Free Will and Determinism Necessitate Eachother

[Terrapin Station]

I still don't know what you are getting at. I don't know what you mean by a generalization, and I don't know what you mean by an abstraction. Perhaps you could give examples. I can suggest some, but I'm only be guessing.

I gave an example earlier: "dog"

And I explained that all concepts, all universals/types/kinds are abstractions. (Universals, types and kinds are more or less different terms for the same thing (they're not exactly the same, necessarily, but for our present purposes they're close enough).) So any property that we attribute to more than one particular, for example, is an abstraction. I even gave you a definition of what abstraction is (although not as detailed of a definition as what I'm about to give): abstraction is the process of glossing over particular differences, noting resemblances (not identical occurrences), at least per one's perception and perspective, and formulating a type or universal that can apply to multiple particulars--a type or universal or kind such as "dog," or "leg," or "fur" or anything like that.

Generalizations are a particular sort of abstraction, in the form of a proposition (which itself is going to apply abstractions such as property terms, concepts, universal/type/kind terms, etc.): For example, "All dogs are descendants of wolves."

[Terrapin Station]

The regularity of nature is a scientific fact

I'd say that it's an experiential fact (that is, at least a fact about our experiences), at least per how we think about what we experience, and given biases we have due to ways that it's most efficient for our brains to work, biases that lead to us explaining or excusing away recalcitrant data as if it must have been wrong, rather than our assumptions about regularity/uniformity being wrong. Obviously nature is "regular enough"/"similar enough" in many respects to lead to these experiences. But this in no way suggests that natural/physical laws are real.

it is incorrect not to recognize a scientific fact.

I don't at all agree with that. I'm not much for behavioral normatives, though. I'm not going to tell someone that they're "incorrect" because they didn't believe some particular thing (that I and whoever else believes is a fact). I might say that in my view their belief is incorrect, but I'd never say that they're incorrect to not believe what I believe.

[Janoah]

The regularity of nature is a scientific fact

I'd say that it's an experiential fact (that is, at least a fact about our experiences), at least per how we think about what we experience, and given biases we have due to ways that it's most efficient for our brains to work, biases that lead to us explaining or excusing away recalcitrant data as if it must have been wrong, rather than our assumptions about regularity/uniformity being wrong. Obviously nature is "regular enough"/"similar enough" in many respects to lead to these experiences. But this in no way suggests that natural/physical laws are real.

it is incorrect not to recognize a scientific fact.

I don't at all agree with that. I'm not much for behavioral normatives, though. I'm not going to tell someone that they're "incorrect" because they didn't believe some particular thing (that I and whoever else believes is a fact). I might say that in my view their belief is incorrect, but I'd never say that they're incorrect to not believe what I believe.

so are you ready to jump off the roof? if not, why not?

[Terrapin Station]

The regularity of nature is a scientific fact

I'd say that it's an experiential fact (that is, at least a fact about our experiences), at least per how we think about what we experience, and given biases we have due to ways that it's most efficient for our brains to work, biases that lead to us explaining or excusing away recalcitrant data as if it must have been wrong, rather than our assumptions about regularity/uniformity being wrong. Obviously nature is "regular enough"/"similar enough" in many respects to lead to these experiences. But this in no way suggests that natural/physical laws are real.

it is incorrect not to recognize a scientific fact.

I don't at all agree with that. I'm not much for behavioral normatives, though. I'm not going to tell someone that they're "incorrect" because they didn't believe some particular thing (that I and whoever else believes is a fact). I might say that in my view their belief is incorrect, but I'd never say that they're incorrect to not believe what I believe.

so are you ready to jump off the roof? if not, why not?

Because it's neither true that there are natural/physical laws nor that particulars "behave" equiprobably randomly (and certainly not according to my desires).

[Janoah]

I'd say that it's an experiential fact (that is, at least a fact about our experiences), at least per how we think about what we experience, and given biases we have due to ways that it's most efficient for our brains to work, biases that lead to us explaining or excusing away recalcitrant data as if it must have been wrong, rather than our assumptions about regularity/uniformity being wrong. Obviously nature is "regular enough"/"similar enough" in many respects to lead to these experiences. But this in no way suggests that natural/physical laws are real.



