reading Husserl, Fink....

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tapaticmadness
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Re: reading Husserl, Fink....

Post by tapaticmadness » Mon Feb 24, 2020 11:29 pm

odysseus wrote:
Mon Feb 24, 2020 4:31 am

Kant is the one who caused this problem
Internal relations and Idealism. Consider a book. An Idealist would say that an object is a book only because of all the relations it has with so very many other things. Such as to the human hands that will hold it and the eyes that will look at it and the very size of that human. Only in relation to language and its expression in print. Only to the topology of space. And the trees that are used to make the paper. Only to … etc.. Those relations, it is said, are internal to the very being of a book. Without them a book is literally nothing at all. They are not something extraneous to its being. They ARE its being. Moreover, the book is not really something separate from the things it is related to. They all form a system, a continuum of function. It is only the human mind that divides it all up into separate things for the sake of understanding. In itself it is all one undifferentiated whole. The human being puts names on things, categorizes them, and thereby takes the flow of life right out of it. The world becomes a museum where things are labeled and looked at.

The realist will say that a book is a book because it is an example of bookness or the Form of Book. All the relations it has with other things are external to it and extraneous things. The realist sees a certain simplicity in that. Even a powerful elegance. Idealism with its internal relations is messy complicated.

Existence is quantized. One goes from one Form to another, from one particular to another, by means of a jump. There is no smooth continuum leading from one to another. And when you think of a particular exemplifying a Form, even the nexus of exemplification is a third separate thing. And the fact that is all three together is another thing. There is no blending of all into one thing. Difference and separation are final. Even the intimate togetherness is another thing. But we are here close to the unspeakable. Maybe I have gone too far already. Alas, all that otherness will frighten most thinkers away. And they will wander in strange dreams.

odysseus
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Re: reading Husserl, Fink....

Post by odysseus » Tue Feb 25, 2020 5:13 pm

I went to Rorty to try and figure out why he believed that knowing objects as independent perceptual systems was impossible. As far as I can tell it is because we constantly make mistakes in our judgments of what is and isn't the case. If that's his argument then he has once again taken up the same age old argument that has always been presented against realism. This is the same as the Hindu example of someone seeing a snake in the grass and then discovering it was a rope. A realist has to account for how we make mistakes in our perception. Only one answer has been given by realists and it's the answer I adhere to. One must give ontological status to that illusion of a snake. i am here with Alexis Meinong. "Non-existent things" exist. We experience them so they are there. i imagined that this soup I just made was going to be good. It isn't. That imagined object exists as the object of my imagining, but not as something actual in my world. Now, the objects of our imagination are not IN the imagination. They are not IN the mind. They exist external to thought, just as much as this chair I am sitting on and that rope. And once again you are going to wonder where this "external" world of imagined, merely potential, not actual, objects is. Well, they are not in space. I have already spoken about that. And the nexus that connects them to thought isn't either. Rorty made the mistake of thinking that "non-existent" things have to be in the mind and dependent on it. Also go back at look at T. P. Nunn that I sent you early on. Secondary sense data aren't in the mind either. Once again I lean on the Doctrine of External Relations.
You raise so many issues it is hard to know where to step in. You sound like a qualified phenomenologist. here is what Nunn said (that you sent me):

Nunn’s reply is uncompromising. The contrast between ‘sensa’ and ‘actual properties’ is, he argues, an untenable one. All the shades of colour which the buttercup presents to an observer are actual properties of the buttercup; and all the hotnesses of the water are properties of the water. The plain man and the scientist ascribe a standard temperature and a standard colour to a thing and limit it to a certain region of space, because its complexity would otherwise defeat them. The fact remains, Nunn argues, that a thing has not one hotness, for example, but many, and that these hotnesses are not in a limited region of space but in various places around about the standard object. A thing is hotter an inch away than a foot away and hotter on a cold hand than on a warm one, just as it is a paler yellow in one light than it is in another light. To imagine otherwise is to confuse between the arbitrary ‘thing’ of everyday life and the ‘thing’ as experience shows it of be.

