Things-in-Themselves Exist as Real?

[Advocate]

>This interpretation is a form of the anthropic principle. But nor necessarily like it, it tends to imply that no worlds exist WITHOUT us to observe it.

Stuff exists without us but words, and worlds do not. Those are human-centric ideas, regardless of how shared they may or may not be with other creatures.

[Scott Mayers]

This interpretation is a form of the anthropic principle. But nor necessarily like it, it tends to imply that no worlds exist WITHOUT us to observe it.

The anthropic principle doesn't imply or claim anything about the existence or non-existence of anything.

It implies that all observations depend on conditions favourable for the existence of observers.
At best it implies that if the universe was any other way we wouldn't be here to observe it being that way.

I said, "form of". Perhaps 'kind of like' might be better?

I understood it to mean precisely this but Veritas' interpretation of Kant implies existing facts about the real world rely on our existence. It is akin to the anthropic principle in appearance to how it has confused many to interpret this in the implication that WE cannot argue for 'existence' without existing. I disagree to how this 'principle' was even presented because of this implication to which the Christian Apologist has used often to argue the special 'fine tuned' reality as also PROOF of the comparison of the watch as due to a watchmaker, a common argument to suggest design by a Creator. I would use a different argument that avoids this interpretation.

[My argument in the past regarding similar concerns uses the stats of a lottery. If one has already won the lottery, looking back, they had 100% chance to win because they did. This makes people think that given their odds of winning prior to winning was so rare, this 'win' proves they had some SPECIAL fate to win regardless of the odds. The Anthropic Principle is poorly expressed in my opinion because it is arguing like the winner after the fact in a similar way of confusion.]

[Skepdick]

[My argument in the past regarding similar concerns uses the stats of a lottery. If one has already won the lottery, looking back, they had 100% chance to win because they did. This makes people think that given their odds of winning prior to winning was so rare, this 'win' proves they had some SPECIAL fate to win regardless of the odds. The Anthropic Principle is poorly expressed in my opinion because it is arguing like the winner after the fact in a similar way of confusion.]

Well duuuh!

Who would be arguing "before the fact" ?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Thus what Kant meant is whatever are things existing as real, we cannot extricate the human elements from their existence.

This interpretation is a form of the anthropic principle. But nor necessarily like it, it tends to imply that no worlds exist WITHOUT us to observe it.

Note Skepdick's response to the above.

In this case, we just cannot leverage on the concept of 'observation' to arrive at any conclusion regarding the thing-in-itself.

The point here we should start with the obvious, i.e. what is empirically verifiable and justifiable and then attempt to trace it to its source [independent if any].
But so far, all philosophies has failed to trace what is an empirical thing to any independent source as in substance theory.

• Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.

The only sure thing we can infer is, the human conditions are inevitably involved with reference to what exists.

The most is if anyone were to insist on substance theory they have to admit that is based on pure speculation.

For example you exists only as an empirical self and physically but not as person-in-itself as in an independent non-empirical soul that survives physical death.

I don't understand this language as your example. "X-in-itself" lacks meaning other than reference to general objects that are at question beyond our conscious state of perception. Kant would have had no language to express that what we PERCEIVE is independent from the actual objects in a word. So, "person-in-itself" is odd without considering OTHER people beyond one's self.

Also, I don't know what you mean by 'empirical'. (?) What "empirical" refers to is to the convention of ideally all people from anywhere to at least be able to agree in principle that some conclusion is sharable with respect to processes involving experiment and reproducibility of them. The subjective individual is not empirically relevant unless you think that you need a consensus of others to assure you that you exist.

The person-in-itself is the claim that a soul of oneself exists independently of one's empirical self and can live on independently after physical death.

The empirical self is the self that one can see in the mirror, feel and sense empirically and do not exists upon physical death.

Note Descartes' the "I-THINK" that thinks and the "I-AM" that exists as something permanent and survives after death.

What is obvious to humans are the things that can be empirically verified and justified, but for realists they insist there is something that exist beyond the empirical which is independent of the human interactions and conditions, i.e. the thing-in-itself, i.e. substance theory as mentioned above.

[Scott Mayers]

[My argument in the past regarding similar concerns uses the stats of a lottery. If one has already won the lottery, looking back, they had 100% chance to win because they did. This makes people think that given their odds of winning prior to winning was so rare, this 'win' proves they had some SPECIAL fate to win regardless of the odds. The Anthropic Principle is poorly expressed in my opinion because it is arguing like the winner after the fact in a similar way of confusion.]

Well duuuh!

Who would be arguing "before the fact" ?