I don't at all agree with that. I'm not much for behavioral normatives, though. I'm not going to tell someone that they're "incorrect" because they didn't believe some particular thing (that I and whoever else believes is a fact). I might say that in my view their belief is incorrect, but I'd never say that they're incorrect to not believe what I believe.

so are you ready to jump off the roof? if not, why not?

Because it's neither true that there are natural/physical laws nor that particulars "behave" equiprobably randomly (and certainly not according to my desires).

if natural / physical laws don't exist, why don't you jump off the roof?

[Terrapin Station]

so are you ready to jump off the roof? if not, why not?

Because it's neither true that there are natural/physical laws nor that particulars "behave" equiprobably randomly (and certainly not according to my desires).

if natural / physical laws don't exist, why don't you jump off the roof?

But I just answered that: "it's [not the case that] particulars 'behave' equiprobably randomly (and certainly not according to my desires)."

[Janoah]

Because it's neither true that there are natural/physical laws nor that particulars "behave" equiprobably randomly (and certainly not according to my desires).

if natural / physical laws don't exist, why don't you jump off the roof?

But I just answered that: "it's [not the case that] particulars 'behave' equiprobably randomly (and certainly not according to my desires)."

you're mixing apples and oranges.

ok, no more questions, thanks.

[Terrapin Station]

if natural / physical laws don't exist, why don't you jump off the roof?

But I just answered that: "it's [not the case that] particulars 'behave' equiprobably randomly (and certainly not according to my desires)."

you're mixing apples and oranges.

ok, no more questions, thanks.

You'd have to explain why on your view that's "mixing apples and oranges," but if you don't think that will be worth your time or if you think it's too laborious, okay.

Just to explain that a bit more, first off, the fact that one doesn't believe that there are real (objective/extramental) natural or physical laws doesn't imply that one thinks that all particulars are equiprobably random. Not that equiprobable randomness would be a reason to do any particular thing, of course--everything would be a complete gamble then, and not all of us like taking complete gambles, obviously.

And the fact that one doesn't believe that there are real (objective/extramental) natural or physical laws certainly doesn't imply that one believes that the world is going to conform to one's desires.

Insofar as randomness/chance obtains, the possibilities are clearly not equiprobable. And that's one thing that amounts to the behavior or particulars being more or less regular, which we can observe and note, of course. This doesn't mean that unusual, unexpected things can't happen, but they're not likely in many situations.

[Immanuel Can]

If the dynamics are not physical, then Physicalism is untrue.

We're not talking about whether physicalism is "true" or not. We're talking about possible views that people can have.

Well, unless you're encouraging incoherent views, or self-contradictory views, you'd have to say that Physicalism would have to be true to be worth believing, no?

If someone is a physicalist, they're not going to think that there's anything that's not physical. And that's the basic assumption here...

Yes, I see that. But logically, that would mean that a Physicalist would saying both that material things are "real," and that there are no "real" dynamics that are involved with the material things. If that's what they are saying, then it would seem that it's not even coherent.

So yeah, people can believe anything they want. They can believe in phrenology or alchemy or flying pigs...but I think we've got to limit our concern to things that are not self-contradictory or obviously irrational, no?

...this has nothing to do with whether their views are correct. ...

Incoherent views aren't even possibly correct. So I don't know why we'd want to be discussing such things at all...unless we have a perverse interest in marvelling at how goofy people can be.

Again, a possible view is that THERE ARE NO GOVERNING DYNAMICS.

Well, if there are "dynamics" (i.e. movement or change of any kind) at all, then either they're "real" dynamics, or there's none at all. But empirically, things move and change, so how do we explain that?

It thus might be a "possible view," but it's only a "possible false view," and cannot possibly be true. It's not even self-consistent or coherent.

But it's a neat trick...you're calling whatever forces mobilize the "physical" stuff non-physical,

Holy cow you really, really are incapable of reading. I said nothing like that.

I'm sorry...I misunderstood. Did you not say there are physical "things," but that there are "no governing dynamics" of those things? But there are dynamics, manifestly.

So I'll have to ask again: how do you account for "dynamics" that are "not real"? And how if such exist, as obviously they do, then what are they if they are not "physical"? Physicalists, by definition HAVE to say they're "physical," don't they? By definition, they have no other recourse, since they say "all real things are physical."

[Terrapin Station]

Well, unless you're encouraging incoherent views, or self-contradictory views, you'd have to say that Physicalism would have to be true to be worth believing, no?

