Question of hierarchical conditions and standardized levels

[The Voice of Time]

Given you have an object defined by hierarchies of conditions (each lower level being the conditions for the level above, until you get to the top master-condition which is the object itself) over its being in time, is there a way of relating this particular hierarchy to other hierarchies, and say something about they being on an equal general standardized level, without knowing how many hierachical levels are beneath the master-condition?

So you'd potentially have an infinite amount of conditional levels, hierarchical levels. Given this infinity, how can you say that there objects are at same standardized level? Because what is a condition in one hierarchy, is a master-condition in another.... how could you with certainty then say that these are not one and the same level? Because they might both contain each on hierarchical levels subsumed to their object. And so you could neither define it by one always being higher than the other...

I believe that if I could get the answer to this question, I would be able to break another milestone in my philosophy and science of needs, by being able to know the exact boundary and definition of any domain of natural objects. Which in turn will provide a way for studying domains of natural objects and how they behave and the dynamics of the domains.

As a side question which might help a lot on the track to finding this ultimate answer: is there any way these two hierarchies can be compared? One way, I already know: you can compare the conditions they contain and their identity, but I don't know what to do with that fact. Another is you can compare the tendencational structure as you move down the hierarchy, so you can have patterns of similarity in numerical composition (how many conditions are at each level), but this fact neither I understand. A third one is that you could compare shared conditions, but no help there either. I feel I need more ways of comparing, to find a definite answer. Especially because hierarchical composition is a matter of human error, while the object itself does definitely exist if we have experienced it: we don't know how it exists, and we need to be able to compare it to other objects.

[Ginkgo]

Given you have an object defined by hierarchies of conditions (each lower level being the conditions for the level above, until you get to the top master-condition which is the object itself) over its being in time, is there a way of relating this particular hierarchy to other hierarchies, and say something about they being on an equal general standardized level, without knowing how many hierachical levels are beneath the master-condition?

Sounds like supervenience. Can you give an example of an object you had in mind?

[The Voice of Time]

Generic objects can be anything. A chair, a thought, a finger, an entire human body, the Earth... there's no limits to the type and kind. That's another problem which makes it so hard to figure out.

Supervenience sounds interesting, it probably relates to that, yes.

Basically, you want to attain the same level to be able to use the same logic on one of them, on the other. Find two bathing in the same metaphorical "environment". Having the same rules by which you can determine them. The level in question, is a level of "precision" in fact. Are they both at the same level of precision? Because if not, you cannot find an optimal way of reasoning about them because treating them equally then would mean you'd treat uncertainty the same as certainty. Which would be logically erroneous.

[Ginkgo]

Generic objects can be anything. A chair, a thought, a finger, an entire human body, the Earth... there's no limits to the type and kind. That's another problem which makes it so hard to figure out.

Supervenience sounds interesting, it probably relates to that, yes.

Basically, you want to attain the same level to be able to use the same logic on one of them, on the other. Find two bathing in the same metaphorical "environment". Having the same rules by which you can determine them. The level in question, is a level of "precision" in fact. Are they both at the same level of precision? Because if not, you cannot find an optimal way of reasoning about them because treating them equally then would mean you'd treat uncertainty the same as certainty. Which would be logically erroneous.

I think I see what you are getting at. Can we say for a start there are a a huge number of chairs in the world and each chair is a particular example of a chair? In other words, we can have an idea or a concept of a chair that doesn't necessarily have to be an idea or concept of a particular type of chair. There is something about 'chair-ness' that creates an umbrella concept of chair.


Upon second thought there could be a number of different issues you have raised. In relation to your first paragraph on generic objects and how generic objects are related. You could be asking why can't we have a set of all sets. AKA Russells's paradox.

[The Voice of Time]

Not per se, because then you are on "concepts" and not objects. Remember, this is not about categorization though it's easy to think so.

But there is something about this group of chairs, which says that we can treat them all as objects for sitting on.

My question is: from the observation that chairs can be thought of as all being part of the same level of precision... and they can all be sat on... could you make a general rule which would apply for whatever object you put forth with whatever property? For instance: what if there was no predetermined order of categorization, could you then apply this rule?

