Landon D.C. Elkind explains why Russell believed logic can set thought free.
https://philosophynow.org/issues/120/Bertrand_Russell_on_Something
Bertrand Russell on Something
Re: Bertrand Russell on Something
So why does Russell object to the primitive propositions of logic proving that there is something? Why hesitate over the obvious?
Because it is not obvious. It is a logically unsound propositon.
This proposition, that something exists, was derived from this line of thinking:
∗9.1 implies that at least one individual thing exists. It follows that the universal class of things is not empty. This is stated explicitly in proposition ∗24.52. Whitehead and Russell then remark: “This would not hold if there were no instances of anything; hence it implies the existence of something.” (Principia Mathematica, Volume I, 1910, ∗24). Here then, logic seems committed to the existence of something.
If you read it carefully, as Russell did, you realize that the basis of proof was an implication, not a proven fact.
In fact, there is a transmogrifying of implication to fact. And that is not permissible. This is what Russell must have pounced on.
Whether he did or not, I don't know; this is my interpretation anyway.
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Russell is described further on in the article as one who sees iron-clad logic as a hindrance to reasonable thinking. He suggests that old logic (Aristotelian) concerns itself with convergent truths that it shows can't be found, while modern logic concerns itself with divergent possibilities of reality, instead of trying to find a box with an the exact hollow negative shape of reality into which we can neatly place reality.
Because it is not obvious. It is a logically unsound propositon.
This proposition, that something exists, was derived from this line of thinking:
∗9.1 implies that at least one individual thing exists. It follows that the universal class of things is not empty. This is stated explicitly in proposition ∗24.52. Whitehead and Russell then remark: “This would not hold if there were no instances of anything; hence it implies the existence of something.” (Principia Mathematica, Volume I, 1910, ∗24). Here then, logic seems committed to the existence of something.
If you read it carefully, as Russell did, you realize that the basis of proof was an implication, not a proven fact.
In fact, there is a transmogrifying of implication to fact. And that is not permissible. This is what Russell must have pounced on.
Whether he did or not, I don't know; this is my interpretation anyway.
----------------
Russell is described further on in the article as one who sees iron-clad logic as a hindrance to reasonable thinking. He suggests that old logic (Aristotelian) concerns itself with convergent truths that it shows can't be found, while modern logic concerns itself with divergent possibilities of reality, instead of trying to find a box with an the exact hollow negative shape of reality into which we can neatly place reality.