DNA & The Identity Crisis

[vegetariantaxidermy]

And 'humans' don't like each other. Get over it.

Some humans like each other. Some humans don't.

Lets not resort to collectivist thought now, shall we?

Oh please. Humans have been 'collectively' slaughtering each other for as long as there have been humans. They are still at it--and the worst culprit today by a mile is that hot-bed of PCunthink, the US of A. Slaughtering muslims just for being muslims, and celebrating the ones who are carrying it out while at the same time shedding crocodile tears and being 'offended on behalf' of them for perceived insults. Personally, I would rather be 'insulted' than have my arms and legs blown off.

[Skepdick]

Oh please. Humans have been 'collectively' slaughtering each other for as long as there have been humans. They are still at it--and the worst culprit today by a mile is that hot-bed of PCunthink, the US of A. Slaughtering muslims just for being muslims, and celebrating the ones who are carrying it out while at the same time shedding crocodile tears and being 'offended on behalf' of them for perceived insults. Personally, I would rather be 'insulted' than have my arms and legs blown off.

Your view is tantamount to plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose .

How cynical, in the face of evidence. https://slides.ourworldindata.org/war-a ... itle-slide

Would you also like me to get off your lawn? You seem rather grumpy due to your age.

[vegetariantaxidermy]

Oh please. Humans have been 'collectively' slaughtering each other for as long as there have been humans. They are still at it--and the worst culprit today by a mile is that hot-bed of PCunthink, the US of A. Slaughtering muslims just for being muslims, and celebrating the ones who are carrying it out while at the same time shedding crocodile tears and being 'offended on behalf' of them for perceived insults. Personally, I would rather be 'insulted' than have my arms and legs blown off.

Your view is tantamount to plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose .

How cynical, in the face of evidence. https://slides.ourworldindata.org/war-a ... itle-slide

Would you also like me to get off your lawn? You seem rather grumpy due to your age.

Resorting now to childish and personal insults. No surprises there.

[Skepdick]

Oh please. Humans have been 'collectively' slaughtering each other for as long as there have been humans. They are still at it--and the worst culprit today by a mile is that hot-bed of PCunthink, the US of A. Slaughtering muslims just for being muslims, and celebrating the ones who are carrying it out while at the same time shedding crocodile tears and being 'offended on behalf' of them for perceived insults. Personally, I would rather be 'insulted' than have my arms and legs blown off.

Your view is tantamount to plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose .

How cynical, in the face of evidence. https://slides.ourworldindata.org/war-a ... itle-slide

Would you also like me to get off your lawn? You seem rather grumpy due to your age.

Resorting now to childish and personal insults. No surprises there.

Only surprise is the amount of energy you invest in cynicism and being angry at strawmen of your own making.

To the point you are willing to ignore centuries of data, just so you can preserve your misanthropic world-view.

If you see that as a personal insult. Good! That is exactly how I meant it.

[vegetariantaxidermy]

Your view is tantamount to plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose .

How cynical, in the face of evidence. https://slides.ourworldindata.org/war-a ... itle-slide

Would you also like me to get off your lawn? You seem rather grumpy due to your age.

Resorting now to childish and personal insults. No surprises there.

Only surprise is the amount of energy you invest in cynicism and being angry at strawmen of your own making.

To the point you are willing to ignore centuries of data, just so you can preserve your misanthropic world-view.

If you see that as a personal insult. Good! That is exactly how I meant it.

Yet I'm the one who objects to the slaughter of muslims, while the PCfuckturds celebrate it. Hmm. And 'I'm' the misanthrope?
Btw, your ageist insults are terribly unPC. How predictably hypocritical (or are the elderly not one of your 'protected groups'?). There you go. More hypocrisy and contradictions. There are 'protected groups', but apparently there are 'no groups'

[Skepdick]

Yet I'm the one who objects to the slaughter of muslims, while the PCfuckturds celebrate it. Hmm. And 'I'm' the misanthrope?

Note how you were very specific about whose slaughter you object to. Muslims. Not humans.

The virtue-signaling is stong with you

Btw, your ageist insults are terribly unPC. How predictably hypocritical.

I was actually being charitable by blaming your cynicism on your age.
It's much, much worse for you if you actually choose to be so ignorant.

[vegetariantaxidermy]

Yet I'm the one who objects to the slaughter of muslims, while the PCfuckturds celebrate it. Hmm. And 'I'm' the misanthrope?

Note how you were very specific about whose slaughter you object to. Muslims. Not humans.

The virtue-signaling is stong with you

Btw, your ageist insults are terribly unPC. How predictably hypocritical.

