Time does not exist.

[Terrapin Station]

Frege uses 'extension' when writing about mathematical foundations. Extension records those values that map to the true . . .

You're looking to argue over how Frege used terms, because you believe that I'm getting that wrong and I believe that you are? Or are you looking to understand what I asked you?

I'm asking because you're going off on a tangent here of arguing over how Frege used terms, which wasn't at all the point. I brought up Frege just in case you're familiar with Hesperus=Phosphorus (and the only reason I mentioned his name was just in case Hesperus=Phosphorus didn't ring any bells for you--I was making it easier for you to look it up). But that you'd be familiar with Frege and not familiar with the idea of identity is simply trolling. We can play the troll game if you enjoy that though.

[Londoner]

You're looking to argue over how Frege used terms, because you believe that I'm getting that wrong and I believe that you are? Or are you looking to understand what I asked you?

I'm asking because you're going off on a tangent here of arguing over how Frege used terms, which wasn't at all the point. I brought up Frege just in case you're familiar with Hesperus=Phosphorus (and the only reason I mentioned his name was just in case Hesperus=Phosphorus didn't ring any bells for you--I was making it easier for you to look it up). But that you'd be familiar with Frege and not familiar with the idea of identity is simply trolling. We can play the troll game if you enjoy that though.

I finished our little diversion into Frege with the comment:

So after than exciting diversion, are we any closer to understanding what you mean when you ask if 'nerves' ,'an experience of pain' , 'experience of seeing fibrous tissue' and 'mental-content-only' are 'identical'?

Then I repeated my request for an explanation of what you meant by 'mental-content-only' and 'identical' in your question.

So, whenever you're ready...

[Terrapin Station]

Then I repeated my request for an explanation of what you meant by 'mental-content-only' and 'identical' in your question.

So, whenever you're ready...

You'd do better by focusing.

So, do you use the term "mental" (or mind) at all?

[uwot]

In a nutshell, I'm saying that what you're calling the Cartesian view (I don't actually agree that this is what Descartes was doing, but I don't want to get sidetracked into that discussion) is contextually incoherent, because the way that people arrive at that view is by assuming some realist data, either as a conceptual basis or as empirical support, but the view in question is that we can't know anything external (know by acquaintance).

Well, we might have to agree to differ, but that we can't know by acquaintance, in my view is Descartes' starting point. He only got round it by invoking the ontological argument. I'm not sure what "realist data" means. There is only data, it is the interpretation of that data which may be, and generally is, realist.
Anyway; how "people arrive at that view" doesn't make Descartes' approach contextually incoherent.

[Terrapin Station]

In a nutshell, I'm saying that what you're calling the Cartesian view (I don't actually agree that this is what Descartes was doing, but I don't want to get sidetracked into that discussion) is contextually incoherent, because the way that people arrive at that view is by assuming some realist data, either as a conceptual basis or as empirical support, but the view in question is that we can't know anything external (know by acquaintance).

Well, we might have to agree to differ, but that we can't know by acquaintance, in my view is Descartes' starting point. He only got round it by invoking the ontological argument. I'm not sure what "realist data" means. There is only data, it is the interpretation of that data which may be, and generally is, realist.
Anyway; how "people arrive at that view" doesn't make Descartes' approach contextually incoherent.

"Knowledge by acquaintance" is one of the three types of knowledge, the other two being propositional knowledge and how-to knowledge. I'm guessing that when you say "We can't know by acquaintance" you're saying that we can't know propositional knowledge by acquaintance (and more specifically, we can't know propositional knowledge that isn't the "same" as the specific knowledge by acquaintance in question).

In other words, in the vein of a similar discussion I'm having on one of the other philosophy boards, knowing a toaster by acquaintance simply means that there is phenomenal data of a toaster--in other words, a toaster appears. It's not a proposition about a toaster. We could say that knowledge by acquaintance fuels propositional knowledge that's the "same" as the knowledge by acquaintance--namely, "A toaster appeared," but yeah, it doesn't fuel a proposition such as "That toaster was purchased from Amazon."

What I mean by "realist data," and more specifically by assuming some, is that people assume things such as "I have an embodied mind, I have a brain, etc., and my body is situated in the world, where there's putatively a toaster that's not part of my body," as well as things like "we've studied brains and eyes and optic nerves and so on, and we know something about how they work." Those sorts of ideas lie behind idealist views--for example, the information about how eyes and optic nerves work is taken to support the idea that we can't directly experience things like toasters. The reason I'm saying this is incoherent is that it arrives at a conclusion by assuming things that can't be had if the conclusion is correct. This includes even the idea of a mind/not-mind distinction in the first place, which is the only way we can make sense out of a notion such as 'that toaster that appeared phenomenally is just a mental event."

Again, I'm not actually commenting on Descartes, because what I'm talking about isn't what Descartes was doing. He was focused on the idea of knowing (a la propositional knowledge) things with certainty, for the purpose of demonstrating how indeed we could know a number of things with certainty contra skeptical doubt. I'm not talking about anything like that.

[uwot]

What I mean by "realist data," and more specifically by assuming some, is that people assume things such as "I have an embodied mind, I have a brain, etc., and my body is situated in the world, where there's putatively a toaster that's not part of my body," as well as things like "we've studied brains and eyes and optic nerves and so on, and we know something about how they work." Those sorts of ideas lie behind idealist views--for example, the information about how eyes and optic nerves work is taken to support the idea that we can't directly experience things like toasters. The reason I'm saying this is incoherent is that it arrives at a conclusion by assuming things that can't be had if the conclusion is correct. This includes even the idea of a mind/not-mind distinction in the first place, which is the only way we can make sense out of a notion such as 'that toaster that appeared phenomenally is just a mental event."

As I've said, if you think you have an argument, you need to spell it out, because the way you have presented it so far suggests it hinges on the assumption that people take things like eyes and optic nerves for granted, but don't do the same for toasters. If so, you are mistaken because...

Again, I'm not actually commenting on Descartes, because what I'm talking about isn't what Descartes was doing. He was focused on the idea of knowing (a la propositional knowledge) things with certainty, for the purpose of demonstrating how indeed we could know a number of things with certainty contra skeptical doubt.

...while it is true that his model was the axiomatic program of Euclid, Descartes reached the conclusion that he was fundamentally a thing that experiences. 'I think, therefore I am' is an a posteriori analytic truth, dunno how Kant could have missed it. As I said, Descartes had to invoke god to underpin certainty about anything else, including that he had eyes and optic nerves.

[Londoner]

Then I repeated my request for an explanation of what you meant by 'mental-content-only' and 'identical' in your question.

So, whenever you're ready...

You'd do better by focusing.

So, do you use the term "mental" (or mind) at all?

It is no good asking me what you mean! You used the phrase 'mental-content-only'. You said you would explain it.

I've given you lots of chances so there doesn't seem much point in pressing you further. Why not take a while to think about it? Perhaps I'll check back in few days.

[Terrapin Station]

It is no good asking me what you mean!

If only I'd done that.

Here's what I asked you:

So, do you use the term "mental" (or mind) at all?

That's a yes or no question. Either you use the term or you do not.

You said you would explain it.

Which is what I'm doing, but you have to be capable of responding in a way that's not troll-like. If you're not capable of answering a simple yes or no question, then no one would be able to explain anything to you.

Perhaps I'll check back in few days.

Sure, but nothing will proceed any differently when you check back unless you decide that you'd actually bother with a conversation.