You missed the significance of this rhetorical assertion. The Anthropic Principle is nothing more than saying that things are the way they are because they are. If they were not, then they would not be. It is the same as someone saying they are divinely special because they won the lottery (as proof of the unusual 'fine tune' nature of their beief in God); But had they not been special, they wouldn't have even been able to buy that ticket that granted them their unusual winning odds that they superceded.

To me, Veritas is appearing to claim that if we were not conscious, the world would not exist, as though our existence is what assured reality. But this is itself an anthrocentric bias. Furthermore, if we were to take this view, not even any meaning to 'empirical' matters because it deals with MORE than one person. If I wasn't born to be conscious, does this mean that not even other people exist? If I am NOT a conscious observer, it merely assures that I cannot in principle QUALIFY to argue about 'proof'. The religious apologist actually plays into the very thing that 'empirical' validation is supposed to be restricted to AT MINIMAL: that a 'subjective' observer is at least understood to be necessary in order for an 'objective' view to JUDGE whether some observations among other subjects AGREE or not to their observations. Either way, it is an empty argument and if anything, ignores the fact that no stat can even measure the odds of our existence OTHER than 100%. But since we do not even have an observation of other life out there, no declared 'odds' are 'empirical' either.

All that is needed to argue against the religious apologist who declares something appears 'designed' is to ask them to provide an example of something NOT 'designed'. (?) There is no need to formulate a 'principle' as though it has more scientific validity or rationale. It is only effective to at best intimidate those who don't know the difference.

As to the topic, there is nothing 'empirical' if it is not SHARED. It is a POLITIC regarding groups of people (formally 'scientists' who agree to the same set of observations), not a fact of intellectual reflection about how someone SUBJECTIVELY can have 'proof' about reality beyond them. Those other people who are in our world are as much 'things-in-themselves' and so cannot be trusted if one cannot trust non-human 'objects' either. Thus, "empirical verifiablity and justifiablity" are irrelevant terms. When one is trying to philosophically try to determine FROM the 'subjective' perspective whether other things exist, they don't require asking the opinions of others who are also 'objects' in the very question about whether objects one is trying to determine exist are valid or not.

[Scott Mayers]

Thus what Kant meant is whatever are things existing as real, we cannot extricate the human elements from their existence.

This interpretation is a form of the anthropic principle. But nor necessarily like it, it tends to imply that no worlds exist WITHOUT us to observe it.

Note Skepdick's response to the above.

In this case, we just cannot leverage on the concept of 'observation' to arrive at any conclusion regarding the thing-in-itself.

The point here we should start with the obvious, i.e. what is empirically verifiable and justifiable and then attempt to trace it to its source [independent if any].
But so far, all philosophies has failed to trace what is an empirical thing to any independent source as in substance theory.

• Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.

The only sure thing we can infer is, the human conditions are inevitably involved with reference to what exists.

The most is if anyone were to insist on substance theory they have to admit that is based on pure speculation.

You cannot even postulate whether other 'humans' exist if you doubt objects. ALL things one percieves are OBJECTS, including your reflection in the mirror! If you are not permitted to assert objects are things-in-themselves, you cannot ASK the opinion of any such 'object', which includes other people. Then you cannot qualify what is called, "empirical", as having MORE power to justify anything because what is empirical requires the opinions of other people...other objects.

You cannot ask a rock if it exists and expect it to reflect an answer that is human-like. But human-like objects that CAN do this are no more 'proof' if you cannot accept using your collective experiences about observing rocks as 'communicating' information sufficient for you to determine if it is or is not 'real'.

For example you exists only as an empirical self and physically but not as person-in-itself as in an independent non-empirical soul that survives physical death.

I don't understand this language as your example. "X-in-itself" lacks meaning other than reference to general objects that are at question beyond our conscious state of perception. Kant would have had no language to express that what we PERCEIVE is independent from the actual objects in a word. So, "person-in-itself" is odd without considering OTHER people beyond one's self.

Also, I don't know what you mean by 'empirical'. (?) What "empirical" refers to is to the convention of ideally all people from anywhere to at least be able to agree in principle that some conclusion is sharable with respect to processes involving experiment and reproducibility of them. The subjective individual is not empirically relevant unless you think that you need a consensus of others to assure you that you exist.

The person-in-itself is the claim that a soul of oneself exists independently of one's empirical self and can live on independently after physical death.

The empirical self is the self that one can see in the mirror, feel and sense empirically and do not exists upon physical death.

Note Descartes' the "I-THINK" that thinks and the "I-AM" that exists as something permanent and survives after death.

What is obvious to humans are the things that can be empirically verified and justified, but for realists they insist there is something that exist beyond the empirical which is independent of the human interactions and conditions, i.e. the thing-in-itself, i.e. substance theory as mentioned above.

