acknowledgement of your "mistake" does not exempts you from the consequences, being the main one that a source that you trusted blindly gives a different account of Transcendental Idealism from what you propose.
I presumed you are familiar with the Principle of Charity??
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity

You don't seem to appreciate the above principle but seem to be very obstinate and refuse to accept the truth.

In addition you ignore the sequence of how the point originated and the various relevant points I posted e.g.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Apr 27, 2021 6:53 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote:Transcendental Idealism by all means is NOT a defunct doctrine but adopted by many neo-Kantians who agree with it.
Note this article on TI and the long list of bibliography therein.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant ... -idealism/
Note this;
Allison, H 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, New Haven: Yale University Press. Revised and Enlarged Edition.
viewtopic.php?p=508036#p508036
If I had resort to and secondary authority I would definitely refer to Allison, NOT Stang's view.

The main point started and is still hinges on 1 above.

I NEVER claim I relied on Stang as an authority nor AGREED with Stang on Transcendental Idealism [which is actually a discussion and not specifically his conclusive views on what is TI]..

I have read Allison, H 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, New Haven: Yale University Press. Revised and Enlarged Edition and agree with Allison.
My mentioned of Henry Allision H 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, has no relevance to you?
This is a significant point.

When I posted the SEP article, my only intention was to show that transcendental idealism is still active and note, I highlighted Allison's book.
I have been following Henry Allison for a long time, so I know the SEP article referencing Allison and other authors I know, is definitely presenting TI as active not as a defunct theory.

In addition, the SEP article is a discussion of various views which according to the author had remained unsettled till today, thus you cannot assumed I agreed with Stang's view just because I referenced the article.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Apr 27, 2021 6:53 am I did not agree with Stang's view but merely implied the discussion on the topic of TI. If TI is defunct, there would be no such discussion and if mentioned would have qualified TI is defunct.
It's funny that you say that, because at one point I alerted that the article actually confirmed my views, and you replied confidently, as if knowing enough of the content of the article, that I was "likely mistaken", and in complete disbelief challenged me to show which points converged with mine. Was that also the result of another "quick and hasty" action of yours?
As I had stated, the SEP article is a discussion of various opposing points.
Requesting you to show me which point converged with yours does not imply that I agree with the article.
If you refer your points to the article, then I would read it in detail whence I would discover the full materials [which I later and now is aware of].

Btw, the points you had referred to the article are too loose and you did not take into account the whole article. I still wonder you have read the whole article yet, if so, should be at least more than 3 times fully.

After reading the Stang's article in detail, I am of the conclusion that Stang do not fully understand Kant's position in the CPR.
Besides Stang is reading Kant shortsighted as a philosophical realist. You need to understand the history how the philosophical realists were sympathetic to Kant [who was a staunch anti-philosophical-realist].
I had opened a thread to discuss Transcendental Idealism [TI] specifically with reference to Stang's short-sighted view of TI.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 3:42 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Apr 28, 2021 6:41 am I would like to establish the truth as posted in this article,
viewtopic.php?p=508929#p508929
before I proceed to answer your other points [otherwise wasting effort].

I have also open a thread re;
Kant's Transcendental Idealism: SEP: By Stang
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32940
so we can zoom into the specifics with reference to the contents,
As I already said, being so obvious, you are clashing with a scholar that has written mostly about Kant. So, you either acknowledge that there's no academic consensus on the interpretation of Kant's CPR (a point you contended earlier), or that you were simply wrong about Kant. Your choice. In any case, you will have to recant once again. BTW, there are plenty of other references that coincide with Stang's account, so you better choose well.

As for the rest of my other points, plenty of them, you can still reply without wasting effort. They have little to do with Stang's article.
Stang may be a scholar but as far as on the subject of Transcendental Idealism [Kantian], his views are of low class [quality].

I suggest you read Henry Allison's book and you will know where Stang stands.

Here is where Allison [as with Kant] critiques realists of Stang genre;
Allison wrote:Although Kant only infrequently makes use of the expression, he repeatedly accuses philosophers of a variety of stripes of treating appearances as if they were things-in-themselves or, equivalently, of granting “absolute” or “transcendental” reality to appearances.[3]
Indeed, at one place in the Critique he terms this confusion the “common prejudice” (A740 / B768), while at another he refers to the “common but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances” (A536 / B564).
Moreover, this claim is found in even stronger form in other texts.
In fact, he goes so far as to assert that prior to the Critique the confusion was unavoidable (Fort 20: 287; 377) and even that “until the critical philosophy all philosophies are not distinguished in their essentials” (Fort 20: 335; 413).
Allison Chapter 3.1.
In reality, the likes of Stang, you and other philosophical realists are entrapped in an illusion as Kant had warned, i.e.
Kant in CPR wrote:Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them [the illusions].
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.
B397
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Tue Apr 27, 2021 2:32 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Apr 24, 2021 7:02 am Yes, Kant accepted the universe exists a mind-independent reality, but that is within his empirical realism perspective which is subsumed within his transcendental realism, thus ultimately whatever is external cannot be independent of the human conditions.
What you are saying here is that Kant denied the existence of things in themselves, which is completely false. Conditioning existence of things to minds is just the same as saying they don't exist as mind-independent things.
That is the problem when you do not read Kant's CPR thus ignorant of what Kant actual views are.

If you are familiar with the CPR, you will not Kant presented 'things' and things-in-themselves in many perspectives and contexts.

