Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

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FlashDangerpants
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Sculptor wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 3:08 pm
FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 1:51 pm
Sculptor wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 8:35 am
I am always astounded that the one most likely to accuse another of "projection" is the one most commonly in the habit of projecting.
That would be you!
Did you see that thing last year where he misunderstood an article so badly that he thought a real life professional philosopher had actually published an argument to the effect that anyone who argues against moral realism has brain damage? Nobody else had to read the article at all to know he failed to understand it. He later claimed that he couldn't be mistaken though because he had read it "at least 20 times". He probably did read it 20 times, but he'll read this 20 times too, and will still fail to get the point of these words.
I missed that one. But there is a similarly amusing bit of misconception that happened this week on the matter of a "table" where he attributes to Russell a postion he in no way held, by mis-quoting a passage from Russell's history of philosophy where he desrcibes such a postion.
I think we all need to take care of reading what we want to read, but VA is a rather "special" case I think.
Is that one where Russell goes on about sense data and the uneven brownness of the table for 7 pages?
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

For Reference,

SUMMARY - Chapter 1 Problems of Philosophy
  • 1. Is there Knowledge So Certain it can be Exempt from Doubt
    2. Ordinarily we Assume Certainty but Scrutiny reveals otherwise
    3. Start with Experience to search for Certainty of Knowledge
    4. What is so Evident can be doubted to be true
    5. The Table is so real to the Senses but not if we are to be more Precise
    6. There are so many perspectives to what is the Color of the Table
    7. The Different Perspective Critical to the Painter and specialists
    8. There is a Distinction between Appearance and Reality
    9. Table do not have a particular color, depend on light, spectator, angle
    10. Table – no particular texture, normal sight, via microscope
    11. The Shape of the Table in not ‘Real’ but Inferred
    12. Touch of the Table, Sensation Varied
    13. Sound of Table also varied to perspectives
    14. Real Table not as Immediately known by Sensed and Experienced
    15. Sense-data =immediately known in Sensation [immediate aware]
    16. Relation of the Sense Data to the Real Table [Physical Object]
    17. Sense-Data is not THE Table, also not the direct properties of the Table
    18. Real Table [if exists] is Physical Object
    19. All Physical Objects is Matter, Does it exists? If so, what is it?
    20. Berkeley – there is no matter independent of Minds
    21. What is Matter – something opposed to mind
    22. Berkeley Demonstrated ‘Matter’ is not real, sense-data exist as sign to SOMETHING independent of us as idea in the mind of God.
    23. To Others [Idealists], Table seen by Whole Collective Mind of the Universe but they don’t DENY matter. Leibniz – collection of rudimentary minds [monads].
    24. Most Philosophers [realists] agreed There is a Real Table
    25. What Arguments for the Real Table and What is its Nature?
    26. Senses refer only to truth of sense-data not the truth of the Physical Object independent of us.
    27. If Appearance is not Reality, Is there Any Reality at All?
    28. The Ordinary Table raise many doubts and opposing views
    29. Perhaps There Is No Table at All.
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by Sculptor »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 6:26 pm
Sculptor wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 3:08 pm
FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 1:51 pm
Did you see that thing last year where he misunderstood an article so badly that he thought a real life professional philosopher had actually published an argument to the effect that anyone who argues against moral realism has brain damage? Nobody else had to read the article at all to know he failed to understand it. He later claimed that he couldn't be mistaken though because he had read it "at least 20 times". He probably did read it 20 times, but he'll read this 20 times too, and will still fail to get the point of these words.
I missed that one. But there is a similarly amusing bit of misconception that happened this week on the matter of a "table" where he attributes to Russell a postion he in no way held, by mis-quoting a passage from Russell's history of philosophy where he desrcibes such a postion.
I think we all need to take care of reading what we want to read, but VA is a rather "special" case I think.
Is that one where Russell goes on about sense data and the uneven brownness of the table for 7 pages?
Not sure. I think my eyes would have glazed over after 4 pages.!
FlashDangerpants
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Sculptor wrote: Wed May 19, 2021 8:40 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 6:26 pm
Sculptor wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 3:08 pm
I missed that one. But there is a similarly amusing bit of misconception that happened this week on the matter of a "table" where he attributes to Russell a postion he in no way held, by mis-quoting a passage from Russell's history of philosophy where he desrcibes such a postion.
I think we all need to take care of reading what we want to read, but VA is a rather "special" case I think.
Is that one where Russell goes on about sense data and the uneven brownness of the table for 7 pages?
Not sure. I think my eyes would have glazed over after 4 pages.!
I've read this book, a long time ago though, it is the one they used to use to teach A-Level philosophy to school kids. I'm not entirely sure why it is getting trotted out again now though.

