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Berkeley’s Suitcase

Posted: Fri Nov 25, 2016 12:41 am
by Philosophy Now
Hugh Hunter unpacks the sources of Berkeley’s idealism.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/117/Berkeleys_Suitcase

Re: Berkeley’s Suitcase

Posted: Fri Nov 25, 2016 1:42 am
by Impenitent
what exists is that which is held in perception ...

how does one perceive other minds?

-Imp

Re: Berkeley’s Suitcase

Posted: Fri Nov 25, 2016 6:06 pm
by jayjacobus
Before ideas comes perception and before perception comes representations. Representations don't have mass nor are atoms represented.
Where do representations come from? It seems obvious.

Re: Berkeley’s Suitcase

Posted: Fri Nov 25, 2016 9:42 pm
by Hobbes' Choice
Bejesus if noting exists then every ting else makes sense.

If this were not a completely Irish manoeuvre, one might be accused of racism for criticising it.

Re: Berkeley’s Suitcase

Posted: Sat Nov 26, 2016 12:36 am
by Hugh H
Impenitent, that's a very good question. Berkeley doesn't think we can perceive other minds. Instead, we perceive the changes they make to ideas. One way to think about this is that he has a version of the problem of other minds. Where Descartes says that we know of other minds because they make changes in the material world, Berkeley thinks we know of other minds because they make changes in the world of ideas that we all share.

Hobbes' Choice: Oh no, this is what people often say about Berkeley, but I don't think that's his view. My Berkeley is a dualist much like Descartes or Locke, except that where those guys think there are minds and matter/corpuscles, Berkeley thinks that there are minds and ideas. Berkeley's metaphysics are going to be unusual, of course, but in the end he wants to use that metaphysics to explain how it is true that there are chairs and whatnot. His project is no different than that of other philosophers with unusual ideas about matter (e.g. the Platonists).

Re: Berkeley’s Suitcase

Posted: Mon Nov 28, 2016 10:59 pm
by Impenitent
Hugh H wrote:Impenitent, that's a very good question. Berkeley doesn't think we can perceive other minds. Instead, we perceive the changes they make to ideas. One way to think about this is that he has a version of the problem of other minds. Where Descartes says that we know of other minds because they make changes in the material world, Berkeley thinks we know of other minds because they make changes in the world of ideas that we all share.
the world of ideas that "we" imperceptibly share...

I suppose the bishop had to have "someone" else to save...

-Imp