I was actually being charitable by blaming your cynicism on your age.
It's much, much worse for you if you actually choose to be so ignorant.

You are embarrassingly stupid. Arguing with idiots takes too much energy. You aren't making any sense.

[Skepdick]

Arguing with idiots takes too much energy. You aren't making any sense.

It's probably all these new words you are having to look up...

[vegetariantaxidermy]

Arguing with idiots takes too much energy. You aren't making any sense.

It's probably all these new words you are having to look up...

Ok. I'm sure that's the reason.
And it's hardly 'virtue-signalling' to have a hatred for war and its proponents. Quite the contrary. My antiwar comments are the ones that get the most vicious responses--from those who like to 'signal their virtue' by posting bullshit 'Lest we forget' crap and red poppies all over their postings.

[RaymondKeogh]

The human genome answers one question that has plagued philosophy since the remote past and still eludes social scientists today: Are we the same at all times or under all circumstances? Genetics gives us the answer which philosophy could not and cannot provide. We are.

Issues like genetic determinism; or the role of nature versus nurture; or self-perception; or human behavior; or the existence—or otherwise—of “race”, etc, are beyond the scope of the article. These issues must continue to be researched by science and the humanities. To assume that it answers these questions, or that answers are implicit, is to expect too much.

On the other hand, it is equally erroneous to downplay the implications arising from new revelations about “sameness” in humankind. The human genome allows (and indeed requires) us to apply an objective definition of identity (example given in the article itself), which was not possible in the absence of a precise explanation of “sameness” at the personal and communal levels. This is a major change in paradigm because it permits linguistic precision in defining identity.

But there is a problem. How to ensure that “identity” is confined to the succinct definition in view of the plethora of loose, confused and even contradictory applications of the word? In their seminal paper Beyond “Identity” authors Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper provide an answer: Parcel out the work that “identity” is currently required to do, to a number of less congested terms (identification and categorization; self-understanding and social location; commonality, connectedness, groupness). I strongly endorse this tactic but add that “identity” as a term should now be confined—rigorously and specifically—to its concise objective definition(s). The combined approach of Brubaker and Cooper together with the objective definitions of personal identity and communal identity provide an elegant solution to the contemporary confusion in which this word is embroiled.

[jpaatero]

I am no expert on the literature discussing identity at large, but it seems to me that binding out identity to our DNA does not really work on a personal level.

It is true that humanity as a whole might form a relatively consistent and identifiable pool of DNA and therefore a context for identity. But if we go to the personal level, things get tricky. It seems that the DNA in our body presents variation instead of a single, persistent set of DNA (https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1239503). So the claim "a DNA fingerprint is the same for every cell, tissue, and organ of our body, with a few exceptions (like gametes and brain neurons)" seems to actually include more exceptions than non-exceptions.

While the paper presents a bold attempt to use our DNA to clarify a infamously complex issue of identity, the claim on persistent DNA simply seems untrue and thus undermains much of the logic in this paper.

[RaymondKeogh]

jpaatero’s is the kind of response that is both challenging and useful (which, unfortunately, is too rare today). Alexander Hoischen of Radboud University Medical Center in Nijmegen, the Netherlands, would agree with many of the comments.

Hoischen, who was part of a research project into post-zygotic mutations stated that: The textbook knowledge that our genome is identical in all the cells of our body is probably not true
(see: https://www.the-scientist.com/daily-new ... rare-35342 )
Post-zygotic mutations are an under-recognised source of genomic variation.

The reason why scientists assumed—and many still do—that normal cells have the same basic DNA sequences, relates to the predominance of observed similarities across most cell types. However, as sequencing techniques are becoming more widely used and as techniques are improving, an increasing number of anomalies are being found. Despite these advances, limitations of current technologies still hamper our understanding of the extent of these changes, but conventional wisdom suggests they are likely to be much more common than previously thought. How can these be accommodated in the definition of “personal identity”?

Where they occur, the repercussions of post-zygote stage development on the definition of personal identity require careful consideration. For instance, if a mutation occurs at an early stage in one stem cell whose descendants become a specialised organ, then the tissue of that organ will appear different to all other parts of the body with respect to that mutation. The term for this anomaly is a “mosaic mutation”. The appearance of such differences has even given rise to the suggestion that some of our cells carry different versions of our genomes. Others suggest that some people may carry different genomes at the same time (e.g. in the case of human chimerism resulting from fused zygotes). However, for the purposes of the present discussion, the genome is understood to mean the complete set of genetic material present in an organism, whatever its complexities. Therefore, all material—whether original, mutation, or even blended genotypes, as in the case of human chimeras—is included in the term.

