Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Advocate »

The search for truth is meaningless if one doesn't have the tools to recognize it when they see it. Who cares wtf X said? That's philosophy as a hobby!
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Mon May 31, 2021 1:04 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon May 31, 2021 3:56 am This philosophical realists' view of an independent reality [looking for something X independent of the human conditions] has been questioned since >2500 years ago to Parmenides and way back to >5000 years within Eastern Philosophy.

In his poem, Parmenides prescribes two views of reality. In "the way of truth" (a part of the poem), he explains how all reality is one, change is impossible, and existence is timeless, uniform, and necessary. In "the way of opinion", Parmenides explains the world of appearances, in which one's sensory faculties lead to conceptions which are false and deceitful, yet he does offer a cosmology.
That the world had people like bahman 2500 years ago doesn't imply anything about those views being justifiable.
We have not got into the details but the point is those [my agreeable] views re > 2500 years ago can be justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK.

Re 'bahman' you mean 'Brahman'??
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahman
If so, this Brahman [Absolute like God] is a realists' view which cannot be justifiable to be real.

>2500 years ago there were already anti-realists' views [rare minority] which are against the idea of Brahman the Absolute thing-in-itself.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Jun 01, 2021 5:08 am
We have not got into the details but the point is those [my agreeable] views re > 2500 years ago can be justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK.
Oy vey.
Re 'bahman' you mean 'Brahman'??
bahman. He's a regular on this board. Another obsessive nutball like you.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Tue Jun 01, 2021 7:11 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Jun 01, 2021 5:08 am
We have not got into the details but the point is those [my agreeable] views re > 2500 years ago can be justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK.
Oy vey.
Re 'bahman' you mean 'Brahman'??
bahman. He's a regular on this board. Another obsessive nutball like you.
That is the problem with you, you cannot differentiate between apples and oranges, thus fallaciously conflating them all the time.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

Veritas Aequitas wrote:Realists take that there a really real something X beyond appearance, sensation and experience, i.e. something X that exists as real and independent of the human conditions.
Realists are well justified in taking that position. It is the more sensical view of the world. If we see the Moon out there, and we have plenty of ways of verifying that as an objective fact of the world, independent of an individual's subjective view, there's little reason to doubt that there's no real Moon out there. The key philosophical requirement, though, is the recognition of the mind-independent existence of other subjects (as things in themselves), something that anti-realists deny for their own view, and the cause of much trouble for their doctrines.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I as a non-realist [transcendental idealist] do not agree with the above view.
My approach is dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience and understanding what the whole process of cognition is about without a care/damn for any something X beyond appearances, sensation and experience.
Dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience, disregarding the possible cause of those experiences, what's the underlying order, assuming the subject as just another appearance, sensation and experience. Not only their structure remains a mystery, the whole foundation is missing, which only means "anything goes".
Veritas Aequitas wrote:Since Kant had presented the argument which I agree and support my views, I am thus relying on Kant as the authority and thus refer to his argument in the Critique of Pure Reason.

I don't see any problem with the above which is typical within the philosophical community.
The problem arises when the arguments themselves are challenged, and you're required to think of a response, but instead rely on saying that Kant did not hold that belief. If you're going to use Kant's argument, it should be exposed clearly as a demonstration, not just as the label of a doctrine attached to your own beliefs.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Your two alternatives are only applicable to a realist's view. You assumed there is the realist's something-X [stuff], if otherwise there is no X [non-stuff].
From the transcendental realist view, I don't accept your basis of the two alternatives as a premise for my argument. Rather I begin my premise with appearances, sensation and experienced without accepting there is a thing-in-itself that is given.
My point was that there are things and they have properties, regardless of what is the substantial or non-substantial nature of those properties one ascribes to them. You cannot get away from attaching properties to things, which is why you're always stuck with ontology. When you say things don't have substantial properties, but neither non-substantial properties, you're actually saying that no things exist at all, that there are no classes of beings, which is not possible. And that certainly doesn't seem to be compatible with Kant's statements.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I don't see anything wrong with the above.
Who is the philosophical community has ever declared Kant's CPR as some sort of sacred scripture?
It is very common for Kantian philosophers to quote Kant in supporting their argument.

If I ever to produce my view on such issues, it would exactly be the same as Kant's main theme. So why waste my time instead of referring to Kant's CPR.
But you're not providing the argument, you're just providing the description of the doctrines you endorse.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I stated it can be justified subject to producing the actual justification which we have to refer to Kant's CPR.
Since I am referring to justification from primary sources, where is the begging the question?
The point is that something that departs from an assumption and is only justified by that assumption, cannot produce new knowledge, just go in circles restating the initial assumption.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: When realists take it as a philosophical principle there is something X beyond "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" even before justifying and proving it, they are really begging the question.
The fact is realists are realists because they have gone beyond the pre-theoeretical, common sense view of the world, and found enough justification in their lived experience and the discoveries of science, that there is an underlying, substantial order, that justifies the "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" of things. Then they elevate that conviction to a philosophical principle.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: On the other hand, the non-realist [me] merely focus on what is "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" without consideration of something x and let the evidence points to the direction of what is justified.
Such justification is self-referential, so it actually does not justify anything. And by voluntarily ignoring the possible existence of X, it is not justified in claiming X cannot exist. It only means: "X does not exist (because it is not considered) in the perspective I chose".
Veritas Aequitas wrote: What is real is specific to Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK].
When a hallucination is subject to the scientific method, it is not real per se relative to the scientific FS
Placing the cognitive experience on one side (the hallucination in this case) and the perspective method on the other, while claiming that perspective and experience are the same thing, and account for what is real, dissolves any distinction between illusion and reality. The scientific method would prove to be useless in that case, since there's no objective criteria. Anti-realism and science are simply incompatible.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Note the scientific framework merely ASSUMED the ontology of materialism and NOT all scientific frameworks assume the ontology of materialism.
Once any scientific framework abandons materialism it ceases to be scientific.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: In any case, the assumption of ontology is science is not critical to science per se since science is science as per its FSK and science is not philosophy per se.
When scientists produced scientific knowledge the question is whether it is testable, repeatable and useful, has potential use, or merely for knowledge sake.
Scientists don't give a damn with any ontology of materialism. It is only some philosophers of Science who bring in the ontology of materialism in their Philosophy of Science and not all philosophers agree with that.
Maybe it's not relevant to the "hands-on" scientists who simply accepts as a given the materialistic principles of science, but it is relevant to philosophers of science and philosophers in general. A contemporary philosopher cannot put aside the key discoveries of science, they must be part of any philosophical program.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: As I had stated, I am the one who raised the OP and it significantly entailed the reference to Kant's thing-in-itself.

