if the universe is limitless

[jackles]

Yes if universe is limitless in the nonlocal sense does that mean our universal identity is limitless also. And if there were aliens on another planet could there identity be limitless to.

[GreatandWiseTrixie]

Not sure what you mean.

[David Handeye]

I see. But even if it was, where does this argument of yours take? I mean, so what?

[jackles]

Well if love is our real universal identity maybe aliens on other planets will also find the same nonlocal identity and when we meet our local brain identitys will not clash.

[GreatandWiseTrixie]

Well if love is our real universal identity maybe aliens on other planets will also find the same nonlocal identity and when we meet our local brain identitys will not clash.

Not sure if I follow. Clash in what way?

[David Handeye]

Well if love is our real universal identity maybe aliens on other planets will also find the same nonlocal identity and when we meet our local brain identitys will not clash.

Love? I don't think so. I think it's more realistic dna.

[jackles]

Well dave dna gives us the brain and the brain gets its identity from the geography of the event amongest other event things. But the brain also gets identity from its own consciousness as in a conscience. Love is conscience on this planet or any other.

[hammock]

Well if love is our real universal identity maybe aliens on other planets will also find the same nonlocal identity and when we meet our local brain identitys will not clash.

Sounds like you just want rights of personhood (or a collection of rights for all intelligent agents) to indeed be a universal duty or obligation to be upheld by rational entities. The alternative would be that particular agents have to earn (rather than being "born" with) their status of personhood or basic importance. IOW, all being entitled to fundamental rights that grant them some degree of respect and security from exploitation. Common moral principles like do not murder, do not steal, do not torture / abuse, etc would fall out of such, simplifying the quarrelsome mess of which provenances justify them for all cultures. Kant contended similarly that genuine principles should be universal rather than contingent / practical, but avoided the futility of grounding their global reach in the natural or phenomenal world of the extrospective senses. However, he failed to go the extra step of just subsuming the collection under human rights or rights of personhood -- or did not clarify enough such as an overarching source of a moral rule's potency, anyway.

[David Handeye]

Kant contended similarly that genuine principles should be universal rather than contingent / practical, but avoided the futility of grounding their global reach in the natural or phenomenal world of the extrospective senses. However, he failed to go the extra step of just subsuming the collection under human rights or rights of personhood -- or did not clarify enough such as an overarching source of a moral rule's potency, anyway.

I haven't understood what you mean by subsuming the collection under human right or rights of personhood. Kant founded ethics on the inborn concept of duty, the categorical imperative; he never said "You must have rights", just "You must". Only the command is universal, not the rights you could get by that; rights come along with civil society based on the law of the State. Kant was Prussian, after all.

[jackles]

When you say must are you saying the universe says you must to be inside virtue.

[David Handeye]

no, Kant, said every man was born with the innate moral command "You must". Regardless what he thinks about what is good and what is bad.

[jackles]

Yes that you must . Is the individual locked into the event as a localised program . Each individuals input exactly matching like a jigsaw piece all other localised idividualality. Example you is a tribes man in a particular tribe in the brazilian jungle. You must be as an individual localised to the action of that tribe. Christianity gives the individual the choice of a nonlocal universal element going against the must be.

[hammock]

Kant contended similarly that genuine principles should be universal rather than contingent / practical [revision note: latter should have used Kant's distinguishing term "technical-practical" --hammock], but avoided the futility of grounding their global reach in the natural or phenomenal world of the extrospective senses. However, he failed to go the extra step of just subsuming the collection under human rights or rights of personhood -- or did not clarify enough such as an overarching source of a moral rule's potency, anyway.

I haven't understood what you mean by subsuming the collection under human right or rights of personhood. ... he never said "You must have rights", just "You must". Only the command is universal, not the rights you could get by that; rights come along with civil society based on the law of the State. Kant was Prussian, after all.

As mentioned, Kant didn't take the extra step of conceptual subsumption / simplification, as some contemporaries influenced by him have. Or didn't clarify / approach that direction until later works; potential example (conflation of morality and human rights):

KANT = "Genuine politics cannot risk a step without first having demonstrated its fidelity to morality, and even though politics may justly be called a difficult art, its combination with morality is no art at all; for morality slices in two the knot which others flounder in the face of once they fall into squabbling. Human rights must be kept whole, no matter what that may cost the powers that be. In this case there must be no compromise, no median worked out between pragmatically oriented rights (between rights and utilitarianism)–all politics must bend its knee before human rights, and only in this fashion may politics ever aspire to reach the stage where it will illuminate humanity." [Zum ewigen Frieden – Anhang II (1795)]

Kant's inspiration on contemporary views of rational agents, their personhood, and their importance [rights] stemming from qualifying for such usually do not necessarily feature rational beings having a supersensible side or belonging to an intelligible world, "world of understanding", etc. Which is to say, it is here that the biologically-loaded "innate / inborn" can become applicable [the problem with that usage is examined in the second half of this post]. Examples:

AJUME WINGO = The distinctive qualities of this concept of persons (as interpreted by Wiredu) are brought out when contrasted to the analysis of another leading African philosopher, Kwame Gyekye, who takes issue with this graduated conception of person. Gyekye specifically objects to the role that social status plays in Wiredu's view of personhood, arguing that that is inconsistent with the natural or innate moral equality of persons derived from their common humanity. That is, we are human persons before we are anything else and it is the human person that matters from the moral point of view. Not surprisingly, Gyekye quotes Kant's categorical imperative approvingly when arguing that human persons are, as members of the ‘kingdom of ends,’ equal independent of their empirical or accidental characteristics (be they social or even genetic qualities).