We know that mutations are relatively low in the human body. Every mutation affects a minor part of the entire genome. In other words, “sameness” is retained in the bulk of our underlying genetic sequences across the whole organism, including those in the chromosomes and cells that contain the mutation. It may seem reasonable, therefore, in cases where post-zygotic mutations are found, to base “sameness” of the person on the fact that the vast majority of their genome remains the same.

But no matter how small the modification is—it is a change and “sameness” is infringed. This makes sense. After all, if a tiny mutation gives rise to a gene that induces susceptibility to cancer or another malady, it is highly significant for the whole organism. So, even though the rates of change are relatively small, the implication that the genome is not the same at all times or in all circumstances in terms of its structural makeup is irrefutable in these instances. As mutations are part of the life of these genomes, DNA sequences—alone—cannot be used to define personal identity in all cases. For this reason, “sameness” must be qualified.

The question we must now answer is: How do we know that we are the same person if post-zygote stage mutations take place? In what way are we the same under these circumstances? It turns out that “sameness”—though not contained in all DNA sequences—is present in the individual’s genome, which conforms to a specific set of unchanging conditions. These include:

• Viability: the genome is able to survive as an entity;
• Continuity: development from its beginning to end-of-life is an uninterrupted series of events (in terms of life processes);
• Individuality: it is independent of all other genomes in the post-fertilised state (or after separation in the case of a monozygotic twin); and
• Uniqueness: it is unlike any other genome.

In other words, not only is the vast majority of the underlying genome retained, it remains viable at all times. Viability is an important quality in that it overcomes the suggestion that the chimera or mosaic genome is actually two or more people in one. A person cannot be divided up and remain viable. Continuity intimately links subsequent post-zygotic mutations to the same genome. A separate person is not created because mutations take place; they are part of the nature of that person’s genome. And individuality is maintained from the point of fertilization (or separation of monozygotic twins) until death. Furthermore, individuality is underlined by the uniqueness of the makeup of the genome itself.

Personal identity is defined as the sameness of the individual at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that the individual is itself and not something else. As sameness of the individual is shown to reside at all times or in all circumstances in the nature of a person’s genome, this means that it is also the source of a succinct definition of personal identity.

Again, thanks to for the comments.

For more updates see Our Own Identity’s website http://ourownidentity.com/

[Skepdick]

The human genome answers one question that has plagued philosophy since the remote past and still eludes social scientists today: Are we the same at all times or under all circumstances?

This is erroneous. The notions/concepts of "sameness" and "difference" are fundamentally and foundationally abstract. They are the cognitive processes upon which everything else hinges. Even logic itself.

This bug in language, which manifests in the highest order of human reasoning stems from failing to account for the dynamic nature of reality. A bug that Heraclitus recognized aeons ago.

No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man

It all boils down to the fact that Aristotle's "law" of identity is prescriptive, not descriptive. The first axiom of logic violates the is-ought gap.

Descriptively, a thing needs not be "the same" as itself! Here is a proof/empirical demonstration for you:

https://repl.it/repls/ClearcutAridDowngrade

Code: Select all

class Human(object):

  def __eq__(self, other):
    return False

Skepdick = Human()
# Is Skepdick the same as Skepdick?
print(Skepdick == Skepdick) # No!

Genetics gives us the answer which philosophy could not and cannot provide. We are.

Neither genetics, nor science can answer questions of identity because "identity" is a metaphysical concern.

It's subject to choice - not science. I am whatever I say I am.

[RaymondKeogh]

The history of “identity” as a concept can be summarised broadly as an attempt to overcome a logical conundrum about “sameness” in the material world (think Ship of Theseus). When this failed, thinkers resorted to cognitive processes in their attempts to provide practical solutions (i.e. as applied to the human person). It was suggested that “sameness” resides in memory, thinking, consciousness, ego or "sense" of self. The problem here is—how to account for persistence of the person when we sleep, or if we happen to be in a coma, or if we have the misfortune of getting Alzheimer's Disease? And how do we account for persistence before we had a remembered memory of any sort, as in our time in the womb?

In the absence of a good answer, many philosophers began to avoid the suggestion that we have an unchanging essence that makes us who we are. In other words, the essential “sameness” demanded by the former understanding or definition of “identity” was difficult to prove. As a result, some social scientists have concluded that it is fruitless to continue the discussion and have yielded to the view that we cannot be definite about who we are as persons. Rather than assuming there is any persistence let's acknowledge that it cannot be pinned down. In these cases, self-perception becomes dependent on who you think you are. It can, indeed, change according to your views of yourself; so, it may be in a state of constant flux. These thinkers have capitulated to the view that the original definition of “identity” is no longer tenable as a concept. These approaches have influenced the humanities to the extent that they now go to great lengths to avoid the dreaded charge of “essentialism”.

