Time does not exist.

[uwot]

As for noumenon/ding an sich, here's Kant himself: "The concept of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be thought not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition." Make of that what you will, but to me he's saying it's a concept of pure understanding.

He's addressing the concept of noumenon there, how to think about it. So that's obviously going to be about thought in that regard--that's what concepts are, after all, and obviously it's what thinking about something is. But he says right there that a noumenon is a thing in itself.

Which can thought of "solely through the pure understanding." It's from the Critique of Pure Reason, after all. As I said, make of it what you will, but my interpretation is that a noumenon is a concept we have of a thing in itself.

[Londoner]

Are those things identical to mental-content-only in your view?

It is good to practice your serve, but if the other player never attempts a return it becomes boring.

How about returning then rather than giving a boring answer where you don't directly address a simple question. If you can't straightforwardly, directly answer a simple question there's no way we can tackle anything more complex.

OK. Let's say that I have been completely baffled by your brilliant question.

Having established that, now are you prepared to answer mine?

[Terrapin Station]

Well, I made a start here:

That's outlining or fleshing out the view. It's not a support for why we'd believe that view over alternate views.

It's stating the bleedin' obvious. Our sensation of a fire engine is of a red, howly thing in a hurry.

What I'm challenging is the idea that it's obvious, though. I don't agree that it is. I believe that people are assuming things to be mental content based on a realist interpretation of what the world is like--that we're creatures-in-the-world with brains that function as minds, where there are things like fire trucks and so on--BUT that they're also taking that realist picture to imply that we can't actually directly access things in the world like fire trucks. However, if the conclusion is correct, then the premises are something that we can't actually know (at least via acquaintance), which disables those premises from serving as (empirical support) premises for that conclusion in the first place.

Or in other words, I think it's only "obvious" on assumptions that turn out to be incoherent in context.

[Terrapin Station]

It is good to practice your serve, but if the other player never attempts a return it becomes boring.

How about returning then rather than giving a boring answer where you don't directly address a simple question. If you can't straightforwardly, directly answer a simple question there's no way we can tackle anything more complex.

OK. Let's say that I have been completely baffled by your brilliant question.

Having established that, now are you prepared to answer mine?

If you're baffled by it--you shouldn't be, because it's so simple and straightforward, then let's help you not be baffled by it. I'll gladly answer your questions. Not prior to you having a discussion with me about your views, though. So what didn't you understand about the question I asked?

[Londoner]

How about returning then rather than giving a boring answer where you don't directly address a simple question. If you can't straightforwardly, directly answer a simple question there's no way we can tackle anything more complex.

OK. Let's say that I have been completely baffled by your brilliant question.

Having established that, now are you prepared to answer mine?

If you're baffled by it--you shouldn't be, because it's so simple and straightforward, then let's help you not be baffled by it. I'll gladly answer your questions. Not prior to you having a discussion with me about your views, though. So what didn't you understand about the question I asked?

Really, what I didn't understand about the question is why you kept asking it, when I had answered various versions of it so many times before.

It was just a test to see whether you ever had any intention of taking your turn to answer my questions and explaining your own view. Now I know.

[SpheresOfBalance]

He was talking of gods which has never been shown to exist, keys have. That there is no evidence that a blompodilia exists does not necessarily mean that one doesn't. In fact, absence of evidence, is not necessarily evidence of absence, it might seem so, but it's not necessarily so.

I addressed this in the paragraph you quoted that follows your comment.

I said this: "The cliche arises from induction rather. For anything that we can't check exhaustively, we can't say that there couldn't be evidence of the thing in question around the next corner that we do check. But, aside from supposing an infinite number of places to check, the more we do check for something in appropriate places and find an absence of evidence, the better the reason for believing that counts as evidence of absence."

For the record I agree with much that you have said, recently, on this current permutation of the topic at hand. I just felt I had to correct that which philosophically one actually cannot say with certainty.

[Terrapin Station]

OK. Let's say that I have been completely baffled by your brilliant question.

Having established that, now are you prepared to answer mine?

If you're baffled by it--you shouldn't be, because it's so simple and straightforward, then let's help you not be baffled by it. I'll gladly answer your questions. Not prior to you having a discussion with me about your views, though. So what didn't you understand about the question I asked?

Really, what I didn't understand about the question is why you kept asking it, when I had answered various versions of it so many times before.

It was just a test to see whether you ever had any intention of taking your turn to answer my questions and explaining your own view. Now I know.

What's the reason that you'd exert the effort to type the above rather than just simply answering (again) the question I asked without needing to extend it to 200-300 words? You could have just said yes or no.

[SpheresOfBalance]

What I'm more interested in is that you're not telling me what I asked: "how is that support that noumena (or ding an sich if you prefer on the distinction you believe should be made) are not the same as phenomena"

An answer to that would go something like this: "That is support for noumena (or ding an sich) not being the same as phenomena because . . . . . " and then you'd explain how it's a support for it.

Well, I made a start here:

The thing in itself, is not any particular colour, for instance, it just happens to reflect certain wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum that stimulate human retinas. What we see depends on, among other things, the source of light that illuminates it.

I take it from your professed naive realism that you believe fire engines are red; that is just contingently true for most human beings, in my view.

As for noumenon/ding an sich, here's Kant himself: "The concept of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be thought not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition." Make of that what you will, but to me he's saying it's a concept of pure understanding.

I would like to deconstruct his words, section by section:

"The concept of a noumenon,...
Here he's naming something and categorizing it as a concept.

...that is, of a thing which must be thought not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself...
Here he's defining noumenon by first stating what it's not, so one can more readily understand what it is.

...(solely through the pure understanding),...
Here he's showing how one can know a noumenon.

