Moral Pornography

[Philosophy Now]

by Joel Marks

http://philosophynow.org/issues/87/Moral_Pornography

[keithprosser2]

I get the impression that the writer is struggling with his professed 'amoralism'! Indeed he admits to the (absurd?) conclusion amoralism leads to:

"But what’s the alternative? My suggestion is that we recognize that criminals are no more morally guilty than our boss, neighbor, family, or self … because there is no such thing as morality to begin with."

But is happy with making that suggestion? I don't think so. He did not focus on a story of, say, someone allowing their dog to foul the pavement which is from an amoralist perspective equivalent.
Why not, if they are morally equivalent?

I think we are all familiar with the arguments for amoralism. Amoralism follows naturally from the 'materialistic/objectivist' world view most of us have opted for. But let me suggest that because amoralism is a logical consequence of materialism (or whatever label people prefer to use for that world view - I am not denying the logic of amoralism), it fails one acid test.... it doesn't match the facts.

The fact is that my (now ex) boss is not as morally guilty as the criminals in the article. The fact is that altruism is better than genocide. I feel the amoralists are in the position of denying the obvious because they can't prove it. Whether that is philosophically justifiable I will not specuate about, but scientists know that no matter how beautiful or logical a theory is, if it doesn't match the facts it is wrong. A scientist does not deny reality of the facts (as the amoralist does) because it does not match his pet theory. He junks the theory and comes up with a better one. Not so the amoralist who faced with an obvious fact (altruism is better than genocide) denies it to protect the sacredness of the theory!

I won't speculate on what is wrong with the amoralists theory. But a moral theory that ends up with the conclusion "that criminals are no more morally guilty than our boss, neighbor, family, or self" is clearly one that should go the same way as geocentrism.

[Thundril]

I wonder if Professor Marks is doing what he rejects here; isn't he morally condemning moral condemnation?
I agree with a lot of what he says about morality. As a materialist, I am a bit perplexed to account for all sorts of things I experience, including moral outrage, a sense of being able to influence the future according to what I want, and indeed the sensations themselves such as 'I' and 'feel' and 'want'.
So I'll go along to some extent with the idea that there is no absolute morality. But the fact is that we have historically made great use of socio-political emotional 'ideas' like morality, and we continue to do so.
I wonder if the answer lies in recognising our inescapably social nature? Each of us needs others to tell us what is right, wrong, good, bad etc. I think our capacity, in fact our compulsion, for this social intercommunication is what creates morality, as it creates other forms of social agreement. And if we actually enjoy doing it, how can Professor Marks condemn us for that?

[keithprosser2]

Each of us needs others to tell us what is right, wrong, good, bad etc.

Do we tho'? Certainly, if I were a Jew I would need to be told that eating pork was wrong, but would I need to be told that what the criminals in the articles did was wrong?

There do seem to be two distinct types of morality - the sort that is 'culturally relativistic' (eg religiously determined dress codes) and the sort that seems (at least to me) to be self-evident, such as 'senseless killing is wrong'.

I will suggest - for discussion only - a core of moral principles that are universal and absolute exists, but real-world societies need a much more complicated set of guidelines to function.

If you examine a complex society, we will see that the moralities different societies differ in the details but show internal consistency. For example, in an Islamic society a woman (traditionally) would not be able to support herself. That means that it makes sense to allow polygamy to 'mop up' any excess women who would otherwise perish. It also means that steps to reduce the temptation to 'stray' are a good idea - the hijab makes women 'sexless' so less likely to be 'poached' and so abandoned by husband and lover. Women in the west (at least in the recent past) are expected to be 'self-sufficient' so safeguards for the 'nuclear family' have eroded - there is no stigma to cohabitation or illigitimacy any more - a huge change in attitude in just a couple of generations from one self-consistent morality to another.

[Thundril]

. . . . .
I will suggest - for discussion only - a core of moral principles that are universal and absolute exists, but real-world societies need a much more complicated set of guidelines to function.
. . . . .

You present a few examples of culturally-variable rules regarding the ownership of women, and imply, ISTM, that these are culturally-variable morals. Well, maybe. But where is this core of universal morals?

[keithprosser2]

If universal principals exist at all, I think they would be actually quite unspecific. As you, Thundril, will know from my posts elsewhere, I take very seriously the idea that the advent of consciousness in the universe was a 'game-changer' - a universe with consciousness is a very different case from one with out it. I think that a universal morality principle could perhaps be to 'Respect consciousness', so possibly that which enhances consciousness is 'good', that which diminishes it is 'bad'.

