Logic is Grounded in Self Referential Tautologies

[Skepdick]

What does intelligence mean in this context?

You tell me.

In the context of this conversation, you used the word:

'God' implies non human intelligence.

In the current context I doubt there is much difference between what you mean by awareness, and my meaning of intelligence.

I wouldn't know - you can't tell me how to test that.

[Sculptor]

I don't recognise any of those symbolic formulae as being the grounding of Logic.

You seem confused, Eodnhoj.

Nothing new there then! LOL

[Eodnhoj7]

I don't recognise any of those symbolic formulae as being the grounding of Logic.

You seem confused, Eodnhoj.

Nothing new there then! LOL

You have yet to state what logic is.

[Arising_uk]

Logic is what occurs if you have things or states of affairs.

[Eodnhoj7]

Logic is what occurs if you have things or states of affairs.

So logic is based upon conditions, with these conditions being contexts?

[Arising_uk]

Nope, just that there be things or states of affairs.

[Eodnhoj7]

Nope, just that there be things or states of affairs.

And what is a "thing" or "state of affairs" (without using logic to address its own basic foundations)?

[Arising_uk]

And what is a "thing" or "state of affairs" (without using logic to address its own basic foundations)?

"What is...", are you saying you don't understand the meanings of "thing" or "state of affairs"? If so would it help you if you just think "phenomena"?

[Skepdick]

"What is...", are you saying you don't understand the meanings of "thing" or "state of affairs"? If so would it help you if you just think "phenomena"?

It still ends up being recursive and triggers Russel's paradox (is the set of all sets a member of itself?)

A thing is a phenomenon.
Experience is a phenomenon.

A thing (a phenomenon) appears within experience (another phenomenon).

Whether you use the language of phenomenology, or the language of ontology - it's still language and language is recursive.

The moment you switch perspectives (from object language to the meta language) the inconsistency blows up like any dualism.

[Eodnhoj7]

And what is a "thing" or "state of affairs" (without using logic to address its own basic foundations)?

"What is...", are you saying you don't understand the meanings of "thing" or "state of affairs"? If so would it help you if you just think "phenomena"?

My point is that it ends in a regress, as I can ask "what is a phenomenon"? Eventually is breaks down to an assumed term as well as "contextuality" as a self referential loop. A context, P= P, is a circular definition.

The term would have to contain itself, thus a loop occurs and what we see as the groundings of logic is not only the paradox skepdick points out above, but an undefined term that is intrinsically empty. Its intrinsic emptiness of meaning would necessitate it as having to progress to further terms. But considering the term is an empty loop, all variations of that term would have to be empty loops as well.

[Arising_uk]

A thing is a phenomenon. ...

Agreed.

Experience is a phenomenon. ...

I think slightly differently, experience is how you deal with a phenomenon, that it is also a phenomenon is a product of being conscious.

A thing (a phenomenon) appears within experience (another phenomenon). ...

See above.

Whether you use the language of phenomenology, or the language of ontology - it's still language and language is recursive. ...

Sure and if you don't have a base case then it's an infinite regress but if you point?

The moment you switch perspectives (from object language to the meta language) the inconsistency blows up like any dualism.

Don't think I'm a dualist, best I get is that I'm a body with senses, memory and language in an external world.

[Arising_uk]

My point is that it ends in a regress, as I can ask "what is a phenomenon"? ...

And I can point.

Eventually is breaks down to an assumed term as well as "contextuality" as a self referential loop. A context, P= P, is a circular definition. ...

Sure, as long as you forget the phenomena and keep fixating on the symbols that evolved to communicate our experience of them.

The term would have to contain itself, thus a loop occurs and what we see as the groundings of logic is not only the paradox skepdick points out above, but an undefined term that is intrinsically empty. Its intrinsic emptiness of meaning would necessitate it as having to progress to further terms. But considering the term is an empty loop, all variations of that term would have to be empty loops as well.

This is just your pet metaphysic as the ground is the being of a body with senses, memory and a language in an external world. You forget that we can point.

[Skepdick]

I think slightly differently, experience is how you deal with a phenomenon, that it is also a phenomenon is a product of being conscious.

Consciousness is a phenomenon too. To speak about consciousness from the view-point of the observer, then you also have to concede that observers/observation are phenomena too.

Sure and if you don't have a base case then it's an infinite regress but if you point?

Everything you point to is a phenomenon too.

You are stuck in the tautology - you are stuck using the language of "phenomena" which axiomatically assumes that everything is a phenomenon.

Don't think I'm a dualist, best I get is that I'm a body with senses, memory and language in an external world.

I wouldn't know how to test whether you are a dualist or a monist. Is just words. In that language/system of thought - everything is a phenomenon.
You can't actually point at anything that isn't a phenomenon, so the act of pointing is superfluous.

