Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Wed Aug 04, 2021 4:32 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon Aug 02, 2021 8:32 am
As I had implied what I can agree with the term 'ontology' is in its widest sense as referring to "what-is" of reality...
Whenever a wannabe philosopher is set to pick up all his spattered nonsense to attempt to recompose with it a decent, coherent argument, you will get him talking about things "in this sense or another". The Eiffel Tower is in Idaho, in the sense that there's the city of Paris in Idaho. Sure, anything can make sense this way.
I wonder you agree with the Law of Non-Contradiction.
  • In logic, the law of non-contradiction (LNC) (also known as the law of contradiction, principle of non-contradiction (PNC), or the principle of contradiction) states that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time,
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction
My use of "sense" is the same as in the above 'law of non-Contradiction'.
Thus when you condemn my use of the term 'sense', you would appear not to agree with the Law of Non-Contradiction as defined above.
If you reject the LNC implied with 'sense' then yours is a case of cheapo philosophy.

So, you have been forced to concede that even from your anti-realist stance, you're still stuck with ontology. The problem is that by giving no serious attention to it, you and the anti-realist gang end up making the most absurd claims about beings from the framework of epistemology, which is like using thermodynamics to measure angles. Worst of all, you're unable to see how this unchecked ontological assumptions corrode the whole logical structure that aims to deny materialist ontology, because the doctrine must posit entities that then cannot be justified.
Point is you are very ignorant of the proper definition of 'what is ontology'.
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies concepts such as existence, being, becoming, and reality. It includes the questions of how entities are grouped into basic categories and which of these entities exist on the most fundamental level.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology#
The term ontology is merely a word and term with a wide range of meanings and only works where there is consensus. Words are not fixed and imperative as if commanded by a God.
I don't have to be stuck with 'Ontology' and where necessary I can used the specific terms existence, being, becoming, and reality in my discourse.

You are really lost and is merely stuck with the term 'ontology' for argument sake.
When one debates issues related to Science, we focus on the specific issues of science in Physics, biology, chemistry and do not need to mention 'Science' at all.
In our case, the issue is not of ontology-in-general but the issue of Philosophical [critical realism] whether things exist independent of human conditions or not.
Sense-impressions delay in particle physics? Come on!! We know science is definitely not your favorite subject, but don't make it so obvious. No one has actually ever observed an electron moving through space, we see its effects afterwards and any delay in sense-impression is irrelevant. Your all made-up "reality gap" is utter nonsense, it only shows up in your dreams.
What are you talking about.
That one has to observe whatever is supposed to be an electron or particle implied there is a distance and time-gap, thus the reality-Gap.
This is basic rationality.
Oh, yes, the Kantian subject: "One consequence of Kant's notion of transcendental apperception is that the "self" is only ever encountered as appearance, never as it is in itself."
The problem remains the same: "subjects appear in my perception".
What justifies the belief that they are things that also experience transcendental apperception and encounter their selves as appearances? The answer is: nothing. In other words, how does the "I think" (instead of "I am") get transformed into the "you think" (instead of "you are")? Anti-realists then can only resort to subjectivism and solipsism: "empirical subjects are valid merely for me".
You are lost and off point in the above.

Subjects are empirical selves that can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically as empirically real.
"Appearances' of subjects can be misleading as implying only visual. A blind person can feel an empirical self by touch.

We can infer all humans are generically the same as human beings.
When one can justify apperception of the self [..I Think] of a human being,
then we can infer it to the same for all human beings.

On the other hand, show me proofs the "I AM" exist as real and independently?
Don't try Descartes' "I think therefore I am" because the I-think precedes the I-AM.
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Conde Lucanor
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

The fact is I don't condemn the use of the word "sense", I only condemn your misuse and abuse of that word to try to justify whatever absurd construction you want to pass as an argument. If you made a real effort to think, you would realize that if I said that the law of non-contradiction in some sense entails that contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time, but in some other sense it entails that contradictory propositions can both be true at the same time, it shows an improper use of the word "sense".

One more fact is that anti-realists explicitly dismiss ontology while clumsily get entangled with it anyway. You are a perfect example of this.

I see that you now will run away as fast as you can from your remark about delayed sense-impressions in particle physics. It is the best that you can do, considering how silly that remark was.

As expected, you couldn't come up with a sound counterargument to the problem of other minds. Sure, yes, subjects appear in my perception as any other object, but the problem is how I justify attributing to them subjective experiences like mine, so that they can be understood as subjects that experience transcendental apperception and encounter their selves as appearances. Remember, Kant and friends claim that through his philosophical reflection he has discovered and revealed the a priori conditions of experience that apply to ALL SUBJECTS, even though his own doctrine departs from the premise that all he has access to is his own sense-impressions. The other subjects belong to the world of objects, but the world of objects supposedly "conforms to his knowledge". His own doctrine do not allow him to jump to the conclusion that they conform to the knowledge of many other subjects, already subsumed within his own subjectivity. Trying to put them outside and independent of his own subjective experience would make them subjects in themselves.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Thu Aug 05, 2021 2:23 am The fact is I don't condemn the use of the word "sense", I only condemn your misuse and abuse of that word to try to justify whatever absurd construction you want to pass as an argument. If you made a real effort to think, you would realize that if I said that the law of non-contradiction in some sense entails that contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time, but in some other sense it entails that contradictory propositions can both be true at the same time, it shows an improper use of the word "sense".
You are blabbering as usual.
Show me evidence I am using 'sense' which is difference from sense in the LNC.
One more fact is that anti-realists explicitly dismiss ontology while clumsily get entangled with it anyway. You are a perfect example of this.
More Blabbering without justifications.
I see that you now will run away as fast as you can from your remark about delayed sense-impressions in particle physics. It is the best that you can do, considering how silly that remark was.
More Blabbering without justifications. Show me precisely why the point below is not rational?

That one has to observe whatever is supposed to be an electron or particle implied there is a distance and time-gap, thus the reality-Gap.
This is basic rationality.

As expected, you couldn't come up with a sound counterargument to the problem of other minds.

Sure, yes, subjects appear in my perception as any other object, but the problem is how I justify attributing to them subjective experiences like mine, so that they can be understood as subjects that experience transcendental apperception and encounter their selves as appearances.

Remember, Kant and friends claim that through his philosophical reflection he has discovered and revealed the a priori conditions of experience that apply to ALL SUBJECTS, even though his own doctrine departs from the premise that all he has access to is his own sense-impressions.