..is not self-contradictory,...
Here he denies a possible argument against his assertion.

...for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition."
Here he's giving his rationale for the possible argument not being the case.

As to what his words are conveying, I welcome any additional thoughts you may care to attach.
As to his words truth factor, I shall attach my thoughts in my next message. It shall be slow and step by step.

[uwot]

I believe that people are assuming things to be mental content based on a realist interpretation of what the world is like...

You're not being clear. What do you mean by 'things'?

--that we're creatures-in-the-world with brains that function as minds, where there are things like fire trucks and so on--BUT that they're also taking that realist picture to imply that we can't actually directly access things in the world like fire trucks. However, if the conclusion is correct, then the premises are something that we can't actually know (at least via acquaintance), which disables those premises from serving as (empirical support) premises for that conclusion in the first place.

Actually; none of that is clear. Is this what you are saying?

"people are assuming":
The perceptions we have are of a real world.
The perceptions are processed in real brains.
You can't get real fire engines into real brains.
Therefore our access to fire engines is restricted to our perceptions of them.

If I understand, you are arguing that if perceptions are all we have, we "can't actually know" there is a real world. If so, that's Descartes starting point.

Or in other words, I think it's only "obvious" on assumptions that turn out to be incoherent in context.

You're going to have to spell it out.

[Londoner]

What's the reason that you'd exert the effort to type the above rather than just simply answering (again) the question I asked without needing to extend it to 200-300 words? You could have just said yes or no.

Only in response to a meaningful question.

Let's remind us of what it was.

'nerves' . . . 'an experience of pain' . . . an "experience of seeing fibrous tissue'
Are those things identical to mental-content-only in your view?

You wrote that you would be kind enough to explain your question if I had any problems. Let's start:

What is meant by 'identical'?

[Terrapin Station]

Let's start:

What is meant by 'identical'?

Identical--in the sense of "equals," or "the same as," with respect to extension, not (necessarily) intension. The morning star is identical to the evening star, or Hesperus = Phosphorus if you're familiar with Frege (or familiar with discussions of Frege from Quine, etc.)

[Terrapin Station]

You're not being clear. What do you mean by 'things'?

I'm just using it as a variable, and in the present context, it's a variable for any arbitrary referent.

Actually; none of that is clear. Is this what you are saying?

No, that's not what I was saying. In a nutshell, I'm saying that what you're calling the Cartesian view (I don't actually agree that this is what Descartes was doing, but I don't want to get sidetracked into that discussion) is contextually incoherent, because the way that people arrive at that view is by assuming some realist data, either as a conceptual basis or as empirical support, but the view in question is that we can't know anything external (know by acquaintance).

[Londoner]

Let's start:

What is meant by 'identical'?

Identical--in the sense of "equals," or "the same as," with respect to extension, not (necessarily) intension. The morning star is identical to the evening star, or Hesperus = Phosphorus if you're familiar with Frege (or familiar with discussions of Frege from Quine, etc.)

So you are asking me if the 'Bedeutung' of 'mental-content-only' is the same as 'experience of pain' etc., as opposed to their sense or tone?

And you think of 'mental-content-only' as being a name? If so, what is its 'Bedeutung'? I can't tell you if they are the same, until you explain what your expression means.

[Terrapin Station]

So you are asking me if the 'Bedeutung' of 'mental-content-only' is the same as 'experience of pain' etc., as opposed to their sense or tone?

No, the extension. Bedeutung IS sense or intension.

And you think of 'mental-content-only' as being a name?

It is a name, obviously. It has meaning, too, as well as extension.

If you're unfamiliar with "extension"--although you shouldn't be if you're familiar with the term "bedeutung," extension is the stuff that's "picked out" by the term, the objective stuff that we're pointing to, basically, where that's not the same as its meaning. Hence, the extension of morning star and evening star is the same--namely the planet Venus, but the meaning or bedeutung of morning star and evening star are different. After all, one is "the star (or 'star' rather) you see in the morning" and the other is "the star ('star') that you see in the evening."

So I'm asking you whether "an experience of pain" and "an experience of seeing fibrous tissues" refers, in your view, to something that's ontologically only mental content.

[Londoner]

So you are asking me if the 'Bedeutung' of 'mental-content-only' is the same as 'experience of pain' etc., as opposed to their sense or tone?

No, the extension. Bedeutung IS sense or intension.

Frege uses 'extension' when writing about mathematical foundations. Extension records those values that map to the true.

Sense is something possessed by the word. 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' have different senses, even though it happens we can discover (empirically) that they have the same reference. Bedeutung is more like reference, users of those two names may not be aware that they have the same reference, which is why some identity statements 'The Morning Star is the Evening Star' can be informative.('Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' 1892)

So after than exciting diversion, are we any closer to understanding what you mean when you ask if 'nerves' ,'an experience of pain' , 'experience of seeing fibrous tissue' and 'mental-content-only' are 'identical'?

Me: And you think of 'mental-content-only' as being a name?

It is a name, obviously. It has meaning, too, as well as extension.

And what is it the name of? So far, all we have is 'mental-content-only' is the name of 'mental-content-only' . Is 'mental-content-only' an object? An idea? How do we tell it from 'not-mental-content-only'? There is no right or wrong answer, I'm just trying to discover what you mean.

So I'm asking you whether "an experience of pain" and "an experience of seeing fibrous tissues" refers, in your view, to something that's ontologically only mental content.

I'm afraid I still need your promised help in understanding the question. So far you have made a reference to Frege and given me your ideas about 'extension' but you have forgotten to get round to explaining what 'identical' or 'mental-content-only' might mean. Pending that, adding 'ontologically' isn't much help.