Richard Rorty On Rights

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Philosophy Now
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Richard Rorty On Rights

Post by Philosophy Now »

Patrícia Fernandes looks at Rorty’s idea for promoting human rights. ... _On_Rights
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Re: Richard Rorty On Rights

Post by spike »

I think Richard Rorty had the mistake in believing that human rights "is grounded on the notion of sentimentality". In other words, Rorty didn't believe in the real importance of human rights and how it really changed the world. And because of his thinking be believed in 'male supremacy', without the importance of women or other minorities.
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Re: Richard Rorty On Rights

Post by tbieter »

Here are the author's conclusions:
Rorty for our Current Crises

Rorty’s account is particularly relevant in our day. The recent surge of xenophobic movements in Europe, the hostility to immigration in many countries, and all the polemic surrounding the giving of support to desperate refugees – none of this is independent of the current global economic crisis. People didn’t suddenly become more ignorant concerning human rights, they simply feel more insecure, and that’s an obstacle to more sympathy. As Rorty says, “The tougher things are, the more you have to be afraid of, the more dangerous your situation, the less you can afford the time or effort to think about what things might be like for people with whom you do not immediately identify.” (p.180).

This is why Rorty’s account is so interesting. On the one hand, his idea of contingency liberates us from the endless quest for Truth, Certainty, and Nature. On the other hand, it liberates us from the burden of rationally justifying our moral sentiments Rorty is withdrawing from asking a philosophical question, from engaging in the philosophical act. Philosophical questions are those that are on the horizon, that transcend the world. I'm reminded of Russell Kirk's criticism of pragmatism. Kirk wrote: "Pragmatism is the negation."that we have been carrying over the last two hundred years. Finally, a Rortian perspective is a great one for thinking about the challenges we are presently facing. “Sentimental education works only on people who can relax long enough to listen” Rorty writes (p.180) – so let’s relax and listen to the tribulations of other people. This is how we can build and improve human rights culture.
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Re: Richard Rorty On Rights

Post by spike »

One thing that bothers me is that Richard Rorty seemed unconscious of the worlds need for change and improvements, brought on by his shallow human 'sentiments'.
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Re: Richard Rorty On Rights

Post by Londoner »

spike wrote:One thing that bothers me is that Richard Rorty seemed unconscious of the worlds need for change and improvements, brought on by his shallow human 'sentiments'.
That isn't how I read it. I understood him to be saying that we cannot justify human rights through reason, that we cannot ground them in some sort of philosophical 'what is'. Rather, they are only grounded in emotions, like empathy or sympathy - our recognising this does not make them trivial or shallow.
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Re: Richard Rorty On Rights

Post by Eodnhoj7 »

1) We cannot justify human rights;
2) Reason is a useless apparatus to promote human rights;
3) We should concentrate our energies instead on sentimental education.

1) Richard Rorty cannot justifiy concentrating our energies on sentimental education.

2) In order to to concentrate our energies on a sentimental education, a necessary definition of sentimental education must be observed. However, in order to define "sentimental education", a necessary ratio between axioms is necessary in order to define such an axiom. It is this manifestation of ratios through the interrelations of axioms that is in and of itself "rationality". But Rorty argues against reason as a means to promote human rights, while requiring sentimentality to be rightfully human.

3)To argue against reason being a necessary apparatus and replace that apparatus with an emotional sentimentally, would be to effectually manifest a ratio where:

R (reason) < S (sentimentality emotion) ∝ (in proportion to) H (human rights)

4) To argue for a strict sentimentally would require a sentimental approach, or in stricter terms one of emotion. However, emotions change relativity to circumstances so if Rorty would be fair he would have to account for the flux (Δ) of sentimentalism reflective of (≡) the proportionality of defined ideals(d▻). Otherwise any unchangeable emotional state would in effect be a form of tyrnanny

so: {(R<S)∝H} Δ ≡ (xd▻∝yd▻)

5) The sentimentality would in turn have to be defined by the majority ideal people are most sentimental too, as to be sentimental of something requires an ideal of it. So dimensional limit ideal (Ωd▻) is required.

So: {(R<S)∝H} Δ ≡ (xd▻∝yd▻) → Ωd▻

6) However that dimensional limit ideal would have to be proportionally less observed than the sentimentally.

So: Ωd▻<S as R = Ωd▻

7) Therefore the process continues as:
{(R<S)∝H} Δ ≡ (xd▻∝yd▻) → Ωd▻

8 ) And we have unlimited ideals to be sentimental about
[{(R<S)∝H} Δ ≡ (xd▻∝yd▻)]∞ → ∞Ωd▻

9) If there are an unlimited number of ideals to be sentimental about, the ability to choose will decrease. We will be blinded by options and unable to establish any proportions of logic or emotion because unlimited choice is similar to (~) randomness (ξ).
(∞Ωd▻) → ∞ψ ~ ξ

10) Randomness implies (⊃) a deficiency in structure, or proportions (∝), so in effect their would be nothing to be sentimental about as sentimentally would be canceled(↯).
ξ ⊃ (-∝)↯(S)
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