In the above I presented two perspectives;
1. Kant accepted the universe exists a mind-independent reality [externality], but that is within his empirical realism perspective,
2. the above perspective is subsumed within his transcendental realism,

because of 2, thus ultimately whatever-is-external cannot be independent of the human conditions.

Whatever-is-external are not things-in-themselves in the ultimate sense.
Things-in-themselves do not exist as real in the ultimate sense and cannot be known in the real sense.
However Kant stated things-in-themselves can only be thought of thus only in mind

Note according to Kant's main approach i.e. Copernican Revolution, the things-in-themselves are only epistemological things not ontological things.
The mistake with realists like you is they ASSUMED things-in-themselves are ontological things that has objective reality.

It is this wrong assumption of the ontological things-in-themselves that lead realists to their idea of 'affection', there must be things-in-themselves to affect representations. Thus leading the 'problem of affection' below.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Apr 24, 2021 7:02 am Note the point from the above,
(Affection) Things-in-themselves causally affect us

Kant would never agree with the above literally.
Actually, he would, depending on which edition of the CPR one is looking at, and which section. If one is looking to the Aesthetics, or the Prolegomena, or the Refutation of Idealism, different interpretations might emerge. It is well known that this tension inside Kant's own system was the basis of Jacobi's criticism of Transcendental Idealism, which accurately describes the major problem of this philosophy: either accept things in themselves or solipsism. Most philosophers try to deny solipsism, but in order to remain faithful to idealism, assume positions such as yours, where things do exist (to keep realism), but they also don't (to keep idealism). An absurd, incoherent philosophy.
Stang wrote of Jacobi and the Problem of Affection,

  • In the context of Kant’s theory of experience, it means that appearances cannot “reach back” and cause the very experiences in virtue of which they exist.
    From the 1780s until today, many have taken this problem to be fatal to Kant’s theory of experience.
    3.4.3
That is only his and realists of the likes' opinion which is based on a short-sighted view of Kant's CPR.

Allison's allocated a chapter to the Jacobi dilemma issue and explained how Jacobi and Vaihinger's posers were based on a short-sighted view of the CPR.
see Allison, Chapter 3 The Thing-in-itself and the Problem of Affection, pg 50

Allison's view on Jacobi Dilemma is summed up as;

  • In fact, Jacobi's denial is based on a twofold confusion:
    1. it conflates Kantian Appearances with Berkeleian Ideas, and
    2. it construes Affection simply as a species of causation.
    [...]
    Consequently, we can reject the second horn of Jacobi's dilemma,
    ... namely, that with the concept of the Thing-in-Itself (or Transcendental object) we cannot remain in the Kantian philosophy.
    Indeed, we can remain in it quite comfortably, so long as we keep in mind that the concept has a legitimate meta-level function within the framework of Transcendental Reflection and, as such, does not bring with it any claim to cognize a super-Sensible reality.
Allision detailed exposition is in the book.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 5:14 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Apr 28, 2021 10:22 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Apr 28, 2021 3:15 am
Btw, I am the one who is making the claims and you are one who is misunderstanding my claims.

I don't get how you arrive at "me claiming two different definitions of 'mind-independent' "

This is what I have been claiming;
  • 1. There is an external independent world from my self, i.e. empirical realism. In this case, I see tables, chairs, trees, etc. as independent from my mind, i.e. empirical realism.

    2. But at the same time, the above external_ness in 1 is NOT ultimately independent when it is viewed as subsumed within the human conditions.
    In this case, the reality is the human person cannot never extricate himself from the reality he is part and parcel of - thus cannot be fully independent.
There is only one perspective of independence i.e. 1.

Perhaps you stick to the above 1 and 2 then show me where are there 2 different definition of 'mind independent'?
When I said that "x is mind-independent" and "x cannot be 'human condition' independent" are contradictory,and you responded that they're not contradictory because they're employing two different senses of a term, what term were you referring to? Mind-independent? Independent? External? What?

Tell me what term you were referring to, and then give the two different definitions.
1. When I refer to "x is mind-independent" is saying "the tree" out there is mind-independent, i.e. the existence of the tree is independent of my and all human minds.
This is in one perspective, i.e. empirical realism.

2. But the whole sense/perspective of 1 [independent externality] is not independent of my mind and all human minds, i.e. human conditions.

In terms of Venn Diagrams,
Circle-1 is totally inside the circle-2. i.e. circle-1 is totally subsumed within circle-2.
Below [ignore labels] is an example of total subsumption;

Image
First, what was the answer to the term you were referring to that you're saying has two senses? Don't type a long response. Just tell me the term you're saying has two senses.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 10:02 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 5:14 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Apr 28, 2021 10:22 am

When I said that "x is mind-independent" and "x cannot be 'human condition' independent" are contradictory,and you responded that they're not contradictory because they're employing two different senses of a term, what term were you referring to? Mind-independent? Independent? External? What?

Tell me what term you were referring to, and then give the two different definitions.
1. When I refer to "x is mind-independent" is saying "the tree" out there is mind-independent, i.e. the existence of the tree is independent of my and all human minds.
This is in one perspective, i.e. empirical realism.

2. But the whole sense/perspective of 1 [independent externality] is not independent of my mind and all human minds, i.e. human conditions.

In terms of Venn Diagrams,
Circle-1 is totally inside the circle-2. i.e. circle-1 is totally subsumed within circle-2.
Below [ignore labels] is an example of total subsumption;

Image
First, what was the answer to the term you were referring to that you're saying has two senses? Don't type a long response. Just tell me the term you're saying has two senses.
Note sure what you want with 'term'?

