Theism - better to believe a lie?

[Ginkgo]

I came up with the question while reading "Can Man Live Without God" by Ravi Zacharias. The message I took away from what he wrote was that an atheistic worldview is meaningless, baseless, lacks morals, leads to suicide, genocide, misery etc... My first thought is that even if everything he said were true, it has no bearing on whether or not theism is true and that it's still better to believe what is true rather than what people want to believe to give their lives meaning and sense of purpose. But this assumes that the value of holding a true belief outweighs the value of believing a non-truth for one's own well-being. But does it?

Well, we've still got the "better" problem, and it's going to determine the answer you're going to get.

If you are meaning "better for the production of an individual's happiness," then it might well be the case that believing in something that was not true would work. Kids who believe in unicorns might be happier kids.

If you are meaning "better for the survival of the race," it might or might not. If being deluded is maladaptive from an evolutionary point of view, then it would not be "better" to be deluded in any case. But if a delusion like "morality" might, say, contribute to social cohesion and peace in such a way that a larger number of human animals survived, then you might think it was "better."

However, in a purely Materialist universe, it wouldn't be "wrong" in any sense to believe in a thing that wasn't true, whether it contributed to survival or not. For in a purely Materialist universe, morality cannot be grounded and justified rationally: it can only be regarded as a quirk of evolution or a sociological "phenomenon" -- meaning, "a thing people happen to like to believe in or do." Whether they morally owe anyone to continue to do it cannot be answered through Materialism, for Materialism has no moral precepts, only empirical claims. About that, Zacharias is quite right.

He's also right about empirical "meaning." For while it is quite possible for a Materialist to choose to *imagine* or *invent* a meaning for life, it would not be possible for him to believe on the basis of Materialism itself that there was any truth behind whatever he invented. The universe would be an accident, and accidents don't have "meaning." And this would then create the same question, but this time for the atheist:

Namely: If I am an atheist, and I know full well that the universe started accidentally, by the Big Bang, and I want to imagine that this accidental event actually means something, or somehow generated a "meaning" for life, is it "better" for me to embrace a delusion?

Or again, if I am an atheist, and hence believe that morality is merely an evolutionary quirk or a sociological phenomenon, not a binding reality, but it turns out to be "better" if I act and believe as if morality is some sort of real property of the universe, is it "better" for me to embrace that delusion?

In my view Zacharias is wrong. However, before I address the latter argument I can think of another example of the "better" problem. No need to consider unicorns.

It was once argued that the practice of eugenics in the early part of the 20th century was for the betterment of society. Reducing the number of genetically inferior peoples was a way of improving the quality of life for everyone. Even though eugenics is a myth it was still none the less a strong moral argument for people who were in an authoritative position at the time. The "betterment" argument doesn't wash. It was morally wrong at the time in exactly the same way as it is morally wrong now.

So why the need for "wrong" to enter the argument in the terms you express? There is no need to go beyond human rationality in this particular case. There is nothing added or gained by postulating "wrong" as being above and beyond human morality. We have all we need right here. It is simply immoral to inflict the products of eugenics on certain sections of a population. There is a good reason not to do this sort of thing and it is a reason most humans are capable of recognizing. If we were alive during the early part of the 20th century then we could demonstrate our capacity to step back and reflect upon what was taking place.

[Immanuel Can]

Even though eugenics is a myth

I'm interested in this statement. Might I ask, in what sense are you asserting it to be a "myth"?

In that it does not produce the result it alleges to produce? That it does not really exist at all? That it does work, but is immoral to perform? Clarification would be useful here. "Myth" usually means option #2, or sometimes option #1, but I am unfamiliar with its usage as a synonym for #3.

I'm going to venture a guess, based on your later words,

It is simply immoral to inflict the products of eugenics on certain sections of a population.

So it's the third alternative: you consider it "immoral"? "Myth" in your usage here means, "a thing that cannot be justified by morality," not "a thing that does not exist" or "a thing that does not work"? Am I right?

Well, can I probe that a little? May I ask, if it "worked" to promote evolution, as Social Darwinists say, or perhaps "worked" for some other socially or democratically-approved outcome, then would it not meet your required standards of "better-ness"? And if its functional utility in producing "better" results were well established scientifically, would you still reject it as "mythical" (i.e. "immoral")?

Understand, of course, I do believe it IS immoral, but I suspect that perhaps my reasons could be quite different from yours. I need to fill out your conception of "immoral" here in order to be fair in my response.

There is a good reason not to do this sort of thing and it is a reason most humans are capable of recognizing.

May I ask, what is that "reason" that you identify as something "most humans are capable of realizing" and thus are using there to establish the epithet "immoral"? I don't want to misunderstand your claim there.

Thanks.

[uwot]

However, in a purely Materialist universe, it wouldn't be "wrong" in any sense to believe in a thing that wasn't true, whether it contributed to survival or not. For in a purely Materialist universe, morality cannot be grounded and justified rationally: it can only be regarded as a quirk of evolution or a sociological "phenomenon" -- meaning, "a thing people happen to like to believe in or do." Whether they morally owe anyone to continue to do it cannot be answered through Materialism, for Materialism has no moral precepts, only empirical claims. About that, Zacharias is quite right.