In any of your attempt to prove an independent reality-in-itself exists as real, I will counter you with the arguments from Transcendental idealism which is essentially from Kant.

I have already shown that any attempt to refute the existence of reality in itself based on the doctrines of TI clashes with the problem of departing from a perspective that already denies access to knowledge of the things in themselves. Therefore, it cannot be neither a refutation, nor it can deny by its own merits the existence of things in themselves, since it already renounces to any ontological commitments for the sake of favoring only the epistemological ones. The OP presents an ontological problem for which it already has a predesigned answer that closes the door to any ontological argument. It's a fallacious construction: "give me an ontological argument that proves the existence of X, but I don't accept ontological arguments".
Veritas Aequitas wrote: You may insist I interpret Kant [a non-realist] wrongly and insist philosophers like Guyer [realist] has the right interpretation. Did you see the mismatch [& inherent confirmation bias] there i.e. a realist interpreting a non-realist's book?
You have absolutely no major convincing argument that philosophers like Guyer do not interpret Kant correctly. They are well-known, respected Kant scholars, not members of some sort of anti-Kantian coalition. Calling them realists is not a reasoanable defense against views that are not even that contentious. Admitting such argument would be the equivalent of saying that an interpretation of Kant's CPR is not legitimately objective if it comes from an anti-realist, for being biased towards anti-realism.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: When referring to humans that lack substance, that is related to the claim the human has a soul or a permanent self.
The scientific FSK is the most reliable to represent what is real. Thus to justify whatever is real of human I will rely on Scientific knowledge of humans.
We're talking about any substance, including material or non-material, so when referring to humans as lacking any substance, you're denying them the condition of being actual things, you refer to them only as other appearances that show in experience as dream-like figures and cannot exist outside of experience, they are supposedly mere epistemological objects. Yet, those epistemological objects are also the ones carrying the experiences themseleves, but don't actually exist, so how can they be the foundation for any experience at all? As much as you would want to talk about experience, you cannot talk about the subjects that supposedly live those experiences, to do that would be talking about the subject-in-themselves.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Note my consideration of empirical realism and transcendental idealism.
I have already stated, a mind independent reality exists within empirical realism but such a reality is ultimately subsumed with transcendental idealism which is not independent of the human conditions.

From what you have been posting, you appear to have problem understanding the above seemingly contradiction.
It is not a "seemingly" contradiction, but a plain contradiction which you have not been able to resolve. It is clear that by a "a mind-independent reality that exists within empirical realism" you are not talking about ontological existence, but this term is employed as a figure of speech to express the dream-like appearance of something called reality, which just seems to operate as a realm of things independent of the observer, and only in that sense "mind-independent", but ultimately subsumed within subjective experience, therefore not real and actually mind-dependent. The main problem with this is that the carriers of experiences, the subjects, are also victims of this dream-like condition, they are no less mind-dependent. The entire TI doctrine, however, is devoted to talk about the real properties of subjects enabling the conditions of experience itself, something which the doctrine itself would not allow. It posits that real subjects (necessarily outside experience) contribute to how things appear in experience, while denying that there can be real things outside of experience. This is an unsolvable contradiction.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I have already stated, if you insist, my ontology is that of process-ontology without consideration for any material of substance ontology.

Note I do claim there is a distinction between subjects and objects but only qualified within empirical realism. Obviously there is a difference between the tree I see out there in the jungle and me inside my house. But within transcendental idealism, there is no absolute independence between me and the tree I see out there in the jungle.
"A distinction between subjects and objects but only qualified within empirical realism" only means here the basic tenet of non-realism: no actual distinction, but just an apparent distinction, which ultimately resolves in objects subsumed within the subjects' minds. So you get the appearance of a tree and a jungle, behind which there's no real, mind-independent tree, nor jungle, that causes the appearance of a tree. To complicate things unnecessarily even more, you are not real either, but the appearance of you, behind which there's no real, mind-independent you.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: There you go again, i.e. hasty generalization.
There are many types of idealism and not all are the same.
As many variants as there can be of idealism, they all share common flaws. I know no version of idealism that makes any sense at all.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: As I had stated you are an idealist as well, i.e. an empirical idealist.
I have already refuted that claim several times. I have also explained to you that empirical idealists are the same as subjective idealists, like Berkeley.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Eodnhoj7 »

The observation of change necessitates an object which exists in itself. First an object is unobserved, then it is observed. This is the change in observation. The absence of seeing an object acts as the point of change in which the object is then revealed. Change necessitates an object exists in itself as independent of observation.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Advocate »

