I thought I would do a summary of Wittgenstein if there is enough interest. I will start with the Tractatus, and conclude with an in-depth analysis of On Certainty.
I am going to use K. T. Fann's book Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy as a guide because I think it is one of the best summaries written on Wittgenstein. If you want to study Wittgenstein, I would suggest getting Fann's book. You can get it on Alibris (used) for just a few dollars.
It is important to understand the background to Wittgenstein's works in order to better understand his thinking. I am not going to be able to give those of you who are interested a complete background of what was going on in philosophy at the time, vis-a-vis Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and Gottlob Frege. I will only give you bits and pieces, and hopefully this will inspire you to do your own thinking, and come to your own conclusions about the nature of Wittgenstein's work; and not only the nature of his work, but to come to understand how his thinking should influence the way we think about language, and in particular – propositions/statements.
As much as I enjoy Wittgenstein's philosophy and thinking about what he said concerning the nature of a proposition, it is important to understand that no philosopher no matter how brilliant - is without flaws. So, we have to be careful about getting tunnel vision, and we have to be careful about being too dogmatic about a certain philosopher, philosophy, or theory.
I have come to the conclusion after reading several biographies, and studying Wittgenstein on my own for many years, that in the 20th century Wittgenstein is to philosophy, what Einstein is to physics; and just as a physicist would not neglect Einstein's theories, I think philosophers should also not neglect the study of Wittgenstein's methods. His works are some of the most original in all of philosophy. The power of his intellect is obvious, and this is seen not only in his writings, but in other areas of his life.
Wittgenstein was born in Vienna, and he was the youngest of eight children. He came from a very rich industrialist family. In fact, Brahm's would come to the Wittgenstein home and play his music. He was educated at home until the age of 14, when his parents decided to send the young Wittgenstein to Linz to prepare him in mathematics and the physical sciences. It seems that the young Wittgenstein wanted to study with the physicist Boltzmann, however, Boltzmann died in 1906.
After being educated in Linz for three years, he then went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochscule at Charlottenburg. After two years in Berlin, he went to England where he became a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester. During this time he engaged in aeronautical research, and went from experimenting with kites, to the construction of a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. The design of the propeller was a mathematical endeavor, which eventually led the young Wittgenstein into pure mathematics, and then, to the foundation of mathematics. Apparently his interest in the foundation of mathematics led him to Russell and Whitehead's work called The Principles of Mathematics. The Principles of Mathematics greatly affected the young Wittgenstein, and this interest led him to the works of Frege who was the founder of modern mathematical logic. So it was through Russell, Whitehead, and Frege's works that Wittgenstein entered into the study of philosophy.
According to G. H. Von Wright Wittgenstein read Schopenhauer's Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, and this brought him face-to-face with Schopenhauer's idealism. Later Wittgenstein apparently abandoned his Schopenharuerian idealistic views in favor of Frege's conceptual realism; and it seems that after a talk with Frege, Wittgenstein decided to go to Cambridge and study philosophy with Russell (G. H. Von Wright, A Biographical Sketch, p. 6).
Summarizing Wittgenstein
Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
The Philosophical Investigations has to be seen in the light of his former work - the Tractatus. Therefore, I will begin by briefly outlining the Tractatus before I move on to a brief outline of the Philosophical Investigations. The Tractatus is one of the most difficult works of philosophy, and it is because of this that many of the interpretations of the Tractatus have been deficient. Even Russell and Frege misinterpreted the Tractatus according to Wittgenstein; and I am sure that my attempt at interpreting Wittgenstein will also fall short. Nevertheless, I shall have a go at it.
In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein tells us what the aim of the Tractatus is, "The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. "Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather--not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). "It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (Tractatus, p. 3)." Even in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein is still thinking in terms of the logic of language; however, his method is different. The Tractatus is an a priori investigation of language, and the Philosophical Investigations is more of an a posteriori or pragmatic approach to language. My personal belief is that both works have something important to say. The a priori approach in the Tractatus is due to Wittgenstein's belief that the structure of language is revealed by logic (P.I. para. 107).
