by Joel Marks
https://philosophynow.org/issues/52/Showdown
Showdown
Re: Showdown
"Showdown" by Joel Marks is a judgment between consequentalism (goal-oriented ethics: the outcome of an action is more important than the intention driving it) and Kantism (a notion that we ought to be constantly aware of our every actions' effect on the world and choose the one action available that respects (sentient or not) beings' interest the most.)
I disagree with needing to choose between the two or that one must combine elements of both.
The first and foremost argument Marks presented was that the future can't be known. This seems to be true today, but if I can know the future, then AI will enable us to know the future with more accuracy. After all the future is theoretically knowable; its knowability is only limited by man's limited intellect. If AI-created intellect will far surpass human ability,then the future will be knowable for a longer term than the very short term we can predict it with any accuracy now.
The denial of long-term predictability also denies the usefulness of natural laws. The employment of the knowledge of natural laws have helped man navigate in the world. If it is successfully determined, by employing the wisdom in anthropological laws, that being kicked in the nuts hurts, or that betrayal hurts, or that having different weltanschauungs makes one feel compelled to proselytize, then one can conclude that we should avoid kicking others in the nuts lest we get kicked, etc. This is a predictive factor that Marks throws out with all considerations of the future, like throwing out the baby with the bath water.
In other words, I don't know if I will be even alive tomorrow; but I know that for a long time coming, if I do stay alive, then being kicked in the nuts will be unpleasant. And I can adjust my ethical compass to that, as ethics hinges on the notion that whether we talk intentions or measured outcome, the ethical effect is acting now, to see the effect of it in the future.
Denying predictability altogether therefore nullifies the usefulness or inherent validity for existence of any ethical consideration.
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Marks therefore, because he is forced, chooses to value intention in ethics more than consequentialism.
He brought up one example: those hospices operate more satisfactorily that are run by non-paid volunteers than those that operate for profit. Marks deduces from this, that a difference in motivation results in differences of outcome. Why this is treated as an ethical example, remains a secret. I say that because it may be a question of honour to do a good job, still, a job is a job is a job, and it is always performed for some reward, monetary or other. There is a fair trade in hospice service, as far as the workers who work there are concerned. A worker would need to not perform his or her job or underperform it to be branded unethical. But the trade is fair, so there is no underperformance.
Choosing intention as a basis of judging actions for ethical correctness is a fine and valid logical conclusion to Marks's proposal; but he failed to establish the truth of one of the premises he bases his conclusion on,and that failure is to show that the future is entirely unknowable and unpredictable.
I disagree with needing to choose between the two or that one must combine elements of both.
The first and foremost argument Marks presented was that the future can't be known. This seems to be true today, but if I can know the future, then AI will enable us to know the future with more accuracy. After all the future is theoretically knowable; its knowability is only limited by man's limited intellect. If AI-created intellect will far surpass human ability,then the future will be knowable for a longer term than the very short term we can predict it with any accuracy now.
The denial of long-term predictability also denies the usefulness of natural laws. The employment of the knowledge of natural laws have helped man navigate in the world. If it is successfully determined, by employing the wisdom in anthropological laws, that being kicked in the nuts hurts, or that betrayal hurts, or that having different weltanschauungs makes one feel compelled to proselytize, then one can conclude that we should avoid kicking others in the nuts lest we get kicked, etc. This is a predictive factor that Marks throws out with all considerations of the future, like throwing out the baby with the bath water.
In other words, I don't know if I will be even alive tomorrow; but I know that for a long time coming, if I do stay alive, then being kicked in the nuts will be unpleasant. And I can adjust my ethical compass to that, as ethics hinges on the notion that whether we talk intentions or measured outcome, the ethical effect is acting now, to see the effect of it in the future.
Denying predictability altogether therefore nullifies the usefulness or inherent validity for existence of any ethical consideration.
----------------
Marks therefore, because he is forced, chooses to value intention in ethics more than consequentialism.
He brought up one example: those hospices operate more satisfactorily that are run by non-paid volunteers than those that operate for profit. Marks deduces from this, that a difference in motivation results in differences of outcome. Why this is treated as an ethical example, remains a secret. I say that because it may be a question of honour to do a good job, still, a job is a job is a job, and it is always performed for some reward, monetary or other. There is a fair trade in hospice service, as far as the workers who work there are concerned. A worker would need to not perform his or her job or underperform it to be branded unethical. But the trade is fair, so there is no underperformance.
Choosing intention as a basis of judging actions for ethical correctness is a fine and valid logical conclusion to Marks's proposal; but he failed to establish the truth of one of the premises he bases his conclusion on,and that failure is to show that the future is entirely unknowable and unpredictable.
Re: Showdown
Kant's deontology is nothing more than pie in the sky.Philosophy Now wrote: ↑Sat Nov 10, 2018 6:42 am by Joel Marks
https://philosophynow.org/issues/52/Showdown
The concept that 'the outcomes of a person's actions matter less than the motives of their actions' is nothing short of ridiculous. Matters less to whom? The person carrying out the action? or some distant observer?
How can it be determined with any sort of objective meaningfulness what is the 'right' thing to do except that it brings about beneficial consequences? It can't.
Kantian deontology is nothing short of hypocrisy. It attempts to influence other people's decisions and actions towards detrimental consequences for the taker of the action and for the benefit of the Kantians.
Re: Showdown
In the hospice example, what makes for the better outcome is what causes respect for the dying patients, the staff members, and the viability of the hospice itself. I suggest that what causes the better outcome is pride, which underlies respect. Pride includes not only the pride which a dying person has a right to feel, but also employers' and employees' pride in the system under which each individual does their work, and pride in themselves so that they will regulate their own actions and help to regulate the system itself.
I believe that pride can also extend to commerce and industry in such a way that the product instead of a patient who dies in a state of proper pride is an inanimate product which does the job its maker or provider says it does.
Proper pride makes for a combination of consequentialism and deontology.
I believe that pride can also extend to commerce and industry in such a way that the product instead of a patient who dies in a state of proper pride is an inanimate product which does the job its maker or provider says it does.
Proper pride makes for a combination of consequentialism and deontology.