According to Gyekye, it is our essentially human capacity for reason—not other fortuitous or accidental predicates—that serves as the basis for moral worth. In this respect, one cannot point to such accidental characteristics as height, gender, age, marital status, or social class as basis for personhood: What a person acquires are status, habits, and personality or character traits: he, qua person acquires and thus becomes the subject of acquisition, and being thus prior to acquisition process, he cannot be defined by what he acquires. One is a person because of what he is, not because of what he acquire. [Akan Philosophy of the Person]

Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre, Thomas Shanks, S.J., and Michael J. Meyer = One of the most important and influential interpretations of moral rights is based on the work of Immanuel Kant, an eighteenth century philosopher. Kant maintained that each of us has a worth or a dignity that must be respected. This dignity makes it wrong for others to abuse us or to use us against our will. Kant expressed this idea in a moral principle: humanity must always be treated as an end, not merely as a means. To treat a person as a mere means is to use a person to advance one's own interest. But to treat a person as an end is to respect that person's dignity by allowing each the freedom to choose for himself or herself. [RIGHTS, Issues in Ethics, V3 N1 (Winter 1990)]

... Kant founded ethics on the inborn concept of duty, the categorical imperative ... [To jackles:]...Kant, said every man was born with the innate moral command "You must"...

"Inborn" and "innate" would refer to mechanistic-enabled tendencies of the body, which are part of the sensible world; and thereby could be triggered by desires, the need to preserve progress toward personal goals, etc. The CI didn't fall out of local body structure and the causal inter-dependencies of empirical entities; or rest in particular conditions / scenarios, warranted by the consequences or expected effects of actions.

KANT = ... Every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging to the world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient cause belonging to that world that he calls his causality a will. On the other side he is also conscious of himself as a part of the world of sense in which his actions which are mere appearances [phenomena] of that causality are displayed; we cannot however discern how they are possible from this causality which we do not know; but instead of that, these actions as belonging to the sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena, namely, desires and inclinations. If therefore I were only a member of the world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle of autonomy of the pure will; if I were only a part of the world of sense they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of nature. (The former would rest on morality as the supreme principle, the latter on happiness.) Since however the world of understanding contains the foundation of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws also, and accordingly gives the law to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of understanding) directly, and must be conceived as doing so, it follows that, although on the one side I must regard myself as a being belonging to the world of sense, yet on the other side I must recognise myself as subject as an intelligence to the law of the world of understanding, i.e., to reason, which contains this law in the idea of freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy of the will: consequently I must regard the laws of the world of understanding as imperatives for me, and the actions which conform to them as duties.

And thus what makes categorical imperatives possible is this, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in consequence of which if I were nothing else all my actions would always conform to the autonomy of the will; but as I at the same time intuite myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought so to conform, and this categorical “ought” implies a synthetic a priori proposition, inasmuch as besides my will as affected by sensible desires there is added further the idea of the same will but as belonging to the world of the understanding, pure and practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according to Reason of the former will; precisely as to the intuitions of sense there are added concepts of the understanding which of themselves signify nothing but regular form in general, and in this way synthetic a priori propositions become possible, on which all knowledge of physical nature rests. [The Critique of Practical Reason]

KANT = ... Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects—agreeableness of one’s condition, and even the promotion of the happiness of others—could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will.

... But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i. e. I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion.

... the moral law is an imperative, which commands categorically, because the law is unconditioned; the relation of such a will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation, which implies a constraint to an action, though only by reason and its objective law; and this action is called duty, because an elective will, subject to pathological affections (though not determined by them, and, therefore, still free), implies a wish that arises from subjective causes and, therefore, may often be opposed to the pure objective determining principle; whence it requires the moral constraint of a resistance of the practical reason, which may be called an internal, but intellectual, compulsion. In the supreme intelligence the elective will is rightly conceived as incapable of any maxim which could not at the same time be objectively a law..." [Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals]

[David Handeye]

Thank you for your complete explanation, hammock.
I wrote something in Italian about Kant, but often language happens to be a barrier.
I think synthetic a priori do not exist. That is.
In other words, a metaphysical thought is impossible. You could never have a thought without sensitive intuitions.
After having closed doors at metaphysics with transcendental dialectics, he seems to re-open those in ethics' field. So, do you think are possible synthetical a priori? I mean, as a matter of fact, he also used to say "act as if any of your actions should be taken as a universal example".

[Ginkgo]

Thank you for your complete explanation, hammock.
I wrote something about Kant, but often language happens to be a barrier.
I think synthetic a priori do not exist. That is.
In other words, a metaphysical thought is impossible. You could never have a thought without sensitive intuitions.
After having closed doors at metaphysics with transcendental dialectics, he seems to re-open those in ethics' field. So, do you think are possible synthetical a priori? I mean, as a matter of fact, he also used to say "act as if any of your actions should be taken as a universal example".

Kant claims his categorical imperative is synthetic apriori, but I don't see how it is. Interesting point you make, so I guess I better have another look at it just in case.