What is your Framework and System of Reality?

[bahman]

With the falling apple, what it the change in properties, first off?

Its position.

Position is a relational property. It can't only be a property of the apple. It's a property of the apple AND something else, like the ground. If we're ONLY talking about the apple, there's no change in position, right?

In reality, we define the position of the apple as the distance it has to the ground for example.

[Skepdick]

Position is a relational property. It can't only be a property of the apple. It's a property of the apple AND something else, like the ground. If we're ONLY talking about the apple, there's no change in position, right?

All properties are relational properties. At least between the observer and the property being observed.

Semiotics 101.

[Terrapin Station]

Its position.

Position is a relational property. It can't only be a property of the apple. It's a property of the apple AND something else, like the ground. If we're ONLY talking about the apple, there's no change in position, right?

In reality, we define the position of the apple as the distance it has to the ground for example.

Right, because it's a relational property, not a property of the apple itself. (Not that the apple itself doesn't hinge on relational properties, but we can ignore that for the moment.)

[bahman]

Position is a relational property. It can't only be a property of the apple. It's a property of the apple AND something else, like the ground. If we're ONLY talking about the apple, there's no change in position, right?

In reality, we define the position of the apple as the distance it has to the ground for example.

Right, because it's a relational property, not a property of the apple itself. (Not that the apple itself doesn't hinge on relational properties, but we can ignore that for the moment.)

So relational property changes while the object is the same.

[Terrapin Station]

In reality, we define the position of the apple as the distance it has to the ground for example.

Right, because it's a relational property, not a property of the apple itself. (Not that the apple itself doesn't hinge on relational properties, but we can ignore that for the moment.)

So relational property changes while the object is the same.

If we're considering "falling" or positional change to be a property, it's a property not of the apple, right, but the apple with respect to the ground. in other words, the object in this case is the apple and the ground in (dynamic) relation to each other, right?

[Iwannaplato]

Existents (aside perhaps from elementary particles) aren't identical through time. A block of wood at time T1 isn't identical to the block of wood at time T2. Saying that it's "literally the same" block of wood at T1 and T2 is an abstraction.

So, then, there regardless of whether we can tell or not if something has had a change in properties it is not exactly the same. Nothing it the same from time point A to time point B, regardless.

[Iwannaplato]

A property is what defines the behavior of an entity that is the subject of discussion.

I am not sure behavior is the best word. Many things do not behave, certain for periods of time, in any of the usual, even non-living, senses of that word.

[Terrapin Station]

Existents (aside perhaps from elementary particles) aren't identical through time. A block of wood at time T1 isn't identical to the block of wood at time T2. Saying that it's "literally the same" block of wood at T1 and T2 is an abstraction.

So, then, there regardless of whether we can tell or not if something has had a change in properties it is not exactly the same. Nothing it the same from time point A to time point B, regardless.

Well, an elementary particle could be identical from T1 to T2, where (a) T1 and T2 are a factor of something other than the elementary particle in question (in other words, the elementary particle relative to time passing in something else) and (b) we're not talking about the particle's relations to anything else, but for anything where we're talking about an existent with parts, the existent is not going to be identical from T1 to T2, unless we're talking about it relative to very, very small time slices relative to something else (and even then it might not be feasible), smaller than any changes that would occur in the existent at hand. Existents with parts, or existents without parts relative to each other, do not seem capable of remaining static. They're always in motion/changing. And since time is just motion or change, existent with parts are not identical from any T1 to T2.

[Skepdick]

Well, an elementary particle could be identical from T1 to T2, where (a) T1 and T2 are a factor of something other than the elementary particle in question (in other words, the elementary particle relative to time passing in something else) and (b) we're not talking about the particle's relations to anything else, but for anything where we're talking about an existent with parts, the existent is not going to be identical from T1 to T2, unless we're talking about it relative to very, very small time slices relative to something else (and even then it might not be feasible), smaller than any changes that would occur in the existent at hand. Existents with parts, or existents without parts relative to each other, do not seem capable of remaining static. They're always in motion/changing. And since time is just motion or change, existent with parts are not identical from any T1 to T2.

None of the above is necessarily true in quantum physics.

Given two observations of an electron at T1 and T2 there is absolutely no way of telling whether it's the "exact same electron".
e.g there is no way to determine whether it's AN existent; or existents

You could assert it's the same electron.
You could also assert that any electron, anywhere in spacetime is "the exact same electron".

The identity axiom is undecidable. Any nominal assertion of "sameness" is purely pragmatic.

DOI: 10.1007/BF01057649
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-electron_universe

[bahman]

Right, because it's a relational property, not a property of the apple itself. (Not that the apple itself doesn't hinge on relational properties, but we can ignore that for the moment.)

So relational property changes while the object is the same.

If we're considering "falling" or positional change to be a property, it's a property not of the apple, right, but the apple with respect to the ground. in other words, the object in this case is the apple and the ground in (dynamic) relation to each other, right?

Yes, that relational property is respect to point of view. You can consider that point of view a person who observes the falling apple.

[bahman]

A property is what defines the behavior of an entity that is the subject of discussion.

I am not sure behavior is the best word. Many things do not behave, certain for periods of time, in any of the usual, even non-living, senses of that word.

Can you give me an example of something that does not behave?

[Terrapin Station]

So relational property changes while the object is the same.

If we're considering "falling" or positional change to be a property, it's a property not of the apple, right, but the apple with respect to the ground. in other words, the object in this case is the apple and the ground in (dynamic) relation to each other, right?

Yes, that relational property is respect to point of view. You can consider that point of view a person who observes the falling apple.

It's not at all due to the point of view of a person. It's necessarily a relational property (assuming we're calling falling/change of position a property--I wouldn't, but it works fine as an example for what it is). It can't obtain just with the apple.

[bahman]

If we're considering "falling" or positional change to be a property, it's a property not of the apple, right, but the apple with respect to the ground. in other words, the object in this case is the apple and the ground in (dynamic) relation to each other, right?

Yes, that relational property is respect to point of view. You can consider that point of view a person who observes the falling apple.

It's not at all due to the point of view of a person. It's necessarily a relational property (assuming we're calling falling/change of position a property--I wouldn't, but it works fine as an example for what it is). It can't obtain just with the apple.

Any relational property is respect to a point of view.

[Terrapin Station]

Any relational property is respect to a point of view.

Not to a person's point of view.

[bahman]

Any relational property is respect to a point of view.

Not to a person's point of view.

The point of view could be anything.