And so there is a deeply embedded epistemic assumption. Pointing particular cases (cats, storms, oceans, planets, sunsets) of the general concept of "phenomena" is precisely epistemic particularism. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemol ... ticularism

You know that thing you are pointing at is whatever label we have given it, but you can't tell me HOW you know that it's the label we have given it.

Two hardest things when dealing with computers... naming things and cache invalidation e.g forgetting stale/incorrect/discredited memories.

[Arising_uk]

Consciousness is a phenomenon too. ...

Is it? Not sure about that as is it observable?

To speak about consciousness from the view-point of the observer, then you also have to concede that observers/observation are phenomena too. ...

See above. What I do by speaking about it is to try and find inter-subjective agreement between observers about what and what isn't a thing or state of affairs.

Everything you point to is a phenomenon too. ...

Sure and there are lots of them, so the point of pointing or touching is to narrow them down the one I wish us to consider.

You are stuck in the tautology - you are stuck using the language of "phenomena" which axiomatically assumes that everything is a phenomenon. ...

If I'm stuck in a tautology then it must be necessarily true.

I wouldn't know how to test whether you are a dualist or a monist. Is just words. In that language/system of thought - everything is a phenomenon.

You can't actually point at anything that isn't a phenomenon, so the act of pointing is superfluous. ...

See above.

And so there is a deeply embedded epistemic assumption. Pointing particular cases (cats, storms, oceans, planets, sunsets) of the general concept of "phenomena" is precisely epistemic particularism. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemol ... ticularism

You know that thing you are pointing at is whatever label we have given it, but you can't tell me HOW you know that it's the label we have given it. ...

(Not sure which or what 'how' you are asking for here so will just respond and see how it goes.)
How I know is in the response the other gives. When I taught my children the names of things I pointed at the thing and uttered a sound until the day that they consistently uttered the sound in the presence of the thing.

If you meant how it is we can do this then I think the computational models of neuronal nets gives us a lot of clues in that neuronal nets can, upon stimulus, retrieve/activate/reactivate learnt/imprinted/... patterns. Given the CNS appears to be one great big neuronal net I think that's pretty much what we do.

Two hardest things when dealing with computers... naming things and cache invalidation e.g forgetting stale/incorrect/discredited memories.

Not sure how this applies as we are not built upon a von Neumann architecture.

[Skepdick]

Is it? Not sure about that as is it observable?

You are talking about it. You recognise it as a thing e.g it exists in your ontology. If it's not a phenomenon, what kind of thing is consciousness?

See above. What I do by speaking about it is to try and find inter-subjective agreement between observers about what and what isn't a thing or state of affairs.

Yeah, but the matter of whether consciousness exists (ontologically) is a separate concern as to whether we can agree on its proper definition.

And in so doing, you are talking about "inter-subjective consensus". Are "subjects" not phenomena too? Are agreements/disagreements not phenomena too?

Sure and there are lots of them, so the point of pointing or touching is to narrow them down the one I wish us to consider.

But then you aren't interested in understanding the essence of a "phenomenon" - you are interested in the thing you are pointing to.

Whatever it is. So how could we ever arrive at inter-subjective consensus on what a "phenomenon" in general, not in particular?

We are both using the word "phenomenon" in this conversation assuming that we agree on its meaning. Maybe we don't - who knows? But it was a useful assumption to get us this far.

If I'm stuck in a tautology then it must be necessarily true.

Well DUH. Everything is a phenomenon. And so it is true - by definition.

What's the definition of "truth"?
What's the true definition of "definition"?

How I know is in the response the other gives. When I taught my children the names of things I pointed at the thing and uttered a sound until the day that they consistently uttered the sound in the presence of the thing.

You are telling me how your children know - you taught them.
You aren't telling me how you know - how did you learn those labels.

If you meant how it is we can do this then I think the computational models of neuronal nets gives us a lot of clues in that neuronal nets can, upon stimulus can retrieve/activate/reactivate learnt/imprinted/... patterns. Given the CNS appears to be one great big neuronal net I think that's pretty much what we do.

So in defending epistemic particularism (telling me what you know), you have left the epistemic methodists unsatisfied.

You still aren't answering the "How do you know?" question. Which is really the same as asking "How does learning work?"

Not sure how this applies as we are not built upon a von Neumann architecture.

Caching is not about von Neumann - it's about redundancy and locality of data and the inherent problems that arise when all copies of the same data need to be updated.

You change your telephone number - it takes time to propagate the new information to all of your friends. You are the "source of truth" for what your mobile number is - the address books of your friends are cached copies of that data.

That's cache invalidation. Note I make no mention of technology at all - the above scenario has inherent difficulties with good ol pen&paper.

If you squint your eyes and tilt your head a little, that's what persuasion/arguing is about - invalidating old ideas in people's heads (caches).

It's a cache coherence protocol