Are There ‘Other’ Ways of Knowing?

[Philosophy Now]

Our philosophical science correspondent Massimo Pigliucci asks.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/102/Are ... of_Knowing

[alqpr]

It seems unfair to accuse Krauss of contending "stubbornly" if indeed you were able to "quickly" disabuse him. But in fact you were wrong to even try, and did him a disservice if you succeeded, for he was almost certainly right in his original position. Logic is just an attempt to establish the existence and properties of some kind of "truth" function on some subset of all possible statements that a human can imagine, and as such it is clearly an empirical science.

With regard to the "other kinds of knowledge" surely they are "going beyond" science whenever they deal with any kind of experience that cannot be unequivocally and universally shared - which includes both the "what it's like to be me" that only I can know, and the "what is good" that I can know in common only with those who happen to share my own moral and aesthetic values. And whether or not such knowledge is "better" than scientific knowledge is a value judgement which is itself outside the domain of science.

[Arising_uk]

It seems unfair to accuse Krauss of contending "stubbornly" if indeed you were able to "quickly" disabuse him. But in fact you were wrong to even try, and did him a disservice if you succeeded, for he was almost certainly right in his original position. Logic is just an attempt to establish the existence and properties of some kind of "truth" function on some subset of all possible statements that a human can imagine, and as such it is clearly an empirical science.

Hmmm...but isn't it the case that by definition a propositional truth function applies to all such propositions regardless if we empirically prove them? Pardon me if I've misunderstood the use of "empirical".

[Impenitent]

One might argue that "Knowing" is more than agreement on definition...

-Imp

[Arising_uk]

One might argue that "Knowing" is more than agreement on definition...

-Imp

As the article says, it depends upon what we mean by "knowing".

In the case of Logic I was just wondering how it was an empirical exercise if we had no need of experimentally proving that each proposition has the property in question since the definition is the proof that it does?

[Impenitent]

One might argue that "Knowing" is more than agreement on definition...

-Imp

As the article says, it depends upon what we mean by "knowing".

In the case of Logic I was just wondering how it was an empirical exercise if we had no need of experimentally proving that each proposition has the property in question since the definition is the proof that it does?

if the meaning of the word is the proof, the argument is circular (and tells one nothing of the "experienced world")

if the proof requires empirical evidence one finds Hume's problem of induction (one instance does not make a universal)

-Imp

[madera]

Our philosophical science correspondent Massimo Pigliucci asks.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/102/Are ... of_Knowing

One must be still to know. There is no other way.

[Arising_uk]

if the meaning of the word is the proof, the argument is circular (and tells one nothing of the "experienced world") ...

Although propositional logic tells us what is and isn't an empirical proposition and hence gives us the limits or boundaries of the "experienced world"?

if the proof requires empirical evidence one finds Hume's problem of induction (one instance does not make a universal)

-Imp

Are all empirical questions universal ones?

[Impenitent]

Although propositional logic tells us what is and isn't an empirical proposition and hence gives us the limits or boundaries of the "experienced world"?

it gives us a circle of definitions, nothing more...

Are all empirical questions universal ones?

... empirical evidences of singular instances are erroneously attributed to all (universal/similar) instances including un-sensed future instances... it's just how we think...

-Imp

[Ginkgo]

it gives us a circle of definitions, nothing more...

It probably does a little more. It can also allow us to interpret conditional claims within propositions.

... empirical evidences of singular instances are erroneously attributed to all (universal/similar) instances including un-sensed future instances... it's just how we think...

The way you seem to be using the term "empirical evidence" seems to communicate the idea that such evidence is based on cause and effect. In other words the belief that the past will resemble the future. Hume talked about the conjoining of such events as custom or habit. In other words, there is no logical necessity when it comes to cause and effect.

On the other hand you might be using the term "empirical evidence" in relation to the scientific method. Either way, there is no "universality" attached to the idea of empiricism.

[Impenitent]

it gives us a circle of definitions, nothing more...