I think what you have done, Immanuel Can is the usual casual and uncritical appropriation of a few premises which don't really refer to anything and created a coherent, and quite possibly logically valid story. That's how religions start, and for their adherents, that sort of sloppy thinking becomes a habit. The 'Materialists' you describe are barely more real than the god you believe in.

He's also right about empirical "meaning." For while it is quite possible for a Materialist to choose to *imagine* or *invent* a meaning for life,

It is also possible for a theist to imagine or invent a god. I suspect that if you were to do the sums, you would agree that the majority of people who have believed in a god have believed in a fiction. Atheists are just those who see no special cause for accepting any particular story about a god among the many.

it would not be possible for him to believe on the basis of Materialism itself that there was any truth behind whatever he invented.

It is entirely possible to believe absolutely anything; it is wise therefore to be at least critical of your own beliefs, even better: don't 'believe' anything.

The universe would be an accident, and accidents don't have "meaning." And this would then create the same question, but this time for the atheist:

Namely: If I am an atheist, and I know full well that the universe started accidentally, by the Big Bang,

Atheists don't 'know' this, and any who has even a passing familiarity with epistemology will acknowledge that. Scientists don't claim to 'know' in the way that religious people do.

and I want to imagine that this accidental event actually means something, or somehow generated a "meaning" for life, is it "better" for me to embrace a delusion?

From the point of view of an atheist, that is precisely what theists do. I would add that you clearly think so.

Or again, if I am an atheist, and hence believe that morality is merely an evolutionary quirk or a sociological phenomenon, not a binding reality,

We do have laws, you know. I think I could probably make a case that secular legal systems are more compassionate than theocratic ones, it certainly wouldn't be hard to find examples of appalling 'religious' laws.

but it turns out to be "better" if I act and believe as if morality is some sort of real property of the universe, is it "better" for me to embrace that delusion?

Personally, I think it is right to treat people with due respect. It makes no difference if that is a feature of the universe or not; it is one of the few things I believe uncritically.

[Immanuel Can]

The 'Materialists' you describe are barely more real than the god you believe in.

ma·te·ri·al·ism: a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter. (Source: Merriam-Webster Online).

Your implication, then, is that such people do not exist, uwot?

[uwot]

The 'Materialists' you describe are barely more real than the god you believe in.

ma·te·ri·al·ism: a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter. (Source: Merriam-Webster Online).

Your implication, then, is that such people do not exist, uwot?

That is really poor logic. The "'Materialists' you describe", to quote myself, have rather more about them than the dictionary definition above. Such people as described by Merriam-Webster do exist, it is those you burden with your own inventions that are rare.

[Immanuel Can]

The definition, then, is acceptable to you?

Good. I shall not trouble you further.

[mickthinks]

Personally, I think it is right to treat people with due respect. It makes no difference if that is a feature of the universe or not; it is one of the few things I believe uncritically.

I think this begs the moral realism question, uwot. I get that you are allowing others to have a different belief from yours, but nevertheless, you couch your belief in an objective frame via your choice of the "it is ..." phrase. The phrase is suggestive of a external reality to which you ascribe truth. But where is that moral reality? What, how, or where is this right, and why is it not a feature of the universe you believe you live in?

[uwot]

The definition, then, is acceptable to you?

Good. I shall not trouble you further.

It's no trouble. Do you really not see the difference between the definition and your perception?

[mickthinks]

Immanuel and others have raised the problems in our understanding of the term "best", but I want to return to art's problem of "belief" and "truth".

The problem I see in marsh's conundrum is that it is constructed out of two viewpoints and asks us to make sense of their juxtaposition, but the viewpoints are mutually exclusive.

We have a proposition G (it's more likely a system of many propositions, but let's keep it simple for now), and we are told it is a lie, so G is false. We are also told to consider that it is better (in some way) to believe it to be true.

But we are no longer in a position to believe G, because we know it is false. So who are we to imagine believing G for this thought experiment? Not ourselves, but some person or group kept in ignorance. By us? I don't know about you, but I find it difficult to imagine it ever being right to deny others knowledge I had, for their own good. But even if we grant that it might be morally justified for a guardian class to patronise a protected class in this way, that answers a different question from the one I take marsh to be posing.

But maybe I can rescue marsh's thought experiment by imagining an "afterlife" in which the deluded (and in this set-up, they could include me) came to have the truth of ~G revealed to them after having enjoyed the full benefits of believing the falsehood G, and being duly grateful to have been deluded.

But what I still can't incorporate into the thought experiment is an active, and hence moral, decision to believe G. Which ever way you cut it, those who believe G have no choice but to believe, for better or for worse, and likewise those who know ~G.

[uwot]

Personally, I think it is right to treat people with due respect. It makes no difference if that is a feature of the universe or not; it is one of the few things I believe uncritically.

I think this begs the moral realism question, uwot.

I take your point, mickthinks, but to be honest, I couldn't give a monkeys about moral realism. I really, really, really don't care if it is True that causing unnecessary harm is absolutely or objectively wrong: I don't like it, where possible I will stop it, with force if reason fails, and I will support laws that prohibit it.