'Sense' in this case is equivalent to perspective.

In the above case, the smaller circle [oval] represent the common and conventional perspectives of reality while the larger oval is that of the collective human conditions and the whole of reality.
To add: the outer area is bounded for convenience but actually it is open ended.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:34 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 10:02 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 5:14 am
1. When I refer to "x is mind-independent" is saying "the tree" out there is mind-independent, i.e. the existence of the tree is independent of my and all human minds.
This is in one perspective, i.e. empirical realism.

2. But the whole sense/perspective of 1 [independent externality] is not independent of my mind and all human minds, i.e. human conditions.

In terms of Venn Diagrams,
Circle-1 is totally inside the circle-2. i.e. circle-1 is totally subsumed within circle-2.
Below [ignore labels] is an example of total subsumption;

Image
First, what was the answer to the term you were referring to that you're saying has two senses? Don't type a long response. Just tell me the term you're saying has two senses.
Note sure what you want with 'term'?

'Sense' in this case is equivalent to perspective.

In the above case, the smaller circle [oval] represent the common and conventional perspectives of reality while the larger oval is that of the collective human conditions and the whole of reality.
To add: the outer area is bounded for convenience but actually it is open ended.
Seriously? Your next avoidance move is to pretend you don't know what "term" refers to? lol
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

Sorry for the late reply. I had written a response some days ago but the reply window timed out when I was writing on a phone at the beach and everything was lost.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I presumed you are familiar with the Principle of Charity??
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity

You don't seem to appreciate the above principle but seem to be very obstinate and refuse to accept the truth.

In addition you ignore the sequence of how the point originated and the various relevant points I posted e.g.
All I have done is to state the facts and derive the logical consequences from them. You have not provided a proper argument in response to each of my arguments above, and simply avoided the main issue. The fact is that you brought up Stang's SEP article on Transcendental Idealism as an example of neo-Kantians adopting TI and agreeing with it. You didn't say "discussing TI", but adopting and agreeing with it, which implied your assumption that TI is a monolithic, unique doctrine, which accepts no other interpretation. You obviously did not read the article (even though at one moment you had made the pretension that you had), except part of its bibliography (which included Allison's work) based on that assumption. But Stang's article proved that this is not the case, as it provided an interpretation that matches more closely the one I had offered, forcing you to recant. And even though you say you don't agree with the article, you cannot escape the fact that it was brought up by you as a proof of the validity of TI as a current, relevant doctrine, in which neo-Kantians agreed. Turns out they cannot agree, since there are still plenty of interpretations (as all scholars acknowledge while advancing their own). There's not even an orthodox view opposed to a non-orthodox view, there's simply no academic consensus about what Kant's TI actually entails. Another reason to confirm that it is a defunct doctrine. It provides no insights that can be incorporated today into our practical views of the world, being only useful to idealists for promoting their nonsensical phenomenalist doctrines.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: My mentioned of Henry Allision H 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, has no relevance to you?
This is a significant point.

When I posted the SEP article, my only intention was to show that transcendental idealism is still active and note, I highlighted Allison's book.
I have been following Henry Allison for a long time, so I know the SEP article referencing Allison and other authors I know, is definitely presenting TI as active not as a defunct theory.
We'll get to Allison, but you have not yet answered my contention that referencing an article about a subject is by no means an indication of the current validity of the doctrine it deals with. There are plenty of articles of multiple doctrines proposed since the dawn of civilization, but that doesn't make all of them relevant to contemporary philosophical problems. BTW, while you claim now that you didn't know, neither endorse the article, you still point at its bibliography as an indicator of philosophers embracing Transcendental Idealism, but the bibliography references, among others, the works of Strawson and Jacobi, to which Allison opposes.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Requesting you to show me which point converged with yours does not imply that I agree with the article.
If you refer your points to the article, then I would read it in detail whence I would discover the full materials [which I later and now is aware of].
You forget again that your request implied that you knew the content of the article. You were so sure that you even said I was likely mistaken. The key point is that you never thought there could be contentious issues about TI among Kant's scholars, but you always said that it was just me not understanding it. That is not an argument you can advance any more. Not only that, but I have shown that your understanding of Kant's work and its scholarship is fundamentally wrong.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Besides Stang is reading Kant shortsighted as a philosophical realist. You need to understand the history how the philosophical realists were sympathetic to Kant [who was a staunch anti-philosophical-realist].
This is one of the key misunderstandings in your views about Kant's work. Actually, all evidence points at Kant trying to position himself as a realist against the "problematic idealists" like Berkeley and Descartes, even though his realism was not the traditional Lockean realism.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Here is where Allison [as with Kant] critiques realists of Stang genre;
Allison wrote: Although Kant only infrequently makes use of the expression, he repeatedly accuses philosophers of a variety of stripes of treating appearances as if they were things-in-themselves or, equivalently, of granting “absolute” or “transcendental” reality to appearances.[3]
Indeed, at one place in the Critique he terms this confusion the “common prejudice” (A740 / B768), while at another he refers to the “common but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances” (A536 / B564).
Moreover, this claim is found in even stronger form in other texts.
In fact, he goes so far as to assert that prior to the Critique the confusion was unavoidable (Fort 20: 287; 377) and even that “until the critical philosophy all philosophies are not distinguished in their essentials” (Fort 20: 335; 413).
Allison Chapter 3.1.
In reality, the likes of Stang, you and other philosophical realists are entrapped in an illusion as Kant had warned, i.e.
The argument that those who find contentious issues in Kant's work are just being "realists" in the sense Kant declared Lockean empiricists to be, is a poor one, very simplistic. Even Allison and other scholars that appreciate Kant agree that his work contains doctrines that are confusing and problematic, and the cause of much controversy. That since the very first edition of the CPR and why motivated him to write to his critics and make changes in the second edition. And it is very clear that what Kant wanted to do there is to distance himself from the Berkeleyan, subjective idealists, and get closer to a form of realism. But you keep conflating Kant's doctrine to Berkeley's subjective idealism. This only shows the same confusion you had and that I dealt with since the beginning of this thread, about what exactly Kant refers to as illusions. He just claims that identifying the appearances (the mind-dependent things), with the things in themselves (the mind-independent things) is a mistake, but he does not claim that the things in themselves do not exist. From the epistemic point of view he adopts, he clearly admits the necessity of the transcendental object for there to be a cause of affection (the base of Jacobi's criticism), but from the ontological point of view he adopts what is known as "agnostic criticism", which means we simply cannot know whether things in themselves exist or not and how they are. As Allison himself acknowledges, we can consider the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves (which would imply an ontology of the things in themselves) only because it is a purely epistemological stance of how they should be conceived. No implication on the actual existence of things. There's dispute over the non-ontological and ontological interpretations of Kant, but nevertheless it is not in dispute that Kant did not embrace subjective idealism, that is, the denial of things in themselves, although many scholars agree that his intentions to distance from Berkeley ultimately are not too effective.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: That is the problem when you do not read Kant's CPR thus ignorant of what Kant actual views are.