[quote=Eodnhoj7 post_id=512656 time=1622578303 user_id=14533]
The observation of change necessitates an object which exists in itself. First an object is unobserved, then it is observed. This is the change in observation. The absence of seeing an object acts as the point of change in which the object is then revealed. Change necessitates an object exists in itself as independent of observation.
[/quote]

It doesn't exist As an object except in a mind. Actuality is just undifferentiated stuff doing stuff. Objects/things occur according to purpose. We recognize them as sets of boundary conditions relevant to changes we intend to affect.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Eodnhoj7 »

Advocate wrote: Tue Jun 01, 2021 9:22 pm
Eodnhoj7 wrote: Tue Jun 01, 2021 9:11 pm The observation of change necessitates an object which exists in itself. First an object is unobserved, then it is observed. This is the change in observation. The absence of seeing an object acts as the point of change in which the object is then revealed. Change necessitates an object exists in itself as independent of observation.
It doesn't exist As an object except in a mind. Actuality is just undifferentiated stuff doing stuff. Objects/things occur according to purpose. We recognize them as sets of boundary conditions relevant to changes we intend to affect.
Actualization is the formation of limits. Unobserved things exist as limits which form the observing mind through the change of the observing mind by introducing it to new limits.

Dually:

Under a universal mind grades of that mind exist with these grades being distinct from another mind. Because of this gradation Somethings exist as unobservable to some minds yet exist. A distinction between absolute and relative minds has to be observed. With this distinction in mind Somethings exist as unobserved by the relative minds.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Eodnhoj7 »

Advocate wrote: Mon May 31, 2021 5:11 pm The search for truth is meaningless if one doesn't have the tools to recognize it when they see it. Who cares wtf X said? That's philosophy as a hobby!
Thus tools equate to meaning yet these tools are formed by a prior state absent of tools therefore resulting in a contradiction over the nature of meaning as what is meaningless (toolless) determines what is meaningful (tools).
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Tue Jun 01, 2021 6:36 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote:Realists take that there a really real something X beyond appearance, sensation and experience, i.e. something X that exists as real and independent of the human conditions.
Realists are well justified in taking that position. It is the more sensical view of the world. If we see the Moon out there, and we have plenty of ways of verifying that as an objective fact of the world, independent of an individual's subjective view, there's little reason to doubt that there's no real Moon out there. The key philosophical requirement, though, is the recognition of the mind-independent existence of other subjects (as things in themselves), something that anti-realists deny for their own view, and the cause of much trouble for their doctrines.

I have no dispute from the common sense, conventional and empirical perspectives that things are independent of the individual's subjective view. Even a small child will by evolutionary default be able to comprehend that. In these perspectives there are no doubts there is a 'real' moon out there.

You differentiated the difference between the typical scientists and the philosophy of science.
Now, from the perspective of the philosophy of reality in contrast to everyday sense of reality, there is so much evidence to point out that there is are significant differences between appearance and reality, and that they do not necessary correspond 100% nor it is certain appearances are represented that 'what appears' on the basis of substance-ontology.

One obvious evidence is that there is a reality-gap between the observers and the thing out there.
Another is humans are NEVER in direct contact with the object out there but only in contact with whatever is trigger and infer what is object by information the senses [i.e. sense-data]. This is why Russell raised the question, "perhaps there is no table at all".
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=27599

I have also raised MANY thread to show the common sense or conventional scientific perspective are not reliable in claiming an independent reality exists as real.
e.g.
Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=25316

Point you ignored all my above counter claims of the realists and kept insisting the common sense or any child's claim of external reality is THE real deal.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I as a non-realist [transcendental idealist] do not agree with the above view.
My approach is dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience and understanding what the whole process of cognition is about without a care/damn for any something X beyond appearances, sensation and experience.
Dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience, disregarding the possible cause of those experiences, what's the underlying order, assuming the subject as just another appearance, sensation and experience. Not only their structure remains a mystery, the whole foundation is missing, which only means "anything goes".
As mentioned above, I agree with an empirical external independent reality including external subjects. So it is not a question of "anything goes" in this case.

Now within the philosophical consideration,
you are begging the question when you regard there is a cause [thing] that represent those appearance, sensation and experience even before you prove they exists. Even if you prove them syllogistically, you are still begging the question.

On the other hand, I don't make any presumptions at all but deals directly with appearances, sensations and experience and understanding what the whole process of cognition is about. You are also ignoring my point re understanding what the whole process of cognition is about as you usually do in most of the cases, thus that is a strawman.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:Since Kant had presented the argument which I agree and support my views, I am thus relying on Kant as the authority and thus refer to his argument in the Critique of Pure Reason.

I don't see any problem with the above which is typical within the philosophical community.
The problem arises when the arguments themselves are challenged, and you're required to think of a response, but instead rely on saying that Kant did not hold that belief. If you're going to use Kant's argument, it should be exposed clearly as a demonstration, not just as the label of a doctrine attached to your own beliefs.
I don't get your point.
What I have been doing is the same with what is typical in the philosophical community where philosophers defend with positions with reference to other philosophers' arguments.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Your two alternatives are only applicable to a realist's view. You assumed there is the realist's something-X [stuff], if otherwise there is no X [non-stuff].
From the transcendental realist view, I don't accept your basis of the two alternatives as a premise for my argument. Rather I begin my premise with appearances, sensation and experienced without accepting there is a thing-in-itself that is given.
My point was that there are things and they have properties, regardless of what is the substantial or non-substantial nature of those properties one ascribes to them. You cannot get away from attaching properties to things, which is why you're always stuck with ontology. When you say things don't have substantial properties, but neither non-substantial properties, you're actually saying that no things exist at all, that there are no classes of beings, which is not possible. And that certainly doesn't seem to be compatible with Kant's statements.
You still get it?
If you refer to empirical things, I don't dispute they have empirical properties.