I'm not campaigning for whether it's worth believing either. I don't want to get distracted by stuff like that. I'm simply shooting for you being able to understand, logically, how someone could be a physicalist yet not be a realist on physical laws.

Yes, I see that. But logically, that would mean that a Physicalist would saying both that material things are "real," and that there are no "real" dynamics that are involved with the material things.

No real physical laws or "governing" whatevers (I don't want to bias that by suggesting a particular word).

If that's what they are saying, then it would seem that it's not even coherent.

The issue then would be why you can't understand positing that there might be no real physical laws. (Which has nothing to do with you agreeing or thinking it's a worthwhile thing to think. Just why the notion doesn't even make sense to you.)

So yeah, people can believe anything they want. They can believe in phrenology or alchemy or flying pigs...but I think we've got to limit our concern to things that are not self-contradictory or obviously irrational, no?

No. I don't at all expect that you'd ever think that physical law antirealism is rational. Hence why I proposed the "automobiles are made completely of toast" example. Neither of us would think that's a rational view, and certainly we wouldn't think that "the toast that comprises automobiles arrives on Earth from the Jovian atmosphere" is rational, but I can understand that someone could have both views, and they're not self-contradictory, despite the fact that I think they're crazy views to have. You should be able to understand how someone could have both views, too, and be able to understand that they're not self-contradictory, despite you thinking they're crazy views to have. That's all I'm shooting for here.

Well, if there are "dynamics" (i.e. movement or change of any kind) at all, then either they're "real" dynamics, or there's none at all.

Sure. The issue is "governing." Hence why I emphasized that particular word.

But empirically, things move and change, so how do we explain that?

Again, that's getting off track. Physicalism doesn't at all hinge on how anyone explains movement. It has nothing to do with that. It's like asking a theist to explain apparent evolution. Theism doesn't at all hinge on that.

So I'll have to ask again: how do you account for "dynamics" that are "not real"?

I didn't say that motion isn't real. I said that "GOVERNING" dynamics a la physical laws are not real.

By the way, if you think "Everything is physical but there are no real physical laws" is contradictory, what's P in the contradiction? What's the P that's both being asserted and denied?

[Immanuel Can]

Well, unless you're encouraging incoherent views, or self-contradictory views, you'd have to say that Physicalism would have to be true to be worth believing, no?

I'm not campaigning for whether it's worth believing either. I don't want to get distracted by stuff like that. I'm simply shooting for you being able to understand, logically, how someone could be a physicalist yet not be a realist on physical laws.

"Logically" is the problem. It isn't logical to believe in dynamics that are not "real." That's irrational behaviour.

That problem is pretty much not a "distraction." It's what one should call a "terminal fault."

Yes, I see that. But logically, that would mean that a Physicalist would saying both that material things are "real," and that there are no "real" dynamics that are involved with the material things.

No real physical laws or "governing" whatevers (I don't want to bias that by suggesting a particular word).

Oh, you're riffing on "governing"? Don't worry about it. Let's just call it "dynamics." Things move. Things change. Nobody can deny that. But the Physicalist has to say that the reasons they move are "physical" reasons. There's no other logical explanation.

Just why the notion doesn't even make sense to you.

Irrational explanations don't "even" make sense to any logical person.

So yeah, people can believe anything they want. They can believe in phrenology or alchemy or flying pigs...but I think we've got to limit our concern to things that are not self-contradictory or obviously irrational, no?

No.

Yes.

You should be able to understand how someone could have both views, too, and be able to understand that they're not self-contradictory, despite you thinking they're crazy views to have. That's all I'm shooting for here.

My "ability to understand" is not the problem. It's the incoherence -- or, to use your word "craziness" of their view that's the problem.

Well, if there are "dynamics" (i.e. movement or change of any kind) at all, then either they're "real" dynamics, or there's none at all.

Sure. The issue is "governing." Hence why I emphasized that particular word.

No, the issue is "dynamics." Drop the word "governing" if it hurts you to think about it. Just ask yourself this: in an allegedly purely-physical world, how do things move or change without a "physical" cause?

Physicalism doesn't at all hinge on how anyone explains movement.

Yeah, it does. Because it means that that sort of "non-physical" Physicalism fails to explain at least half of the empirical data accessible to everyone.

So I'll have to ask again: how do you account for "dynamics" that are "not real"?