According to K. T. Fann “...we should first look at the basic assumptions which lie behind the method of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein assumes that the structure of language is revealed by logic and that the essential function of language is to depict or to describe the world. Thus, there are two major questions to be answered: (1) What is the nature of logic? and (2) How is language related to the world (K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, p. 5)?” Therefore, the three main issues of the Tractatus are logic, language, and the world. And this is clearly pointed out in Wittgenstein's picture theory of language, which is directly related to his theory of truth-functions. "These two theories are designed to answer the questions: 'What is the function of language?' and 'What is the structure of language?' Since language is conceived as 'the totality of propositions' (T. 4.001), the two questions are transformed into the following: 'How are propositions related to the world?' and 'How are propositions related to one another?' This is why Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebook, 'My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition' (Nb p. 39). Wittgenstein assumes that if we can use language to talk about the world, there must be some propositions directly connected with the world, so that their truth or falsity are not determined by other propositions, but by the world: these he called 'elementary propositions' (K. T. Fann, p.
.
In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein tells us what the aim of the Tractatus is, "The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. "Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather--not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). "It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (Tractatus, p. 3)." Even in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein is still thinking in terms of the logic of language; however, his method is different. The Tractatus is an a priori investigation of language, and the Philosophical Investigations is more of an a posteriori or pragmatic approach to language. My personal belief is that both works have something important to say. The a priori approach in the Tractatus is due to Wittgenstein's belief that the structure of language is revealed by logic (P.I. para. 107).
According to K. T. Fann “...we should first look at the basic assumptions which lie behind the method of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein assumes that the structure of language is revealed by logic and that the essential function of language is to depict or to describe the world. Thus, there are two major questions to be answered: (1) What is the nature of logic? and (2) How is language related to the world (K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, p. 5)?” Therefore, the three main issues of the Tractatus are logic, language, and the world. And this is clearly pointed out in Wittgenstein's picture theory of language, which is directly related to his theory of truth-functions. "These two theories are designed to answer the questions: 'What is the function of language?' and 'What is the structure of language?' Since language is conceived as 'the totality of propositions' (T. 4.001), the two questions are transformed into the following: 'How are propositions related to the world?' and 'How are propositions related to one another?' This is why Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebook, 'My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition' (Nb p. 39). Wittgenstein assumes that if we can use language to talk about the world, there must be some propositions directly connected with the world, so that their truth or falsity are not determined by other propositions, but by the world: these he called 'elementary propositions' (K. T. Fann, p.
.Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
Elementary propositions are the constituent parts of complex or ordinary propositions. That is to say, ordinary propositions can be analyzed into more basic kinds of propositions, which can be further analyzed into the most fundamental parts, until no further analysis is possible. Once we reach the point where no further analysis is possible, then we have what Wittgenstein called the elementary proposition. The elementary proposition puts us into direct contact with the world. Elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts. Atomic facts are the smallest constituent parts of more complex facts. As a result of Wittgenstein's analysis, we are in direct contact with the world, because the smallest analyzable proposition, the elementary proposition, puts us in contact with the smallest analyzable fact - the atomic fact (facts exist in the world).
An elementary proposition is the simplest kind of proposition, and it is made up of names (T. 4.22). What is a name? "A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26)." Names refer to objects in the world, and objects are simple (T. 3.203, 2.02). While it is true that elementary propositions are the simplest kind of proposition, they can be analyzed or broken into smaller parts; however, these parts are no longer called propositions, they are called names. Hence, a complete analysis of a proposition is the following: Complex proposition -------> elementary proposition -------> and finally, names.
