Truth by Simon Blackburn

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Philosophy Now
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Truth by Simon Blackburn

Post by Philosophy Now »

Nick Everitt is unconvinced that what Simon Blackburn says about truth is true.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/141/Truth_by_Simon_Blackburn
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Terrapin Station
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Post by Terrapin Station »

The first problem with that article occurs here:

"First, what does ‘correspond with the facts’ mean or imply? If ‘corresponds with the facts’ is just a synonym for ‘is true’, then the idea provides no illumination. "

All definitions are synonyms--otherwise they're not really definitions. So that a definition is synonymous with the term it's defining isn't a problem with a definition, it's a feature of them; it's what makes it a definition rather than something else.

If a definition, if some synonymous account of what a term refers to isn't "illuminating," then likely one doesn't understand the synonymous content, or one wants further synonymous phrases (definitions) for some of the terms in the definition. If one does understand the terms in the definition, if one understands the set of synonymous words, and they make sense to one as a (set of) phrase(s), then the definition should be illuminating, even though it's synonymous.

For example, let's say that there's a term, "Frumpblast." We have no idea what it refers to. We're told that the definition is, "An oversized, wrinkly trenchcoat." As a definition, "An oversized, wrinkly trenchcoat" is synonymous with "frumpblast"--otherwise it wouldn't count as a definition. And it should be illuminating. After reading the definition, we should be able to say, "Ah! So that's what a frumpblast is!"--at least as long as we know the words "oversized," "wrinkly" and "trenchcoat," and those words make sense to us in conjunction with each other.
Scott Mayers
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Post by Scott Mayers »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Jan 17, 2021 4:54 pm The first problem with that article occurs here:

"First, what does ‘correspond with the facts’ mean or imply? If ‘corresponds with the facts’ is just a synonym for ‘is true’, then the idea provides no illumination. "

All definitions are synonyms--otherwise they're not really definitions. So that a definition is synonymous with the term it's defining isn't a problem with a definition, it's a feature of them; it's what makes it a definition rather than something else.

If a definition, if some synonymous account of what a term refers to isn't "illuminating," then likely one doesn't understand the synonymous content, or one wants further synonymous phrases (definitions) for some of the terms in the definition. If one does understand the terms in the definition, if one understands the set of synonymous words, and they make sense to one as a (set of) phrase(s), then the definition should be illuminating, even though it's synonymous.

For example, let's say that there's a term, "Frumpblast." We have no idea what it refers to. We're told that the definition is, "An oversized, wrinkly trenchcoat." As a definition, "An oversized, wrinkly trenchcoat" is synonymous with "frumpblast"--otherwise it wouldn't count as a definition. And it should be illuminating. After reading the definition, we should be able to say, "Ah! So that's what a frumpblast is!"--at least as long as we know the words "oversized," "wrinkly" and "trenchcoat," and those words make sense to us in conjunction with each other.
Note that he is critiquing Simon Blackburn's book to your first point, not speaking of his own view. At the midpoint where he mentions the author delved into questioning 'truth' with respect to artistic factors was sufficient for me to opt out of picking Simon Blackburn's book.

As for whether definitions are reference for 'truth' and to the comparison of synonymity, I think that I agree with your points on the surface. There is something about the 'synonymous' factor regarding truth in that I interpret what is 'true' is about aligning two factors in sync with one another, ...minimally, the reality and the person's agreement to it. Also, a 'truth' can be merely the convention between two (or more) people to agree to something. In the latter sense, however, one may question whether the agreement of opinion is relevant.

For me, I default to assume all things possible (or none) with respect to Totality. Then, 'truth' (nor 'falsity') is something universally 'true' nor 'false' itself, but both or neither. In this case, I would prefer defining 'truth' as the synonymous mapping of something that is locally shared between two (or more) things in some context or universe of discourse. Between people, this has to be merely 'agreement' because both could be wrong about the mapping in question. With respect to the meaning about reality apart from our agreements, then the minimal 'truth' would be a description of some contemporary (localized) comparison between two things in which one class of things is a subset of another exclusively, where 'subset' includes being identical to it. The class containing the other would be the relative 'universe of discourse' and the other would be what is either a proper subset (a subset that is NOT the universe itself) or the reflective equality of the universe to itself.

So, for instance, to say, "X is true", means that X is a subset of some Universal class. Whether the particular 'facts' about this is irrelevant because all that is literally determinable is subjective to each of us by our own perspective of experiences. So "truth" is only the term we use to refer to the meaning that is ideal to our own experience by analogy. If X represents a personal experience, the Universe of discourse is my collection of experiences, including the act of recall/memory-retrieval, and possibly the logic of my thought processes as I relate things.

In summary, "X is true" means to me...

X ⊆ U

...and any agreement of any other possible classes like say, Y ⊆ U, we assume is effectively shared in sync with the X and U relationship.
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