What are the main problems of philosophy?
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What are the main problems of philosophy?
Is it that it can't solve every mystery? That it can't get agreement among all philosophers?
What should we focus on?
PhilX
What should we focus on?
PhilX
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Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
Is that the "royal we"?
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Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
The problem is not sitting still enough.
Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
1) most areas of philosophy are outdated and replaced by science.
2) most philosophers are not geniuses.
3) modern philosophy books are nothing but nonsense and babble.
4) philosophy needs to be refined to be relevant again.
2) most philosophers are not geniuses.
3) modern philosophy books are nothing but nonsense and babble.
4) philosophy needs to be refined to be relevant again.
Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
1. Not enough people wear hats.
2. If you say "philosophy" you summon big egos saying the same things all the time.
3. All relevant questions already have an answer (42).
4. I can't make the typical spanish joke with the 5.
2. If you say "philosophy" you summon big egos saying the same things all the time.
3. All relevant questions already have an answer (42).
4. I can't make the typical spanish joke with the 5.
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Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
The questions of philosophy are:
1 What is real?
2 How do we know?
3 What is important?
Science has done most of the heavy lifting for the first question.
Neuroscience is chipping in on the second but there will always be a need for individuals to get clear on this for themselves.
But I don't see much application for science on the third question. It can contribute to deciding on an optimal course of action once we are clear on our priorities.
1 What is real?
2 How do we know?
3 What is important?
Science has done most of the heavy lifting for the first question.
Neuroscience is chipping in on the second but there will always be a need for individuals to get clear on this for themselves.
But I don't see much application for science on the third question. It can contribute to deciding on an optimal course of action once we are clear on our priorities.
Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
If one can't tell what's real and unreal, then you are totally unsuited for philosophy as one would simply lack cognitive abilities!Interjectivist wrote:The questions of philosophy are:
1 What is real?
2 How do we know?
3 What is important?
Science has done most of the heavy lifting for the first question.
Neuroscience is chipping in on the second but there will always be a need for individuals to get clear on this for themselves.
But I don't see much application for science on the third question. It can contribute to deciding on an optimal course of action once we are clear on our priorities.
Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
Philosophy is a gabfest of opinions which the majority cannot agree on.
These boards are witness of this.
These boards are witness of this.
Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
The problem essentially seems to be that everything is question-begging and nothing is established.
The beginning of a solution might be to focus on the nature of this 'nothing' that is established, rather than getting lost in whatever falls under the umbrella of 'everything'. One might then ponder on the necessary non-duality of 'nothing' and 'everything'.
The beginning of a solution might be to focus on the nature of this 'nothing' that is established, rather than getting lost in whatever falls under the umbrella of 'everything'. One might then ponder on the necessary non-duality of 'nothing' and 'everything'.
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Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
People are not wearing enough hats.Sam I. Elle wrote:The problem is not sitting still enough.
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Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
Owly wrote:The problem essentially seems to be that everything is question-begging and nothing is established.
The beginning of a solution might be to focus on the nature of this 'nothing' that is established, rather than getting lost in whatever falls under the umbrella of 'everything'. One might then ponder on the necessary non-duality of 'nothing' and 'everything'.
Maybe you have an example. If not this is just question begging.
Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
An example of... nothing?
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Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
Owly wrote:An example of... nothing?
No. An example of "everything", in which you say "everything is question-begging".
Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
There's been no philosophical schema or proposition offered, that I'm aware of, whose assumptions can't be brought into question.
Without firm epistemological or ontological grounding, the true status of anything, and everything, is up in the air. If we say a particular grounding is 'good enough' or 'good enough for this particular purpose' then we're either just playing metaphysical mind games or submitting to the 'shut up and calculate' school of scientific non-philosophy.
Without firm epistemological or ontological grounding, the true status of anything, and everything, is up in the air. If we say a particular grounding is 'good enough' or 'good enough for this particular purpose' then we're either just playing metaphysical mind games or submitting to the 'shut up and calculate' school of scientific non-philosophy.
Re: What are the main problems of philosophy?