If you are familiar with the CPR, you will not Kant presented 'things' and things-in-themselves in many perspectives and contexts.

In the above I presented two perspectives;
1. Kant accepted the universe exists a mind-independent reality [externality], but that is within his empirical realism perspective,
2. the above perspective is subsumed within his transcendental realism,
You are fundamentally wrong on this. It's baffling that after bragging about supposedly having a profound and extensive knowledge of Kant's work, you would advance such an interpretation. What you're saying is completely contradictory: if a mind-independent reality exists only as a mind-dependent reality, then you're actually saying a mind-independent reality does not exist. And that's evidently a statement of an ontological nature. But Kant clearly did not take that position, he actually denied ontology and embraced "agnostic criticism" about mind-independent entities. His position is purely epistemological and all ontological interpretations are contentious.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 7:18 am However Kant stated things-in-themselves can only be thought of thus only in mind

Note according to Kant's main approach i.e. Copernican Revolution, the things-in-themselves are only epistemological things not ontological things.
The mistake with realists like you is they ASSUMED things-in-themselves are ontological things that has objective reality.

It is this wrong assumption of the ontological things-in-themselves that lead realists to their idea of 'affection', there must be things-in-themselves to affect representations. Thus leading the 'problem of affection' below.
This is what you get wrong, assuming that the denial of knowing the things in themselves immediately implies the denial of the actual existence of things in themselves. This is not Kant's agnostic criticism, which simply states that the assertion of knowledge of the actual existence of things in themselves has no foundation. Realists will disagree, but that's not the point, since Kant's criticism is about the epistemological certainties that imply ontological commitments, while he disregards (at least in the epistemological interpretation of Kant) any ontological commitments at all. The other interpretation, the ontological one, leads to Berkeleyan subjectivism. And Berkeleyan subjectivism leads inevitably to solipsism.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

I thought you have ran off.
Anyway a forum is like an intellectual-market, where if both have something of interest, then they can trade.
Conde Lucanor wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 2:14 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I presumed you are familiar with the Principle of Charity??
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity
You don't seem to appreciate the above principle but seem to be very obstinate and refuse to accept the truth.
In addition you ignore the sequence of how the point originated and the various relevant points I posted e.g.
All I have done is to state the facts and derive the logical consequences from them. You have not provided a proper argument in response to each of my arguments above, and simply avoided the main issue.
I don't intent to avoid any main issue and I don't believe I have missed any. If you think I have missed any of your main points you can remind me of it.
The fact is that you brought up Stang's SEP article on Transcendental Idealism as an example of neo-Kantians adopting TI and agreeing with it. You didn't say "discussing TI", but adopting and agreeing with it, which implied your assumption that TI is a monolithic, unique doctrine, which accepts no other interpretation.
You obviously did not read the article (even though at one moment you had made the pretension that you had), except part of its bibliography (which included Allison's work) based on that assumption.
But Stang's article proved that this is not the case, as it provided an interpretation that matches more closely the one I had offered, forcing you to recant.
And even though you say you don't agree with the article, you cannot escape the fact that it was brought up by you as a proof of the validity of TI as a current, relevant doctrine, in which neo-Kantians agreed. Turns out they cannot agree, since there are still plenty of interpretations (as all scholars acknowledge while advancing their own).
There's not even an orthodox view opposed to a non-orthodox view, there's simply no academic consensus about what Kant's TI actually entails.

Another reason to confirm that it is a defunct doctrine. It provides no insights that can be incorporated today into our practical views of the world, being only useful to idealists for promoting their nonsensical phenomenalist doctrines.
Note again I never agreed with the TI article of Stang at all.
It was merely to respond to the point you insisted TI is defunct.
As such I did not read the article but just to point out TI is still actively engaged.
The point is I am very well aware Transcendental Idealism I is CENTRAL and critical as a backbone to the whole theme of Kant's CPR. SO if TI is defunct so is Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. There is no way I would have accepted that!