The other subjects belong to the world of objects, but the world of objects supposedly "conforms to his knowledge".

His own doctrine do not allow him to jump to the conclusion that they conform to the knowledge of many other subjects, already subsumed within his own subjectivity.

Trying to put them outside and independent of his own subjective experience would make them subjects in themselves.
Yes, Kant claimed there is no way one can have direct access and know the mind-in-itself [thoughts and feelings] of other subjects. [note mind-in-itself].
This is very obvious.
However, Kant presented many indirect ways of knowing the minds of other empirical selves exist as real empirically. [not in-it-self].
Kant, if he is in our present time, will surely rely on cognitive science, neurosciences, neuro-psychology to conclude the existence of other minds as real.

Note the contentious points with the Problem of the Other Minds are, what is existence, what is mind and 'what is real?' You did not take into account the above.
However that you are dogmatic with critical realism denote your views are not realistic at all.

You as a critical [philosophical] realist [claim an independent thing-in-itself] would have serious problems knowing the real mind-in-itself because by 'your' definition it is independent from yourself.

You have not addressed my challenge, i.e.
"On the other hand, show me proofs the "I AM" exist as real and independently?
Don't try Descartes' "I think therefore I am" because the I-think precedes the I-AM."
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Conde Lucanor
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

As usual, you cannot provide arguments nor counterarguments to my points. Your modus operandi is to demand from others thorough explanations, while you lazily sit back and limit yourself to saying things like "you're blabbering" and "I believe what Kant says".

Veritas Aequitas wrote:However, Kant presented many indirect ways of knowing the minds of other empirical selves exist as real empirically. [not in-it-self].
Oh, yes, many "indirect ways", the same "indirect ways" that his doctrine prohibits as a method to determine the reality of objects independent of minds, but surely he is all for acknowledging the existence of things (subjects with minds) he has no direct access to. Is there a way that other minds could "appear" to his senses? There's absolutely no empirical justification, no way he could have experienced the reality of other minds, he's bound to make assumptions, the same assumptions that he calls "chasing illusions" when made by realists. It is intrinsically tied to his phenomenalism. Of course, from then on, any other assertion about products of minds and subjects, including science, appears empirically unjustified within the boundaries of Kant's own experience. It's kind of an epistemological trap: once he acknowledges there are other experiences independent of his, he must be ready to accept there are other things independent of him. He denies it, so he's forced to acknowledge that he cannot assert there are other experiences independent of his, thus solipsism, or subjective idealism. As we all know, Kant's pretensions in the Refutation of Idealism failed miserably. A big problem, one you have not been able to solve.

Now you can sit down lazily again, say I'm blabbering and throw your loose comments, as usual.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Sun Aug 08, 2021 4:49 pm As usual, you cannot provide arguments nor counterarguments to my points. Your modus operandi is to demand from others thorough explanations, while you lazily sit back and limit yourself to saying things like "you're blabbering" and "I believe what Kant says".
The point is our stance is like apples [oil] versus oranges [water], i.e. yours is philosophical [critical realism] while mine is Anti-Philosophical_Realism [ like Empirical Realism and others].

As such, you are always presenting and shooting your own strawman. How can I counter effectively if what you are presenting are merely strawmen.

Even if there is any semblance of an argument, and because you are so dogmatic and blinded to only your philosophical realism, whatever counter arguments I have presented [already many] you are unable to see my points are counter arguments to your argument.
It is like the dogmatic theists who will never accept any counter-arguments from non-theists regardless of how rational and sound they are.

This is why I always fall back to the roots, i.e.
demanding that you demonstrate your philosophical [critical] reason is solidly sound but you have ignored it as re this OP.
Rather you present your strawman on Kant for me to counter like below.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:However, Kant presented many indirect ways of knowing the minds of other empirical selves exist as real empirically. [not in-it-self].
Oh, yes, many "indirect ways", the same "indirect ways" that his doctrine prohibits as a method to determine the reality of objects independent of minds, but surely he is all for acknowledging the existence of things (subjects with minds) he has no direct access to.

Is there a way that other minds could "appear" to his senses?
There's absolutely no empirical justification, no way he could have experienced the reality of other minds, he's bound to make assumptions, the same assumptions that he calls "chasing illusions" when made by realists.

It is intrinsically tied to his phenomenalism.
Of course, from then on, any other assertion about products of minds and subjects, including science, appears empirically unjustified within the boundaries of Kant's own experience.
It's kind of an epistemological trap: once he acknowledges there are other experiences independent of his, he must be ready to accept there are other things independent of him.
He denies it, so he's forced to acknowledge that he cannot assert there are other experiences independent of his, thus solipsism, or subjective idealism.
As we all know, Kant's pretensions in the Refutation of Idealism failed miserably. A big problem, one you have not been able to solve.

Now you can sit down lazily again, say I'm blabbering and throw your loose comments, as usual.
Again you are presenting strawman of Kant's argument.
  • "he [Kant] is all for acknowledging the existence of things (subjects with minds) he has no direct access to."
You are imposing your Philosophical Realism on Kant which he never agreed with.
Kant NEVER ...
  • "acknowledge the existence of things (subjects with minds) he has no direct access to"
Kant claimed it is delusional for one to insist there are subjects-in-themselves [person-in-itself] as you present above from your philosophical [critical] realism stance.
What Kant acknowledge is only the existence of the real empirical person NEVER the sort of 'subject' you claimed above in your Philosophical [critical] Realism sense.

This is not a counter-argument rather it is educating you that you are making a strawman.
I have done that a "1000" times whilst you are accusing of not providing any counter-argument.
How can I counter any argument effectively when what you have presented are merely strawmen.

Kant failed in his refutation of Idealism??
We have gone through this earlier, re Nicholas Stang and others.
Again the philosophical realists are creating their own strawman without considering Kant's refutation of Idealism in its full proper contexts.
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Conde Lucanor
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Once again your resort to your usual (lazy) defense of: "it's a straw man". You say this to everything, even if one is not describing the position that one wants to refute, but responding directly to a specific statement. And by means of this little trick, you avoid providing any counterargument. It's simply your modus operandi.

You have failed to understand (or so you pretended) my argument. Let's be reminded that your statement: "Kant presented many indirect ways of knowing the minds of other empirical selves exist as real empirically" came in response to this argument I presented:
Conde Lucanor wrote:As expected, you couldn't come up with a sound counterargument to the problem of other minds.

