What is your Framework and System of Reality?

[bahman]

Lead is made of different materials, in different dynamic relations, than brains are.

Every difference of substance, every different in relations, every different in processes, amounts to different properties. Brains obviously have different properties than lead does. One set of those properties amounts to consciousness/mentality.

Does each atom of the brain have conscious property?

No. Again, properties obtain via (a) substances (b) relations and (c) processes. The properties of brains are properties of ALL of the substances, relations and processes that are occurring at a particular time, and the mental properties would be properties of ALL of the substances, relations and processes relevant to that mental state obtaining. A subset of the substances, relations and processes wouldn't have the same properties. Every difference in substance, relations and processes has different properties.

Properties of the whole are obtained via properties of parts, where the properties of parts are relations, intrinsic properties, and process for example. The intrinsic properties are such as mass, spin, charge, etc. but not consciousness. The property of the whole, therefore, is a function of the properties of parts according to what it is stated. Therefore, there is no emergence. Therefore, there is no consciousness. You cannot have a new property in the whole that parts don't have. That is true since the only variables that exist are the properties of parts and the property of the whole is a function of properties of parts.

[Terrapin Station]

Does each atom of the brain have conscious property?

No. Again, properties obtain via (a) substances (b) relations and (c) processes. The properties of brains are properties of ALL of the substances, relations and processes that are occurring at a particular time, and the mental properties would be properties of ALL of the substances, relations and processes relevant to that mental state obtaining. A subset of the substances, relations and processes wouldn't have the same properties. Every difference in substance, relations and processes has different properties.

Properties of the whole are obtained via properties of parts, where the properties of parts are relations, intrinsic properties, and process for example. The intrinsic properties are such as mass, spin, charge, etc. but not consciousness. The property of the whole, therefore, is a function of the properties of parts according to what it is stated. Therefore, there is no emergence. Therefore, there is no consciousness. You cannot have a new property in the whole that parts don't have. That is true since the only variables that exist are the properties of parts and the property of the whole is a function of properties of parts.

No. First there are no "intrinsic" versus whatever-distinction-you'd-make-contra-"intrinsic" properties. None have any sort of ontological priority like that. And properties are always unique to whatever whole we consider. It's not as if properties are just of parts and then those carry on to larger groupings somehow. EVERY substance, relation and process of whatever we're talking about contributes to unique properties of the ENTIRE grouping we're considering.

The above isn't anything about "emergence." I'm not saying anything at all about that idea.

"You cannot have a new property in the whole that parts don't have." <--- this couldn't be more wrong.

[bahman]

No. Again, properties obtain via (a) substances (b) relations and (c) processes. The properties of brains are properties of ALL of the substances, relations and processes that are occurring at a particular time, and the mental properties would be properties of ALL of the substances, relations and processes relevant to that mental state obtaining. A subset of the substances, relations and processes wouldn't have the same properties. Every difference in substance, relations and processes has different properties.

Properties of the whole are obtained via properties of parts, where the properties of parts are relations, intrinsic properties, and process for example. The intrinsic properties are such as mass, spin, charge, etc. but not consciousness. The property of the whole, therefore, is a function of the properties of parts according to what it is stated. Therefore, there is no emergence. Therefore, there is no consciousness. You cannot have a new property in the whole that parts don't have. That is true since the only variables that exist are the properties of parts and the property of the whole is a function of properties of parts.

No. First there are no "intrinsic" versus whatever-distinction-you'd-make-contra-"intrinsic" properties. None have any sort of ontological priority like that. And properties are always unique to whatever whole we consider. It's not as if properties are just of parts and then those carry on to larger groupings somehow. EVERY substance, relation and process of whatever we're talking about contributes to unique properties of the ENTIRE grouping we're considering.

The above isn't anything about "emergence." I'm not saying anything at all about that idea.

"You cannot have a new property in the whole that parts don't have." <--- this couldn't be more wrong.

So why the whole show a specific property and not any other property when it is in a given configuration that is defined by properties of parts.