But now we are going into a philosophical arena;
in such an arena you are a philosophical realist [stuff vs non-stuff - substance] while I am distinctively a transcendental idealist (aka empirical realist) [not of substance ontology].

If Kant claimed to be transcendental idealist and I claim to be the same as Kant, obvious we are in the same shoes [compatible] on the same issues.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I don't see anything wrong with the above.
Who is the philosophical community has ever declared Kant's CPR as some sort of sacred scripture?
It is very common for Kantian philosophers to quote Kant in supporting their argument.

If I ever to produce my view on such issues, it would exactly be the same as Kant's main theme. So why waste my time instead of referring to Kant's CPR.
But you're not providing the argument, you're just providing the description of the doctrines you endorse.
You are wrong in referring to my use of Kant's view as if they are sort of sacred scripture.
Btw, re the OP you are supposed to produce the argument to counter the OP, not me.
So far, you have not produced any relevant argument because you do not understand what Kant meant by thing-in-itself.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I stated it can be justified subject to producing the actual justification which we have to refer to Kant's CPR.
Since I am referring to justification from primary sources, where is the begging the question?
The point is that something that departs from an assumption and is only justified by that assumption, cannot produce new knowledge, just go in circles restating the initial assumption.
Point re assumption is not relevant at all in this case.
The point is whatever the argument presented it must be justified validly and soundly.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: When realists take it as a philosophical principle there is something X beyond "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" even before justifying and proving it, they are really begging the question.
The fact is realists are realists because they have gone beyond the pre-theoeretical, common sense view of the world, and found enough justification in their lived experience and the discoveries of science, that there is an underlying, substantial order, that justifies the "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" of things. Then they elevate that conviction to a philosophical principle.
As I had highlighted earlier there are many counter views to the common sense, conventional sense and scientific sense of reality.
Even within Science there are so many different views re the idea of external reality.
see: Scientific Anti-Realism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-real ... ti-realism

What is basically science is this;
  • Science (from the Latin word scientia, meaning "knowledge")[1] is a systematic enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the universe.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science
If there is a question of things beyond "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" that is merely an ASSUMPTION, and this assumption is not critical nor imperative for science.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: On the other hand, the non-realist [me] merely focus on what is "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" without consideration of something x and let the evidence points to the direction of what is justified.
Such justification is self-referential, so it actually does not justify anything. And by voluntarily ignoring the possible existence of X, it is not justified in claiming X cannot exist. It only means: "X does not exist (because it is not considered) in the perspective I chose".
Your knowledge seem to be limited in this case.
If it is claimed scientifically that the speed of light is 299,792,458 m/s, then it has to be justified based on evidences. What is self-referential about that.
What is critical is the conclusion MUST BE testable and repeatable by anyone, and useful for humanity.

In this case we can ignore the existence of the ontological independent light.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: What is real is specific to Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK].
When a hallucination is subject to the scientific method, it is not real per se relative to the scientific FSK
Placing the cognitive experience on one side (the hallucination in this case) and the perspective method on the other, while claiming that perspective and experience are the same thing, and account for what is real, dissolves any distinction between illusion and reality. The scientific method would prove to be useless in that case, since there's no objective criteria. Anti-realism and science are simply incompatible.
Not too sure of your point.

The objective criteria in this case is the reliable scientific method and FSK itself.
As such, one will say, it objective X's experience was a hallucination because Science said so [as verified via scientific method.].

It would be subjective if it was X's friends, father or mother who said so.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Tue Jun 01, 2021 6:36 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Note the scientific framework merely ASSUMED the ontology of materialism and NOT all scientific frameworks assume the ontology of materialism.
Once any scientific framework abandons materialism it ceases to be scientific.
Where is you evidence to support the above?

As I had claimed earlier, the definition of what is science and the assumption of 'materialism' by scientists [not all] is not critical nor imperative for Science to work.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: In any case, the assumption of ontology is science is not critical to science per se since science is science as per its FSK and science is not philosophy per se.
When scientists produced scientific knowledge the question is whether it is testable, repeatable and useful, has potential use, or merely for knowledge sake.
Scientists don't give a damn with any ontology of materialism. It is only some philosophers of Science who bring in the ontology of materialism in their Philosophy of Science and not all philosophers agree with that.
Maybe it's not relevant to the "hands-on" scientists who simply accepts as a given the materialistic principles of science, but it is relevant to philosophers of science and philosophers in general. A contemporary philosopher cannot put aside the key discoveries of science, they must be part of any philosophical program.
Again your knowledge is limited in this case.

Note Ant-Scientific-Realism within Philosophy;
  • 3. Considerations Against Scientific Realism (and Responses)
    3.1 The Underdetermination of Theory by Data
    3.2 Skepticism about Inference to the Best Explanation
    3.3 The Pessimistic Induction
    3.4 Skepticism about Approximate Truth
    4. Antirealism: Foils for Scientific Realism
    4.1 Empiricism
    4.2 Historicism
    4.3 Social Constructivism
    4.4 Feminist Approaches
    4.5 Pragmatism, Quietism, and Dialectical Paralysis
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scie ... ieRealResp
Veritas Aequitas wrote: As I had stated, I am the one who raised the OP and it significantly entailed the reference to Kant's thing-in-itself.

In any of your attempt to prove an independent reality-in-itself exists as real, I will counter you with the arguments from Transcendental idealism which is essentially from Kant.