VA should just look at that bullet pointed thing he typed there, then read Ch 1 of Mirror of Nature (read, not worthlessly organise into folders) and see if he finally gets it. If the answer is still no, he has a lifetime of failure ahead of him.
Atla
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed May 19, 2021 5:21 am For Reference,

SUMMARY - Chapter 1 Problems of Philosophy
  • 1. Is there Knowledge So Certain it can be Exempt from Doubt
    2. Ordinarily we Assume Certainty but Scrutiny reveals otherwise
    3. Start with Experience to search for Certainty of Knowledge
    4. What is so Evident can be doubted to be true
    5. The Table is so real to the Senses but not if we are to be more Precise
    6. There are so many perspectives to what is the Color of the Table
    7. The Different Perspective Critical to the Painter and specialists
    8. There is a Distinction between Appearance and Reality
    9. Table do not have a particular color, depend on light, spectator, angle
    10. Table – no particular texture, normal sight, via microscope
    11. The Shape of the Table in not ‘Real’ but Inferred
    12. Touch of the Table, Sensation Varied
    13. Sound of Table also varied to perspectives
    14. Real Table not as Immediately known by Sensed and Experienced
    15. Sense-data =immediately known in Sensation [immediate aware]
    16. Relation of the Sense Data to the Real Table [Physical Object]
    17. Sense-Data is not THE Table, also not the direct properties of the Table
    18. Real Table [if exists] is Physical Object
    19. All Physical Objects is Matter, Does it exists? If so, what is it?
    20. Berkeley – there is no matter independent of Minds
    21. What is Matter – something opposed to mind
    22. Berkeley Demonstrated ‘Matter’ is not real, sense-data exist as sign to SOMETHING independent of us as idea in the mind of God.
    23. To Others [Idealists], Table seen by Whole Collective Mind of the Universe but they don’t DENY matter. Leibniz – collection of rudimentary minds [monads].
    24. Most Philosophers [realists] agreed There is a Real Table
    25. What Arguments for the Real Table and What is its Nature?
    26. Senses refer only to truth of sense-data not the truth of the Physical Object independent of us.
    27. If Appearance is not Reality, Is there Any Reality at All?
    28. The Ordinary Table raise many doubts and opposing views
    29. Perhaps There Is No Table at All.
Quite a long-winded way of saying that the assumed table appears differently to every person and from every perspective. Because every brain works differently and every spatial perspective is different. There, Captain Obvious saves the day.
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by Sculptor »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Wed May 19, 2021 2:30 pm
Sculptor wrote: Wed May 19, 2021 8:40 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 6:26 pm
Is that one where Russell goes on about sense data and the uneven brownness of the table for 7 pages?
Not sure. I think my eyes would have glazed over after 4 pages.!
I've read this book, a long time ago though, it is the one they used to use to teach A-Level philosophy to school kids. I'm not entirely sure why it is getting trotted out again now though.

VA should just look at that bullet pointed thing he typed there, then read Ch 1 of Mirror of Nature (read, not worthlessly organise into folders) and see if he finally gets it. If the answer is still no, he has a lifetime of failure ahead of him.
I do not know how old he is. Mostly he comes across as very young and green, but other times I think he's really a grumpy 76 year old that has come across philosophy recently and deos not really get it.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Wed May 19, 2021 2:30 pm
Sculptor wrote: Wed May 19, 2021 8:40 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue May 18, 2021 6:26 pm
Is that one where Russell goes on about sense data and the uneven brownness of the table for 7 pages?
Not sure. I think my eyes would have glazed over after 4 pages.!
I've read this book, a long time ago though, it is the one they used to use to teach A-Level philosophy to school kids. I'm not entirely sure why it is getting trotted out again now though.