Sure, yes, subjects appear in my perception as any other object, but the problem is how I justify attributing to them subjective experiences like mine, so that they can be understood as subjects that experience transcendental apperception and encounter their selves as appearances.

Remember, Kant and friends claim that through his philosophical reflection he has discovered and revealed the a priori conditions of experience that apply to ALL SUBJECTS, even though his own doctrine departs from the premise that all he has access to is his own sense-impressions.

The other subjects belong to the world of objects, but the world of objects supposedly "conforms to his knowledge".

His own doctrine do not allow him to jump to the conclusion that they conform to the knowledge of many other subjects, already subsumed within his own subjectivity.
I never mentioned there the "in itself", I remained within the boundaries of this quote you gave yourself to ground the notion of the empirical self: "One consequence of Kant's notion of transcendental apperception is that the "self" is only ever encountered as appearance..." And so I questioned how it was possible for Kant to encounter the selves of others, if they could not appear to him. For all purposes, they would be beyond Kant's experience. His own doctrine would not allow it. So, in order for admitting that there are other selves, and that they are empirically real, Kant would have to stay away from his own doctrine and posit that he must infer them as things existing independent of his own cognition. It doesn't matter whether he did or not (he obviously did), the point is that he fell in his own trap. And there is where I added: "Trying to put them outside and independent of his own subjective experience would make them subjects in themselves."

And then you responded simply restating what I had said: "Kant presented many indirect ways of knowing the minds of other empirical selves exist as real empirically." I explicitly dealt with those "indirect ways", stating that when realists engaged in presenting many indirect ways of knowing that other objects outside one's mind exist as real empirically, Kant called that "chasing illusions". So he's denying to others what he approves for himself.

Your response now is that this is "imposing Philosophical Realism on Kant", but the point was: to advance his anti-realism, he ends up shooting at it. If his anti-realism fails by flaws in its internal structure, realism prevails. Also, by presenting things as existing outside and independent of his own subjective experience, the anti-realist is actually positing an external world existing independent of human minds. And this is called reality in itself, just as you said in the OP:
Veritas Aequitas wrote:an existing independent-of-human-mind external world - reality-in-itself.
The only way out of this is for the anti-realist to state that other minds, other selves that experience, do not exist independent of the mind of the anti-realist. And that is called solipsism.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

viewtopic.php?p=514180#p514180
Transcendental Apperception
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcend ... perception
"One consequence of Kant's notion of transcendental apperception is that the "self" [the person] is only ever encountered as appearance, NEVER as it is in itself."
Conde Lucanor wrote: Tue Aug 10, 2021 4:09 am Once again your resort to your usual (lazy) defense of: "it's a straw man". You say this to everything, even if one is not describing the position that one wants to refute, but responding directly to a specific statement. And by means of this little trick, you avoid providing any counterargument. It's simply your modus operandi.

You have failed to understand (or so you pretended) my argument. Let's be reminded that your statement: "Kant presented many indirect ways of knowing the minds of other empirical selves exist as real empirically" came in response to this argument I presented:
Conde Lucanor wrote:As expected, you couldn't come up with a sound counterargument to the problem of other minds.

Sure, yes, subjects appear in my perception as any other object, but the problem is how I justify attributing to them subjective experiences like mine, so that they can be understood as subjects that experience transcendental apperception and encounter their selves as appearances.

Remember, Kant and friends claim that through his philosophical reflection he has discovered and revealed the a priori conditions of experience that apply to ALL SUBJECTS, even though his own doctrine departs from the premise that all he has access to is his own sense-impressions.

The other subjects belong to the world of objects, but the world of objects supposedly "conforms to his knowledge".

His own doctrine do not allow him to jump to the conclusion that they conform to the knowledge of many other subjects, already subsumed within his own subjectivity.
I never mentioned there the "in itself", I remained within the boundaries of this quote you gave yourself to ground the notion of the empirical self:
"One consequence of Kant's notion of transcendental apperception is that the "self" is only ever encountered as appearance..."
And so I questioned how it was possible for Kant to encounter the selves of others, if they could not appear to him.
For all purposes, they would be beyond Kant's experience. His own doctrine would not allow it.
So, in order for admitting that there are other selves, and that they are empirically real, Kant would have to stay away from his own doctrine and posit that he must infer them as things existing independent of his own cognition.
It doesn't matter whether he did or not (he obviously did), the point is that he fell in his own trap.
And there is where I added: "Trying to put them outside and independent of his own subjective experience would make them subjects in themselves."

And then you responded simply restating what I had said: "Kant presented many indirect ways of knowing the minds of other empirical selves exist as real empirically."
I explicitly dealt with those "indirect ways", stating that when realists engaged in presenting many indirect ways of knowing that other objects outside one's mind exist as real empirically, Kant called that "chasing illusions".
So he's denying to others what he approves for himself.

Your response now is that this is "imposing Philosophical Realism on Kant", but the point was: to advance his anti-realism, he ends up shooting at it.
If his anti-realism fails by flaws in its internal structure, realism prevails.
Also, by presenting things as existing outside and independent of his own subjective experience, the anti-realist is actually positing an external world existing independent of human minds.
And this is called reality-in-itself, just as you said in the OP:
You are still imposing your Philosophical [critical] Realism on Kant.

Note your point;

  • So, in order for admitting that there are other selves, and that they are empirically real, Kant would have to stay away from his own doctrine and posit that he must infer them as things existing independent of his own cognition.

Your strawman and rhetoric is to slide in ‘cognition’ i.e. “things existing independent of his own cognition.”

When Kant admit to the fact that other selves are empirically real and that they are in that sense existing independent of and external to his own self [not cognition], he is subscribing to his own Empirical Realism.

I have already explained a “1000” times, the empirical externality of other selves, i.e. within Kant's Empirical Realism is subsumed [wholly] within his Transcendental Idealism which claim Empirical Realism-as-whole [thus whatever therein] CANNOT be absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Within Kant’s Empirical Realism, these empirical external selves are independent and objectively real grounded on an 'outer sense'. [note 'outer sense'] Kant never asserted these empirical external selves re Empirical Realism are illusions.
Kant only insisted the supposed independent external selves claimed by Philosophical [critical realists] as things-in-themselves are illusions.

It is because you cannot understand the above [being stuck dogmatically in your critical realism silo] that you keep throwing out strawmen created within your Philosophical [critical realism].