Nowhere does Wittgenstein come up with an example of an elementary proposition or name. According to Norman Malcolm, when he asked Wittgenstein about why there were no examples of elementary propositions or names, Wittgenstein said that it was not his job as a logician to decide whether this thing or that was a simple or complex thing. Wittgenstein believed this was an empirical matter, and apparently outside the scope of his work. However, to be fair, Wittgenstein understood the problem and makes reference to it in the Notebooks.
So what we have then is the following: Complex propositions can be analyzed into the most basic kind of proposition - called elementary propositions. Elementary propositions are made up of simple terms called names. He concludes that names must refer to objects in the world, i.e., the object is its referent. If the referent does not exist, then the proposition is senseless. However, because a proposition is senseless (has no referent), this does not mean that it cannot be understood. For instance, if I say "I saw a unicorn yesterday," you can understand the proposition even though the term unicorn has no referent. Wittgenstein's use of senseless and nonsense are important to understand. More on this later.
The idea that names must refer to objects is a view that goes all the way back to Augustine, but keep in mind that the naming of objects as defined in the Tractatus is similar to the Augustinian model in that something in the proposition is pointing to something in the world, but it is different in an important respect. For example, objects in the Tractatus are what make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021), but what is meant by object is not what you might think ( it is not tables, chairs, trees, etc, as Augustine might have thought) i.e., it is the smallest constituent part of reality. Names and objects in the Wittgensteinian sense are what must exist if his logical analysis is to be correct. So there is a one-to-one correspondence between the smallest analyzable part of an elementary proposition (names), and the smallest analyzable part of atomic facts (objects).
An elementary proposition is the simplest kind of proposition, and it is made up of names (T. 4.22). What is a name? "A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26)." Names refer to objects in the world, and objects are simple (T. 3.203, 2.02). While it is true that elementary propositions are the simplest kind of proposition, they can be analyzed or broken into smaller parts; however, these parts are no longer called propositions, they are called names. Hence, a complete analysis of a proposition is the following: Complex proposition -------> elementary proposition -------> and finally, names.
Nowhere does Wittgenstein come up with an example of an elementary proposition or name. According to Norman Malcolm, when he asked Wittgenstein about why there were no examples of elementary propositions or names, Wittgenstein said that it was not his job as a logician to decide whether this thing or that was a simple or complex thing. Wittgenstein believed this was an empirical matter, and apparently outside the scope of his work. However, to be fair, Wittgenstein understood the problem and makes reference to it in the Notebooks.
So what we have then is the following: Complex propositions can be analyzed into the most basic kind of proposition - called elementary propositions. Elementary propositions are made up of simple terms called names. He concludes that names must refer to objects in the world, i.e., the object is its referent. If the referent does not exist, then the proposition is senseless. However, because a proposition is senseless (has no referent), this does not mean that it cannot be understood. For instance, if I say "I saw a unicorn yesterday," you can understand the proposition even though the term unicorn has no referent. Wittgenstein's use of senseless and nonsense are important to understand. More on this later.
The idea that names must refer to objects is a view that goes all the way back to Augustine, but keep in mind that the naming of objects as defined in the Tractatus is similar to the Augustinian model in that something in the proposition is pointing to something in the world, but it is different in an important respect. For example, objects in the Tractatus are what make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021), but what is meant by object is not what you might think ( it is not tables, chairs, trees, etc, as Augustine might have thought) i.e., it is the smallest constituent part of reality. Names and objects in the Wittgensteinian sense are what must exist if his logical analysis is to be correct. So there is a one-to-one correspondence between the smallest analyzable part of an elementary proposition (names), and the smallest analyzable part of atomic facts (objects).
Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
So what we have then is the following: Complex propositions can be analyzed into the most basic kind of propositions - called elementary propositions; and elementary propositions are made up of simple terms called names. Wittgenstein concludes that names must refer to objects in the world, i.e., the object is its referent. If the referent does not exist, then the proposition is senseless. But how can this be, since we often make reference to things that do not exist, and yet we understand the sense of the proposition. We refer to hobbits, witches, and little green monsters, and yet we know they do not exist. We understand these senseless propositions because we understand the concepts, not because they point to some object; and we understand, because propositions paint a picture, and these pictures either mirror reality or they do not.