VA should just look at that bullet pointed thing he typed there, then read Ch 1 of Mirror of Nature (read, not worthlessly organise into folders) and see if he finally gets it. If the answer is still no, he has a lifetime of failure ahead of him.
I've read Russell's Problems of Philosophy sometime ago. As I had stated the problems of philosophy is generic to philosophy in general and they have not been resolved for all of humanity.
So what is wrong if I referenced certain parts where it is relevant to the point.

I agree with most of Rorty's views and suggestions in his Mirror of Nature but not totally. However I believed he did not understand Kant thoroughly.
In addition, how can we implement Rorty's ideas [edifying, etc.] if we are not familiar with all the authors [those he critiqued and those he agreed with] he mentioned and others of the past?

I have read Rorty's book a few times already and I don't think understanding Chapter 1
in chapter one I try to show that the so­ called intuitions which lie behind Cartesian dualism are ones which have a historical origin.
is significant enough to understand and implement Rorty's project effectively.

Rather
Chapter four is the central chapter of the book - the one in which the ideas which led to its being written are presented.
These ideas are those of Sellars and of Quine, and in that chapter I interpret
Sellars's attack on "givenness" and
Quine's attack on "necessity"
as the crucial steps in undermining the possibility of a "theory of knowledge."

The holism and pragmatism common to both philosophers, and which they share with the later-Wittgenstein, are the lines of thought within analytic philosophy which I wish to extend.

I argue that when [analytic philosophy is] extended in a certain way they [Sellars, Quine, Wittgenstein] let us see truth as,
in James's phrase, "what it is better for us to believe," rather than as "the accurate representation of reality."

Or, to put the point less provocatively,
they show us that the notion of "accurate representation"
is simply an automatic and empty compliment
which we pay to those beliefs which are successful in helping us do what we want to do.
10
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

For anyone interested, here is Rorty's summary what he is offering in his Mirror of Nature,

Summary for Each Part and Chapters
"Quote"
Part I is concerned with philosophy of mind, and in chapter one I try to show that the so­ called intuitions which lie behind Cartesian dualism are ones which have a historical origin.

In chapter two, I try to show how these intuitions would be changed if physiological methods of prediction and control took the place of psychological methods.

Part II is concerned with epistemology and with recent attempts to find "successor subjects" to epistemology.
Chapter three describes the genesis of the notion of "epistemology" in the seventeenth century, and its connection with the Cartesian notions of "mind" discussed in chapter one.
It presents "theory of knowledge" as a notion based upon a confusion
between the justification of knowledge-claims and their causal explanation –
between, roughly, social practices and postulated psychological processes.

Chapter four is the central chapter of the book - the one in which the ideas which led to its being written are presented.
These ideas are those of Sellars and of Quine, and in that chapter I interpret
Sellars's attack on "givenness" and
Quine's attack on "necessity"
as the crucial steps in undermining the possibility of a "theory of knowledge."

The holism and pragmatism common to both philosophers, and which they share with the later-Wittgenstein, are the lines of thought within analytic philosophy which I wish to extend.

I argue that when [analytic philosophy is] extended in a certain way they [Sellars, Quine, Wittgenstein] let us see truth as,
in James's phrase, "what it is better for us to believe," rather than as "the accurate representation of reality."

Or, to put the point less provocatively,
they show us that the notion of "accurate representation"
is simply an automatic and empty compliment
which we pay to those beliefs which are successful in helping us do what we want to do.
10

In chapters five and six I discuss and criticize
what I regard as reactionary attempts to treat empirical psychology or philosophy of language
as "successor subjects" to epistemology.

I argue that only the notion of knowledge as "accuracy of representation"
persuades us that the study of psychological processes or of language – qua media of representation –
can do what epistemology failed to do.

The moral of Part II as a whole is that
the notion of knowledge as the assemblage of accurate representations is optional –
that it may be replaced by a pragmatist conception of knowledge
which eliminates the Greek contrast
between contemplation and action,
between representing the world and coping with it.