Philosophy suffers a little from 'science envy' - Philosophers want philosophy to be a 'hard, objective' rational affair like (they imagine) physics to be (ideally we want philosophy to be physics without the hard maths!). I find that unfortunate because it means philosophy always hangs on to the coat tails of physics. Philosophers - by trying to be 'scientifically objective' - end up just going over the same ground as the physicists, but because philosophy only analyses data and never turns up anything new it always lags behind. It can never lead - when it tries to it usually gets it wrong because the universe is as it is, not as philosophers pontificate how it 'must' be!

But for my purposes - for discussing a morality, based not on expedience or even 'the common good' but on the possibilty of an actual purpose to existence - a teleological reason for us being here, based on the qualities of consciousness, then I feel I have to run counter to the fashion of philosophical objectivism.

We have a philosophy of the physical and objective - it's called physics. What we don't have is a philosophy of the subjective, of the world or universe that consciousness created, or revealed or whatever term one feels appropriate. I have said repeatedly that morality has no basis in the objective world - and few have disagreed with my on that. The issue is whether that means that morality does not exist at all.

If morality - or an absolute morality - exists 'only in the mind' isn't that 'real enough'? Which of the five (I think its five) physical forces makes you love your daughter? Does magnetism or gravity get you out of bed in the mornings? Is it the strong nuclear force that makes me think racism (in its many forms) is the greatest evil we fact in the world today?

I think philosophy has to reclaim the subjective and deal with it rigorously if it is to be anything more than a review of last years physics without the knowledge of mathematics to do it right.

[Thundril]

If universal principals exist at all, I think they would be actually quite unspecific. As you, Thundril, will know from my posts elsewhere, I take very seriously the idea that the advent of consciousness in the universe was a 'game-changer' - a universe with consciousness is a very different case from one with out it. I think that a universal morality principle could perhaps be to 'Respect consciousness', so possibly that which enhances consciousness is 'good', that which diminishes it is 'bad'.

I don't think I follow you, Keith. Are you saying a moral imperative to 'respect consciousness'
a. already exists universally, ie in the hearts of all of us, or
b. is your proposal for a universal moral imperative?
if you're suggesting a, then I see no evidence for this at all. Lots of people disrespect consciousness, (nihilistic poets, drug-users, anaesthetists) without apparently feeling that it is wrong to do so.
If you're suggesting b, then ok, it's as good an idea as any, but it's just another example of how we suggest these things to each other.

[Thundril]

I get the impression that the writer is struggling with his professed 'amoralism'! Indeed he admits to the (absurd?) conclusion amoralism leads to:

"But what’s the alternative? My suggestion is that we recognize that criminals are no more morally guilty than our boss, neighbor, family, or self … because there is no such thing as morality to begin with."

But is happy with making that suggestion? I don't think so. He did not focus on a story of, say, someone allowing their dog to foul the pavement which is from an amoralist perspective equivalent.
Why not, if they are morally equivalent?

I think we are all familiar with the arguments for amoralism. Amoralism follows naturally from the 'materialistic/objectivist' world view most of us have opted for.

I don't think so; moral relativism seems to 'flow naturally' from materialism (ie, if there is no Supreme Arbiter, where would we get our absolute moral truths from) but even this connection is tenuous. There are many serious philosophers who, whilst declaring themselves atheist, claim to believe in an absolute morality.

But let me suggest that because amoralism is a logical consequence of materialism (or whatever label people prefer to use for that world view - I am not denying the logic of amoralism), it fails one acid test.... it doesn't match the facts.

The fact is that my (now ex) boss is not as morally guilty as the criminals in the article.

This is not a fact, it's your judgement. It so happens that I agree wholeheartedly with your judgement in this case, but that still doesn't make it a fact.

The fact is that altruism is better than genocide.

Ditto.

I won't speculate on what is wrong with the amoralists theory. But a moral theory that ends up with the conclusion "that criminals are no more morally guilty than our boss, neighbor, family, or self" is clearly one that should go the same way as geocentrism.

You think we should bin this radical idea, without 'speculating on' what is wrong with it? I think we need to consider carefully what, if anything, is wrong with it. I suggest we both read the article again and resume discussions on the basis of what Joel Marks is actually saying.

[Notvacka]

It's a fact that other people exist.