I get that you are allowing others to have a different belief from yours,

Actually, I'm not very tolerant of people who think it is acceptable to treat others 'badly'.

but nevertheless, you couch your belief in an objective frame via your choice of the "it is ..." phrase.

Well, yes, but that was qualified by "I think". If it is just my opinion, so be it; it is still something I 'believe' I should uphold.

The phrase is suggestive of a external reality to which you ascribe truth.

I'm very sparing with my ascription of truth and I'm unclear about the nature of external reality. If anything I say suggests otherwise, I'm sorry for not making myself clearer.

But where is that moral reality? What, how, or where is this right, and why is it not a feature of the universe you believe you live in?

It is a fact that people suffer. It is also a fact that there are things I can do to lessen, or at least not add to suffering. I don't know where in the universe moral values exist independently of moral agents, but that will not stop me being a self-righteous git.

[Immanuel Can]

Mcthinks:

I find your formalist version of the problem very helpful and interesting. Thanks for framing it. Can I try to help with that last point?

I mean...

what I still can't incorporate into the thought experiment is an active, and hence moral, decision to believe G. Which ever way you cut it, those who believe G have no choice but to believe, for better or for worse, and likewise those who know ~G.

I think this impinges on the philosophically-interesting notion of "self-deception." What makes it such an interesting case is that the perpetrator is also the victim. But in order to perpetrate a fraud, the perpetrators must know the truth; and in order to be a victim, the victim must not know the truth. So does the "self" in question really know, or not know, the truth? If he/she does, then he/she is a perp but not a victim; and if he/she does not, then he/she is a victim but not a perp.

But still, our intuition and experience strongly suggest to us that "self-deception" is a real phenomenon. So philosophers puzzle about how this plays out.

It gets a bit clearer if we think of "self-deception" as wish-directed behavior aimed at convincing oneself of something one still knows isn't true. As such, usually only partially successful: the "self-deceived" person knows the truth on a subconscious or semi-conscious level, but on the level of consciousness and action is persisting in choosing to act as if this knowledge was not true. This produces a divided self, a sort of "bad faith."

In short, a person can in fact know ¬ G, but still be consciously bent on the project of avoiding the knowledge of ¬ G. And if I'm right about the results usually being only half successful, then the result would be likely to be divided people who are unable to achieve any sort of unified, integrated and authentic selfhood -- at least with regard to those matters in which they were practicing self-deception.

And if that could be said for the ¬ G hypothesis, in the case of Theists, it would equally hold true for the ¬ M (no morality) hypothesis in the case of Materialists.

So back to Marsh's question: could practicing that sort of self-deception be "better" than not doing it? We still perhaps can't settle that yet, but we can add the insight that a cost of doing it would be divided selfhood and inauthenticity.

[uwot]

It gets a bit clearer if we think of "self-deception" as wish-directed behavior aimed at convincing oneself of something one still knows isn't true. As such, usually only partially successful: the "self-deceived" person knows the truth on a subconscious or semi-conscious level, but on the level of consciousness and action is persisting in choosing to act as if this knowledge was not true. This produces a divided self, a sort of "bad faith.".

You're doing it again. This sounds plausible, but do you have any experience of people being so deceived, or can you point to some research, on actual people, that supports your hypothesis?

[Immanuel Can]

Yes.

I think almost anyone can.

That is, unless one has been so fortunate as to live in this world of ours and meet no one who is self-deceived. I have no further insight on the subject to offer such fortunate souls, should they exist.

[uwot]

Yes.

I think almost anyone can.

That is, unless one has been so fortunate as to live in this world of ours and meet no one who is self-deceived. I have no further insight on the subject to offer such fortunate souls, should they exist.

I wouldn't claim that there are not people who deceive themselves and believe things that are untrue: since they cannot all possibly be correct, the great majority (at least) of people who believe in gods must believe something which is untrue. Science has its own examples: phrenology is based on the premise that it is possible to discern characteristics from bumps on the head. Freudian analysis is based on the premise that men are jealous of their fathers. Eugenics, to return to an earlier point, is based on the premise that it is possible to breed disease and infirmity out of a species, which as Ginkgo pointed out, is a myth.
Like I said, it is depressingly common that people convince themselves of bogus premises and believe the conclusions they draw, logically and validly, from those premises are true; there are countless examples of people so deceiving themselves. However, what you are describing is someone who believes something they know to be untrue. Do you have any actual examples of such a person?

[Immanuel Can]

Sure.

An abused wife is warned that she must leave her husband, or he will beat her again. She strenuously denies it. She says, "He is sorry...you just don't know him...sometimes he's so sweet...and he's changed now," and so on.

But when he comes home and slams the door, she jumps in terror. Her actions show one kind of belief, but unless we take her to be entirely insincere, her protestations of his essential goodness proclaim an opposite belief.

Or an athlete has been diagnosed with a terminal illness. Scientifically, he knows homeopathy is nonsense and will not cure him; yet he tries homeopathy anyway. So does he believe homeopathy can cure diseases, or does he not?

Such cases can easily be multiplied.