I have already shown that any attempt to refute the existence of reality in itself based on the doctrines of TI clashes with the problem of departing from a perspective that already denies access to knowledge of the things in themselves.
Therefore, it cannot be neither a refutation, nor it can deny by its own merits the existence of things in themselves, since it already renounces to any ontological commitments for the sake of favoring only the epistemological ones.
The OP presents an ontological problem for which it already has a predesigned answer that closes the door to any ontological argument. It's a fallacious construction: "give me an ontological argument that proves the existence of X, but I don't accept ontological arguments".
I have already stated the term 'ontology' the study of being is very wide, broad and loose. We just cannot rely on the term without qualifications.

I believe the OP can still stand on itself without reference to the term ontology.

You as a realist believes that there is something X which is an objective reality existing as real beyond sensations, appearances and experiences. In this case, prove it?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: You may insist I interpret Kant [a non-realist] wrongly and insist philosophers like Guyer [realist] has the right interpretation. Did you see the mismatch [& inherent confirmation bias] there i.e. a realist interpreting a non-realist's book?
You have absolutely no major convincing argument that philosophers like Guyer do not interpret Kant correctly. They are well-known, respected Kant scholars, not members of some sort of anti-Kantian coalition. Calling them realists is not a reasoanable defense against views that are not even that contentious. Admitting such argument would be the equivalent of saying that an interpretation of Kant's CPR is not legitimately objective if it comes from an anti-realist, for being biased towards anti-realism.
Do I really have to produce evidences for my claims above?
It is public knowledge if you are well read on this issue.

I have been reading from Allison, Graham Bird and the likes and they dispute the interpretations of Guyer and his likes.
It is also well known there are two main school of thoughts re Kant, i.e.
1. the anti-realist Kantian, Allison, Bird, etc.
2. the realists and analytic Kantian, i.e. Strawson, Guyer.

If you are well read on the above you will note the philosophers in 1 do not agree with those philosophers in group 2.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: When referring to humans that lack substance, that is related to the claim the human has a soul or a permanent self.
The scientific FSK is the most reliable to represent what is real. Thus to justify whatever is real of human I will rely on Scientific knowledge of humans.
We're talking about any substance, including material or non-material, so when referring to humans as lacking any substance, you're denying them the condition of being actual things, you refer to them only as other appearances that show in experience as dream-like figures and cannot exist outside of experience, they are supposedly mere epistemological objects. Yet, those epistemological objects are also the ones carrying the experiences themseleves, but don't actually exist, so how can they be the foundation for any experience at all? As much as you would want to talk about experience, you cannot talk about the subjects that supposedly live those experiences, to do that would be talking about the subject-in-themselves.
You are still missing my point.
I have already stated I am not disputing from the empirical perspective where I [as a normal person] acknowledge the existence of real solid physical human beings. It is so absurd to assume I take my spouse, children, friends and all other humans as illusory things.

I have already stated, from the philosophical perspective, I do not agree humans has a substance reality as realists who claim humans has a substantial permanent self or soul that survives physical death.
I have stated this many times, why are you ignoring this point?
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Note my consideration of empirical realism and transcendental idealism.
I have already stated, a mind independent reality exists within empirical realism but such a reality is ultimately subsumed with transcendental idealism which is not independent of the human conditions.

From what you have been posting, you appear to have problem understanding the above seemingly contradiction.
It is not a "seemingly" contradiction, but a plain contradiction which you have not been able to resolve.
It is clear that by a "a mind-independent reality that exists within empirical realism" you are not talking about ontological existence, but this term is employed as a figure of speech to express the dream-like appearance of something called reality, which just seems to operate as a realm of things independent of the observer, and only in that sense "mind-independent", but ultimately subsumed within subjective experience, therefore not real and actually mind-dependent.
The main problem with this is that the carriers of experiences, the subjects, are also victims of this dream-like condition, they are no less mind-dependent.
The entire TI doctrine, however, is devoted to talk about the real properties of subjects enabling the conditions of experience itself, something which the doctrine itself would not allow.
It posits that real subjects (necessarily outside experience) contribute to how things appear in experience, while denying that there can be real things outside of experience. This is an unsolvable contradiction.
You are talking to yourself.

When TI speak of a "a mind-independent reality that exists within empirical realism" it is related to the typical empirical reality that is verifiable and justifiable by Science.

Note when you make a table out of wood then throw it away in a rubbish dump miles away, based on empirical realism that table is an independent external reality, but in another meta-perspective you cannot claim that specific table out there is absolutely independent of you because without you, that table would not have existed.

It is the same with ordinary empirical reality of the external world within common sense, conventional sense, scientific sense, and the likes, BUT from a subtle meta-perspective [you are unable to understand] what is reality out here cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions, e.g. this claim;

Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=25316

The above sort of hallucination is not the sort related mental illnesses but it is a default via evolution that is so normative thus taken as normal.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: I have already stated, if you insist, my ontology is that of process-ontology without consideration for any material of substance ontology.

Note I do claim there is a distinction between subjects and objects but only qualified within empirical realism. Obviously there is a difference between the tree I see out there in the jungle and me inside my house. But within transcendental idealism, there is no absolute independence between me and the tree I see out there in the jungle.
"A distinction between subjects and objects but only qualified within empirical realism" only means here the basic tenet of non-realism: no actual distinction, but just an apparent distinction, which ultimately resolves in objects subsumed within the subjects' minds.
So you get the appearance of a tree and a jungle, behind which there's no real, mind-independent tree, nor jungle, that causes the appearance of a tree. To complicate things unnecessarily even more, you are not real either, but the appearance of you, behind which there's no real, mind-independent you.
To bring in the "you are not real either" is a strawman, note my explanation above.