It not only you but the strawmen you created are typical of the analytic philosophers [since the late 1700s to Strawson to Guyer and the rest] who misunderstood the central theme of Kant's CPR.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:an existing independent-of-human-mind external world - reality-in-itself.
The only way out of this is for the anti-realist to state that other minds, other selves that experience, do not exist independent of the mind of the anti-realist. And that is called solipsism.
As far as Kantian anti-realism is concern, it is based on Empirical Realism thus solipsism is irrelevant. Solipsism is another of your strawman from the basis of your philosophical [critical ] realism.
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Conde Lucanor
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

You're still saying that I'm saying what I'm not saying. If there's someone imposing realism upon himself is Kant, when he forced upon himself the assertion that there are other things (selves) independent of his own mind (cognition, experience, etc.), which he merely inferred indirectly, not by direct contact with them.

And then you go on, of course, to reproduce Kant's dogma: "Empirical Realism is subsumed [wholly] within his Transcendental Idealism, blah, blah, blah..." No argument there, no demostration, just pure recitation of Kant's dogma. The issue is where does his dogma lead us logically, and the analysis shows it leads to contradictions. The empirical selves of other subjects supposedly cannot be absolutely independent of Kant's human condition, yet that is exactly what his own system entails. And if those are not illusions, they are real in themselves, and so are not illusions the real things in themselves of realists. Again, not me imposing realism on Kant, but he imposing it upon himself. There is no difference between the "independent external selves claimed by Philosophical [critical realists]" and the "other selves that are empirically real and existing independent of and external to [Kant's] own self".

The charge of solispism against Kant is not new. As was discussed earlier, Kant's attempt to take distance from Berkeley were not completely successful. His doctrine still carries the germ of phenomenalism, which ultimately always leads to solipsism. Note what happens when some try to separate Kant's phenomenalism from Berkeley's:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenalism
Kant's "epistemological phenomenalism", as it has been called, is therefore quite distinct from Berkeley's earlier ontological version. In Berkeley's view, the so-called "things-in-themselves" do not exist except as subjectively perceived bundles of sensations which are guaranteed consistency and permanence because they are constantly perceived by the mind of God. Hence, while Berkeley holds that objects are merely bundles of sensations (see bundle theory), Kant holds (unlike other bundle theorists) that objects do not cease to exist when they are no longer perceived by some merely human subject or mind.
Just think of that: in order for being saved from the phenomenalism of subjective idealism, Kant supposedly must have posited that objects are independent of human conditions. Apparently he did not, so you say, so he remains attached to Berkeley's phenomenalism.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

xxx
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Wed Aug 11, 2021 7:01 am, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Wed Aug 11, 2021 3:25 am You're still saying that I'm saying what I'm not saying. If there's someone imposing realism upon himself is Kant, when he forced upon himself the assertion that there are other things (selves) independent of his own mind (cognition, experience, etc.), which he merely inferred indirectly, not by direct contact with them.
You are still imposing ‘your realism’ upon Kant which he categorically rejected.

You are making a ridiculous claim.
How can Kant imposed Philosophical Realism on himself when he had condemned Philosophical Realism in one of the main theme in his CPR? Note, [mine]
Kant in CPR wrote:it still remains a scandal to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us [re Philosophical (critical) Realism] […] must be accepted merely on Faith,
and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their Existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.
B xxxix Preface 2nd Edition.
There are many philosophers who understand the above challenge and the notable GE Moore had taken the challenge, but failed. Moore mentioned Kant's challenge in one paper related to the following theme.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand
http://www.ditext.com/moore/common-sense.html
  • Proof of an External World
    by G. E. Moore (1939)
    It seems to me that, so far from its being true, as Kant declares to be his opinion, that there is only one possible proof of the existence of things outside of us, namely the one which he has given, I can now give a large number of different proofs, each of which is a perfectly rigorous proof; and that at many other times I have been in a position to give many others. I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples.

The other obvious clue is Kant's Copernican Revolution [CPR-2nd Bxvi], i.e. instead of chasing after absolute-external-reality which the majority of traditional metaphysicists had failed to confirm, Kant turned 180 degrees to the human conditions in relation to the realization and knowledge of things.

When you insists Kant is contradicting himself, it is because you have not understood [not necessary agree] Kant Critique of Pure Reason thoroughly. That is the most likely because you have not read the CPR thoroughly [which is very tedious] but rather you lazily depend on secondary sources [analytic philosophers] who also misunderstood Kant due to their sticking dogmatically via Philosophical Realism [transcendental realism].

On the other hand, I had spent years reading and researching on Kant's philosophies [line by line for the CPR] and in the last two months had been refreshing through the CPR and the secondary sources.

Note many commentators [Allison, Grier, Bird] who are pro Kant admitted Kant had been 'apparently" quite messy in his presentations and appear to be presenting conflicting views throughout the CPR. But the point is when any philosophical work dig very deep and wide it is very common for views at various points to be seemingly conflicting. However, taken in the whole context they are not contradictory.

For example a beginner in Physics if he presented with Newtonian, Einsteinian and QM theories at one go in the beginning, it is obvious to him, there are so many contradictions [apparently] between them. This is the same problem with Kant's work re his corresponding separate faculties of Sensibility, Understanding and Reason.
And then you go on, of course, to reproduce Kant's dogma: "Empirical Realism is subsumed [wholly] within his Transcendental Idealism, blah, blah, blah..." No argument there, no demonstration, just pure recitation of Kant's dogma.
The issue is where does his dogma lead us logically, and the analysis shows it leads to contradictions.

The empirical selves of other subjects supposedly cannot be absolutely independent of Kant's human condition, yet that is exactly what his own system entails.
And if those are not illusions, they are real in themselves, and so are not illusions the real things in themselves of realists.
Again, not me imposing realism on Kant, but he imposing it upon himself.
There is no difference between the "independent external selves claimed by Philosophical [critical realists]" and the "other selves that are empirically real and existing independent of and external to [Kant's] own self".
WHO ARE YOU to simply make such statements?

Kant’s argument against Transcendental Realism [as with Philosophical Realism] is documented thoroughly in his CPR.
I have already provided a summary of this Kant, but in this case [which is very complex], it is imperative one read Kant thoroughly to understand his argument and therefrom provide their counter argument.

For you to insist
  • “The empirical selves of other subjects supposedly cannot be absolutely independent of Kant's human condition, yet that is exactly what his own system entails.”
without reference to Kant’s full argument would be very dishonest intellectually.