[Terrapin Station]

Properties of the whole are obtained via properties of parts, where the properties of parts are relations, intrinsic properties, and process for example. The intrinsic properties are such as mass, spin, charge, etc. but not consciousness. The property of the whole, therefore, is a function of the properties of parts according to what it is stated. Therefore, there is no emergence. Therefore, there is no consciousness. You cannot have a new property in the whole that parts don't have. That is true since the only variables that exist are the properties of parts and the property of the whole is a function of properties of parts.

No. First there are no "intrinsic" versus whatever-distinction-you'd-make-contra-"intrinsic" properties. None have any sort of ontological priority like that. And properties are always unique to whatever whole we consider. It's not as if properties are just of parts and then those carry on to larger groupings somehow. EVERY substance, relation and process of whatever we're talking about contributes to unique properties of the ENTIRE grouping we're considering.

The above isn't anything about "emergence." I'm not saying anything at all about that idea.

"You cannot have a new property in the whole that parts don't have." <--- this couldn't be more wrong.

So why the whole show a specific property and not any other property when it is in a given configuration that is defined by properties of parts.

I'm not sure what you're asking here, but say an electron orbiting a proton is going to have different properties than either an electron in isolation or a proton in isolation simply because an electron orbiting a proton is different (it's a different dynamic relation) than either particle in isolation. Differences in materials, relations and processes make differences in properties.

[bahman]

No. First there are no "intrinsic" versus whatever-distinction-you'd-make-contra-"intrinsic" properties. None have any sort of ontological priority like that. And properties are always unique to whatever whole we consider. It's not as if properties are just of parts and then those carry on to larger groupings somehow. EVERY substance, relation and process of whatever we're talking about contributes to unique properties of the ENTIRE grouping we're considering.

The above isn't anything about "emergence." I'm not saying anything at all about that idea.

"You cannot have a new property in the whole that parts don't have." <--- this couldn't be more wrong.

So why the whole show a specific property and not any other property when it is in a given configuration that is defined by properties of parts.

I'm not sure what you're asking here, but say an electron orbiting a proton is going to have different properties than either an electron in isolation or a proton in isolation simply because an electron orbiting a proton is different (it's a different dynamic relation) than either particle in isolation. Differences in materials, relations and processes make differences in properties.

Does the whole in a specific configuration have a specific property and not any other property? I think the answer to this question is yes, the whole show a very specific property any time that you bring the whole in that configuration.

[Veritas Aequitas]

While we must always ask questions of reality, we cannot simply jump to hasty conclusions because there are no justified reasons.

As I had stated,

• What is most practical and realistic is to work downward [justified empirically and philosophically] reducibly to the deepest point of
  1. what is known,
  2. knowable and
  3. of possible experience.
  
  Then we take Wittgenstein's advice,
  “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”,
  i.e. literally shut up and do not insist there is something further than whereof one cannot speak.

I simply disagree with him and you. One should always investigate any situation. What is the point of being intellectual otherwise?

I did not state we must stop questioning and investigation, note I stated above,
"While we must always ask questions of reality, we cannot simply jump to hasty conclusions because [where] there are no justified reasons."

What Wittgenstein implied in the quote above [in the context of his Book PI] is we should not jump hastily to a conclusion as in your case, i.e. there is a soul that survives beyond physical death.

You on the other hand is jumping to conclusion based on very crude pseudo reasoning, i.e. because we are conscious, therefore there must be a source of consciousness.

Your system of belief is incoherent because it cannot answer many things one of them being the hard problem of consciousness. The reality is that there is no problem in here once you change your system of belief. You are left on the field once you kill the opponent thought. There are other problems like Libet result of free will.

My system of belief is realistic i.e. confined to what is real.

As I stated above, we can continue to ask questions regarding the hard problem of consciousness, but we should not be hasty in jumping to conclusion on what is 'hard' consciousness without sound arguments and proof.

The point is what is to be believed must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a framework and system of knowledge [FSK.]

What you believed is not verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a framework and system of knowledge [FSK.] You are relying the metaphysical approach where the conclusions are illusory.

Therefrom you cannot justify your conclusion empirically and philosophically.