I am not a philosopher, just another internet nobody. I was largely drawn to philosophy by a need to clear some personal issues that were never resolved because I was too busy trying to keep afloat, until retirement. Philosophy on a personal level is like cognitive therapy in that it attempts to expose illogical assumptions and allow them to be replaced by a clearer take on reality.
Postmodernists and subjectivists might claim that the paradigm-shaping of cognitive therapy is unnecessary, treating personal subjective experience as sacrosanct, even if that involves a pink pixie tea party at the bottom of the garden. At least those pink pixies were not moulded into "cogs for the machine", according to subjectivists. Many on philosophy forums seem to think that way. However, I agree with Owly that reality must be grounded, at least as much as is possible in a relativistic reality in which we attempt to study from the inside as though it was outside of us:
Ultimately either approach only produces models, with Kant's noumena remaining elusive - for now. As mathematical models become ever less sketchy approximations of reality, in time we will be ever more capable of creating life, with digital approximations being as indistinguishable to our senses from "natural" phenomena as digital movies are from analogue film.
Still, I agree that philosophers could at least be daring enough to speak about what might be than what is not, even if couched in qualifiers. That's what I like about David Chalmers - he doesn't make certainty claims but at least posits a model, and he has copped much flak for it. By contrast, Dan Dennett seems more like the philosophical equivalent of a collections manager than a researcher, categorising and organising current information with meta-analyses but not proposing anything new. I find Galen Strawson more interesting.
Postmodernists and subjectivists might claim that the paradigm-shaping of cognitive therapy is unnecessary, treating personal subjective experience as sacrosanct, even if that involves a pink pixie tea party at the bottom of the garden. At least those pink pixies were not moulded into "cogs for the machine", according to subjectivists. Many on philosophy forums seem to think that way. However, I agree with Owly that reality must be grounded, at least as much as is possible in a relativistic reality in which we attempt to study from the inside as though it was outside of us:
Very broadly, with overlap, philosophy is the study of reality using natural language while the "hard sciences" investigate reality via mathematics-based languages as they "shut up and calculate". The language of mathematics is more precise and less prone to semantic confusion than spoken languages but, as with regular languages (and the arts) pure maths can both abstractly describe reality and unreal models.Owly wrote:Without firm epistemological or ontological grounding, the true status of anything, and everything, is up in the air. If we say a particular grounding is 'good enough' or 'good enough for this particular purpose' then we're either just playing metaphysical mind games or submitting to the 'shut up and calculate' school of scientific non-philosophy.
Ultimately either approach only produces models, with Kant's noumena remaining elusive - for now. As mathematical models become ever less sketchy approximations of reality, in time we will be ever more capable of creating life, with digital approximations being as indistinguishable to our senses from "natural" phenomena as digital movies are from analogue film.
As it should be - until established by verified repeatable experiments. Given that scientists are hamstrung by the rigorous expectations of their field and the cuts in blue skies research, who is left to push the boundaries of current thinking? The vision of philosophers (and science fiction writers) provide avenues to be explored using the scientific method. A philosopher who doesn't beg the question - who attempts to definitively answer questions of reality in lieu of relevant research - is not a philosopher but just another internet person sprouting off.Owly wrote:The problem essentially seems to be that everything is question-begging and nothing is established.
Still, I agree that philosophers could at least be daring enough to speak about what might be than what is not, even if couched in qualifiers. That's what I like about David Chalmers - he doesn't make certainty claims but at least posits a model, and he has copped much flak for it. By contrast, Dan Dennett seems more like the philosophical equivalent of a collections manager than a researcher, categorising and organising current information with meta-analyses but not proposing anything new. I find Galen Strawson more interesting.
I have no problem with "good enough for this purpose", as long as it's not a device to shut down further discussion.Owly wrote:Without firm epistemological or ontological grounding, the true status of anything, and everything, is up in the air. If we say a particular grounding is 'good enough' or 'good enough for this particular purpose' then we're either just playing metaphysical mind games or submitting to the 'shut up and calculate' school of scientific non-philosophy.