Note you insist I am an idealist without qualification and my idealism is the same as Berkeley's.Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Sat May 15, 2021 9:59 pmBy your own criteria, LP could not be defunct. It is still discussed and has influenced some philosophers, no less than Kantianism.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat May 15, 2021 10:39 amI did not mean you adopted the LPs philosophies wholesale which is now defunct.Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Thu May 13, 2021 9:06 pm I have not explicitly endorsed nor implied Logical Positivism, so that's an straw man fallacy of yours. I have already stated that I'm more inclined towards Critical Realism, which is a position born in direct challenge to Logical Positivism.
In condemning TI, I'm not more arrogant than you condemning realism.
What I imply is you are adopting some bits of their views and their typical ideological stance in condemning others who do not agree with them, pejoratively, i.e. those they think are leaning toward the metaphysical.
The similarity is you are critical of my views [empirical realism and others] so arrogantly when your views [transcendental/material realism] are groundless.
Having views which coincide with LP philosophies does not make one an endorser of the whole body of doctrines of LP. I certainly would prefer, nonetheless, endorsing LP than endorsing idealism in any of its forms.
Your ad hominems are grounded in another fallacy. To condemn opponents pejoratively would require insulting them, being deprecatory, but I have never referred to any person in such terms. I have only pointed at and condemned ideas, doctrines, in no less derogatory terms that you have used against the doctrines you oppose. I have respect for Kant, Berkeley, etc., and give them the credit they deserve in the history of philosophy, being alongside many others that, while ultimately wrong in the doctrines they promoted, nevertheless contributed in important discussions that enriched our philosophical culture. That doesn't mean one should treat their ideas with a soft glove.
Then you condemn idealists' view as nonsense [which in any case you are an empirical idealist].
That is blatantly insulting and offensive especially when I have stated many times, my idealism is that of transcendental idealism and has nothing to do with Berkeley and other sorts of idealism.
I believe it is very appropriate for me to explain [not condemn] why you are behaving [not acknowledging my claims at all] as such. I am referring to the history of the views you hold at present [material realist and analytic] and that is traceable to the logical positivists and their ideology.
I am also researching into the psychology of the logical positivists and the classical analytical philosophers. I would suggest that to you as well.
That is what I meant above.You have branded yourself as a Kantian and an idealist. Kant himself has been branded a phenomenalist or at least a precursor or phenomenalism, and Husserl, the father of modern phenomenology, branded himself a transcendental idealist. You cannot get away from the phenomenalist labeling so easily, calling it a straw man, without taking distance at the same time from transcendental idealism. There may be important distinctions on the grounds that one can favor either an epistemological interpretation of Kant's work or an ontological one, as has already been discussed, but it has been precisely my intention that you settle for one perspective, which so far you have not, moving from one position to another that contradicts it, or a mixture of positions that do not correspond to the labels you assign for yourself. In the end, I really care very little about labels, which is not your case.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat May 15, 2021 10:39 am Somehow you are very obstinate and fixated in branding me as a phenomenalist and the typical idealist when I have stated so many times I am not.
As such that is your strawman.
I have told you a "million" times I am not the typical "idealist" but rather is an empirical realist or a transcendental idealist.
You are still branding me as an idealist [unqualified] and a phenomenalist.
There are loads of texts out there that argued Kant was not a phenomenalist in the serious and ultimate sense.
Kant himself proclaimed his transcendental idealism has nothing to do with Berkeley and the other sorts of idealism. [note the bits I quoted from the Prolegomena].
Why his opponents insisted to pigeon-hole Kant's views as Berkeley was due to primal psychology like what the LPs are doing in condemning those whose philosophies are not aligned to theirs.
Nope.From that last statement we get that humans are, ultimately, illusions.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat May 15, 2021 10:39 amI believe you missed my point due to your dogmatic view re transcendental realism.Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Thu May 13, 2021 9:06 pm
The problem with the above is that you still refuse to answer directly and without giving resolution to the conditional clause.
You say "if X perspective, then Z is real, but X is subsumed within Y perspective".
And then when I ask what is real for Y perspective, you come back with "if X perspective, then Z is real, but X is subsumed within Y perspective".
When I ask: is Z real for Y perspective?, you repeat the same mantra.
Let me rephrase,
What is real-Z is only within the perspective of reality, but that is subsumed within Y.
Since there is only the perspective of reality [Kant Category of reality] there is no question of what is real-Z within perspective-Y.
To insist there is a real-Z within perspective-Y is chasing an illusion.
It's not that they don't exist empirically, but don't exist at all.
And so, according to the doctrine you embrace, a transcendental realist about humans, is only chasing illusions, as there are no real, actual humans, as mind-independent objects. This is completely absurd.
Did you not read what I stated, i.e.
" ...there is no question of what is real-Z within perspective-Y."
You are the one who is questioning and insisting "there is a real-Z within perspective-Y" thus you are the one who would be chasing an illusion. In this case, it would be a soul that survives physical death.
Re your last para, I have already stated the main difference between Kant [also mine] and Berkeley is the God factor among other differences.You didn't get it. I never said Berkeley thought of "the Outer Appearance of the moon as the moon-it-itself existing independent of the human conditions."Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat May 15, 2021 10:39 am Show me evidence where did Berkeley,
"interpret the Outer Appearance of the moon as the moon-it-itself existing independent of the human conditions."
Berkeley interpreted outer-appearances are merely ideas in the mind from perceptions and they do not exist as thing-in-itself, thus moon-in-itself.
This is why to Berkeley, the moon do not exists if no one is perceiving but exists only in the mind of God.
Quite the opposite, but then I pointed at you saying that Kant's position is that
"when transcendental realists claimed, say, the moon-it-itself exists as real and is absolutely independent of the human conditions, then the transcendental realist [you] is clinging on to an illusion."
So, there must be humans cognizing the object Moon for there being such and object, and when not perceived by humans, this object ceases to be.
That is consistent with Berkeley's subjective idealism, yet you claim is Kant's TI.
You have clearly stated that both deny the Moon in itself ever existing. I have contended that this is not exactly what Kant said, but if you want to say I'm misinterpreting you on what Kant said, then you cannot keep peddling the view that for Kant the Moon cannot exist in itself as a mind-independent object.
Your reply that "things in themselves" are not to be understood as ontological things, but epistemological things, actually sends you closer again to Berkeley, as epistemological things are necessarily mind-only things. That gets you in trouble even more quickly than subjective idealism.
Berkeley relied on God as the ultimate to leverage the existence of things and I don't.
This god factor of Berkeley's is the overriding reason why Berkeley's idealism cannot be the same as Kant's.
Both Kant and Berkeley deny the moon-it-itself i.e. the ontological moon-in-itself exists as real.
However Kant's empirical realism meant the empirical moon exists even if there are no persons to perceive it. Berkeley did not agree with this point with his Esse est percipi i.e. "To be is to be perceived.”