Wittgenstein's objects, which are the simplest elements in reality, i.e., they are what reality is composed of; and they are what the names in elementary propositions refer too. Objects are indestructible, they are the constituent parts that remain the same over time. We use them to construct a picture of reality (PI. 59). Furthermore objects make up atomic facts, which are then used to construct any fact or state of affairs portrayed in complex propositions.
Again, we have the world (T. 1), and the world is composed of objects, atomic facts, and finally the facts themselves, or states of affairs (T. 2, 2.01). Each of these (object, atomic fact, and fact) has its corresponding component in language (name, elementary proposition, and complex proposition). Wittgenstein is constructing an ontology in the Tractatus: "Objects make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021)." "Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions (T. 5.5561)."
The idea that propositions/statements picture facts apparently occurred to Wittgenstein when he observed or read about a model of a car accident that was used in a Paris court of law, i.e., they used dolls and other objects to represent the facts of the case. The model was a picture of reality; and so it is with a proposition, it is a model of reality as we imagine or picture it (T. 4.01). So Wittgenstein believed that propositions literally picture reality. In as much as a model of an accident can be manipulated (dolls, toy cars, etc.) to show various facts depending of the placement of the various objects used in the model, so too, can a proposition be manipulated to construct a picture of reality as we see it. “In a proposition a situation is, as it were, put together experimentally (T. 4.031)”
Before I end this post, I just want to say that I believe that many of our propositions are pictures of reality, but again this is not the only way propositions state the facts. Many people think that Wittgenstein repudiated this idea, but I think he merely was saying that language does more than this - just as language does more than use the ostensive definition model.
Wittgenstein's objects, which are the simplest elements in reality, i.e., they are what reality is composed of; and they are what the names in elementary propositions refer too. Objects are indestructible, they are the constituent parts that remain the same over time. We use them to construct a picture of reality (PI. 59). Furthermore objects make up atomic facts, which are then used to construct any fact or state of affairs portrayed in complex propositions.
Again, we have the world (T. 1), and the world is composed of objects, atomic facts, and finally the facts themselves, or states of affairs (T. 2, 2.01). Each of these (object, atomic fact, and fact) has its corresponding component in language (name, elementary proposition, and complex proposition). Wittgenstein is constructing an ontology in the Tractatus: "Objects make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021)." "Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions (T. 5.5561)."
The idea that propositions/statements picture facts apparently occurred to Wittgenstein when he observed or read about a model of a car accident that was used in a Paris court of law, i.e., they used dolls and other objects to represent the facts of the case. The model was a picture of reality; and so it is with a proposition, it is a model of reality as we imagine or picture it (T. 4.01). So Wittgenstein believed that propositions literally picture reality. In as much as a model of an accident can be manipulated (dolls, toy cars, etc.) to show various facts depending of the placement of the various objects used in the model, so too, can a proposition be manipulated to construct a picture of reality as we see it. “In a proposition a situation is, as it were, put together experimentally (T. 4.031)”
Before I end this post, I just want to say that I believe that many of our propositions are pictures of reality, but again this is not the only way propositions state the facts. Many people think that Wittgenstein repudiated this idea, but I think he merely was saying that language does more than this - just as language does more than use the ostensive definition model.
Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
Above I talked about names being the simplest component of elementary propositions, and that names refer to objects (objects in the Wittgensteinian sense), and objects make up atomic facts. The question came up about how we could make sense of a proposition if there were no corresponding objects, and thus, no corresponding facts. According to the Tractatus a proposition pictures reality, so if we are to understand a proposition that refers to unicorns, it is because the proposition displays a picture, and that picture either matches reality or it does not. If it correctly mirrors reality, then it is true, if it does not mirror reality, then it is false. So to understand the sense of the proposition is a matter of picturing the proposition, and this occurs quite apart from there being a corresponding fact in reality.