Kant is not disputing the external empirical selves from the common and conventional perspectives, but that he insisted
it still remains a scandal to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us must be accepted merely on Faith,


i.e. Philosophical [critical realism] is a scandal to Philosophy, there must be something more to it than empirical externality. Kant wrote the above in the Preface and the whole argument is supported by the >700 pages of his CPR in one full argument.

Kant already anticipated ‘short changers’ like you and the analytic philosophers you relied upon who cherry picked;
  • If we take single passages, torn from their contexts, and compare them with one another, apparent contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in a work that is written with any freedom of expression.
    In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others, such contradictions have the effect of placing the work in an unfavourable light; but they are easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the Whole. B xliv
Kant knew his thesis is very complex and thus expect those who critiqued his work to master the Idea-of-the-Whole before they present their critique of the CPR.

I have mentioned the above many times, but you simply ignored them and argued from the basis of ignorance of the CPR.
The charge of solispism against Kant is not new. As was discussed earlier, Kant's attempt to take distance from Berkeley were not completely successful. His doctrine still carries the germ of phenomenalism, which ultimately always leads to solipsism. Note what happens when some try to separate Kant's phenomenalism from Berkeley's:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenalism
Kant's "epistemological phenomenalism", as it has been called, is therefore quite distinct from Berkeley's earlier ontological version. In Berkeley's view, the so-called "things-in-themselves" do not exist except as subjectively perceived bundles of sensations which are guaranteed consistency and permanence because they are constantly perceived by the mind of God. Hence, while Berkeley holds that objects are merely bundles of sensations (see bundle theory), Kant holds (unlike other bundle theorists) that objects do not cease to exist when they are no longer perceived by some merely human subject or mind.
Just think of that: in order for being saved from the phenomenalism of subjective idealism, Kant supposedly must have posited that objects are independent of human conditions. Apparently he did not, so you say, so he remains attached to Berkeley's phenomenalism.
We have gone through the above before.
There are loads of books written to counter the above charges and I have mentioned some of them before.

As explained above all these charges are based on ignorance of the “idea of the Whole” Bxliv of the CPR.

ps: propose your requote my post in your response, else I do not get the notification and likely to miss it, and also you do not miss out the critical points I raised.
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Wed Aug 11, 2021 7:00 am, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

double-posting
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Conde Lucanor »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Aug 11, 2021 6:55 am You are still imposing ‘your realism’ upon Kant which he categorically rejected.
There you go again, reciting Kant's dogma without providing further counterarguments and analysis to my arguments. Your approach goes like that of the cult member that says: "the Bible is the truth and has all the answers, therefore if you find inconsistencies, it MUST BE that you're not getting it, not that the Bible is wrong". So you come now to say it's ridiculous to claim Kant's anti-realism has some serious flaws that ultimately make the case for realism, because Kant's anti-realism is unquestionable, and doing so would be imposing upon Kant a doctrine that he explicitly rejected. But you're deliberately missing the point there, as I'm not arguing Kant advocated for what you call Philosophical Realism. What I have pointed out is that in the process of arguing against realism, Kant misses the fact that he makes assumptions that replicate the same thought process he rejects from realists. The fact that he's forced to do it (otherwise his system crumbles), is a point in favor of realism. My argument has been all along that if you take a description of what Kant's main doctrine entails, such as this excerpt from the introduction of a Cambridge edition, there are several (apparently casual) assumptions that Kant is not entitled to take if he was consistent and followed his own doctrine:

http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts ... bridge.pdf
This new science, which Kant calls "transcendental" (A 1 1 I B 25), does not deal directly with objects of empirical cognition, but investigates the conditions of the possibility of OUR experience of them by examining the mental capacities that are required for US to have any cognition of objects at all.
in general terms it is the claim that it is only from the HUMAN standpoint that WE can speak of space, time, and the spatiotemporality of the objects of experience, thus that WE cognize these things not as they are in themselves but only as they appear under the conditions of OUR sensibility (A26-30/B42-5, A 32-48 /B 49-73). This is Kant's famous doctrine of transcendental idealism, which is employed throughout the Critique of Pure Reason (and the two subsequent critiques) in a variety of ways, both positively, as in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and "Discipline of Pure Reason," to account for the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition in mathematics, and negatively, as in the "Transcendental Dialectic," to limit the scope of OUR cognition to the appearances given to OUR sensibility, while denying that WE can have any cognition of things as they are in themselves, that is, as transcendent realities constituted as they are independently of the constitution of OUR cognitive capacities.
As I have said many times, the use of words like "human", "we", "our", already implies spatiotemporal objects of experience, objects with some particular attributes: they think, the reality of which Kant must explain too, from his own first person perspective, the start of all phenomenalist accounts of reality. But as he takes all objects to be: things are not to be cognized by HIM as they are in themselves but only as they appear under the conditions of HIS sensibility. So, following his doctrine, it is HIS own sensibility that attributes empirical reality to the subject-things that appear to HIS senses, as well as attributes sensibility to them, and HE cannot know nothing about human subjects and their sensibility as a transcendental reality constituted as it is, independently of the constitution of HIS cognitive capacities, in other words, he must deny HE can have cognition of human subjects as they are in themselves, nor of human sensibility in itself. Whatever Kant wants to say about human conditions, they must be limited to what HIS own mind constitutes as such, and whenever he claimed such human conditions existed on their own, so that it would be possible to talk about "humans" and "we" as a transcendent reality, he would be refuting his own doctrine. The possibilities of his philosophical project are them limited to the scope of his own subjective experience, thus subjective idealism and solipsism, but of course we know he ventured to open the door to a reality beyond HIMSELF. When he opened that door, he gave a license to realists to go through it themselves.

It's worth noticing that my arguments deal directly with Kant's quotes that you have provided as the faithful reflection of his thought and with scholarly references. My arguments are there for debate, and surely I could be proven wrong, as I get glimpses of possible refutation strategies which I'm prepared to deal with, but never arrive. To make such refutations one would have to look at the arguments themselves and find their logical soundness, or lack of. You are, however, uncapable of doing that, you can only resort to the cult-like, dogmatic behavior of dismissing everything with the claim that it must be a misunderstanding, which supposedly should be instantly solved by submitting one's faith to the word of the self-ordained minister of Kantian philosophy, Veritas Aequitas.

