RCSaunders wrote: ↑Tue Sep 15, 2020 8:33 pm
wtf wrote: ↑Tue Sep 15, 2020 1:58 am
RCSaunders wrote: ↑Tue Sep 15, 2020 1:09 am
Why bother. Whatever it says, it's opposite is also true. If you believe that nonsense, I'll take your word for it.
Can't get more reputable than SEP. You should read the article, you might learn something. It's an interesting subject. If you refuse to click on a SEP article because you've already decided not to understand or agree or be interested in it, that reflects on you. You play a serious person on this forum. Are you trying to convince me otherwise?
I read the article twenty year ago. The update in 2018 did not fix anything. The problem is that logic after Abelard was beginning to be destroyed by divorcing reason from that to which reason pertained, actual concepts of existents, until finally it was destroyed by the logical positivists and linguistic analysis to nothing more than the manipulation of symbols. One simple juvenile mistake destroyed logic, the confusion of the word true (meaning a proposition that describes some aspect of reality correctly) and true (meaning the operation or manipulation of symbols was done correctly). Boolean true only describes a symbolic relationship which has nothing to do with true logic.
Kant confusing meaning (that which a concept refers to) with a definition opened the door to the destruction of reason.
From that link, it says:
Paraconsistent logic is defined negatively: any logic is paraconsistent as long as it is not explosive. This means there is no single set of open problems or programs in paraconsistent logic. As such, this entry is not a complete survey of paraconsistent logic. The aim is to describe some philosophically salient features of a diverse field.
This is itself confusing. Normally, anything 'explosive' is dismissed in traditional logic. Yet this falsely asserts that this stance (paraconsistent logic) is a system that agrees with this here, when it is the opposite: that they accept contradiction by permitting an alternate place (a para-llel place) that permits resolution of the contradiction. As such, that article appears to be written by non-paraconsistent supporter because it falsely implies they accept ONLY logic that is NOT explosive....thus, not contradictory. Thus, this article cannot be trusted for it being contradictory in expressing it.
Many times an outsider of some philosophy may misinterpret the intentional meaning. This definitely demonstrates SOME misinterpretation or simply poor writing skills. If this was intentional, then it was set up to purposely make this view contradictory. It is possible that those originating the stance ARE lacking rational capacity. However, the class of those people who may support the LABEL, would be more likely to be supporting a system of reasoning that permits the resolution of a contradiction by allowing for consistency 'elsewhere' even if it is not consistent locally. IF this is what was intended fairly, this perspective DOES have validity.
It is definitely not relevant to 'logical posivists' as you falsely presume. You may be taking a political interpretation with some bias.
This is a debate about whether nature originates as abstractions that manifest into reality versus reality as being independent of abstract representations. For instance, you might discover a 'pattern' scientifically and guess some logic applies. But given most of science cannot precisely assure what is specifically true for being induced by stats that are not extreme (0% or 100%, or, possibly by some, 50%). The view by a logical positivist might then argue that given formal logic is itself artificially VARIABLE, like how you can use different languages to express the same thing, then the actual reality may not map onto any PARTICULAR system. As such, all you can assume valid of any one system of reasoning via 'logic formalism', is that the systems are defined by symbolic representations only and that while it may be universally true about what the reasoning represents, another system can use another language to prove what couldn't be proven by another.
An example: the rules of a given game, like Monopoly, is it's relative 'logic' system. Following the logic of the game's written rules is relatively arbitrary to that game though. That is, you can only use the rules of Monopoly for Monopoly, not some other game. So, the rules of games are relatively arbitrary and thus are only relatively true of the DOMAIN of the system's rules.
This has no relevant connection unless you interpret 'para-consistency' as referencing the nature of games themselves to be like different universes, which they are relative to our use. The question of whether there is a universal system of reasoning by those labelled as 'posivists' today looking back on others (that label was not created by those labelled as such but by outsiders trying to classify where they think
those people fit into. For instance, Bertrand Russell, by some, is interpreted as being a 'logical positivist'. But is he, by context of how some interpret the meaning of 'logical posivists'? Bertrand actually believed that there IS a universal 'logic' but would still likely agree to separate the reasoning from meaning that you can have a priori
statements. Rather, they would argue that logic cannot speak of whether the very first premises in any logical discourse can be interpreted as true BY THE SYSTEM itself. Then, all that could be interpreted about a logical argument is that you have POSTULATES that we pretend are true a posteriori
and then treat these statements as symbols when developing a system of logic.
This is absolutely rational and would be likened to that example of Monopoly as having rules that are 'formulated' consistently but does not speak about whether the particular players are real or not. This is because there may be no players willing to play. But the fact of whether the players exist is irrelevant to the consistency of the created rules. Then 'player' is a SYMBOL because it is VARIABLE and you don't require defining the qualities of whomever they are themselves. The game can be played by Chinese person IF THEY CAN UNDERSTAND THE RULES. But the rules then are also then just symbols unless or until they are interpreted.
THIS is the essence of the logical posivists. Note that Godel became an 'intuitionist' based upon his "Incompleteness Theorem". Because it proves that you cannot have a perfect logic that covers all possible reasoning YET, we trust that nature IS 'reasonable' still, the meaning of one's INTUITION is what defines this nature of trust because you cannot use one complete logic to solve all problems assumed to still exist.