Re: Is It Possible To Think Without Language?
Posted: Thu Nov 01, 2018 5:13 pm
If and when one believes all thought/belief is through language concepts, then in order to avoid self-contradiction(incoherence) s/he must admit that prior to language there can be no such thing as thought/belief. Language concepts are existentially dependent upon language. If it is the case that all thinking is through language concepts then it would be impossible for thought/belief to exist without language.
However...
It takes quite a bit of justificatory groundwork to establish what we're looking to establish:Whether or not thought/belief is prior to language. This kind of endeavor requires being in the right frame of mind. The aim is to establish whether or not thought/belief can even be prior to language. Method matters most here. If some thought/belief is prior to language, then the above position is based upon a framework that is utterly inadequate for taking proper account of it.
If it is the case that some thought and belief exist in their entirety prior to language, then it must also be the case that non-linguistic thought/belief exist(s) independently of language concepts. Because that is the case, it makes no sense whatsoever to say that non linguistic belief must be through language(concepts). Non linguistic creatures have no language. If they have thought/belief without language, then it is either the case that there can indeed be thought/belief without language or it is the case that language concepts are prior to language. If the latter is true, then "language concept" is a misnomer... an unadulterated bit of meaningless nonsense.
So...
It may be best to begin by granting the archaic notions of "thought" and "belief" and see where that path ends up. We have to start somewhere. Let's look at each and every report/account/example/candidate of thought/belief that we have at our disposal and see what they all have in common. See if that approach helps us to figure out whether or not ir is even possible for thought/belief to be prior to language.
They all consist of propositions, statements, or some such other linguistic expression/utterance. They are each meaningful to the thinker/believer. They each presuppose truth(as correspondence) somewhere along the line. So, we're faced with the following considerations...
1.)If it is the case that i all thought/belief consists of propositions, and ii some thought/belief is prior to language, then it only follows that some propositions are prior to language.
2.)If it is the case that i no propositions are prior to language, and ii all thought/belief consists of propositions, then it only follows that no thought/belief is prior to language.
I argue that there are no propositions prior to language, and that(for coherency's sake) non linguistic thought/belief cannot consist of propositions, for propositions are existentially dependent upon language, and non-linguistic thought/belief(all thought/belief that is prior to language is non-linguistic) cannot be... lest we render our discovery process and the notion of non-linguistic thought/belief incoherent. For these reasons, neither of the above arguments are acceptable for they are quite simply incapable of taking proper account of thought/belief that is prior to language.
Anyone who follows either of those lines of reasoning is hamstrung by the conceptual scheme itself. The first leads one to say that propositions are prior to language, and the second leads one to say that no language-less creature thinks/believes anything at all. Witt was hamstrung by the first. He was the fly in the bottle.
However...
It takes quite a bit of justificatory groundwork to establish what we're looking to establish:Whether or not thought/belief is prior to language. This kind of endeavor requires being in the right frame of mind. The aim is to establish whether or not thought/belief can even be prior to language. Method matters most here. If some thought/belief is prior to language, then the above position is based upon a framework that is utterly inadequate for taking proper account of it.
If it is the case that some thought and belief exist in their entirety prior to language, then it must also be the case that non-linguistic thought/belief exist(s) independently of language concepts. Because that is the case, it makes no sense whatsoever to say that non linguistic belief must be through language(concepts). Non linguistic creatures have no language. If they have thought/belief without language, then it is either the case that there can indeed be thought/belief without language or it is the case that language concepts are prior to language. If the latter is true, then "language concept" is a misnomer... an unadulterated bit of meaningless nonsense.
So...
It may be best to begin by granting the archaic notions of "thought" and "belief" and see where that path ends up. We have to start somewhere. Let's look at each and every report/account/example/candidate of thought/belief that we have at our disposal and see what they all have in common. See if that approach helps us to figure out whether or not ir is even possible for thought/belief to be prior to language.
They all consist of propositions, statements, or some such other linguistic expression/utterance. They are each meaningful to the thinker/believer. They each presuppose truth(as correspondence) somewhere along the line. So, we're faced with the following considerations...
1.)If it is the case that i all thought/belief consists of propositions, and ii some thought/belief is prior to language, then it only follows that some propositions are prior to language.
2.)If it is the case that i no propositions are prior to language, and ii all thought/belief consists of propositions, then it only follows that no thought/belief is prior to language.
I argue that there are no propositions prior to language, and that(for coherency's sake) non linguistic thought/belief cannot consist of propositions, for propositions are existentially dependent upon language, and non-linguistic thought/belief(all thought/belief that is prior to language is non-linguistic) cannot be... lest we render our discovery process and the notion of non-linguistic thought/belief incoherent. For these reasons, neither of the above arguments are acceptable for they are quite simply incapable of taking proper account of thought/belief that is prior to language.
Anyone who follows either of those lines of reasoning is hamstrung by the conceptual scheme itself. The first leads one to say that propositions are prior to language, and the second leads one to say that no language-less creature thinks/believes anything at all. Witt was hamstrung by the first. He was the fly in the bottle.