A historical epoch dominated by Greek ocular [of or connected with the eyes or vision] metaphors may, I suggest,
yield to one in which the philosophical vocabulary incorporating these metaphors
seems as quaint [attractively unusual or old-fashioned] as the animistic vocabulary of pre-classical times.

In Part III I take up the idea of "philosophy" more explicitly.

Chapter seven interprets the traditional distinction between the search for "objective knowledge" and other, less privileged, areas of human activity
as merely the distinction between "normal discourse" and "abnormal discourse."

Normal discourse (a generalization of Kuhn's notion of "normal science")
is any discourse (scientific, political, theological, or whatever)
which embodies agreed-upon criteria for reaching agreement;
abnormal discourse is any which lacks such criteria.

I argue that the attempt (which has defined traditional philosophy) to explicate "rationality" and "objectivity"
in terms of conditions of accurate representation
is a self-deceptive effort to eternalize the normal discourse of the day,
and that, since the Greeks, philosophy's self-image has been dominated by this attempt.

In chapter eight I use some ideas drawn from Gadamer and Sartre
to develop a contrast between "systematic" and "edifying" philosophy,
and to show how "abnormal" philosophy which does not conform to the traditional Cartesian­ Kantian matrix
is related to "normal" philosophy.

I present Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey as philosophers whose aim is to edify –
to help their readers, or society as a whole,
break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes,
rather than to provide "grounding" for the intuitions and customs of the present.

Picture – Mind as a Mirror
I hope that what I have been saying has made clear why I chose "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" as a title.

It is
pictures rather than propositions,
metaphors rather than statements,
which determine most of our [‘existing’] philosophical convictions.

The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive
is that of the mind as a great mirror,
containing various representations –
some accurate,
some not –
and capable of being studied by pure, non-empirical methods.

Without the notion of the mind as mirror,
the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation
would not have suggested itself.

Without this latter notion,
the strategy common to Descartes and Kant –
getting more accurate representations by inspecting, repairing, and polishing the mirror, so to speak –
would not have made sense.

Without this strategy in mind,
recent claims that philosophy could consist of
"conceptual analysis" or
"phenomenological analysis" or
"explication of meanings" or
examination
of "the logic of our language" or
of "the structure of the constituting activity of consciousness"
would not have made sense.

It was such [misleading] claims as these which Wittgenstein mocked in the, Philosophical Investigations
and it is by following Wittgenstein's lead that analytic philosophy has progressed toward the "post-positivistic" stance it presently occupies.

But Wittgenstein's flair for deconstructing captivating pictures needs to be supplemented by historical awareness -awareness of the source of all this mirror­imagery -and that seems to me Heidegger's greatest contribution [in exposing that mirror-imagery].

Heidegger's way of recounting history of philosophy
lets us see the beginnings of the Cartesian imagery in the Greeks and
the metamorphoses of this imagery during the last three centuries.
He thus lets us "distance" ourselves from the tradition.
12

Historical Phenomenon of Mirror-imagery Missing
Yet neither Heidegger nor Wittgenstein
lets us see the historical phenomenon of mirror­imagery,
the story of the domination of the mind of the West by ocular [re eyesight] metaphors, within a social perspective.

Both men [Heidegger and Wittgenstein] are concerned with the rarely favored individual
rather than with society –
with the chances of keeping oneself apart from the banal self-deception typical of the latter days of a decaying tradition.

Dewey’s aesthetic enhancement and Hope
Dewey, on the other hand, though he had neither Wittgenstein's dialectical acuity nor Heidegger's historical learning,
wrote his polemics against traditional mirror-imagery out of a vision of a new kind of society.
In his ideal society, culture is no longer dominated by the ideal of objective cognition but by that of aesthetic enhancement.
In that culture, as he said, the arts and the sciences would be "the unforced flowers of life."
I would hope that we are now in a position to see the charges of "relativism" and "irrationalism" once leveled against Dewey
as merely the mindless defensive reflexes of the philosophical tradition which he attacked.
Such charges have no weight if one takes seriously the criticisms of mirror­ magery which he [Dewey], Wittgenstein, and Heidegger make.

