YehYeh wrote:I'm still not sure where you're headed with those distinctions. I'll just take a stab at what I can see.
Metaphysics exist (in a Platonic-Pythagorean universe) to create logical models of some aspects of personal or public experience.
Distinctions such as analytic/synthetic, reality/appearance, appearance/statement, statement/proposition depend on specific metaphysics, where these ideas may or may not be meaningfully defined. Perhaps inside realism the analytic/synthetic distinction collapses due to the structure of realism, but that need not be the case for other metaphysics.
Each metaphysic, in itself, is analytical. The axioms are hypothetical -- best guesses -- derived either from other analytical sources, such as pure logic, or from personal experience.
It is not inconsistent for Parmenides and Aristotle to develop metaphysical systems of the One or of sensible objects based on binary logic with non-contradiction. The advantage of these metaphysics is pragmatic -- they are logically manageable. The disadvantage is that they are far from and severely limited in applicability to experience. Attempts at internal, ontological pluralism to address this shortcoming will fail in the face of logical argument.
Plato's realism does not reject flux from the 'world of illusions' of life. Instead, flux is sampled at points along the way. While time disappears between the points, so that we cannot tell how much "time passed". However, we can still see the consequences of change, when we look at the images at each point. This method is standard in the sciences.
private metaphysics, defined by private meaning (as opposed to private language...)
and yes, the method may well be standard in the sciences (as well as everyday existence); however, it falls apart with Hume's problem of induction and the assumption of the future resembling the past...
we are ultimately in agreement of the applicability of these systems to the world of experience...
-Imp