A picture or proposition presents a fact from a position outside of it, or separate from the fact it is displaying. Just as a picture of the White House presents the White House from a position outside it, or quite separate from reality or the state-of-affairs it is picturing. Any picture either accurately or inaccurately presents a certain state of affairs (T. 2.1). For example, consider any painting that displays a picture, the picture may or may not actually match up with a corresponding state of affairs, and yet whether it does, has no bearing on whether we understand the picture.
"The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture (T. 2.15)."
The pictorial form is the form a picture shares with a fact. The form of the picture has to do with the arrangement of the elements in the picture. "What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the way it does, is its pictorial form. A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spacial picture can depict anything spacial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc. A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it (T. 2.17 - 2.172)."
There is a shared logic between the picture and the fact (T. 2.18).
How does a proposition correspond with reality? "Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.
"That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.
"It is laid against reality like a measure (T. 2.151-2.1512)."
Each person, truck, bridge, house in the picture represents those things in the world.
So how do we tell if a proposition is true or false? We must compare it with reality (T. 2.223).
The sense of a picture is the arrangement of the things in the picture, which supposedly correspond to the arrangement of things in the world (T. 2.221).
The way one verifies the correctness of a proposition is by inspecting the proposition to see if it indeed reflects reality (T. 2.223).
According to Wittgenstein a thought is a logical picture (Wittgenstein does not believe that we can think illogically), it uses the form of logic to represent a fact (T. 3 and 3.03).
"In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses (T. 3.1)." So the logical picture is made by logical units, such as, visual marks or auditory marks.
Therefore, a proposition says that 'a' is in a certain relation to 'b', i.e., 'aRb'. For instance, Sam is standing next to Jane.
A picture or proposition presents a fact from a position outside of it, or separate from the fact it is displaying. Just as a picture of the White House presents the White House from a position outside it, or quite separate from reality or the state-of-affairs it is picturing. Any picture either accurately or inaccurately presents a certain state of affairs (T. 2.1). For example, consider any painting that displays a picture, the picture may or may not actually match up with a corresponding state of affairs, and yet whether it does, has no bearing on whether we understand the picture.
"The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture (T. 2.15)."
The pictorial form is the form a picture shares with a fact. The form of the picture has to do with the arrangement of the elements in the picture. "What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the way it does, is its pictorial form. A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spacial picture can depict anything spacial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc. A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it (T. 2.17 - 2.172)."
There is a shared logic between the picture and the fact (T. 2.18).
How does a proposition correspond with reality? "Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.
"That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.
"It is laid against reality like a measure (T. 2.151-2.1512)."
Each person, truck, bridge, house in the picture represents those things in the world.
So how do we tell if a proposition is true or false? We must compare it with reality (T. 2.223).
The sense of a picture is the arrangement of the things in the picture, which supposedly correspond to the arrangement of things in the world (T. 2.221).
The way one verifies the correctness of a proposition is by inspecting the proposition to see if it indeed reflects reality (T. 2.223).
According to Wittgenstein a thought is a logical picture (Wittgenstein does not believe that we can think illogically), it uses the form of logic to represent a fact (T. 3 and 3.03).
"In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses (T. 3.1)." So the logical picture is made by logical units, such as, visual marks or auditory marks.
Therefore, a proposition says that 'a' is in a certain relation to 'b', i.e., 'aRb'. For instance, Sam is standing next to Jane.
Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
There doesn't seem to be much interest here in Wittgenstein, so I don't know if I will continue.
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chaz wyman
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Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
A summary is a short sketch. This is 650 words with no philosophy content.Sam26 wrote:I thought I would do a summary of Wittgenstein if there is enough interest. I will start with the Tractatus, and conclude with an in-depth analysis of On Certainty.
I am going to use K. T. Fann's book Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy as a guide because I think it is one of the best summaries written on Wittgenstein. If you want to study Wittgenstein, I would suggest getting Fann's book. You can get it on Alibris (used) for just a few dollars.