In contrast the analytic philosophers treat Kant's TI as a separate part of Kant's main philosophy. That is why they claim TI is defunct because they faced their own invented controversies in Kant's TI.

Kant's TI has no practical values to humanity?
You are just ignorant on this.
Kant is touted as a godfather of Cognitive Science and respected in many other fields of Knowledge.
  • Through nineteenth-century intermediaries, the model of the mind developed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) has had an enormous influence on contemporary cognitive research. Indeed, Kant could be viewed as the intellectual godfather of cognitive science.
    https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... Kantianism#:
Veritas Aequitas wrote: My mentioned of Henry Allision H 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, has no relevance to you?
This is a significant point.

When I posted the SEP article, my only intention was to show that transcendental idealism is still active and note, I highlighted Allison's book.
I have been following Henry Allison for a long time, so I know the SEP article referencing Allison and other authors I know, is definitely presenting TI as active not as a defunct theory.
We'll get to Allison, but you have not yet answered my contention that referencing an article about a subject is by no means an indication of the current validity of the doctrine it deals with. There are plenty of articles of multiple doctrines proposed since the dawn of civilization, but that doesn't make all of them relevant to contemporary philosophical problems.
BTW, while you claim now that you didn't know, neither endorse the article, you still point at its bibliography as an indicator of philosophers embracing Transcendental Idealism, but the bibliography references, among others, the works of Strawson and Jacobi, to which Allison opposes.
As stated above,
The point is I am very well aware Transcendental Idealism I is CENTRAL and critical as a backbone to the whole theme of Kant's CPR.
SO if TI is defunct so is Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
I am very aware of Allision is a strong proponent of TI that I why I mentioned Allison in that article.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Requesting you to show me which point converged with yours does not imply that I agree with the article.
If you refer your points to the article, then I would read it in detail whence I would discover the full materials [which I later and now is aware of].
You forget again that your request implied that you knew the content of the article. You were so sure that you even said I was likely mistaken. The key point is that you never thought there could be contentious issues about TI among Kant's scholars, but you always said that it was just me not understanding it. That is not an argument you can advance any more. Not only that, but I have shown that your understanding of Kant's work and its scholarship is fundamentally wrong.
This is pointless speculation on your part.
Having done such extensive coverage of Kant's CPR I am well aware of the contentious issues re TI among Kant's scholars.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Besides Stang is reading Kant shortsighted as a philosophical realist. You need to understand the history how the philosophical realists were sympathetic to Kant [who was a staunch anti-philosophical-realist].
This is one of the key misunderstandings in your views about Kant's work. Actually, all evidence points at Kant trying to position himself as a realist against the "problematic idealists" like Berkeley and Descartes, even though his realism was not the traditional Lockean realism.
This is where I think you are wrong in understanding the article.

Kant never positioned himself as a 'realist' [philosophical realism] against the idealism of Berkeley. Rather he differentiated his Transcendental Idealism from Berkeley's problematic or subjective idealism.

As for Descartes, Kant differentiated his Transcendental Idealism against Descartes' philosophical realism. In fact your sort of realism is the same as Descartes' realism.

Kant's realism is that of empirical realism which is his Transcendental Idealism in another perspective.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Here is where Allison [as with Kant] critiques realists of Stang genre;
Allison wrote: Although Kant only infrequently makes use of the expression, he repeatedly accuses philosophers of a variety of stripes of treating appearances as if they were things-in-themselves or, equivalently, of granting “absolute” or “transcendental” reality to appearances.[3]
Indeed, at one place in the Critique he terms this confusion the “common prejudice” (A740 / B768), while at another he refers to the “common but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances” (A536 / B564).
Moreover, this claim is found in even stronger form in other texts.
In fact, he goes so far as to assert that prior to the Critique the confusion was unavoidable (Fort 20: 287; 377) and even that “until the critical philosophy all philosophies are not distinguished in their essentials” (Fort 20: 335; 413).
Allison Chapter 3.1.
In reality, the likes of Stang, you and other philosophical realists are entrapped in an illusion as Kant had warned, i.e.
The argument that those who find contentious issues in Kant's work are just being "realists" in the sense Kant declared Lockean empiricists to be, is a poor one, very simplistic.
Even Allison and other scholars that appreciate Kant agree that his work contains doctrines that are confusing and problematic, and the cause of much controversy.
That since the very first edition of the CPR and why motivated him to write to his critics and make changes in the second edition.

And it is very clear that what Kant wanted to do there is to distance himself from the Berkeleyan, subjective idealists, and get closer to a form of realism.
But you keep conflating Kant's doctrine to Berkeley's subjective idealism.
This only shows the same confusion you had and that I dealt with since the beginning of this thread, about what exactly Kant refers to as illusions.
Show me where did I conflate Kant's doctrine to Berkeley's subjective idealism.
It is so obvious Kant wrote the Refutation of Idealism [which I am very familiar with] to differentiate and distance his 'idealism' from Berkeley's idealism.
He just claims that identifying the appearances (the mind-dependent things), with the things in themselves (the mind-independent things) is a mistake, but he does not claim that the things in themselves do not exist.
From the epistemic point of view he adopts, he clearly admits the necessity of the transcendental object for there to be a cause of affection (the base of Jacobi's criticism), but from the ontological point of view he adopts what is known as "agnostic criticism", which means we simply cannot know whether things in themselves exist or not and how they are.
As Allison himself acknowledges, we can consider the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves (which would imply an ontology of the things in themselves) only because it is a purely epistemological stance of how they should be conceived.
No implication on the actual existence of things.
There's dispute over the non-ontological and ontological interpretations of Kant, but nevertheless it is not in dispute that Kant did not embrace subjective idealism, that is, the denial of things in themselves, although many scholars agree that his intentions to distance from Berkeley ultimately are not too effective.
Kant did claim that things-in-themselves do not exist as real in the spatio-temporal sense within human conditions.