As a result, the word has split along countless fissures of meaning, resulting in contemporary confusion. Indeed, a blatant contradiction is produced by continuing to speak of "identity" while repudiating the implication of sameness. After all, the very word originates from the Latin word identitas meaning “sameness”. This has led to calls to avoid using the word “identity” altogether, which is sensible under these circumstances.

Unfortunately, rather than being confined to the world of linguistics, semantics or the halls of academia, the problems associated with how the term is used and misused are causing major negative effects in contemporary society leading to anxiety, ambiguity, confusion, social divisions and even civil unrest (think of the worst forms of “identity” politics). This is a problem that needs to be addressed in a practical manner.

In recent decades science has begun to unlock the secrets of the human genome. We now know that every individual has an exclusive genetic structure, which is a distinct pattern of DNA sequences. This basic pattern is measurable and constitutes an objective description of an individual’s deep-seated physical makeup. Until recently it was assumed that the DNA sequences in every cell of the human body, with some minor exceptions, are the same. Furthermore, it was believed that they are left essentially unchanged throughout all stages of growth, development and degeneration in old age. Reality is a bit more complex.

We now know that the individual human genome conforms to a specific set of unchanging conditions. These include:

• Viability: the genome is able to survive as an entity;
• Continuity: development from its beginning to end-of-life is an uninterrupted series of events (in terms of life processes);
• Individuality: it is independent of all other genomes in the post-fertilised state (or after separation in the case of a monozygotic twin); and
• Uniqueness: it is unlike any other genome.

The fact that the personal human genome is composed of the same underlying genetic code, contained in a viable entity that is independent of all other individual genomes, and is unlike any other, and whose biological narrative is an unbroken continuity from beginning to end of life, says more, in objective terms, about our essence than any other approach to the topic. It is the closest we can get to an objective and practical definition of identity.

We are free to think about ourselves in any way we like, within the bounds of objective reality as established by science. But science has determined that we do carry an underlying persistence or essence in the heart of our biological makeup (i.e. in our DNA which is the basis for life, and which carries the codes that store information and instructions to guide our bodily development). What is this if it is not our identity? It certainly conforms to the definition of personal identity, which is defined as the sameness of the individual at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that the individual is itself and not something else.

[Skepdick]

The history of “identity” as a concept can be summarised broadly as an attempt to overcome a logical conundrum about “sameness” in the material world (think Ship of Theseus). When this failed, thinkers resorted to cognitive processes in their attempts to provide practical solutions (i.e. as applied to the human person). It was suggested that “sameness” resides in memory, thinking, consciousness, ego or "sense" of self. The problem here is—how to account for persistence of the person when we sleep, or if we happen to be in a coma, or if we have the misfortune of getting Alzheimer's Disease? And how do we account for persistence before we had a remembered memory of any sort, as in our time in the womb?

In the absence of a good answer, many philosophers began to avoid the suggestion that we have an unchanging essence that makes us who we are. In other words, the essential “sameness” demanded by the former understanding or definition of “identity” was difficult to prove.

Therein lies the conundrum. The Ship of Theseus is an incomplete argument - it deals with only one ship.

Lets adopt the Atomists perspective for a second: If we can replace the parts of one ship, then we could also build two identical ships.
Lets pretend that the TWO ships are manufactured as identical replicas of each other (for some idealised definition of "identical"). Atom by atom (or quark by quark - whatever we assume the fundamental building blocks of matter are) they are indistinguishable from one another to any observer.

So you have two ships that are essentially and ontologically identical. Are they "the same" ship?

Now imagine an infinite number of essentially and ontologically identical ships. Are they "the same" ship?

The answer is either "yes" or "no" and it's entirely subjective. It's just a choice! It is ALWAYS a choice.

As a result, some social scientists have concluded that it is fruitless to continue the discussion and have yielded to the view that we cannot be definite about who we are as persons. Rather than assuming there is any persistence let's acknowledge that it cannot be pinned down. In these cases, self-perception becomes dependent on who you think you are. It can, indeed, change according to your views of yourself; so, it may be in a state of constant flux. These thinkers have capitulated to the view that the original definition of “identity” is no longer tenable as a concept. These approaches have influenced the humanities to the extent that they now go to great lengths to avoid the dreaded charge of “essentialism”.

