Simply defining Gödel Incompleteness away V8

[Eodnhoj7]

Cats are goats and goats are dump trucks therefore water is wet.
Has a true conclusion that does not logically follow for its premises
therefore it is both invalid and unsound.

"Goats" are "dump trucks" through the context of "material carrier".

All premises equate through a middle context, thus the premises can equate to the conclusion in light of form. The conclusion as equitable through a middle context stems from the same form and function of the premises.

It seems that your reasoning is too incoherent to understand what I am saying.
Goats are never dump trucks unless they share an identical set of properties which they do not.

Goats are dump trucks through a middle context of material carrier. Seemingly unequivocable contexts can equate through a middle context...again "through" a middle context.

[PeteOlcott]

"Goats" are "dump trucks" through the context of "material carrier".

All premises equate through a middle context, thus the premises can equate to the conclusion in light of form. The conclusion as equitable through a middle context stems from the same form and function of the premises.

It seems that your reasoning is too incoherent to understand what I am saying.
Goats are never dump trucks unless they share an identical set of properties which they do not.

Goats are dump trucks through a middle context of material carrier. Seemingly unequivocable contexts can equate through a middle context...again "through" a middle context.

That is ridiculous.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles

[Eodnhoj7]

It seems that your reasoning is too incoherent to understand what I am saying.
Goats are never dump trucks unless they share an identical set of properties which they do not.

Goats are dump trucks through a middle context of material carrier. Seemingly unequivocable contexts can equate through a middle context...again "through" a middle context.

That is ridiculous.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles

False, both goat and dump truck share the same property of material carrying or removal (dump truck carries x and goat carries what it consumes).

Both seemingling different contexts share a context which equates. It is called a middle term.

There is no context which is completely equal to another context, no two rivers are the same. 1 does not equal 1 as one 1 may equate to a jet and another to a horse. They equate through a singular entity but that singular entity differs. Thus a middle term is necessary, but no two contexts share the same quality and quantity of middle terms. 1=1 and 1=/=1 simultaneously.

[PeteOlcott]

Goats are dump trucks through a middle context of material carrier. Seemingly unequivocable contexts can equate through a middle context...again "through" a middle context.

That is ridiculous.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles

False, both goat and dump truck share the same property of material carrying or removal (dump truck carries x and goat carries what it consumes).

Both seemingling different contexts share a context which equates. It is called a middle term.

There is no context which is completely equal to another context, no two rivers are the same. 1 does not equal 1 as one 1 may equate to a jet and another to a horse. They equate through a singular entity but that singular entity differs. Thus a middle term is necessary, but no two contexts share the same quality and quantity of middle terms. 1=1 and 1=/=1 simultaneously.

The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles

Likewise two separate objects are distinguished as separate objects on the basis that they have at least one property that is not in common.

[Eodnhoj7]

That is ridiculous.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles

False, both goat and dump truck share the same property of material carrying or removal (dump truck carries x and goat carries what it consumes).

Both seemingling different contexts share a context which equates. It is called a middle term.

There is no context which is completely equal to another context, no two rivers are the same. 1 does not equal 1 as one 1 may equate to a jet and another to a horse. They equate through a singular entity but that singular entity differs. Thus a middle term is necessary, but no two contexts share the same quality and quantity of middle terms. 1=1 and 1=/=1 simultaneously.

The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles



Likewise two separate objects are distinguished as separate objects on the basis that they have at least one property that is not in common.

There is no object or identity which holds all the same properties in common thus the principle is useless.

[PeteOlcott]

False, both goat and dump truck share the same property of material carrying or removal (dump truck carries x and goat carries what it consumes).

Both seemingling different contexts share a context which equates. It is called a middle term.

There is no context which is completely equal to another context, no two rivers are the same. 1 does not equal 1 as one 1 may equate to a jet and another to a horse. They equate through a singular entity but that singular entity differs. Thus a middle term is necessary, but no two contexts share the same quality and quantity of middle terms. 1=1 and 1=/=1 simultaneously.

The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles



Likewise two separate objects are distinguished as separate objects on the basis that they have at least one property that is not in common.

There is no object or identity which holds all the same properties in common thus the principle is useless.

You are contradicting yourself. Previously you said: "Goats are dump trucks" now you are saying:
"There is no object or identity which holds all the same properties" nothing is the same as anything else.
I am going to have to quit.

[Skepdick]

The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles

Likewise two separate objects are distinguished as separate objects on the basis that they have at least one property that is not in common.

The identify of indiscernibles contradicts itself.

If you have TWO DIFFERENT ENTITIES which are identical with respect to all their properties, you have still discerned TWO DIFFERENT ENTITIES simply from their locations in spacetime.

Schrödinger logics are a correction on Leibniz's law.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-class ... cal_logics

Non-reflexive logic (also known as "Schrödinger logics") rejects or restricts the law of identity;

Axiom: ~(x=x)

https://sci-hub.tw/10.1007/BF01057649

Abstract. Schrödinger logics are logical systems in which the principle of identity is
not true in general. The intuitive motivation for these logics is both Erwin Schrödinger's
thesis (which has been advanced by other authors) that identity lacks sense for elementary
particles of modern physics, and the way which physicists deal with this concept; normally,
they understand identity as meaning indistinguishability (agreemment with respect to attributes). Observing that these concepts are equivalent in classical logic and mathematics,
which underly the usual physical theories, we present a higher-order logical system in
which these concepts are systematically separated.