Empirically? I experience mind once. Philosophically I have arguments in favor of my ideas

.
Personally I have various so-called altered states of consciousness. There are many reports of experiences of altered stated of consciousness, soul, God, the absolute, oneness, unity consciousness, etc. by those who meditate, pray, took hallucinogens, has mental illness, has brain damage, etc. see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIiIsDIkDtg
Research has indicated all those altered states of consciousness are merely brain activities within the person and not that there is something real [an essence] that is experienced.

Philosophers of the past, and modern has realized the above delusional tendency. Here is where Kant critiqued Plato hastiness [read it carefully];

It was thus that Plato left the World of the Senses, as setting too narrow Limits to 2 the Understanding [intellect], and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the Ideas, in the empty Space [la la land] of the Pure Understanding.

He [Plato] did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his Understanding in motion.

It is, indeed, the common fate of Human Reason to complete its Speculative Structures as speedily as may be,
and only afterwards to enquire whether the foundations are reliable.

All sorts of excuses will then be appealed to, in order to reassure us of their solidity, or rather indeed 3 to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and so dangerous an enquiry.

I have stated, why you and gang are so hasty in jumping to conclusion is due to a psychological drive to eliminate the existential dissonance.
I suggest you try to research and understand this point which is happening within your psyche.

I have many mental states that you are not aware of it.

As mentioned above, those mental states if extra-ordinary are more likely to be hallucinations.
If you are not engaging in some spiritual practices or took hallucinogenic drugs, it could be due to temporal epilepsy, or otherwise.

Moreover, it is important to know whether you can break a chain of causality or not. Yes, or no?

I am not sure of your question.
You'll need to elaborate with more details.

I believe in 'causality' which is conditioned upon the human conditions and there is no ultimate cause that can be known experientially.

Think of the situation when you are following a chain of causality, chain of thoughts for example. Couldn't you stop thinking whenever you wish?

It is impossible to deliberately and consciously stop thinking, i.e. to think of "stopping thinking" is thinking itself.

I have been meditator for MANY years and have done various types of meditation.
In mantra meditation, one in a state of relaxation focus on a sound to its source but at some point, all thinking [consciously aware] will disappeared and one is suspended in 'nothingness' with extra-ordinary experiences.
In that case, it is not willing and deliberately stopping the thinking process, but the loss of thinking is merely spontaneous.

But whatever is experienced in that state is not "of-something" i.e. an essence but rather is it merely a manifestation of brain activities.
Even though there is "no" conscious thinking, the brain is still active and neurons are still firing in its various parts. See image below;

See the work of Andrew Newberg;

http://www.andrewnewberg.com/
Dr. Andrew Newberg is a neuroscientist who studies the relationship between brain function and various mental states. He is a pioneer in the neurological study of religious and spiritual experiences, a field known as “neurotheology.” His research includes taking brain scans of people in prayer, meditation, rituals, and trance states, in an attempt to better understand the nature of religious and spiritual practices and attitudes.

[Terrapin Station]

So why the whole show a specific property and not any other property when it is in a given configuration that is defined by properties of parts.

I'm not sure what you're asking here, but say an electron orbiting a proton is going to have different properties than either an electron in isolation or a proton in isolation simply because an electron orbiting a proton is different (it's a different dynamic relation) than either particle in isolation. Differences in materials, relations and processes make differences in properties.

Does the whole in a specific configuration have a specific property and not any other property? I think the answer to this question is yes, the whole show a very specific property any time that you bring the whole in that configuration.

Are you asking if things only have one property? No. Of course not. Nothing only has one property.

[Sculptor]

I'm not sure what you're asking here, but say an electron orbiting a proton is going to have different properties than either an electron in isolation or a proton in isolation simply because an electron orbiting a proton is different (it's a different dynamic relation) than either particle in isolation. Differences in materials, relations and processes make differences in properties.

Does the whole in a specific configuration have a specific property and not any other property? I think the answer to this question is yes, the whole show a very specific property any time that you bring the whole in that configuration.

Are you asking if things only have one property? No. Of course not. Nothing only has one property.

what about time?