I didn't say that motion isn't real.

Motion is a "dynamic." Dynamism is real. Real things are physical. Finish the chain syllogism, and you see the logical problem.

What's the P that's both being asserted and denied?

The existence of dynamics, and that dynamics are physical.

All this, while insisting that everything real is physical.

It's totally incoherent...and self-contradicting.

[Terrapin Station]

"Logically" is the problem. It isn't logical to believe in dynamics that are not "real." That's irrational behaviour.

Let's clear up one thing at a time so that we don't have to keep repeating stuff and typing so much.

Dynamics, or things changing/being in motion, is different than governing dynamics, different than physical laws, and different from the claim that from an antecedent state, only one possible consequent state can obtain, no?

Let's straighten that out first.

[RCSaunders]

I still don't know what you are getting at. I don't know what you mean by a generalization, and I don't know what you mean by an abstraction. Perhaps you could give examples. I can suggest some, but I'm only be guessing.

I gave an example earlier: "dog"

And I explained that all concepts, all universals/types/kinds are abstractions. (Universals, types and kinds are more or less different terms for the same thing (they're not exactly the same, necessarily, but for our present purposes they're close enough).) So any property that we attribute to more than one particular, for example, is an abstraction. I even gave you a definition of what abstraction is (although not as detailed of a definition as what I'm about to give): abstraction is the process of glossing over particular differences, noting resemblances (not identical occurrences), at least per one's perception and perspective, and formulating a type or universal that can apply to multiple particulars--a type or universal or kind such as "dog," or "leg," or "fur" or anything like that.

Generalizations are a particular sort of abstraction, in the form of a proposition (which itself is going to apply abstractions such as property terms, concepts, universal/type/kind terms, etc.): For example, "All dogs are descendants of wolves."

Your description of what you mean by a, "concept," seems to mix up ontology (what actually exists) with epistemology (the identification of what exists). Ontologically, any existent is whatever its qualities and attributes are. Epistemologically an existent is identified by whatever attributes an existent has one can be aware of and which differentiate it from all other existents. Many existents have attributes similar to other existents, and it is epistemologically practical to identify all such existents as categories or classes of existents (universals). There is nothing ontological about such classifications (no mystical Platonic essences), only the factual observation that all, "dogs," "legs," "potatoes," "planets," "histories," have attributes by which we identify them as those kinds of things. Those universal concepts are valid because the existents really do have those attributes by which they are identified.

For all existents identified as members of a class or category of existents because they have the same identical identifying attributes (universal), each individual existent (member of that class) must have some attribute or attributes that differentiate it from all other entities of the same class or category, because every existent must be different in some way from all other existents--no two existents can be totally identical else they would be the same thing, not two.

A concept does not, "leave out," or, "extract," those differentiating attributes, it includes them as necessary to the actual entities the concept identifies, but a concept is not knowledge about any existent. Concepts only identify the existents all our knowledge is about. All knowledge about existents must be in the form of propositions.

A concept only identifies existents which is why a little girl who only knows what apples look and taste like and a botanist specializing in apples mean exactly the same thing when they use the word, "apple," --an actual piece of fruit called an apple with all its attributes, both those that identify it as an apple and those that differentiate it from all others, as well as all that can be known about it, whether anyone knows it or not.

So a concept is not an abstraction. Nothing is, "left out." A concept is only a means of identifying actual existents that all our knowledge is about.

[Terrapin Station]

There is nothing ontological about such classifications (no mystical Platonic essences),

Okay, wait. start here for a minute. Again, I don't want to keep typing and typing with us getting nowhere.

The classifications exist, don't they? Otherwise, how are there the classifications in the first place?

I said nothing along the lines of the classifications being "mystical platonic essences" obviously, but the classifications exist.

[Immanuel Can]

"Logically" is the problem. It isn't logical to believe in dynamics that are not "real." That's irrational behaviour.

Let's clear up one thing at a time so that we don't have to keep repeating stuff and typing so much.

Dynamics, or things changing/being in motion, is different than governing dynamics, different than physical laws, and different from the claim that from an antecedent state, only one possible consequent state can obtain, no?

Let's straighten that out first.

Drop the word "governing." It was an adjective, not the noun. The noun is the main thing.

So, Poof! It's gone.

Now, tell me how we can have dynamics that are not "physical," and still be "Physicalists."

Fire away.