In this reasoning, it seems only definitions and categorizations work. And that's a problem, it's artificial, it doesn't deal with the real world of chaos, disorder. I want to know the general rule. The rule that can tell without having the particular predefined in identity (for instance: that it is a chair).

[Ginkgo]

Not per se, because then you are on "concepts" and not objects. Remember, this is not about categorization though it's easy to think so.

But there is something about this group of chairs, which says that we can treat them all as objects for sitting on.

My question is: from the observation that chairs can be thought of as all being part of the same level of precision... and they can all be sat on... could you make a general rule which would apply for whatever object you put forth with whatever property? For instance: what if there was no predetermined order of categorization, could you then apply this rule?

In this reasoning, it seems only definitions and categorizations work. And that's a problem, it's artificial, it doesn't deal with the real world of chaos, disorder. I want to know the general rule. The rule that can tell without having the particular predefined in identity (for instance: that it is a chair).

I'd have to think about that.

[The Voice of Time]

I'm considering this solution for my final problem:

Any domain of objects is found by the experience: a process "P" (i.e. time) over the environment E (i.e. locality) showing tendencies of all objects engima-"X" (if too many objects, then extend environment) to keep themselves in the process. Objects that support the other objects, are part of the domain. Objects that fail to support others or to endure from others support themselves, are not part of the domain.

But not sure of it yet.

All objects that stop being part of the domain are either "consumed" or "exported". Consumed means not-existing anymore, and "exported" means "causing to appear in another domain". "Imported" likewise is when the process takes in new members that are part of the network of each-other supporting objects. To do this, there has to be a transition period where at some moment the domain suddenly changes form. The new supporting object cannot be part of its former domain, or else the dual participation results in a domain-merge.

[The Voice of Time]

This:

Objects that support the other objects, are part of the domain. Objects that fail to support others or to endure from others support themselves, are not part of the domain.

Can more formally be stated as: given a depth "D" (how far down you look through the hierarchy), any conditions, that also are conditions of conditions in other objects, are also part of the domain (but not when they are objects themselves in the environment, because then they are subsumed under the first object as part of its hierarchy).

A domain can therefore be defined by reference to its properties: "depth D" AND "process P" AND "environment E" = unique object domain.

The environment is defined as a set of particular objects. Not any one particular object, but all particular objects said to be part of that "environment". An environment can be across space, and time, since a process does not require one-dimensional time, but leaves room for nested time understandings and other time understandings.

Environments are decided without the requirement or aid of any imposed order, the same rules apply to ordered environments as well as chaotic and "unnaturally" composed environments.

[Ginkgo]

Not per se, because then you are on "concepts" and not objects. Remember, this is not about categorization though it's easy to think so.

But there is something about this group of chairs, which says that we can treat them all as objects for sitting on.

My question is: from the observation that chairs can be thought of as all being part of the same level of precision... and they can all be sat on... could you make a general rule which would apply for whatever object you put forth with whatever property? For instance: what if there was no predetermined order of categorization, could you then apply this rule?

In this reasoning, it seems only definitions and categorizations work. And that's a problem, it's artificial, it doesn't deal with the real world of chaos, disorder. I want to know the general rule. The rule that can tell without having the particular predefined in identity (for instance: that it is a chair).

I think we are actually talking about properties of an object that can be identified as essential or accidental. And yes, supervenience does come into play at some stage.

The essential feature of water is that it contains two atoms of hydrogen. If water doesn't have this essential feature, then the substance cannot be water. On the other hand, a chair can be made of wood, plastic or metal and still be a chair, so the materials that make up a chair can be said to be accidental. However, there is a problem with this. The essential feature of the chair that I am sitting upon is that it is made of wood. Why is this a problem? Everyone knows a chair can be made out of a number of substances so materials should be accidental properties.

Basically, if I say the chair I am sitting on is made of a substance other than wood then it cannot be the particular chair I happen to be sitting on. Obviously, chairs other than the one I am referring to can be made of any number of substances. Nonetheless, 'woodness' is the essential feature of this particular chair.