This book has little to add to these criticisms, but I hope that it presents some of them in a way which will help pierce through that crust of philosophical convention which Dewey vainly hoped to shatter.
"Unquote"
FlashDangerpants
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Yeah, so like I said, you don't need the whole book, you just need to understand what the title means really which is covered adequately in Ch1 iirc.

Then look at your Russell thing, now should see how that problem dissolves.

This goes back to what I told you before about the false dichotomy you present of everyone has to be either a realist or an antirealist. The alternative is that these antique realism debates you keep digging up were based on a mistake, and neither realism nor antirealism makes very much sense.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu May 20, 2021 11:14 am Yeah, so like I said, you don't need the whole book, you just need to understand what the title means really which is covered adequately in Ch1 iirc.

Then look at your Russell thing, now should see how that problem dissolves.

This goes back to what I told you before about the false dichotomy you present of everyone has to be either a realist or an antirealist. The alternative is that these antique realism debates you keep digging up were based on a mistake, and neither realism nor antirealism makes very much sense.
That is not my approach.
My approach is eclectic thus I will dig into all sorts of "ism' preferring some but I don't cling to any 'ism' dogmatically. Btw, my background is Eastern Philosophy where the main principle is [non-attachment] not to stick to anything, for ultimately it is 'nothing' emptiness, Śūnyatā.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C5%9A%C5%ABnyat%C4%81

On any contentious issues I would prefer to read the whole book thoroughly not just pick here and there which one think suits or confirms one's view.

The "realist versus antirealist" dichotomy is a very serious contentious issues within philosophy right from the beginning and hermeneutically we need to understand its origin, its history, the issues involved and especially the psychology [neuroscience elements] which are most critical.
We just cannot abandon it because it is antimonous [an antimony =a contradiction between two beliefs or conclusions that are in themselves reasonable; a paradox.]
Here is where I do not agree with Rorty suggestion that we just give it up because it is very contentious and "antimonous."

Btw, some pragmatists do not agree with Rorty's way of hacking off the essentials of pragmatism in coming with his own approach and claim Rorty's pragmatism is idealistic.
So you cannot insist Rorty has ultimately given up the "realist versus antirealist" dichotomy despite his suggestion to do so.

Currently I am reading,
Beyond Realism and Anti-realism: John Dewey and the Neo-pragmatists
by David L. Hildebrand, i.e. therefrom the following in quotes;

Rorty derives from classical pragmatism a decidedly antirealistic position, which he calls, alternately, “pragmatism” and “ethnocentrism.”
Rorty's pragmatism is in opposition with Hillary Putnam's pragmatism which is inclined toward 'realism'.
It was the suspicion that Rorty and Putnam were fundamentally misinterpreting classical pragmatism (and Dewey in particular) that provided me with the impetus for this book.
According to Putnam, Rorty’s denial of this view constitutes an openly relativistic and subjectivistic position.

While Putnam’s description of Rorty is right as far as it goes, it is also true that Rorty does not view his conclusions as a cause for alarm.
He [Rorty] admits his view is relativistic but maintains that such a relativism is not pernicious.
Nope, not me, I won't abandon philosophical issues because they are highly contentious [unless they are literally stupid]. I will make the attempt to get to the roots of the confusion which I know very well is grounded on psychology and neuroscience or whatever that is verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK.
FlashDangerpants
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by FlashDangerpants »

If you have some way of reading a book that leaves you not understanding the title and central thesis of the work, then there must be a better way to read it than that.

I don't have much interest in pragmatists complaining about Rorty being an imposter, it's Wittgenstein that he's recycling for this stuff, not them. I just never thought it would be fair to you, nor a good way to spend my time, if I tried to approach this via the big W guy, so I pointed you at the easy reading alternative. I also don't care about mystical principles of pretending to be unattached to things that you are clearly deeply addicted to and start 5 threads per day in forums about.