Who am I "to simply make such statements?" I'm confident the debate itself will be the judge, if my ideas find no contest, I can safely assume they're logically sound. To make it even more clear: disputing and refuting my ideas implies putting more effort than just saying: "Kant did not agree with that" or "that is a straw man of Kant's position".
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Mon Aug 16, 2021 2:22 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Aug 11, 2021 6:55 am You are still imposing ‘your realism’ upon Kant which he categorically rejected.
There you go again, reciting Kant's dogma without providing further counterarguments and analysis to my arguments.
Your approach goes like that of the cult member that says: "the Bible is the truth and has all the answers, therefore if you find inconsistencies, it MUST BE that you're not getting it, not that the Bible is wrong".
So you come now to say it's ridiculous to claim Kant's anti-realism has some serious flaws that ultimately make the case for realism, because Kant's anti-realism is unquestionable, and doing so would be imposing upon Kant a doctrine that he explicitly rejected.
But you're deliberately missing the point there, as I'm not arguing Kant advocated for what you call Philosophical Realism.
What I have pointed out is that in the process of arguing against realism, Kant misses the fact that he makes assumptions that replicate the same thought process he rejects from realists.
Your Bible Analogy is a bad one in this case.
Rather here, the case is like I am very familiar with Quantum Mechanics [have done the necessary work, i.e. spent 3 years+ researching Kant full time and is refreshing it at present], while you have not read Kant thoroughly at all while only relying on secondary sources. If you are off tangent with QM [Kant’s], thus I have the credibility to say so.

I don’t get your above point.
When Kant argued against ‘realism’ it is Transcendental Realism which fundamentally is the same as Philosophical or Critical Realism.
In this case, realism treat external objects as existing outside the mind as things-in-themselves in Space & Time which are also things-in-themselves.
Kant reject the above claims.

When you state;
  • Kant misses the fact that he makes assumptions that replicate the same thought process he rejects from realists.

What are the assumptions Kant has made what Kant had rejected from the realists?
The fact that he's forced to do it (otherwise his system crumbles), is a point in favor of realism.
My argument has been all along that if you take a description of what Kant's main doctrine entails, such as this excerpt from the introduction of a Cambridge edition, there are several (apparently casual) assumptions that Kant is not entitled to take if he was consistent and followed his own doctrine:

http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts ... bridge.pdf
This new science, which Kant calls "transcendental" (A 1 1 I B 25), does not deal directly with objects of empirical cognition, but investigates the conditions of the possibility of OUR experience of them by examining the mental capacities that are required for US to have any cognition of objects at all.
in general terms it is the claim that it is only from the HUMAN standpoint that WE can speak of space, time, and the spatiotemporality of the objects of experience, thus that WE cognize these things not as they are in themselves but only as they appear under the conditions of OUR sensibility (A26-30/B42-5, A 32-48 /B 49-73). This is Kant's famous doctrine of transcendental idealism, which is employed throughout the Critique of Pure Reason (and the two subsequent critiques) in a variety of ways, both positively, as in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and "Discipline of Pure Reason," to account for the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition in mathematics, and negatively, as in the "Transcendental Dialectic," to limit the scope of OUR cognition to the appearances given to OUR sensibility, while denying that WE can have any cognition of things as they are in themselves, that is, as transcendent realities constituted as they are independently of the constitution of OUR cognitive capacities.
The above is a general outline of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, but there is more to it.
It stated Kant’s Transcendental Idealism is applied throughout the CPR.
You just cannot understand Kant’s position re his Transcendental Idealism from secondary sources.
As such you need to be understand [not necessary agree with] the CPR fully to understand how Kant full justify his position on his Transcendental Idealism before you can critique his Transcendental Idealism.

In any case, what are the assumptions [re your point below] he adopted from the Realist to ensure the structure of his Transcendental Idealism to be firm.
  • Kant misses the fact that he makes assumptions that replicate the same thought process he rejects from realists.
As I have said many times, the use of words like "human", "we", "our", already implies spatiotemporal objects of experience, objects with some particular attributes: they think, the reality of which Kant must explain too, from his own first person perspective, the start of all phenomenalist accounts of reality.
But as he takes all objects to be: things are not to be cognized by HIM as they are in-themselves but only as they appear under the conditions of HIS sensibility.
So, following his doctrine, it is HIS own sensibility that attributes empirical reality to the subject-things that appear to HIS senses, as well as attributes sensibility to them,
and HE cannot know nothing about human subjects and their sensibility as a transcendental reality constituted as it is, independently of the constitution of HIS cognitive capacities,
in other words, he must deny HE can have cognition of human subjects as they are in themselves, nor of human sensibility in itself.
Whatever Kant wants to say about human conditions, they must be limited to what HIS own mind constitutes as such, and whenever he claimed such human conditions existed on their own, so that it would be possible to talk about "humans" and "we" as a transcendent reality, he would be refuting his own doctrine.
The possibilities of his philosophical project are them limited to the scope of his own subjective experience, thus subjective idealism and solipsism, but of course we know he ventured to open the door to a reality beyond HIMSELF.
When he opened that door, he gave a license to realists to go through it themselves.

It's worth noticing that my arguments deal directly with Kant's quotes that you have provided as the faithful reflection of his thought and with scholarly references.
My arguments are there for debate, and surely I could be proven wrong, as I get glimpses of possible refutation strategies which I'm prepared to deal with, but never arrive.
To make such refutations one would have to look at the arguments themselves and find their logical soundness, or lack of.
You are, however, uncapable of doing that, you can only resort to the cult-like, dogmatic behavior of dismissing everything with the claim that it must be a misunderstanding, which supposedly should be instantly solved by submitting one's faith to the word of the self-ordained minister of Kantian philosophy, Veritas Aequitas.

Who am I "to simply make such statements?"
I'm confident the debate itself will be the judge, if my ideas find no contest, I can safely assume they're logically sound.
To make it even more clear: disputing and refuting my ideas implies putting more effort than just saying: "Kant did not agree with that" or "that is a straw man of Kant's position".
Note Kant treatment of Space & Time in his Transcendental Idealism is different from that of Realism.
For Kant Space & Time is within human conditions not like the Realists’ space & time which is external and exists in themselves.

In your above counter, you are only countering based on that quoted description of Kant's Transcendental Idealism which is general and crude. As I said there is more to it. Kant's whole complete picture surrounding his Transcendental Idealism much more complex than what you have grasped above.

Btw, I am serious to get to the bottom of the chasm of our discussion, the problem is you are not serious in trying to understand Kant's views thoroughly. I am not trying to bring this as an excuse but it is a fact you don't have the full grip on Kant's view.
Since you linked Kant CPR why don't you spent some time to master it, I assure you it will not be a lost cause but you will gain hell of a lot of philosophical knowledge and be a convert to Empirical Realism & Transcendental Idealism.