It is important to understand the background to Wittgenstein's works in order to better understand his thinking. I am not going to be able to give those of you who are interested a complete background of what was going on in philosophy at the time, vis-a-vis Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and Gottlob Frege. I will only give you bits and pieces, and hopefully this will inspire you to do your own thinking, and come to your own conclusions about the nature of Wittgenstein's work; and not only the nature of his work, but to come to understand how his thinking should influence the way we think about language, and in particular – propositions/statements.
As much as I enjoy Wittgenstein's philosophy and thinking about what he said concerning the nature of a proposition, it is important to understand that no philosopher no matter how brilliant - is without flaws. So, we have to be careful about getting tunnel vision, and we have to be careful about being too dogmatic about a certain philosopher, philosophy, or theory.
I have come to the conclusion after reading several biographies, and studying Wittgenstein on my own for many years, that in the 20th century Wittgenstein is to philosophy, what Einstein is to physics; and just as a physicist would not neglect Einstein's theories, I think philosophers should also not neglect the study of Wittgenstein's methods. His works are some of the most original in all of philosophy. The power of his intellect is obvious, and this is seen not only in his writings, but in other areas of his life.
Wittgenstein was born in Vienna, and he was the youngest of eight children. He came from a very rich industrialist family. In fact, Brahm's would come to the Wittgenstein home and play his music. He was educated at home until the age of 14, when his parents decided to send the young Wittgenstein to Linz to prepare him in mathematics and the physical sciences. It seems that the young Wittgenstein wanted to study with the physicist Boltzmann, however, Boltzmann died in 1906.
After being educated in Linz for three years, he then went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochscule at Charlottenburg. After two years in Berlin, he went to England where he became a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester. During this time he engaged in aeronautical research, and went from experimenting with kites, to the construction of a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. The design of the propeller was a mathematical endeavor, which eventually led the young Wittgenstein into pure mathematics, and then, to the foundation of mathematics. Apparently his interest in the foundation of mathematics led him to Russell and Whitehead's work called The Principles of Mathematics. The Principles of Mathematics greatly affected the young Wittgenstein, and this interest led him to the works of Frege who was the founder of modern mathematical logic. So it was through Russell, Whitehead, and Frege's works that Wittgenstein entered into the study of philosophy.
According to G. H. Von Wright Wittgenstein read Schopenhauer's Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, and this brought him face-to-face with Schopenhauer's idealism. Later Wittgenstein apparently abandoned his Schopenharuerian idealistic views in favor of Frege's conceptual realism; and it seems that after a talk with Frege, Wittgenstein decided to go to Cambridge and study philosophy with Russell (G. H. Von Wright, A Biographical Sketch, p. 6).
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chaz wyman
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Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
Is this a copy&paste from a A-Level essay?Sam26 wrote:The Philosophical Investigations has to be seen in the light of his former work - the Tractatus. Therefore, I will begin by briefly outlining the Tractatus before I move on to a brief outline of the Philosophical Investigations. The Tractatus is one of the most difficult works of philosophy, and it is because of this that many of the interpretations of the Tractatus have been deficient. Even Russell and Frege misinterpreted the Tractatus according to Wittgenstein; and I am sure that my attempt at interpreting Wittgenstein will also fall short. Nevertheless, I shall have a go at it.
In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein tells us what the aim of the Tractatus is, "The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. "Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather--not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). "It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (Tractatus, p. 3)." Even in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein is still thinking in terms of the logic of language; however, his method is different. The Tractatus is an a priori investigation of language, and the Philosophical Investigations is more of an a posteriori or pragmatic approach to language. My personal belief is that both works have something important to say. The a priori approach in the Tractatus is due to Wittgenstein's belief that the structure of language is revealed by logic (P.I. para. 107).