[Eodnhoj7]

The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles



Likewise two separate objects are distinguished as separate objects on the basis that they have at least one property that is not in common.

There is no object or identity which holds all the same properties in common thus the principle is useless.

You are contradicting yourself. Previously you said: "Goats are dump trucks" now you are saying:
"There is no object or identity which holds all the same properties" nothing is the same as anything else.
I am going to have to quit.

False, there is no contradiction as There is no context which is completely equal to another context, no two rivers are the same. 1 does not equal 1 as one 1 may equate to a jet and another to a horse. They equate through a singular entity but that singular entity differs. Thus a middle term is necessary, but no two contexts share the same quality and quantity of middle terms. 1=1 and 1=/=1 simultaneously.

[PeteOlcott]

There is no object or identity which holds all the same properties in common thus the principle is useless.

You are contradicting yourself. Previously you said: "Goats are dump trucks" now you are saying:
"There is no object or identity which holds all the same properties" nothing is the same as anything else.
I am going to have to quit.

False, there is no contradiction as There is no context which is completely equal to another context, no two rivers are the same. 1 does not equal 1 as one 1 may equate to a jet and another to a horse. They equate through a singular entity but that singular entity differs. Thus a middle term is necessary, but no two contexts share the same quality and quantity of middle terms. 1=1 and 1=/=1 simultaneously.

Incoherent. That you are saying that two different things are the same
thing on the on the basis that they share a common property
"Goats are dump trucks through a middle context of material carrier."

Is a little too nutty for me.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/iden ... scernible/
This is often referred to as ‘Leibniz's Law’ and is typically understood to
mean that no two [distinctly different] objects have exactly the same properties.

[PeteOlcott]

The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles

Likewise two separate objects are distinguished as separate objects on the basis that they have at least one property that is not in common.

The identify of indiscernibles contradicts itself.

If you have TWO DIFFERENT ENTITIES which are identical with respect to all their properties, you have still discerned TWO DIFFERENT ENTITIES simply from their locations in spacetime.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/iden ... scernible/
This is often referred to as ‘Leibniz's Law’ and is typically understood to mean
that no two objects have exactly the same properties.

That spacetime is a relevant property that must be considered is an issue that
I first brought up a few years ago within 15 minutes after first encountering identity
indiscernibles. This statement of mind is documented.

I probably mentioned that here too.

[Skepdick]

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/iden ... scernible/
This is often referred to as ‘Leibniz's Law’ and is typically understood to mean
that no two objects have exactly the same properties.

That spacetime is a relevant property that must be considered is an issue that
I first brought up a few years ago within 15 minutes after first encountering identity
indiscernibles. This statement of mind is documented.

I probably mentioned that here too.

Did you bother to read what I wrote?

I said.... Schrödinger logics are a correction on Leibniz's law.

Did you read the paper I pointed you to? No... you didn't...

But we intend to show that it is also possible to violate Leibniz' Law within the scope of the so-called 'negative' theories concerning substance (Quinton 1973); the trick is to admit that x = y is not a well-formed formula if x and y denote m-atoms. In this way, we simply cannot talk about the identity or the diversity of these entities. Leibniz' Law is obviously violated, and the concept of identity (that is, the predicate '=') does not apply to this kind of objects, in conformity with Schrödinger's view.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quasi-set_theory

[PeteOlcott]

The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles

Likewise two separate objects are distinguished as separate objects on the basis that they have at least one property that is not in common.

The identify of indiscernibles contradicts itself.

If you have TWO DIFFERENT ENTITIES which are identical with respect to all their properties, you have still discerned TWO DIFFERENT ENTITIES simply from their locations in spacetime.

"If you have TWO DIFFERENT ENTITIES which are identical with respect to all their properties"

then that already includes that their spacetime properties are also identical, therefore

"The identify of indiscernibles contradicts itself." is false.

[Skepdick]

"If you have TWO DIFFERENT ENTITIES which are identical with respect to all their properties"

then that already includes that their spacetime properties are also identical, therefore

"The identify of indiscernibles contradicts itself." is false.

Pete, either you have TWO THINGS e.g objects with different coordinates in space/time or you don't.

To have "identical spacetime properties" means to "have the same spacetime location" e.g you have one thing.

Can you even count?

[PeteOlcott]

"If you have TWO DIFFERENT ENTITIES which are identical with respect to all their properties"

then that already includes that their spacetime properties are also identical, therefore

"The identify of indiscernibles contradicts itself." is false.

Pete, either you have TWO THINGS e.g objects with different coordinates in space/time or you don't.

To have "identical spacetime properties" means to "have the same spacetime location" e.g you have one thing.

Can you even count?

Yes and that justifies "the identify of indiscernibles":

This is often referred to as ‘Leibniz's Law’ and is typically understood to mean that no two objects have exactly the same properties.

[Skepdick]

Yes and that justifies "the identify of indiscernibles":

This is often referred to as ‘Leibniz's Law’ and is typically understood to mean that no two objects have exactly the same properties.

It doesn't justify anything. You are stuck in a tautology.

Even if TWO objects had exactly the same properties there would still be TWO objects.
The simple fact that there are TWO of them implies there isn't ONE. A thing is only ever identical with itself.

Leibniz's Law is stated like this: FORALL (x,y) [ x = y implies FORALL F [ F(x) = F(y) ]]

I am flat out telling you that the foundation of a logic in which: FORALL (x,y) [ x != y ]