The realism/antirealism controversy itself is unimportant junk. There is no outcome either way. Nothing about our world, or our place in it, nor even how we would talk about it changes depending on the outcome of that nonsense debate.
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by Belinda »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri May 21, 2021 1:56 pm If you have some way of reading a book that leaves you not understanding the title and central thesis of the work, then there must be a better way to read it than that.

I don't have much interest in pragmatists complaining about Rorty being an imposter, it's Wittgenstein that he's recycling for this stuff, not them. I just never thought it would be fair to you, nor a good way to spend my time, if I tried to approach this via the big W guy, so I pointed you at the easy reading alternative. I also don't care about mystical principles of pretending to be unattached to things that you are clearly deeply addicted to and start 5 threads per day in forums about.

The realism/antirealism controversy itself is unimportant junk. There is no outcome either way. Nothing about our world, or our place in it, nor even how we would talk about it changes depending on the outcome of that nonsense debate.
I think perhaps the realism/antirealism controversy matters because if we believe subjective experience matters then it does or will come to be a moral consideration when we decide how our societies will be ruled. 'Reality' is not only descriptive it's also normative.
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Belinda wrote: Sun Jun 06, 2021 10:08 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri May 21, 2021 1:56 pm If you have some way of reading a book that leaves you not understanding the title and central thesis of the work, then there must be a better way to read it than that.

I don't have much interest in pragmatists complaining about Rorty being an imposter, it's Wittgenstein that he's recycling for this stuff, not them. I just never thought it would be fair to you, nor a good way to spend my time, if I tried to approach this via the big W guy, so I pointed you at the easy reading alternative. I also don't care about mystical principles of pretending to be unattached to things that you are clearly deeply addicted to and start 5 threads per day in forums about.

The realism/antirealism controversy itself is unimportant junk. There is no outcome either way. Nothing about our world, or our place in it, nor even how we would talk about it changes depending on the outcome of that nonsense debate.
I think perhaps the realism/antirealism controversy matters because if we believe subjective experience matters then it does or will come to be a moral consideration when we decide how our societies will be ruled. 'Reality' is not only descriptive it's also normative.
And I belive it means absolutely none of that. The reason why none of it makes any sense, and why no arguments about it can possibly be settled, is because the world would be exactly as it is either way. There is exactly nothing hanging on the question of whether "matter" "exists" or is secretly just "stuff" in "God's" "mind" that just happens to behave exactly the same way as that other thing would. Nor any of the other garbage that was inherited from Descarte's faulty assumption that the mind is a set of representational images of the world.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Belinda wrote: Sun Jun 06, 2021 10:08 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri May 21, 2021 1:56 pm If you have some way of reading a book that leaves you not understanding the title and central thesis of the work, then there must be a better way to read it than that.

I don't have much interest in pragmatists complaining about Rorty being an imposter, it's Wittgenstein that he's recycling for this stuff, not them. I just never thought it would be fair to you, nor a good way to spend my time, if I tried to approach this via the big W guy, so I pointed you at the easy reading alternative. I also don't care about mystical principles of pretending to be unattached to things that you are clearly deeply addicted to and start 5 threads per day in forums about.

The realism/antirealism controversy itself is unimportant junk. There is no outcome either way. Nothing about our world, or our place in it, nor even how we would talk about it changes depending on the outcome of that nonsense debate.
I think perhaps the realism/antirealism controversy matters because if we believe subjective experience matters then it does or will come to be a moral consideration when we decide how our societies will be ruled. 'Reality' is not only descriptive it's also normative.
You are right on.

The emergence of realism is driven by an unavoidable inherent psychological impulses that most realists convert realism to ideological beliefs which in turn are driving actions that are evil or good, thus ending with the issues and consideration of morality.

The emergence of anti-realism arose to counter the evils of realism [re the external gods, evil acts and bombs].
I don't deny subsequently some anti-realists also turned evil themselves.

Thus it is critical within philosophy that we understand clearly the realism vs anti-realism distinction and the psychology of their followers.
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Re: Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"

Post by FlashDangerpants »

So you chumps actually believe that whether or not you believe a table is really-really-really-there as opposed to you-should-live-your-life-as-if-there-is-really-really-really-a-table-there-anyway is what makes the difference between good and evil now?
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