Atla wrote: ↑Sat Sep 14, 2019 7:21 pm
Phenomena = appearances, and noumena = things-in-themselves, so far so good (if I understood correctly).
But did he understand that technically and objectively, all phenomena are noumena (the noumena in the human head)? So some of the noumenon is directly 'knowable'.
I haven't read the thread so pardon me if this has been said.
I think you've hit on a crucially important philosophical point but I wouldn't express it quite like this.
Kant thought there could be more than one thing-in-itself and this is logically impossible given its definition of being indistinguishable. If the thing-in-itself is unitary then, as you say, this would suggest that it is shared by all phenomena including human beings. Thus he cannot be sure we do not have access to knowledge of the noumenon.
Mysticism would say we do have such access, but not quite in these terms. The Buddhist Nibbana may be defined as a phenomena without a noumenon, and this indicates a subtlety Kant did not explore (afaik).
He argues all phenomena (as appearances) reduce to the noumenon (or, paradoxically, multiple noumena), but did not make the connection that you have to consciousness and the unitary nature of the noumenon.
I am not a Kant scholar so this may be subject to corrections.
I noted a comment that all knowledge has a sensory origin, which would scupper your idea, but this a false view.