Btw, I find our discussion interesting since you are trying to be more technical [in contrast to all other discussion in this forum at present] but imo you are still way off from the primary sources.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

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Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Aug 19, 2021 9:47 am Your Bible Analogy is a bad one in this case.
Rather here, the case is like I am very familiar with Quantum Mechanics [have done the necessary work, i.e. spent 3 years+ researching Kant full time and is refreshing it at present], while you have not read Kant thoroughly at all while only relying on secondary sources. If you are off tangent with QM [Kant’s], thus I have the credibility to say so.
I couldn't help but let out a good guffaw when I read this. I mean, you're so out of touch of reality, which actually is nothing strange, considering your active pursue of nonsense as a general state of mind. In any case, I already dealt with such ridiculous claims before. First, the idea that Quantum Mechanics is somehow the scientific proof of Kant's antirealism is completely false. At best, being extremely tolerant to speculations in physics, QM could inspire thoughts in Kantian philosophers, but that's about it. That still remains as a philosophical (anti-realist) interpretation of physical phenomena, done with the filter of Kantian epistemology. It has to be that way, because the idea that something out there is REALLY happening with REAL particles and demonstrates how REALITY is, is counterproductive to anti-realism. On the other hand, QM physics and physics in general is the natural research environment for realism and materialist ontology to thrive, and such advantages give very narrow chances for the development of idealist philosophies based on physical sciences, and all you get is complete goofballs like Chopra talking garbage. There's simply no anti-realist science, that is an oxymoron.

Secondly, that silly argument of yours that runs like this: "I have read books that make me an expert in a subject, while you don't" was thoroughly debunked several pages back in this thread. I take it that not being able to deal directly with my arguments forces you to resort to this kind of talk, but please...it would not convince a toddler. Have you read enough books to settle the debate on realism/anti-realism? So, at least you must have read ALL of materialist philosophy, including Bunge's complete works, and researched all of realist literature and critical realism, not just relying on secondary sources, to have a say on realism and materialism, wouldn't you say so? Since works like A Realist Theory of Science, After Finitude, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, to name a few, represent a challenge to Kantian philosophy, they should have been part of your "extensive research", yet no mention of what that "research" has produced. No mention because you haven't done that, you have just read Kant and believe dogmatically that his work contains all the truths. The Bible analogy is a pretty good one to apply in this case.

Third, no matter how hard you try to claim a monopoly in understanding Kant's CPR, the fact is that I already proved you failed miserably on that strategy, since I presented Kant scholarship that directly contradicted your views and supported mine. Your response was, of course, to completely dismiss that scholarship with no other tool than your non-authoritative opinion (the reason why you feel you must emphasize that you become an authority by just reading the CPR over and over, which is ridiculous) and when pressed, rely on other scholarly sources, even though you have been claiming no other "secondary sources" are needed. In any case, your defense mechanism now is to claim that one should first get Kant right before determining whether Kant's doctrine holds water or not. While that is true, it is also true that what Kant meant to say is still a matter of debate, given its problematic "architectonic", it has not been settled and probably never will. Both by directly reading Kant's CPR and relying on scholarly sources, one can get a good understanding of the relevant aspects of Kant's main doctrines. So, it is a lame excuse to avoid debating points just because every time an argument conflicts with Kant's doctrine, you assume the dogmatic position of a doctrinal judge and dismiss the whole issue with vague references to doctrinal purity, without providing further "technical" arguments.

Take your statement that "realism treat external objects as existing outside the mind as things-in-themselves". What is implied here is that "a realist subject treats things that appear to their senses as REALLY existing outside the mind, which they don't". Yet, the anti-realist has no way to prove that they don't, all he can say is that he can doubt it. Also, as I explained at the beginning of this thread, there's a difference between the epistemological stance that commits to the view that we cannot now HOW things really are and the one that is commited to the view that we cannot know WHAT things really are, i.e. whether they truly exist outside of minds or not (it is common knowledge that it is still debated whether Kant embraced one or the other or if he remained ambiguous on that matter). Anyway, I have argued extensively about how the implications of the mentioned first stance ultimately defeats anti-realism in its own grounds. Among other things, because the subject, which is still an object, is treated (inadvertently) by the anti-realist subject as REALLY existing and having properties outside the mind. It pushes them towards subjective idealism and solipsism, but the effort to leave that trap takes them to take realist positions, which is self-defeat.
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Re: Prove An Independent Reality-in-Itself Exists

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Conde Lucanor wrote: Sat Aug 21, 2021 4:36 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Aug 19, 2021 9:47 am Your Bible Analogy is a bad one in this case.
Rather here, the case is like I am very familiar with Quantum Mechanics [have done the necessary work, i.e. spent 3 years+ researching Kant full time and is refreshing it at present], while you have not read Kant thoroughly at all while only relying on secondary sources. If you are off tangent with QM [Kant’s], thus I have the credibility to say so.
I couldn't help but let out a good guffaw when I read this. I mean, you're so out of touch of reality, which actually is nothing strange, considering your active pursue of nonsense as a general state of mind. In any case, I already dealt with such ridiculous claims before. First, the idea that Quantum Mechanics is somehow the scientific proof of Kant's antirealism is completely false. At best, being extremely tolerant to speculations in physics, QM could inspire thoughts in Kantian philosophers, but that's about it. That still remains as a philosophical (anti-realist) interpretation of physical phenomena, done with the filter of Kantian epistemology. It has to be that way, because the idea that something out there is REALLY happening with REAL particles and demonstrates how REALITY is, is counterproductive to anti-realism. On the other hand, QM physics and physics in general is the natural research environment for realism and materialist ontology to thrive, and such advantages give very narrow chances for the development of idealist philosophies based on physical sciences, and all you get is complete goofballs like Chopra talking garbage. There's simply no anti-realist science, that is an oxymoron.
I was not VERY clear with the above.
I did not and assert,
  • the idea that Quantum Mechanics is somehow the scientific proof of Kant's antirealism

This is typical of your lack of depth and broadness in knowledge, thus the conflation.

It is meant to be the second point you mentioned below.
Secondly, that silly argument of yours that runs like this: "I have read books that make me an expert in a subject, while you don't" was thoroughly debunked several pages back in this thread.
I take it that not being able to deal directly with my arguments forces you to resort to this kind of talk, but please...it would not convince a toddler.