However things-in-themselves can ONLY exist as transcendental objects which are merely intelligible entities. These are something like Plato's universals and forms which cannot exists as real at all albeit has some uses.

As far as ontology in the realists [yours et al] sense, Kant condemned ontology, i.e. things existing as real objectively in the independent external world.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: That is the problem when you do not read Kant's CPR thus ignorant of what Kant actual views are.

If you are familiar with the CPR, you will not Kant presented 'things' and things-in-themselves in many perspectives and contexts.

In the above I presented two perspectives;
1. Kant accepted the universe exists a mind-independent reality [externality], but that is within his empirical realism perspective,
2. the above perspective is subsumed within his transcendental realism,
You are fundamentally wrong on this. It's baffling that after bragging about supposedly having a profound and extensive knowledge of Kant's work, you would advance such an interpretation.

What you're saying is completely contradictory:
if a mind-independent reality exists only as a mind-dependent reality, then you're actually saying a mind-independent reality does not exist.
And that's evidently a statement of an ontological nature.

But Kant clearly did not take that position, he actually denied ontology and embraced "agnostic criticism" about mind-independent entities.
His position is purely epistemological and all ontological interpretations are contentious.
You are conflating the perspectives I proposed.

I am claiming as with Kant,
  • 1. A mind-independent reality exists - as evident.
    2. BUT ultimately this "mind-independent reality" cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions. [Kant Copernican Revolution].
Note the point is humans [observers] are NEVER acquainted with objective reality [things-in-themselves].
What humans are acquainted are only the sense-data of a supposed-thing-in-itself[Russell].
As such, ultimately, whatever is supposedly mind-independent, is always in entanglement with the human conditions.

As Russell doubted, perhaps there is no real table out there at all.
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32814

"agnostic criticism" about mind-independent entities. ???
Kant was never agnostic in relation to things-in-themselves, but rather view things-in-themselves in two senses, i.e. in the positive and negative sense;

1. In the negative sense, things-in-themselves [noumena] act merely as limiting concepts.
2. In the positive sense, they cannot be real at all but merely as transcendental objects or intelligible entities for speculative purposes only.
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Fri May 07, 2021 6:55 am, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 2:27 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 7:18 am However Kant stated things-in-themselves can only be thought of thus only in mind

Note according to Kant's main approach i.e. Copernican Revolution, the things-in-themselves are only epistemological things not ontological things.
The mistake with realists like you is they ASSUMED things-in-themselves are ontological things that has objective reality.

It is this wrong assumption of the ontological things-in-themselves that lead realists to their idea of 'affection', there must be things-in-themselves to affect representations. Thus leading the 'problem of affection' below.
This is what you get wrong, assuming that the denial of knowing the things in themselves immediately implies the denial of the actual existence of things in themselves.
This is not Kant's agnostic criticism, which simply states that the assertion of knowledge of the actual existence of things in themselves has no foundation.
Realists will disagree, but that's not the point, since Kant's criticism is about the epistemological certainties that imply ontological commitments, while he disregards (at least in the epistemological interpretation of Kant) any ontological commitments at all.

The other interpretation, the ontological one, leads to Berkeleyan subjectivism. And Berkeleyan subjectivism leads inevitably to solipsism.
I don't agree with your term 'agnostic criticism' with reference to Kant.

But I do agree with your
"the assertion of knowledge of the actual existence of things in themselves has no foundation" i.e. presumably ontological foundation.

Realists will disagree with the above and that is the whole point of what the OP is about.

Realists claim the knowledge of things imply the actual and ontological existence of independent things-in-themselves in the external world.
Note: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
But realists are unable to prove such supposedly ontological things-in-themselves exist as real.

If you think otherwise then address the OP,
Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Realists will never be able to prove their claims re philosophical realism.
The reason is they are unable to realize they are caught in a psychological entrapment [which Kant implied] that led them to speculate there are supposedly real independent things-in-themselves out there.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am I don't intent to avoid any main issue and I don't believe I have missed any. If you think I have missed any of your main points you can remind me of it.
Here is a reminder then: you have not responded to any of these arguments:
Conde Lucanor wrote:So, you either acknowledge that there's no academic consensus on the interpretation of Kant's CPR, or that you were simply wrong about Kant.
Conde Lucanor wrote:Let's put it this way: you used to agree that the 'universe does not exist if there are no humans' Then I argued against it and now you don't agree with it anymore.
Conde Lucanor wrote:So in the end you're actually saying humans don't exist as mind-independent things, as things in themselves. Not only I would be an illusion for you, you would be an illusion for yourself. Then, how do you know anything? Who or what is having the illusion of you?
Conde Lucanor wrote:There are plenty of subjects in SEP, for example, ancient atomism. Does that mean that ancient atomism is not a defunct doctrine? How about the entries on physicalism, dualism or eliminative materialism? Does that mean that they are for you doctrines still doing just fine?
Conde Lucanor wrote:at one point I alerted that the article actually confirmed my views, and you replied confidently, as if knowing enough of the content of the article, that I was "likely mistaken", and in complete disbelief challenged me to show which points converged with mine. Was that also the result of another "quick and hasty" action of yours?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am The point is I am very well aware Transcendental Idealism I is CENTRAL and critical as a backbone to the whole theme of Kant's CPR. SO if TI is defunct so is Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. There is no way I would have accepted that!

