Philosofer123 wrote:When I say "obligation", I am referring to objective (mind-independent) obligation.
An obligation that is outside the mind doesn't make sense. It has to belong to some mind ^^ maybe an authority for instance. I think your real argument is against the existence of God, as he's the only thing I can think of that could contain an obligation for which could be imposed upon somebody else. I can't think of anybody else but religious people having claimed that obligations exist independent of the mind... do you have any examples of somebody who has truly believed that and are not using religion as a container for their obligations?
Philosofer123 wrote:You have not shown that the universe has a "mind" in any meaningful sense of the term. A mind has subjective experience and intention, which the universe as a whole does not appear to have.
Well I never claimed the universe has a mind, I only explained why I appeared to be treating it as if it does have a mind.
Philosofer123 wrote:When I say "obligation", I am referring to objective (mind-independent) obligation.
An obligation that is outside the mind doesn't make sense. It has to belong to some mind ^^ maybe an authority for instance. I think your real argument is against the existence of God, as he's the only thing I can think of that could contain an obligation for which could be imposed upon somebody else. I can't think of anybody else but religious people having claimed that obligations exist independent of the mind... do you have any examples of somebody who has truly believed that and are not using religion as a container for their obligations?
Most moral realists (many of whom are atheists) believe that there are mind-independent obligations.
The Voice of Time wrote:
Philosofer123 wrote:You have not shown that the universe has a "mind" in any meaningful sense of the term. A mind has subjective experience and intention, which the universe as a whole does not appear to have.
Well I never claimed the universe has a mind, I only explained why I appeared to be treating it as if it does have a mind.
If you cannot establish that the universe has a mind, then it does not make sense to treat it as if it has a mind.
Philosofer123 wrote:Most moral realists (many of whom are atheists) believe that there are mind-independent obligations.
I would like to meet some of them and have them explain to me how that works ^^ I would start by asking them whether an obligation is an idea, and when I presumably get "yes" I would ask them how an idea can exist independent of a mind. If I get a "no", I would ask them what an obligation is then.
Philosofer123 wrote:If you cannot establish that the universe has a mind, then it does not make sense to treat it as if it has a mind.
Aye but the appearance was your perception and not my intention x) I was speaking in a metaphorical language. It would be time-consuming to be too literal about it, the actions of the universe are still important whether it has a mind or not.
Philosofer123 wrote:Most moral realists (many of whom are atheists) believe that there are mind-independent obligations.
I would like to meet some of them and have them explain to me how that works ^^ I would start by asking them whether an obligation is an idea, and when I presumably get "yes" I would ask them how an idea can exist independent of a mind. If I get a "no", I would ask them what an obligation is then.
Whether atheistic moral realists are justified in believing that there are mind-independent obligations is irrelevant to your question. I am not a moral realist, so I cannot answer for them.
Philosofer123 wrote:I do not claim that death has value. I simply say that death may not be harmful in some types of extreme circumstances.
Well to me death can't have a value in and of itself even in extreme circumstances. Which is why I'm strongly opposed to euthanasia in any form for any person. It would have to be for a greater cause in the form of a trade-off and as an instrument to achieving that greater cause, that's the only way, because then death itself is not perceived as having qualities by itself that gives it value (which my argument hold is logically impossible, that death has a "null" value), but that the qualities lay in other things which designates death the value and your belief in that makes you able to act instrumentally for that by attaining death. It's the difference between "I like death, therefore I'm willing to give my life for you" and "I like you, therefore I'm willing to give my life for you".
The problem is when those mix and something, wrongly, is perceived as the later, whereas it's just the first making an excuse using the later as an appearance of deception. Then the mentality is wrong and ill as there has to be an unreal, as in imaginary, way in which death is designated qualities of value. Death is thereby wished for not for itself but for its imaginary twin, or deceptively imagined cloak.
Philosofer123 wrote:I do not claim that death has value. I simply say that death may not be harmful in some types of extreme circumstances.
Well to me death can't have a value in and of itself even in extreme circumstances. Which is why I'm strongly opposed to euthanasia in any form for any person. It would have to be for a greater cause in the form of a trade-off and as an instrument to achieving that greater cause, that's the only way, because then death itself is not perceived as having qualities by itself that gives it value (which my argument hold is logically impossible, that death has a "null" value), but that the qualities lay in other things which designates death the value and your belief in that makes you able to act instrumentally for that by attaining death. It's the difference between "I like death, therefore I'm willing to give my life for you" and "I like you, therefore I'm willing to give my life for you".
The problem is when those mix and something, wrongly, is perceived as the later, whereas it's just the first making an excuse using the later as an appearance of deception. Then the mentality is wrong and ill as there has to be an unreal, as in imaginary, way in which death is designated qualities of value. Death is thereby wished for not for itself but for its imaginary twin, or deceptively imagined cloak.
I see nothing in your post that contradicts anything in my philosophy. Again, I do not claim that death has value.
If you disagree with my statement "death may not be harmful in some types of extreme circumstances", then the onus is on you to prove that death is definitely harmful in all circumstances.