Have you read enough books to settle the debate on realism/anti-realism?
So, at least you must have read ALL of materialist philosophy, including Bunge's complete works, and researched all of realist literature and critical realism, not just relying on secondary sources, to have a say on realism and materialism, wouldn't you say so?
Since works like A Realist Theory of Science, After Finitude, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, to name a few, represent a challenge to Kantian philosophy, they should have been part of your "extensive research", yet no mention of what that "research" has produced. No mention because you haven't done that, you have just read Kant and believe dogmatically that his work contains all the truths. The Bible analogy is a pretty good one to apply in this case.
Debunked?? That is only within your narrow-minded view.

Note, this discussion is specific to Kant’s Philosophy, i.e. his Critique of Pure Reason.
Your ignorance in thinking Kant’s CPR is just like any other Philosophical text exposes your range and depth of philosophical knowledge.

Generally within the philosophical circle, Kant’s CPR is a very and most complex text within Western Philosophy which is complicated by the way he wrote the texts.

Many have stated it takes 3 years full time or 5 years part time to fully understand [not necessary agree with] Kant’s CPR taking into account one has to cover all his other related works to the CPR. I know because I have gone through that problem, then the solution.
Do you deny this and can prove otherwise?

If you have not done the above or even half of it, then it is likely you don’t have a good grasp of Kant’s CPR [and the related issues we are debating] and this is reflected in all your responses.

Despite your handicap, my discussion with you is merely as a sort of motivation and impetus to refresh my own knowledge of Kant’s CPR – a very rare chance in forums.
If you persist it may be a gain of Kant’s CPR [not necessary agree with] to yourself.

You can bet, I have done extensive research on the debate between realist and anti-realist and believe I have covered most the critical texts related to it.

Mario Augusto Bunge?? What is so special about Bunge that is different from others. Give me his most famous references and links to his work. Where is he mentioned as a reputable philosopher in relation to the other great philosopher?

Since I am heavily into Kant’s work, obviously I MUST and have covered ALL the significant counters to his Philosophy. The books you mentioned are not significant else they would have been brought to the fore in the discussions of Kant’s Philosophy.
Note my knowledge of Kant's is reinforced with critical knowledge from Eastern Philosophy.

Extensive??
The Folder on Kant in my computer contains >2200 files in 103 sub-folders. I would welcome your suggestions on any aspect I could miss as my mission is to ensure I had covered all significant grounds re Kant’s CPR and his philosophical works, so no one can accuse me of being ignorant re Kant's CPR.
Third, no matter how hard you try to claim a monopoly in understanding Kant's CPR, the fact is that I already proved you failed miserably on that strategy, since I presented Kant scholarship that directly contradicted your views and supported mine.
Your response was, of course, to completely dismiss that scholarship with no other tool than your non-authoritative opinion (the reason why you feel you must emphasize that you become an authority by just reading the CPR over and over, which is ridiculous) and when pressed, rely on other scholarly sources, even though you have been claiming no other "secondary sources" are needed.

In any case, your defense mechanism now is to claim that one should first get Kant right before determining whether Kant's doctrine holds water or not. While that is true, it is also true that what Kant meant to say is still a matter of debate, given its problematic "architectonic", it has not been settled and probably never will. Both by directly reading Kant's CPR and relying on scholarly sources, one can get a good understanding of the relevant aspects of Kant's main doctrines. So, it is a lame excuse to avoid debating points just because every time an argument conflicts with Kant's doctrine, you assume the dogmatic position of a doctrinal judge and dismiss the whole issue with vague references to doctrinal purity, without providing further "technical" arguments.
Your thought that I had failed is due to you viewing from your limited knowledge of Kant’s CPR.

Since Kant’s views are so contentious, depending on secondary sources will not work in this case, so you need to take into account this limitation if you insist to do so in relying on secondary sources.
Note there are tons of philosophers disagreeing with Kant, mostly analytic philosophers [Bennett, Wash, Guyer, etc.] and there are those [Allison, Grier, Bird and others] who counter they [anti-Kantian] are wrong and often on the basis of not fully understanding Kant’s original intention.
Take your statement that "realism treat external objects as existing outside the mind as things-in-themselves".
What is implied here is that "a realist subject treats things that appear to their senses as REALLY existing outside the mind, which they don't". Yet, the anti-realist has no way to prove that they don't, all he can say is that he can doubt it.
Note I have already linked this a “1000” times,
  • Philosophical realism is usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters. Realism about a certain kind of thing is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
    Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of the mind, as opposed to non-realist views..
    Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
The above is the essence of what is “realism” [Philosophical, etc.] and note ‘realism’ cannot stand on its own without the above definition which cover critical realism, indirect realism and all relevant realism, where proponents will argue tooth and nails for their stance.

If it not the above, then, you are on the anti-realists’ side.

Kant's Empirical Realism is similar in general but with a different twist.
In any case, your defense mechanism now is to claim that one should first get Kant right before determining whether Kant's doctrine holds water or not. While that is true, it is also true that what Kant meant to say is still a matter of debate, given its problematic "architectonic", it has not been settled and probably never will.
Yes, what claimed is being debated, but from my perspective that is because those who contested Kant’s view do not understand Kant’s original point. Rather they have a confirmation bias with the Transcendental Realism view.
Note I stated this is also a psychological issue re existential crisis which need to be taken into account.
Also, as I explained at the beginning of this thread, there's a difference between the epistemological stance that commits to the view that we cannot now HOW things really are and the one that is committed to the view that we cannot know WHAT things really are, i.e. whether they truly exist outside of minds or not (it is common knowledge that it is still debated whether Kant embraced one or the other or if he remained ambiguous on that matter).
Anyway, I have argued extensively about how the implications of the mentioned first stance ultimately defeats anti-realism in its own grounds.
You are ignorant on the above.
Kant’s position is very clear based on his Copernican Revolution as a 180 degree turn from that of traditional metaphysics and philosophical realism.
Among other things, because the subject, which is still an object, is treated (inadvertently) by the anti-realist subject as REALLY existing and having properties outside the mind.
It pushes them towards subjective idealism and solipsism, but the effort to leave that trap takes them to take realist positions, which is self-defeat.
Again you are ignorant of Kant’s position re the Self and Apperception.
To counter Kant you have first to present his argument about the self accordance to the CPR and then counter his views appropriately. Your above is merely a strawman based on guess work.
You can open a new thread to counter Kant on his concept of the Self.
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