According to K. T. Fann “...we should first look at the basic assumptions which lie behind the method of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein assumes that the structure of language is revealed by logic and that the essential function of language is to depict or to describe the world. Thus, there are two major questions to be answered: (1) What is the nature of logic? and (2) How is language related to the world (K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, p. 5)?” Therefore, the three main issues of the Tractatus are logic, language, and the world. And this is clearly pointed out in Wittgenstein's picture theory of language, which is directly related to his theory of truth-functions. "These two theories are designed to answer the questions: 'What is the function of language?' and 'What is the structure of language?' Since language is conceived as 'the totality of propositions' (T. 4.001), the two questions are transformed into the following: 'How are propositions related to the world?' and 'How are propositions related to one another?' This is why Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebook, 'My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition' (Nb p. 39). Wittgenstein assumes that if we can use language to talk about the world, there must be some propositions directly connected with the world, so that their truth or falsity are not determined by other propositions, but by the world: these he called 'elementary propositions' (K. T. Fann, p.
What do YOU think about Witt?
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chaz wyman
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Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
Why not just post the whole essay, cutting out the history bits, and give us your opinion on the interesting bits?Sam26 wrote:There doesn't seem to be much interest here in Wittgenstein, so I don't know if I will continue.
Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
chaz wyman wrote:Why not just post the whole essay, cutting out the history bits, and give us your opinion on the interesting bits?Sam26 wrote:There doesn't seem to be much interest here in Wittgenstein, so I don't know if I will continue.
I am not cutting and pasting an essay.-
chaz wyman
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Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
Never mind then.Sam26 wrote:chaz wyman wrote:Why not just post the whole essay, cutting out the history bits, and give us your opinion on the interesting bits?Sam26 wrote:There doesn't seem to be much interest here in Wittgenstein, so I don't know if I will continue.
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Arising_uk
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Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
I thought he said it was the opposite?Sam26 wrote:...
Therefore, a proposition says that 'a' is in a certain relation to 'b', i.e., 'aRb'. For instance, Sam is standing next to Jane.
"Instead of, 'The complex sign "aRb" says that a stands to b in the relation R', we ought to put, 'That "a" stands to "b" in a certain relation says that aRb.' "
TLP: 3.1432
Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
Limiting the expression of thoughts seems an ambitious philosophy project!"Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather--not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts:
Perhaps this is just semantics, but my sense is that we don't draw a limit to thought, but rather understand the limits. Is that what he means? His use of the active tense of "drawing a limit" seems to imply a power we don't have.for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).
I need help here. He is drawing a distinction between thought and language, yes? Why is what can not be expressed in language declared nonsense? What does he mean by nonsense?"It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense
The function of language is to create symbolic entities that correlate to the real world? The word "apple" points to the real apple?Wittgenstein assumes that the structure of language is revealed by logic and that the essential function of language is to depict or to describe the world.
Not sure about the first question.Thus, there are two major questions to be answered: (1) What is the nature of logic? and (2) How is language related to the world?
The second question might be answered by proposing that the function of language is to divide the wholeness of reality in to conceptual parts. This division process is incredibly useful, but the price tag is the introduction of profound distortion.
This is why Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebook, 'My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition' (Nb p. 39).
Example of an "elementary proposition"?Wittgenstein assumes that if we can use language to talk about the world, there must be some propositions directly connected with the world, so that their truth or falsity are not determined by other propositions, but by the world: these he called 'elementary propositions' (K. T. Fann, p.
Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
I'm definitely interested, but you may find this forum is to small to maintain your interest. It appears you may have already flown the coop, which if true, is a shame. You're off to a great start on a very interesting subject.Sam26 wrote:There doesn't seem to be much interest here in Wittgenstein, so I don't know if I will continue.
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fiveredapples
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Re: Summarizing Wittgenstein
Poor Sam,
Where you have gone, buddy? Wittgenstein isn't going to explain himself, now, is he?
Where you have gone, buddy? Wittgenstein isn't going to explain himself, now, is he?