There are many perspectives to reality and each has their relevant consequences, impact and utility [or evil potential] to humanity.
What is happening with you is you are merely stuck with the low levels perspective e.g. common sense, conventional sense, scientific realism, and the likes where you don't have to higher sense of understanding the greater meta-perspectives.

In the very crude perspectives theists believe they have an ontological permanent substance within them, i.e. the soul which is created by a real God. These are so real that theists want their permanent self to be saved in heaven that they will obey their real God's command to kill non-believers [note especially the Islamic jihadists re 911 and the many other killings on non-believers] plus the past inquisitions, etc.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: There you go again, i.e. hasty generalization.
There are many types of idealism and not all are the same.
As many variants as there can be of idealism, they all share common flaws. I know no version of idealism that makes any sense at all.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: As I had stated you are an idealist as well, i.e. an empirical idealist.
I have already refuted that claim several times. I have also explained to you that empirical idealists are the same as subjective idealists, like Berkeley.
Nope empirical idealists like yourself are not the same as subjective idealists like Berkeley.

You are never in direct contact with that supposed real empirical thing at all.
You are an empirical idealist because your reality is only leveraged on ideas in your head, thus idea, ideal, idealism, so empirical idealism and you are an empirical idealist.


I'd raised this thread to argue the point.

A Realist is also an Idealist
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32913

Just noted I missed your post therein. I will response to that later.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

Veritas Aequitas wrote:I have no dispute from the common sense, conventional and empirical perspectives that things are independent of the individual's subjective view. Even a small child will by evolutionary default be able to comprehend that. In these perspectives there are no doubts there is a 'real' moon out there.
The problem is that in order for you to advance the rest of the arguments that comprise your overall view and endorsement of anti-realism, you are necessarily compelled to dispute the common sense, conventional, realist understanding of the world, in which having an actual moon out there is not just a matter of perspective, but the actual case. In the OP, you clearly stated that "one cannot prove there is an existing independent-of-human-mind external world - reality-in-itself."
Veritas Aequitas wrote: You differentiated the difference between the typical scientists and the philosophy of science.
Now, from the perspective of the philosophy of reality in contrast to everyday sense of reality, there is so much evidence to point out that there is are significant differences between appearance and reality, and that they do not necessary correspond 100% nor it is certain appearances are represented that 'what appears' on the basis of substance-ontology.

One obvious evidence is that there is a reality-gap between the observers and the thing out there.
Another is humans are NEVER in direct contact with the object out there but only in contact with whatever is trigger and infer what is object by information the senses [i.e. sense-data]. This is why Russell raised the question, "perhaps there is no table at all".
Modern realists acknowledge that reality is not quite as it appears to be at first glance. Critical realists in particular recognize that our sensibility plays a role in organizing the experience of the world, although ultimately it is through this sensibility, modified by our intellect with a systematic epistemological and methodological approach, that we get access to its ontological objective reality.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I have also raised MANY thread to show the common sense or conventional scientific perspective are not reliable in claiming an independent reality exists as real.
e.g.
Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=25316
A few posts back I asked you what was the difference between hallucination and the reality of experience, and you claimed that there was something real in the epistemological framework, but now it shows that this epistemological framework is an hallucination, too. So you see, the reality of experience turned out to be as suspiciously illusory as the thing in itself. Your view is clearly that "anything goes".
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Point you ignored all my above counter claims of the realists and kept insisting the common sense or any child's claim of external reality is THE real deal.
I never claimed such a thing. I mentioned the common sense, pretheoretical view, which could be seen as the naive realist view, that takes reality as it appears to our senses and builds a coherent picture of the world with the limited state of knowledge at the time. It is the basis of what Sellars calls the manifest image, which a modern realist should not take as the final and complete view of the world.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: As mentioned above, I agree with an empirical external independent reality including external subjects. So it is not a question of "anything goes" in this case.
The point is that you're not justified, by your own approach, to claim a mind-independent reality. By adding the adjective "empirical" you're just moderating the meaning of "external independent reality" to convey "the experience of an apparent external independent reality", that then you are very eager yourself to call it illusion, hallucination, etc. Then there are no actual external subjects for you, and this creates a lot of problems for your doctrine.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Now within the philosophical consideration,
you are begging the question when you regard there is a cause [thing] that represent those appearance, sensation and experience even before you prove they exists. Even if you prove them syllogistically, you are still begging the question.
It is begging the question when one demands proof by means of an epistemological approach that departs from the denial of the possibility of proof. In any case, when one claims the subject's a priori sensibility accommodates objects to the reality of human cognition, one is actually reinstating the cause of appearance, sensation and experience, this time the cause being the subject in itself. Why aren't you there concerned about "proving it exists before"?
Veritas Aequitas wrote: On the other hand, I don't make any presumptions at all but deals directly with appearances, sensations and experience and understanding what the whole process of cognition is about. You are also ignoring my point re understanding what the whole process of cognition is about as you usually do in most of the cases, thus that is a strawman.
You fail to see that your "dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience" is your idealist version of naive realism. It is exactly a presumption, not something justified by another foundational layer of information. In this case, the appearances, sensations and experience are the equivalent of the thing in itself, and the same epistemological skepticism you apply to realism can apply here.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Your knowledge seem to be limited in this case.
If it is claimed scientifically that the speed of light is 299,792,458 m/s, then it has to be justified based on evidences. What is self-referential about that.
What is critical is the conclusion MUST BE testable and repeatable by anyone, and useful for humanity.