I believe that both a need for morality and morality itself emerges naturally and necessarily from the existence of others, and is expressed in our capacity for empathy.

Morality stems from the realisation that your own point of view and your own existence have no objective precedence over the viewpoint or existence of any other person.

Amorality is a sort of ethical myopia, where you refuse to look beyond your own self-interest and fail to recognise that any of those other people could be you, that you in fact are one of all those other people to any of them.

[Thundril]

It's a fact that other people exist.

I believe that both a need for morality and morality itself emerges naturally and necessarily from the existence of others, and is expressed in our capacity for empathy.

Morality stems from the realisation that your own point of view and your own existence have no objective precedence over the viewpoint or existence of any other person.

I agree with everythig you say up to this point, N.

Amorality is a sort of ethical myopia, where you refuse to look beyond your own self-interest and fail to recognise that any of those other people could be you, that you in fact are one of all those other people to any of them.

Not necessarily. Ideas like "other people are just as important as me," "hurting people is undesirable" "societies should have laws that protect the weak from the strong and ruthless" etc, are not necessarily moral ideas. They may be merely practical, socially agreed ideas. With research ongoing into consciousness, it may possibly turn out that the sense of self is 'merely' a mechanism for generating linguistically-communicable concepts. There is some considerable evidence pointing in this direction. And what if that evidence strengthens over the coming decades, to the point that it becomes fairly conclusive? Would that not suggest very strongly that individuals have little choice about their behaviour? Then what would be the principled response? To declare the research 'wrong' because it doesn't match our current ideas about morality? Or to recognise that society needs to reframe its behavioural agreements, with the aim of sustaining cooperative and mutually supportive behaviour, without the quasi-religious notion of 'good vs evil'.

Have you read Joel Marks's article?

[Notvacka]

It's a fact that other people exist.

I believe that both a need for morality and morality itself emerges naturally and necessarily from the existence of others, and is expressed in our capacity for empathy.

Morality stems from the realisation that your own point of view and your own existence have no objective precedence over the viewpoint or existence of any other person.

I agree with everythig you say up to this point, N.

Amorality is a sort of ethical myopia, where you refuse to look beyond your own self-interest and fail to recognise that any of those other people could be you, that you in fact are one of all those other people to any of them.

Not necessarily. Ideas like "other people are just as important as me," "hurting people is undesirable" "societies should have laws that protect the weak from the strong and ruthless" etc, are not necessarily moral ideas. They may be merely practical, socially agreed ideas. With research ongoing into consciousness, it may possibly turn out that the sense of self is 'merely' a mechanism for generating linguistically-communicable concepts. There is some considerable evidence pointing in this direction. And what if that evidence strengthens over the coming decades, to the point that it becomes fairly conclusive? Would that not suggest very strongly that individuals have little choice about their behaviour? Then what would be the principled response? To declare the research 'wrong' because it doesn't match our current ideas about morality? Or to recognise that society needs to reframe its behavioural agreements, with the aim of sustaining cooperative and mutually supportive behaviour, without the quasi-religious notion of 'good vs evil'.

Have you read Joel Marks's article?

Yes, I have read the article. And I do feel the profound sadness that Joel Marks mentions in the last paragraph.

The problem with any discussion about morality is of course the notin of free will. In order to exist as a moral entity, you need to take responsibility for your own actions as if your will was free, even while knowing that it's not. It's rather heavy stuff, and we have discussed it before in this forum, if you remember, in these two threads for instance:

viewtopic.php?f=8&t=7744 (morality)

viewtopic.php?f=23&t=7695 (free will)

To me, the solution is to recognise the reality and the illusion as equally important, and to live in both.

Let me quote you from before:

Without this capacity to choose to act, we return to the position of passive observers, even of our own words and actions. I greatly dislike this position, but I'm not sure how to get out of it. Normally, I manage by forgetting about it, and proceeding as though I had a power of choosing.

[Thundril]

Let me quote you from before:

Without this capacity to choose to act, we return to the position of passive observers, even of our own words and actions. I greatly dislike this position, but I'm not sure how to get out of it. Normally, I manage by forgetting about it, and proceeding as though I had a power of choosing.

Thanks for the memory, N. Since writing that piece, I've thought more about the essentially social nature of the human animal. We are certainly active in telling others how we would like them to behave, (perhaps hyperactive sometimes) and others communicate with us. So I can move on from the hopelessly passive position to that of a political animal. We generate 'morality' and other political ideas by our interaction.