[Terrapin Station]

Does the whole in a specific configuration have a specific property and not any other property? I think the answer to this question is yes, the whole show a very specific property any time that you bring the whole in that configuration.

Are you asking if things only have one property? No. Of course not. Nothing only has one property.

what about time?

Time is a property that things have, it's not a thing that has properties. Time is motion or change. You need things to move or change in order to have that, and those things will have other properties, too.

[Sculptor]

Are you asking if things only have one property? No. Of course not. Nothing only has one property.

what about time?

Time is a property that things have, it's not a thing that has properties. Time is motion or change. You need things to move or change in order to have that, and those things will have other properties, too.

You saying that time is not a thing?
And space - what about that. Just an empty concept?
Is politics a thing?
How do you define a thing?

[Terrapin Station]

what about time?

Time is a property that things have, it's not a thing that has properties. Time is motion or change. You need things to move or change in order to have that, and those things will have other properties, too.

You saying that time is not a thing?
And space - what about that. Just an empty concept?
Is politics a thing?
How do you define a thing?

I'm not saying anything technical about the word "thing." Think of "thing" as functioning like a variable or just being a "whatever."

Time and space aren't things in themselves. Time is motion or change of matter. Space is the extension of and the extensional relations of matter.

Re politics, or any sort of abstract like that, it's a set of mental content (of course about particular behavior)--that is, a (sub)set of brain states. In this regard, I'm a nominalist. There are no objective abstracts. Abstraction refers to a manner of thinking about things (thinking being a subset of brain states).

[Skepdick]

I'm not saying anything technical about the word "thing." Think of "thing" as functioning like a variable or just being a "whatever."

Time and space aren't things in themselves. Time is motion or change of matter. Space is the extension of and the extensional relations of matter.

If "thing" is an abstract variable then it necessarily points to ever-changing states of matter.

To nail down "thingness" you need to nail down time invariance. Which leads nowhere but to an appeal to essentialism.

[Sculptor]

Time is a property that things have, it's not a thing that has properties. Time is motion or change. You need things to move or change in order to have that, and those things will have other properties, too.

You saying that time is not a thing?
And space - what about that. Just an empty concept?
Is politics a thing?
How do you define a thing?

I'm not saying anything technical about the word "thing."

I think you are going to have to.

Think of "thing" as functioning like a variable or just being a "whatever."

eh?

Time and space aren't things in themselves.

So you are a closet Kantian.

Time is motion or change of matter. Space is the extension of and the extensional relations of matter.

Re politics, or any sort of abstract like that, it's a set of mental content (of course about particular behavior)--that is, a (sub)set of brain states. In this regard, I'm a nominalist. There are no objective abstracts. Abstraction refers to a manner of thinking about things (thinking being a subset of brain states).

So what is a thing?

[attofishpi]

So what is a thing?

A perception that consciousness perceives.

[Terrapin Station]

You saying that time is not a thing?
And space - what about that. Just an empty concept?
Is politics a thing?
How do you define a thing?

I'm not saying anything technical about the word "thing."

I think you are going to have to.

Think of "thing" as functioning like a variable or just being a "whatever."

eh?

Time and space aren't things in themselves.

So you are a closet Kantian.

Time is motion or change of matter. Space is the extension of and the extensional relations of matter.

Re politics, or any sort of abstract like that, it's a set of mental content (of course about particular behavior)--that is, a (sub)set of brain states. In this regard, I'm a nominalist. There are no objective abstracts. Abstraction refers to a manner of thinking about things (thinking being a subset of brain states).

So what is a thing?

I'm not saying anything like "time and space aren't real," or "time and space aren't objective" etc.

I'm saying that time is the motion/change of matter--or more broadly, it's processes or dynamicism in general, which is very real and objective. And space is the extension of and extensional relations of matter, which is also very real and objective.

Re "thing," I have no interest in building a technical definition of that term. We can just use "existent" or "that which obtains" or whatever, so that there are no restrictions on the sort of existent that we're referring to. Time and space exist as above--as motion/change and as extension/extensional relations.