In this case we can ignore the existence of the ontological independent light.
If one can ignore the ontologically independent existence of light, then one could surely ignore the ontologically independent existence of the properties and behavior of light, and there would be no justification for giving credit to any "evidence", since such evidence would be a mind-dependent projection. The very concept of a being referred to as "anyone", or "humanity" would not be justified, neither the possibility of testable and repeatable experiments, which only make sense on the basis of an objective, independent reality. When I mentioned that you can make tests to prove that the Moon once existed independent of humans, you dismissed it as irrelevant, because your framework actually prohibits using empirical evidence as proof of something objectively true.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Advocate »

[quote="Veritas Aequitas"]I have no dispute from the common sense, conventional and empirical perspectives that things are independent of the individual's subjective view. Even a small child will by evolutionary default be able to comprehend that. In these perspectives there are no doubts there is a 'real' moon out there.[/quote]

The moon-stuff is there regardless of whether it's experienced, but it's not a moon until it's a pattern in a mind.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Sat Jun 05, 2021 1:04 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote:I have no dispute from the common sense, conventional and empirical perspectives that things are independent of the individual's subjective view. Even a small child will by evolutionary default be able to comprehend that. In these perspectives there are no doubts there is a 'real' moon out there.
The problem is that in order for you to advance the rest of the arguments that comprise your overall view and endorsement of anti-realism, you are necessarily compelled to dispute the common sense, conventional, realist understanding of the world, in which having an actual moon out there is not just a matter of perspective, but the actual case. In the OP, you clearly stated that "one cannot prove there is an existing independent-of-human-mind external world - reality-in-itself."
You are still missing my point.

I have stated my approach is anti-realism of the Kantian kind, i.e. empirical realism [transcendental idealism] where I don't dispute the common sense, conventional, realist understanding of the world.
Even other types of idealism [e.g. Berkeley's, others ] do not dispute the common sense, conventional, realist understanding of the world.
It would be very stupid of any philosopher [if they are normal] to take it that Berkeley could have insisted the oncoming train directly toward him is not real and there is no need to avoid what he was perceiving.

Those who dispute what is common sense is not real would be those with mental illness and suffer from hallucinations and insist [ignorantly] what they hallucinated is really real.

Now you have to get this critical point.
What the anti-realist dispute is against the realists' claim that what is beyond appearances, sensation and experience is directly real [naive realism] or inferred to be really real [indirect realism].

Re the OP, I believe you failed to understand [or refute] what is meant by thing-in-itself and reality-in-itself.
If you refute the thing-in-itself as real, then per OP you have to prove it is real. You have not done that.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: You differentiated the difference between the typical scientists and the philosophy of science.
Now, from the perspective of the philosophy of reality in contrast to everyday sense of reality, there is so much evidence to point out that there is are significant differences between appearance and reality, and that they do not necessary correspond 100% nor it is certain appearances are represented that 'what appears' on the basis of substance-ontology.

One obvious evidence is that there is a reality-gap between the observers and the thing out there.
Another is humans are NEVER in direct contact with the object out there but only in contact with whatever is trigger and infer what is object by information the senses [i.e. sense-data]. This is why Russell raised the question, "perhaps there is no table at all".
Modern realists acknowledge that reality is not quite as it appears to be at first glance. Critical realists in particular recognize that our sensibility plays a role in organizing the experience of the world, although ultimately it is through this sensibility, modified by our intellect with a systematic epistemological and methodological approach, that we get access to its ontological objective reality.
You [critical realist or indirect realism] don't get direct "access" to an ontological objective reality.
What you are doing is merely inferring from the appearances, sensations and experience to the conclusion there is an ontological objective reality.
In this case, your inference is based on induction via a majority of humans, but such an inference is evidently doubtful and countered by anti-realists.

I am willing to accept if what you claimed as real is qualified to your admitted qualifications of your stated Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK], i.e.
  • "although ultimately it is through this sensibility, modified by our intellect with a systematic epistemological and methodological approach, "
As such, what you are claiming as a real 'ontological objective reality' MUST BE qualified to a specific FSK and therefore cannot be an ontological independent thing-in-itself.

Rather your ontological objective reality is a thing-by-FSK, thus not absolutely independent but is ultimately conditioned by human conditions [i.e. the specific FSK].
Veritas Aequitas wrote: I have also raised MANY threads to show the common sense or conventional scientific perspective are not reliable in claiming an independent reality exists as real.
e.g.
Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=25316
A few posts back I asked you what was the difference between hallucination and the reality of experience, and you claimed that there was something real in the epistemological framework, but now it shows that this epistemological framework is an hallucination, too. So you see, the reality of experience turned out to be as suspiciously illusory as the thing in itself. Your view is clearly that "anything goes".
You are missing the point again and generalizing too much.

Earlier, I was referring to the difference between hallucination from mental illness & other abnormalities and the reality of common & conventional.

The above example re hallucination is not related those of mental illness but rather to Cognitive Science and Neurosciences within another perspective.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Point you ignored all my above counter claims of the realists and kept insisting the common sense or any child's claim of external reality is THE real deal.
I never claimed such a thing. I mentioned the common sense, pretheoretical view, which could be seen as the naive realist view, that takes reality as it appears to our senses and builds a coherent picture of the world with the limited state of knowledge at the time. It is the basis of what Sellars calls the manifest image, which a modern realist should not take as the final and complete view of the world.
OK, noted you are not a naive realist.
But as you claimed above, you are a critical realist and I explained your stance would be
"Rather your ontological objective reality is a thing-by-FSK, thus not absolutely independent by ultimately conditioned by human conditions [i.e. the specific FSK]."
In a way this is idealism [modified by our intellect with a systematic epistemological and methodological approach] in a way and not realism. By intellect, you are engaging your brain and using ideas, thus ultimately idea_lism.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: As mentioned above, I agree with an empirical external independent reality including external subjects. So it is not a question of "anything goes" in this case.
The point is that you're not justified, by your own approach, to claim a mind-independent reality. By adding the adjective "empirical" you're just moderating the meaning of "external independent reality" to convey "the experience of an apparent external independent reality", that then you are very eager yourself to call it illusion, hallucination, etc. Then there are no actual external subjects for you, and this creates a lot of problems for your doctrine.
It is only from your dogmatic stance that you refer to "an apparent external independent reality".
To an empirical realist, what is real and reality of an external world is the whole shebang of cognition, experience, consciousness, etc.
There is no question of "beyond" [metaphysical] into another external world or la la land.