What I would say instead is, that to talk about harm and no harm is null and void, because you can't measure death! Of course you can measure social, economical, political and so forth consequences. But you can't measure the value of death itself! It is meaningless to give nothingness a value of itself, and death is just another form of nothingness.
So you are wrong in saying that it does not cause harm in some circumstances, because it can't possess the quality of not causing harm. Other objects can possess the quality of not being harmed, but death can't possess the quality of not harming. Your sentence presumably opens the way for euthanasia by giving only one side of the story, that it doesn't cause harm, you are forgetting however, that death itself can't be asked the question, so you can't give it that value and expect people to value it for having that quality, because if they do they will be committing a logical error.
To the more direct reply you are looking for, Jean-Paul Sartre said something wonderful, which pretty much ends up as such, as that it is the things you do that makes something good, and that they are an example to all the world. All the world can take example from your action, so you would be causing harm always as people would always be able to use it as an excuse for dying as well. But this is not really a big deal for me, I'm not that into Sartre's argument that I believe it to hold too much merit, but the argument could be made and it would refute your claim more directly.
The Voice of Time wrote:What I would say instead is, that to talk about harm and no harm is null and void, because you can't measure death! Of course you can measure social, economical, political and so forth consequences. But you can't measure the value of death itself! It is meaningless to give nothingness a value of itself, and death is just another form of nothingness.
So you are wrong in saying that it does not cause harm in some circumstances, because it can't possess the quality of not causing harm. Other objects can possess the quality of not being harmed, but death can't possess the quality of not harming. Your sentence presumably opens the way for euthanasia by giving only one side of the story, that it doesn't cause harm, you are forgetting however, that death itself can't be asked the question, so you can't give it that value and expect people to value it for having that quality, because if they do they will be committing a logical error.
To the more direct reply you are looking for, Jean-Paul Sartre said something wonderful, which pretty much ends up as such, as that it is the things you do that makes something good, and that they are an example to all the world. All the world can take example from your action, so you would be causing harm always as people would always be able to use it as an excuse for dying as well. But this is not really a big deal for me, I'm not that into Sartre's argument that I believe it to hold too much merit, but the argument could be made and it would refute your claim more directly.
When I say that "death is usually harmful for the one who dies", I mean that one would usually prefer to live longer than one actually does. Using this sense of the term "harmful", I can coherently (and, in my view, correctly) say that "death is not always harmful for the one who dies", as there are cases where one would rationally prefer dying over continuing to live.
Philosofer123 wrote:
When I say that "death is usually harmful for the one who dies", I mean that one would usually prefer to live longer than one actually does. Using this sense of the term "harmful", I can coherently (and, in my view, correctly) say that "death is not always harmful for the one who dies", as there are cases where one would rationally prefer dying over continuing to live.
Watch out, you're probably going to get the old pain and suffering argument.
Philosofer123 wrote:
When I say that "death is usually harmful for the one who dies", I mean that one would usually prefer to live longer than one actually does. Using this sense of the term "harmful", I can coherently (and, in my view, correctly) say that "death is not always harmful for the one who dies", as there are cases where one would rationally prefer dying over continuing to live.
Watch out, you're probably going to get the old pain and suffering argument.
Then I would just add "quickly and painlessly" after "dying".
Well I give up x) Your statements are mostly too vague to be likely subjects to criticism, or too personal. But that's quite typical of philosophy of life, it can be a way of getting the most obvious things down on paper to avoid logical inconsistency in one's thinking, or just a way of expressing one's heart.
Philosofer123 wrote:
When I say that "death is usually harmful for the one who dies", I mean that one would usually prefer to live longer than one actually does. Using this sense of the term "harmful", I can coherently (and, in my view, correctly) say that "death is not always harmful for the one who dies", as there are cases where one would rationally prefer dying over continuing to live.
Watch out, you're probably going to get the old pain and suffering argument.
Then I would just add "quickly and painlessly" after "dying".
That would be the choice, as the alternative to the 'pain and suffering' before the choice to die was made.
The Voice of Time wrote:Well I give up x) Your statements are mostly too vague to be likely subjects to criticism, or too personal. But that's quite typical of philosophy of life, it can be a way of getting the most obvious things down on paper to avoid logical inconsistency in one's thinking, or just a way of expressing one's heart.
Both my positions and the arguments supporting those positions are quite clear.
Thank you taking the time to read and critique my philosophy.
Philosofer123 wrote:Both my positions and the arguments supporting those positions are quite clear.
Aye, the sentences are, the ideas not so much, as in, I can't wrap my head about the specific purpose of many of them. But that's just the philosophy of life style of writing.
Philosofer123 wrote:Both my positions and the arguments supporting those positions are quite clear.
Aye, the sentences are, the ideas not so much, as in, I can't wrap my head about the specific purpose of many of them. But that's just the philosophy of life style of writing.
If there are any ideas in the document on which you are unclear, then please explain and I will do my best to clarify.