In contrast the analytic philosophers treat Kant's TI as a separate part of Kant's main philosophy. That is why they claim TI is defunct because they faced their own invented controversies in Kant's TI.
Actually, analytic philosophy has ignored Kant's overall program as it has ignored idealism in general, because idealism has nothing to offer there. Besides, ever since the first edition of CPR came out, there's simply no consensus about what Kant's TI actually entails.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am Kant's TI has no practical values to humanity?
You are just ignorant on this.
Kant is touted as a godfather of Cognitive Science and respected in many other fields of Knowledge.
Kant would be as much of a godfather of cognitive sciences as Aristotle would be a godfather of biology. Just because they contributed with early speculations on the subject, does not mean those ideas made it into contemporary sciences.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am
  • Through nineteenth-century intermediaries, the model of the mind developed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) has had an enormous influence on contemporary cognitive research. Indeed, Kant could be viewed as the intellectual godfather of cognitive science.
    https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... Kantianism#:
An important distinction is necessary: we should be talking about modern cognitive sciences, not just any theoretical pre-scientific approaches to the subject. Kant's ideas of cognition were interesting and actually were reasonably fine at the basic level one can expect from pure speculation, but the most ambitious concepts that form the core of his speculations are at worst confusing and not useful, and at best completely distanced from scientific realism. Science without an ontological commitment to a mind-independent reality is simply not science, and the very first problem that anti-realists encounter in order to advance a systematic, coherent approach within their doctrines, is to solve the puzzle of other minds. They can't.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am
Conde Lucanor wrote: You forget again that your request implied that you knew the content of the article. You were so sure that you even said I was likely mistaken. The key point is that you never thought there could be contentious issues about TI among Kant's scholars, but you always said that it was just me not understanding it. That is not an argument you can advance any more. Not only that, but I have shown that your understanding of Kant's work and its scholarship is fundamentally wrong.
This is pointless speculation on your part.
Having done such extensive coverage of Kant's CPR I am well aware of the contentious issues re TI among Kant's scholars.
No, I'm not speculating anything. It is a pretty straightforward logical argument derived from actual statements of yours in this thread, and you are (again) not responding to it.

BTW, that you may have "done extensive coverage of Kant's CPR" is by no means an indication that you have secured a proper understanding of what CPR entails.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am This is where I think you are wrong in understanding the article.

Kant never positioned himself as a 'realist' [philosophical realism] against the idealism of Berkeley. Rather he differentiated his Transcendental Idealism from Berkeley's problematic or subjective idealism.
First of all, what I said was not my take on Stang's article, it is my understanding of Kant's positions as almost universally agreed, which is therefore also supported by Stang's article. Stang did not make it up as an interpretation of his own.

You seem to be too much dogmatically entangled with labels and philosophical schools, instead of trying to understand and deal with what is entailed in them. So I said realism and you immediately associated it with what you understand as philosophical realism, but realism in general simply expresses a commitment with the actual existence of some things that have objective properties, even if they are Platonic entities. So this notion of realism shows two aspects: one about existence of things, and another one about the objectivity (mind-independence) of those things. Philosophical realism is simply a commitment about those things being mind-independent entities. The opposite stance, represented by subjective idealism, advances the notion that all there is are only mind-dependent entities. Whoever expresses the view that there are only mind-dependent entities is then associated with the philosophical anti-realism of subjective idealism, represented (although there's controversy on that) by Berkeley. So, by Kant distancing himself from Berkeley and his stance against mind-independent things, he was rejecting his philosophical anti-realism and therefore positioning himself as a realist of mind-independent things, aka an empirical realist:
Britannica wrote: Britannica: Realism-philosophy
The 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant recognized that Berkeley’s “dogmatic idealism” involved denying the independent reality of space. Berkeley’s arguments, he thought, were effective against metaphysical positions which assumed that space is a property of “things in themselves,” as opposed to their representations, or “appearances,” in the mind. Kant argued to the contrary that space as well as time are forms of “sensible intuition,” or the mode in which the mind is affected by sensible objects. Thus, the reality of objects external to the mind (objects in space) is guaranteed, because being in space and time is a condition of being an object of sensible experience at all. Kant’s combination of transcendental idealism—the doctrine that what is given in experience are only appearances—with empirical realism—the view that there are objects external to the mind—allowed him to reject the conception of external objects as “lying behind” appearances and as knowable only (if at all) by a problematic and ultimately indefensible inference from what is given in experience to its hidden causes.


It's a fact that Kant denied the objective existence of space and time, and that is the core of Transcendental Idealism. Those things, according to him, could never be things in themselves, mind-independent realities. However, whether Kant rejected the possibility of existence (ontology) of the objects “lying behind” appearances or not, is somehow disputable, depending on whether one advocates the epistemological, non-ontological interpretation, or the ontological one. The epistemological one, advocated by the likes of Allison, entails no assertion or denial of the objects “lying behind” appearances, the things in themselves, but an ontological agnosticism. Kant's assertions are merely about our claims of knowledge of the reality of things, which he thinks is indefensible (the claim of knowledge, not the reality of things). The ontological one entails the assertion of actual existence of the objects “lying behind” appearances, the non-spatiotemporal things in themselves, of which we would know nothing else. His agnosticism remains as to how these things actually are. The position that you're defending in this forum, however, is that Kant advanced the ontological statement that things in themselves do not, and cannot, exist independent of minds (the two aspects of realism mentioned above), which is actually Berkeley's view, from which Kant moved away.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am Kant did claim that things-in-themselves do not exist as real in the spatio-temporal sense within human conditions.