See my thread on;
From 'No Man's Land' to 'La La Land'
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=31341
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Now within the philosophical consideration,
you are begging the question when you regard there is a cause [thing] that represent those appearance, sensation and experience even before you prove they exists. Even if you prove them syllogistically, you are still begging the question.
It is begging the question when one demands proof by means of an epistemological approach that departs from the denial of the possibility of proof.
In any case, when one claims the subject's a priori sensibility accommodates objects to the reality of human cognition, one is actually reinstating the cause of appearance, sensation and experience, this time the cause being the subject in itself. Why aren't you there concerned about "proving it exists before"?
Note you assumed a pre-existing ontological objective reality exists as real even before you prove that it exists as real by itself.
That is begging the question.

If you prove by some systematic methodology there is a pre-existing ontological objective existing as real, this is still begging the question, but nevertheless must be qualified to the specific systematic methodology [FSK] you used. In this case, this real thing is not a thing-in-itself [as required by the OP] but a thing-by-FSK.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: On the other hand, I don't make any presumptions at all but deals directly with appearances, sensations and experience and understanding what the whole process of cognition is about. You are also ignoring my point re understanding what the whole process of cognition is about as you usually do in most of the cases, thus that is a strawman.
You fail to see that your "dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience" is your idealist version of naive realism. It is exactly a presumption, not something justified by another foundational layer of information. In this case, the appearances, sensations and experience are the equivalent of the thing in itself, and the same epistemological skepticism you apply to realism can apply here.
NOPE!
it is ridiculous and oxymoronic to insist "dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience" is your idealist version of naive realism.
Naive realists claim there is an objective reality independently out there that is 100% corresponding to appearances and sensation.
Anti-realist [empirical realism] is not equivalent to the above in any way.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Your knowledge seem to be limited in this case.
If it is claimed scientifically that the speed of light is 299,792,458 m/s, then it has to be justified based on evidences. What is self-referential about that.
What is critical is the conclusion MUST BE testable and repeatable by anyone, and useful for humanity.

In this case we can ignore the existence of the ontological independent light.
If one can ignore the ontologically independent existence of light, then one could surely ignore the ontologically independent existence of the properties and behavior of light, and there would be no justification for giving credit to any "evidence", since such evidence would be a mind-dependent projection.
The very concept of a being referred to as "anyone", or "humanity" would not be justified, neither the possibility of testable and repeatable experiments, which only make sense on the basis of an objective, independent reality.
When I mentioned that you can make tests to prove that the Moon once existed independent of humans, you dismissed it as irrelevant, because your framework actually prohibits using empirical evidence as proof of something objectively true.
That is not what I meant re the external moon.

What I insisted is, one can inferred any conclusion about the moon, i.e. whether the moon pre-existed humans or not, or it is independent or not-independent of humans,
BUT whatever the inferences and conclusions, they are ultimately not independent of the human conditions, i.e. exists as a moon-in-itself.

Note, here is a point;
Moons-in-general exist all over the universe and in this abstracted sense they are independent of humans.
But a particular moon, say that of the Earth's Moon, it does not exist as a moon-in-itself as a moon per se.
When we review that particular moon per se more realistically, it is not precisely a moon per se [conceptual] but a big collection of rocks, earth, soil, etc. [i.e. moon-stull].
When we increase the precision, that conceptualized moon is a big cluster of molecules, atoms, quarks within a specific location in the Universe and it is changing its content every nano-second.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Advocate wrote: Sat Jun 05, 2021 1:16 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote:I have no dispute from the common sense, conventional and empirical perspectives that things are independent of the individual's subjective view. Even a small child will by evolutionary default be able to comprehend that. In these perspectives there are no doubts there is a 'real' moon out there.
The moon-stuff is there regardless of whether it's experienced, but it's not a moon until it's a pattern in a mind.
You're on my ignore list since you challenged 'my way or the highway' re the 'quote' format.

I'll respond to this one at my discretion.

Yes, it is not a moon per se until it is a pattern in a mind.
But what is "moon-stuff X" is also not "moon-stuff X" until it is a pattern in a mind.

Is there any way one can ultimately determined what is the absolute "moon stuff X" without any means [re Conde Lucanor] "modified by our intellect with a systematic epistemological and methodological approach."

The only way to get to what is the 'ultimate moon stuff' is by inference and ultimately this inference is conditioned by human conditions. i.e. the FSK.

Take the case of stars in the night sky.
You can assumed there is star-stuff regardless whether the star is perceived or not, but the reality is there could no real star [other than our Sun] existing in real time.
What is perceived are merely light waves hitting the retina of a person and the real star in real time could have exploded long long ago.

There is always a reality GAP [even to the nano-second] between what is perceived and what is supposed to be the real thing.
There is this problem of a reality GAP because of the 'supposition' which is not imperative [not critically necessary] but only triggered psychologically and evolutionally with its pros and cons.
If we do away with the 'supposition' [like anti-realists] then there is no ontological issue of ultimate objective reality at all.
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