I don't even know how the 'soul' is relevant in this discussion. I know that the confusion about duality has validity if you interpret the inference of some 'soul' as the non-localized energy that the matter of the brain causes. Descartes could not rationalize the non-locality of consciousness as it is still confusing for most people today. The illusion to be able to sense more than one thing at a time is a form of entanglement of the energy that occurs simultaneously in more than one point in the brain. I also do not make sense of "substance theory" as being related. I am permitted to label a set of phenomena as 'real-in-themselves' if I cannot have the same kind of control that I have when I try to move a finger. I get FEEDBACK about what I 'output' (the command to move a finger) by the 'input(s)' of sensing the expected phenomena consistently. "Objects" can be inferred by defining them as the set of phenomena that one cannot predictively control with absolute consistency. They are not 'provable' as anything more than the descriptions of your unique experience. But you cannot even 'prove' your own body as anything meaningful beyond those sets of experiences that you have MOST consistent control over.

This argument seems to relate to 'solipsism'. We default to assume reality is just OUR experience. The 'proof' that it may not be ONLY our own conscious experience (which is sufficient to doubt solipsism) is that regarding one's predictability.

If you cannot 'predict' some set of phenomena, you lack control over it and thus just DEFINE those things as 'not my-controllable phenomena' which we simplify by the term, 'objects'.

[Veritas Aequitas]

This interpretation is a form of the anthropic principle. But nor necessarily like it, it tends to imply that no worlds exist WITHOUT us to observe it.

Note Skepdick's response to the above.

In this case, we just cannot leverage on the concept of 'observation' to arrive at any conclusion regarding the thing-in-itself.

The point here we should start with the obvious, i.e. what is empirically verifiable and justifiable and then attempt to trace it to its source [independent if any].
But so far, all philosophies has failed to trace what is an empirical thing to any independent source as in substance theory.

• Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.

The only sure thing we can infer is, the human conditions are inevitably involved with reference to what exists.

The most is if anyone were to insist on substance theory they have to admit that is based on pure speculation.

You cannot even postulate whether other 'humans' exist if you doubt objects. ALL things one percieves are OBJECTS, including your reflection in the mirror! If you are not permitted to assert objects are things-in-themselves, you cannot ASK the opinion of any such 'object', which includes other people. Then you cannot qualify what is called, "empirical", as having MORE power to justify anything because what is empirical requires the opinions of other people...other objects.

You cannot ask a rock if it exists and expect it to reflect an answer that is human-like. But human-like objects that CAN do this are no more 'proof' if you cannot accept using your collective experiences about observing rocks as 'communicating' information sufficient for you to determine if it is or is not 'real'.

I don't doubt objects that are empirically possible.

There is a big difference between empirical objects [phenomena] and objects-in-themselves [noumena].

The person-in-itself is the claim that a soul of oneself exists independently of one's empirical self and can live on independently after physical death.

The empirical self is the self that one can see in the mirror, feel and sense empirically and do not exists upon physical death.

Note Descartes' the "I-THINK" that thinks and the "I-AM" that exists as something permanent and survives after death.

What is obvious to humans are the things that can be empirically verified and justified, but for realists they insist there is something that exist beyond the empirical which is independent of the human interactions and conditions, i.e. the thing-in-itself, i.e. substance theory as mentioned above.

I don't even know how the 'soul' is relevant in this discussion. I know that the confusion about duality has validity if you interpret the inference of some 'soul' as the non-localized energy that the matter of the brain causes. Descartes could not rationalize the non-locality of consciousness as it is still confusing for most people today. The illusion to be able to sense more than one thing at a time is a form of entanglement of the energy that occurs simultaneously in more than one point in the brain. I also do not make sense of "substance theory" as being related. I am permitted to label a set of phenomena as 'real-in-themselves' if I cannot have the same kind of control that I have when I try to move a finger. I get FEEDBACK about what I 'output' (the command to move a finger) by the 'input(s)' of sensing the expected phenomena consistently. "Objects" can be inferred by defining them as the set of phenomena that one cannot predictively control with absolute consistency. They are not 'provable' as anything more than the descriptions of your unique experience. But you cannot even 'prove' your own body as anything meaningful beyond those sets of experiences that you have MOST consistent control over.

This argument seems to relate to 'solipsism'. We default to assume reality is just OUR experience. The 'proof' that it may not be ONLY our own conscious experience (which is sufficient to doubt solipsism) is that regarding one's predictability.

If you cannot 'predict' some set of phenomena, you lack control over it and thus just DEFINE those things as 'not my-controllable phenomena' which we simplify by the term, 'objects'.

The soul is very relevant because the soul is the person-in-itself.

I referenced substance theory, but you don't seem to get it.

• Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.
  -wiki

The soul of the person is the substance of that empirical person.
The soul exists by itself which ultimate independent of the empirical-self, the body.
When the empirical self dies, the soul-in-itself will still survive in heaven or in hell.
Theists claim the soul-in-itself, i.e. thing-in-itself or object-in-itself will survive the physical empirical self.

Thus,
A soul [a thing] is a thing-in-itself
A soul is illusory and unreal
Therefore a thing-in-itself is illusory and unreal.

It is not obvious with things in general, but the same logic applies, i.e. all things claimed as things-in-themselves i.e. independent of mind are illusory and unreal.

The alternative is, if you claim all things are not independent of mind, then all things you claimed as real are not things-in-themselves.

Thus as long as you claim all things existing as real are independent of minds, then what you are claiming as real are things-in-themselves.

[Skepdick]

You missed the significance of this rhetorical assertion. The Anthropic Principle is nothing more than saying that things are the way they are because they are. If they were not, then they would not be.

No. it doesn't say that at all!

The Anthropic Principle is nothing more than saying that things are the way they are because they are. If they were not, then YOU would not be.

The Anthropic principle simply states that the current conditions (in their entirety) are necessary for YOUR existence.

It is the same as someone saying they are divinely special because they won the lottery (as proof of the unusual 'fine tune' nature of their beief in God); But had they not been special, they wouldn't have even been able to buy that ticket that granted them their unusual winning odds that they superceded.

Given that we wouldn't exist if the universe was any other way, I'd say that indeed - we are fucking lucky to be here!

To me, Veritas is appearing to claim that if we were not conscious, the world would not exist

You are just arguing over permanence.

If we were not conscious - I wouldn't give a fuck if the world existed.

as though our existence is what assured reality. But this is itself an anthrocentric bias.

My biases are the universe's fault. This is the all that Evolution came up with.

Furthermore, if we were to take this view, not even any meaning to 'empirical' matters because it deals with MORE than one person. If I wasn't born to be conscious, does this mean that not even other people exist?

There's no such thing as "meaning" without consciousness.

If I am NOT a conscious observer, it merely assures that I cannot in principle QUALIFY to argue about 'proof'.

You want to run this experiment in a hospital ward full of people in a coma?

The religious apologist actually plays into the very thing that 'empirical' validation is supposed to be restricted to AT MINIMAL: that a 'subjective' observer is at least understood to be necessary in order for an 'objective' view to JUDGE whether some observations among other subjects AGREE or not to their observations.

...
As to the topic, there is nothing 'empirical' if it is not SHARED. It is a POLITIC regarding groups of people (formally 'scientists' who agree to the same set of observations), not a fact of intellectual reflection about how someone SUBJECTIVELY can have 'proof' about reality beyond them.

This is too reductionist and prescriptive. You are simply restricting "existence" to the public domain and remain silent about the private domain.

That's arbitrary and unnecessary. 100% of scientists agree that they have feelings, emotions and

Either way, it is an empty argument and if anything, ignores the fact that no stat can even measure the odds of our existence OTHER than 100%

I guess you don't understand the difference between odds and probability then?

. But since we do not even have an observation of other life out there, no declared 'odds' are 'empirical' either.

And you don't understand probability-spaces.

All that is needed to argue against the religious apologist who declares something appears 'designed' is to ask them to provide an example of something NOT 'designed'. (?) There is no need to formulate a 'principle' as though it has more scientific validity or rationale. It is only effective to at best intimidate those who don't know the difference.

Obviously. All such arguments are about semantics. All knowledge is designed by humans, so it'd be difficult to meet your challenge in any social context.

Those other people who are in our world are as much 'things-in-themselves' and so cannot be trusted if one cannot trust non-human 'objects' either. Thus, "empirical verifiablity and justifiablity" are irrelevant terms. When one is trying to philosophically try to determine FROM the 'subjective' perspective whether other things exist, they don't require asking the opinions of others who are also 'objects' in the very question about whether objects one is trying to determine exist are valid or not.

Determining existence is not even an interesting project. Why are you so concerned with it? Quine solved it with the brush of indifference.

What exists? Everything! Obviously.

[jayjacobus]

Descartes famously said , "cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am" but what did he think about?

As a baby he thought about very little. He simply reacted to his senses without understanding what his senses were. As he grew up, he learned about the things around him and was taught concepts, behaviors and subjects like every other person.

The blank state of his mind gradually became filled with experiences and ideas. From these experiences and ideas he formed creative ways of interpreting reality and making intelligent connections.

Did Descartes become a thinker without any experiences? Of course not. But he did not say, “Much of what I think about, exists.” Did he understand that he could not have a meaningful existence without a reality?

I think, therefore I am but when I think about reality it is because reality exists as well.