PeteOlcott wrote: ↑Mon Jun 22, 2020 7:46 pm
Yes and that justifies "the identify of indiscernibles":
This is often referred to as ‘Leibniz's Law’ and is typically understood to mean that no two objects have exactly the same properties.
It doesn't justify anything. You are stuck in a tautology.
Even if TWO objects had exactly the same properties there would still be TWO objects.
The simple fact that there are TWO of them implies there isn't ONE. A thing is only ever identical with itself.
Leibniz's Law is stated like this: FORALL (x,y) [ x = y implies FORALL F [ F(x) = F(y) ]]
I am flat out telling you that the foundation of a logic in which: FORALL (x,y) [ x != y ]
If two distinctly different things have all of their properties identical then
is was a mistake to call these two distinctly different things.
PeteOlcott wrote: ↑Mon Jun 22, 2020 8:24 pm
If two distinctly different things have all of their properties identical then
is was a mistake to call these two distinctly different things.
You aren't fucking hearing a word of what I am saying.
Either you have TWO things; or you have ONE thing.
FIRST you have to decide HOW MANY THINGS you have irrespective of their properties.
PeteOlcott wrote: ↑Mon Jun 22, 2020 8:24 pm
If two distinctly different things have all of their properties identical then
is was a mistake to call these two distinctly different things.
You aren't fucking hearing a word of what I am saying.
Either you have TWO things; or you have ONE thing.
FIRST you have to decide HOW MANY THINGS you have irrespective of their properties.
For physically existing things that are a measurable distance apart you can simply count them,
if you count above one then you have distinct things.
For conceptually existing things if they have an identical set of properties then you really only
have one thing with two different words pointing to this one thing.
PeteOlcott wrote: ↑Mon Jun 22, 2020 8:53 pm
For physically existing things that are a measurable distance apart you can simply count them,
if you count above one then you have distinct things.
For conceptually existing things if they have an identical set of properties then you really only
have one thing with two different words pointing to this one thing.
How close to each other must two physical things be in order for you to conceptualise them as being one thing?
PeteOlcott wrote: ↑Mon Jun 22, 2020 8:53 pm
For physically existing things that are a measurable distance apart you can simply count them,
if you count above one then you have distinct things.
For conceptually existing things if they have an identical set of properties then you really only
have one thing with two different words pointing to this one thing.
How close to each other must two physical things be in order for you to conceptualise them as being one thing?
Every single atom must be at the exact same geometric point in space.
You are contradicting yourself. Previously you said: "Goats are dump trucks" now you are saying:
"There is no object or identity which holds all the same properties" nothing is the same as anything else.
I am going to have to quit.
False, there is no contradiction as There is no context which is completely equal to another context, no two rivers are the same. 1 does not equal 1 as one 1 may equate to a jet and another to a horse. They equate through a singular entity but that singular entity differs. Thus a middle term is necessary, but no two contexts share the same quality and quantity of middle terms. 1=1 and 1=/=1 simultaneously.
Incoherent. That you are saying that two different things are the same
thing on the on the basis that they share a common property
"Goats are dump trucks through a middle context of material carrier."
PeteOlcott wrote: ↑Mon Jun 22, 2020 8:53 pm
For physically existing things that are a measurable distance apart you can simply count them,
if you count above one then you have distinct things.
For conceptually existing things if they have an identical set of properties then you really only
have one thing with two different words pointing to this one thing.
How close to each other must two physical things be in order for you to conceptualise them as being one thing?
Every single atom must be at the exact same geometric point in space.
The atom in different positions have different relations thus are non equivocable.
Last edited by Eodnhoj7 on Tue Jun 23, 2020 2:41 am, edited 1 time in total.
PeteOlcott wrote: ↑Mon Jun 22, 2020 8:24 pm
If two distinctly different things have all of their properties identical then
is was a mistake to call these two distinctly different things.
You aren't fucking hearing a word of what I am saying.
Either you have TWO things; or you have ONE thing.
FIRST you have to decide HOW MANY THINGS you have irrespective of their properties.
One can have multiple lines composing one line, the one and many can coexist as they are not limited to an "or" function.