However things-in-themselves can ONLY exist as transcendental objects which are merely intelligible entities. These are something like Plato's universals and forms which cannot exists as real at all albeit has some uses.
One thing is to claim that time and space only exist in minds and that therefore objects appearing in time and space do not exist, and another thing is to claim that objects as independent realities of minds do not exist at all. Kant evidently argued for the first, but he did not argue for the second, which would imply that he had obtained the intellectual intuition that he denied humans had.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am As far as ontology in the realists [yours et al] sense, Kant condemned ontology, i.e. things existing as real objectively in the independent external world.
Not really, he condemned those who claimed to have knowledge of how things in themselves actually are by virtue of how they appear to our cognition, as spatiotemporal objects. So he condemned a spatiotemporal ontology, while remained agnostic or skeptic about what the actual ontology is.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am You are conflating the perspectives I proposed.

I am claiming as with Kant,
  • 1. A mind-independent reality exists - as evident.
    2. BUT ultimately this "mind-independent reality" cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions. [Kant Copernican Revolution].
Note what each statement entails:
"1. A mind-independent reality exists" ==> A reality independent of humans exists.
"2. A [...] "mind-independent reality" cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions" ==> A reality independent of humans does not exist.
One sentence contradicts the other. It's an absurd construction, and notwithstanding all the problems with Kantian doctrines, that is not what Kant argued.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am Note the point is humans [observers] are NEVER acquainted with objective reality [things-in-themselves].
What humans are acquainted are only the sense-data of a supposed-thing-in-itself[Russell].
As such, ultimately, whatever is supposedly mind-independent, is always in entanglement with the human conditions.
The third statement does not follow from the first two. If there are mind-independent things that cannot be cognized as they actually are, all that could be derived from this is that humans are always entangled with things as they appear in cognition. It doesn't mean that mind-independent things, things in themselves, are always necessarily entangled to cognition. I see the Moon as a spatiotemporal object and perhaps it is not quite like that, it is just the appearance of the Moon to my cognition, an illusion in Kantian terms, but even if I accepted those terms, one could not guarantee that there really isn't a Moon at all, and that it didn't exist before my experience or anyone's else experience of it. And I could also argue, against Kant, that the Moon I'm seeing can be indeed a spatiotemporal object actually existing independent of that experience, as this does not violate the dependency of knowledge from sense-data.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am As Russell doubted, perhaps there is no real table out there at all.
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
He could perhaps doubt it, but he could not make the assertion that there isn't.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 4:48 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri May 07, 2021 6:36 am I don't intent to avoid any main issue and I don't believe I have missed any. If you think I have missed any of your main points you can remind me of it.
Here is a reminder then: you have not responded to any of these arguments:
Conde Lucanor wrote:So, you either acknowledge that there's no academic consensus on the interpretation of Kant's CPR, or that you were simply wrong about Kant.
Since I have done extensive research on Kant's works, I am well aware there are loads of non-consensus on the interpretations of Kant's CPR.
There are two main camps, i.e. those I agree with and those I do not agree with.
Obviously I believe I have interpreted Kant's main theme in the CPR correctly.

I am also well aware those whom I do not agree with did not interpret Kant's work correctly. The reason is they are stuck in an old paradigm [Allison called this
transcendentalistic realism POV] and could not step into the shoes of Kant to grasp his points.

Realists as Animals Cannot Recognize Themselves in a Mirror
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32981

I had often quoted this from Kant;
Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them [the illusions].
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.
B397
Conde Lucanor wrote:Let's put it this way: you used to agree that the 'universe does not exist if there are no humans' Then I argued against it and now you don't agree with it anymore.
I believe the prior point was due to some misunderstanding.
You can just take whatever is my latest position.
Conde Lucanor wrote:So in the end you're actually saying humans don't exist as mind-independent things, as things in themselves. Not only I would be an illusion for you, you would be an illusion for yourself. Then, how do you know anything? Who or what is having the illusion of you?
I believe I have answered the above in detail.
Based on the empirical realism of Kant, humans and everything exist in the external world is real but this is ultimately subsumed within transcendental idealism.
Thus if there is an oncoming car I will step aside to avoid the real car crushing the real me.
Conde Lucanor wrote:There are plenty of subjects in SEP, for example, ancient atomism. Does that mean that ancient atomism is not a defunct doctrine? How about the entries on physicalism, dualism or eliminative materialism? Does that mean that they are for you doctrines still doing just fine?
If any subjects as discussed in SEP are defunct, the author will definitely mention it or implied by various qualifications therein.
I am well aware TI [i.e. a central point of the CPR] is not defunct, thus where TI it is mentioned in SEP is not supposed to be defunct.
Conde Lucanor wrote:at one point I alerted that the article actually confirmed my views, and you replied confidently, as if knowing enough of the content of the article, that I was "likely mistaken", and in complete disbelief challenged me to show which points converged with mine. Was that also the result of another "quick and hasty" action of yours?
Nope.
I believe your earliest point then was not in alignment with those who disagreed with TI nor agree with TI.
I asked you to refer to the specific points in the article so we can get into a serious discussion of the article.

I don't see the above 'arguments' as critical at all and I believe I had addressed them in some ways or in another.
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