V of T, I might stop there in order to see if we are still on the same page with this.

[The Voice of Time]

I think we are actually talking about properties of an object that can be identified as essential or accidental. And yes, supervenience does come into play at some stage.

The essential feature of water is that it contains two atoms of hydrogen. If water doesn't have this essential feature, then the substance cannot be water. On the other hand, a chair can be made of wood, plastic or metal and still be a chair, so the materials that make up a chair can be said to be accidental. However, there is a problem with this. The essential feature of the chair that I am sitting upon is that it is made of wood. Why is this a problem? Everyone knows a chair can be made out of a number of substances so materials should be accidental properties.

Basically, if I say the chair I am sitting on is made of a substance other than wood then it cannot be the particular chair I happen to be sitting on. Obviously, chairs other than the one I am referring to can be made of any number of substances. Nonetheless, 'woodness' is the essential feature of this particular chair.

V of T, I might stop there in order to see if we are still on the same page with this.

We're not, doesn't matter if it's "essential" or "accidental" as you say. They are also just human constructs. It's important to understand that conditions aren't the same as compositions either, although compositions are part of the conditions.

[Ginkgo]

I think we are actually talking about properties of an object that can be identified as essential or accidental. And yes, supervenience does come into play at some stage.

The essential feature of water is that it contains two atoms of hydrogen. If water doesn't have this essential feature, then the substance cannot be water. On the other hand, a chair can be made of wood, plastic or metal and still be a chair, so the materials that make up a chair can be said to be accidental. However, there is a problem with this. The essential feature of the chair that I am sitting upon is that it is made of wood. Why is this a problem? Everyone knows a chair can be made out of a number of substances so materials should be accidental properties.

Basically, if I say the chair I am sitting on is made of a substance other than wood then it cannot be the particular chair I happen to be sitting on. Obviously, chairs other than the one I am referring to can be made of any number of substances. Nonetheless, 'woodness' is the essential feature of this particular chair.

V of T, I might stop there in order to see if we are still on the same page with this.

We're not, doesn't matter if it's "essential" or "accidental" as you say. They are also just human constructs. It's important to understand that conditions aren't the same as compositions either, although compositions are part of the conditions.

Ok, then we are leading into "metaphysical" possible and "physically" possible.

[Ginkgo]

I think you are saying that objects existing in a particular state result in these objects exhibiting a particular structure. To use the water example again. When it comes to water it is the laws of physics that dictate water must be H2O, so water must exhibit this feature in order to be water. It is physically necessary.

You could be saying it is metaphysically possible to conceive of a situation or place whereby the structure of water molecules can be different than H2O. In other words, it is metaphysically possible, but not physically possible.

On the other hand, in any world it would be impossible for there to be such an object as a round square. Round squares are both physically impossible and metaphysically impossible.

Is this what you are getting at or have I gone off track?

[The Voice of Time]

You've gone off track xD

You think too simple. Get rid of the entire idea of metaphysical or physical. It's all physical, just because something is unnatural or chaotic does not mean its not physical. It means that the objects do not have to be related by locality or time. You could put any objects into the domain, but you want to be able to know exactly the domain you are talking about, have a way of referring to it.

You'd be able to talk about any random grouping of objects, and tell whether or not, and in the case it is: how many, domains, there are in that group. A domain is a series of objects that support each others being in time (the given process).

The reason why I want to know this, is because if I have, and above I think I found a doable recipe. If I have this ability to reference domains, I also have the ability to talk about unique states of nature, totally unique, and describe the dynamics of their continuation, or downfall. By being able to do this, I have a nature surrounding the objects of need, and I can discuss the optimal ways in which to influence the domain, and I can lay out the details of the domain for a shared objective understanding between people of the state of needs of this something.

Of course, I seem to be able to find in my head now, that given I can do this, I could also work with the domains to create superdomains at ever higher levels that would encompass incredible amounts of information and insight into the needful movement of the world... but that is a thought unfinished, it just dawned on me now.