I am on-board with that view. Identity is a broken concept - it's a linguistic concept. It's probably why we've been using common names to identify each other, and distinguish ourselves from one another for millenia.

Even if two ships are essentially "the same", it would still be obvious to me, you and everybody else that there are TWO of them. They have different world-lines - they travel a different path through spacetime.

Their "sameness" is a Platonic form.

As a result, the word has split along countless fissures of meaning, resulting in contemporary confusion. Indeed, a blatant contradiction is produced by continuing to speak of "identity" while repudiating the implication of sameness. After all, the very word originates from the Latin word identitas meaning “sameness”. This has led to calls to avoid using the word “identity” altogether, which is sensible under these circumstances.

Unfortunately, rather than being confined to the world of linguistics, semantics or the halls of academia, the problems associated with how the term is used and misused are causing major negative effects in contemporary society leading to anxiety, ambiguity, confusion, social divisions and even civil unrest (think of the worst forms of “identity” politics). This is a problem that needs to be addressed in a practical manner.

In recent decades science has begun to unlock the secrets of the human genome. We now know that every individual has an exclusive genetic structure, which is a distinct pattern of DNA sequences. This basic pattern is measurable and constitutes an objective description of an individual’s deep-seated physical makeup. Until recently it was assumed that the DNA sequences in every cell of the human body, with some minor exceptions, are the same. Furthermore, it was believed that they are left essentially unchanged throughout all stages of growth, development and degeneration in old age. Reality is a bit more complex.

Yeah, but the bug in human reasoning is language. Logic.

Logic asks "Is A the same as A"; or "Is A identical as A" and I will keep answering both of those questions in the negative. Even if all the As have the same "essence" they still have different spacetime coordinates, and they came into existence (I typed/created them) at a different times.

We now know that the individual human genome conforms to a specific set of unchanging conditions. These include:

• Viability: the genome is able to survive as an entity;

Except when it doesn't - mutations. Cancer.

• Continuity: development from its beginning to end-of-life is an uninterrupted series of events (in terms of life processes);
• Individuality: it is independent of all other genomes in the post-fertilised state (or after separation in the case of a monozygotic twin); and
• Uniqueness: it is unlike any other genome.

And which metaphysical perspective on 'uniqueness' have you adopted to make this statement?

Are any TWO DNA strands in my body "the same"?
Are any TWO DNA strands in my body "unique"?

The fact that the personal human genome is composed of the same underlying genetic code, contained in a viable entity that is independent of all other individual genomes, and is unlike any other, and whose biological narrative is an unbroken continuity from beginning to end of life, says more, in objective terms, about our essence than any other approach to the topic. It is the closest we can get to an objective and practical definition of identity.

The human genome is relativistic. That is why we measure fixation index to determine "genetic distance" between (what we have categorised as) humans.

We are free to think about ourselves in any way we like, within the bounds of objective reality as established by science.

That is an appeal to authority.

In so far as science continues to use the instrument of logic/language to describe reality science is subject to the limitations of logic/language. ALL of logic/language is founded upon the axiom (read: assumption) of identity.

But science has determined that we do carry an underlying persistence or essence in the heart of our biological makeup (i.e. in our DNA which is the basis for life, and which carries the codes that store information and instructions to guide our bodily development). What is this if it is not our identity?

It's a pragmatic and operational conception/definition of "identity", which falls apart in exactly the same metaphysical ways when you begin talking about genetic cloning/engineering.

It's a viable ontological candidate for identity. The most promising candidate out of all the alternatives. It doesn't mean there isn't a better one.

It certainly conforms to the definition of personal identity, which is defined as the sameness of the individual at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that the individual is itself and not something else.

Huh? Right in the beginning of your post you were arguing that "sameness" and "identity" are not clearly defined. "The individual is self and not something else" is incoherent mumbo jumbo.

Lets talk genetic engineering then. Suppose we make two humans with identical (read: indistinguishable) DNA. How many individuals do we have? One or two? If we go with your definition (DNA is identity) then we have one individual. You've solved nothing - you've kicked the can down the road.

Your definition will be useful right until society begins cloning DNA and then "identity politics" and "individual rights" resurfaces again. How many times must we fail at conceptualising/defining identity before we accept that it cannot be done? What would convince you that it cannot be done?

At what point do we shift the debate towards: Whatever a solution looks like, we first need to accept and agree that Identity is undefinable.

The identity "crisis" stops being a crisis when you come to terms with it. Acceptance of uncertainty is the solution, not new (and still broken) definitions.