It probably does a little more. It can also allow us to interpret conditional claims within propositions.

how is that interpretation more than a refining of the definition?

... empirical evidences of singular instances are erroneously attributed to all (universal/similar) instances including un-sensed future instances... it's just how we think...

The way you seem to be using the term "empirical evidence" seems to communicate the idea that such evidence is based on cause and effect. In other words the belief that the past will resemble the future. Hume talked about the conjoining of such events as custom or habit. In other words, there is no logical necessity when it comes to cause and effect.

On the other hand you might be using the term "empirical evidence" in relation to the scientific method. Either way, there is no "universality" attached to the idea of empiricism.

the former...

additionally, I believe the lack of logical necessity renders the "scientific" method (which connotes the universality) ultimately empty...

-Imp

[Ginkgo]

it gives us a circle of definitions, nothing more...

It probably does a little more. It can also allow us to interpret conditional claims within propositions.

how is that interpretation more than a refining of the definition?

... empirical evidences of singular instances are erroneously attributed to all (universal/similar) instances including un-sensed future instances... it's just how we think...

The way you seem to be using the term "empirical evidence" seems to communicate the idea that such evidence is based on cause and effect. In other words the belief that the past will resemble the future. Hume talked about the conjoining of such events as custom or habit. In other words, there is no logical necessity when it comes to cause and effect.

On the other hand you might be using the term "empirical evidence" in relation to the scientific method. Either way, there is no "universality" attached to the idea of empiricism.

the former...

additionally, I believe the lack of logical necessity renders the "scientific" method (which connotes the universality) ultimately empty...

-Imp

If we make the propositional claim:

Bill is in charge of engineering and administration.

The truth value of this claim is dependent upon the facts. That is to say, it is or isn't the case that Bill is in charge of both administration and engineering. No circular reasoning is involved.


If we are talking about matters of fact then the empirical statement "All swans are white" fit into the category of no logical necessity; as does all empirical claims. In other words, empirical claims are not true by definition. On the other hand, "All green apples are green" is necessarily true by way of definition.

[Impenitent]

If we make the propositional claim:

Bill is in charge of engineering and administration.

The truth value of this claim is dependent upon the facts. That is to say, it is or isn't the case that Bill is in charge of both administration and engineering. No circular reasoning is involved.

a proposition is not an argument

If we are talking about matters of fact then the empirical statement "All swans are white" fit into the category of no logical necessity; as does all empirical claims. In other words, empirical claims are not true by definition. On the other hand, "All green apples are green" is necessarily true by way of definition.

no, the categorical statement "All swans are white" is judged empirically...

we agree on the second bit

-Imp

[Arising_uk]

it gives us a circle of definitions, nothing more...

Not really, as it also gives us the truth conditions for the possible empirical propositions.

... empirical evidences of singular instances are erroneously attributed to all (universal/similar) instances including un-sensed future instances... it's just how we think...

Well, if we are saying that induction is necessarily true then I agree that this is a false assumption but within Logic structured induction and recursion is a necessarily true prove procedure, or at least I think so.

Anyhoo, I'm slightly lost as to whether you think there is other knowledge other than the scientific form? And whether logical knowledge is such a one?

[Impenitent]

it gives us a circle of definitions, nothing more...

Not really, as it also gives us the truth conditions for the possible empirical propositions.

truth conditions? the names we give to that about which we make limited observations are truth? even Ludwig disavowed himself...

... empirical evidences of singular instances are erroneously attributed to all (universal/similar) instances including un-sensed future instances... it's just how we think...

Well, if we are saying that induction is necessarily true then I agree that this is a false assumption but within Logic structured induction and recursion is a necessarily true prove procedure, or at least I think so.

Anyhoo, I'm slightly lost as to whether you think there is other knowledge other than the scientific form? And whether logical knowledge is such a one?

My justified, true belief is that I have yet to be convinced of the existence of knowledge...

-Imp