Herein is Kant, implicitly. And OUT OF Kant, came many variations, but this is phenomenology, though that language is more traditional. Talk about secondary and primary qualities was replaced by Husserl and Heidegger, though analytic philosophers talk like this at times; I don't read them much, which brings me to Rorty. Rorty is not far from this, but he speaks the language of a pragmatist. He is the language philosopher of guys like Dewey, Peirce, and he looks at an experiential event as a problem solving event, and knowledge is what works, and language is how knowledge works; it's a utility.
When Nunn rejects the "contrast between sensa and actual properties" and puts the actual color of the buttercup and the object we call buttercup on the same ontological footing, rejecting the traditional analysis of qualities subjective and objective, that makes him a phenomenologist. The question then turns to how one proceeds from there. This business about the a thing having not one hotness, but many, echoes Sartre's aspectivalism. And the scientist and the "plain man" (this is Husserl's talk, and Heidgger's) with their standards of universality that belie the actual object, well, this is a resistance to Kant's synthetic concepts, certainly, but how this is argued is where the matter takes shape, for you have take on the simple and intuitive idea that when you try to remove quanitfiers from a theory about what actuality is, you are using quantifiers (univerals, all x's are y; and existentials, this x is y) to do this. It is a famliliar argument: what Kant was talking about is THINKING, and it is impossible to remove thought from actuality because such a thing is apriori unthinkable.
Of course, the Atman is the Brahman, but how far this goes to making sense lies exactly where Fink begins his meditation. There it IS, this conditioned, and well established world, and there we are eidetically constructing this world, enworlding. This is the threshold of the other, metaphysics.
Where your resistance to this lies is, I think, in what is called apophatic theology, which is, as I recall, where philosophers like Shankara placed the inquiring mind: neti neti, not this, not that, and when the observing consciousness determines the self to be mysteriously elusive in this effort to discover it the enterprise is dropped and the effort to grasp what the self is is abandoned for a more revelatory approach. If illusion is conceptual, whereby concepts are always already there to IMPOSE structure of the structureless world, that is, to apprehend an object AS the concept, and we wish to escape illusion, then what we wish for is the annihilation of the identifiable self.
This is very close to Kierkegaard (though, you'd have to read his Fear and Trembling account of the knight of faith, which embraces the two). His is the philosophy of the eternal present, and I think he's right.
But this antipathy you have for Kant I think is justified, I know I'm not a Kantian, but THROUGH him, we find existential thought that can explain this above in, on occasion, very clear terms. Fink is Kantian in his point of departure only. He goes where Kant made no attempt.

tapaticmadness
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Re: reading Husserl, Fink....

Post by tapaticmadness » Wed Feb 26, 2020 2:06 am

odysseus wrote:
Tue Feb 25, 2020 5:13 pm

You sound like a qualified phenomenologist.
Yes, I should sound like a phenomenologist. I told you that my philosophy is Phenomenological Realism. All philosophy is and always has been phenomenological. Not all philosophy, however, has been realistic. It is often out and out Idealism, as is yours.

Kant, Nunn, Rorty, Dewey, Pierce, Sartre, Brahman, Atman, Shankara, Kierkegaard, Fink and back to Kant. I’m having trouble figuring out just what it is that Odysseus believes. Maybe like a good scholar you hold your own beliefs in suspension. Or maybe you have bracketed you own beliefs in an epochean templum.

I suspect you see all phenomenal entities as somehow “in” the Self. That there are no individual objects separate from the Self. The Self is the only real object. (Spinoza?) I doubt very much that you think relations exist external to their relata. It may all come down to your withholding judgment about any ontological statements. Until only time and pure consciousness reign supreme. All else being vain conjecture. Please try to speak for yourself, so I can know better how to respond.

odysseus
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Re: reading Husserl, Fink....

Post by odysseus » Wed Feb 26, 2020 5:51 am

ant, Nunn, Rorty, Dewey, Pierce, Sartre, Brahman, Atman, Shankara, Kierkegaard, Fink and back to Kant. I’m having trouble figuring out just what it is that Odysseus believes. Maybe like a good scholar you hold your own beliefs in suspension. Or maybe you have bracketed you own beliefs in an epochean templum.

I suspect you see all phenomenal entities as somehow “in” the Self. That there are no individual objects separate from the Self. The Self is the only real object. (Spinoza?) I doubt very much that you think relations exist external to their relata. It may all come down to your withholding judgment about any ontological statements. Until only time and pure consciousness reign supreme. All else being vain conjecture. Please try to speak for yourself, so I can know better how to respond.
I think philosophy is a tool, and nothing more that I can confirm. That it ends in Derrida is not accidental, for he tells us first and foremost to be quiet, for philosophy does not possess the truth in the "power and the glory" sense of the term, only in the truth value of propositions sense, and this is simply factual and facts, the things analytical philosophers are so fond of, are absolutely without value (and, to listen to Derrida, no privileged center a all) . A fact simply does not matter at all as a fact. This brings the matter to what mattering" is all about, and this is the only philosophical question that, well, matters. You might say, I don't give one scintilla for the truth, but I USE truth to realize God. All that matters to me really is, when I stand in the openness of Being, have I taken down enough barriers that I can see more deeply into what I know to be the sublime nature of my existence. I know this center within is sublime because that is how I experience the world: it comes to my understanding like a romantic vision. I used to see a street with parked cars when I looked out the window. I'm clearer now, than that. Now I see the same street, only it is very different because my experiences do not issue from habit and familiarity. They are divested of what makes the world common.
Philosophers are simply a means to an end.

tapaticmadness
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Re: reading Husserl, Fink....

Post by tapaticmadness » Wed Feb 26, 2020 6:09 am

odysseus wrote:
Wed Feb 26, 2020 5:51 am

I think philosophy is a tool, and nothing more that I can confirm. That it ends in Derrida is not accidental, for he tells us first and foremost to be quiet, for philosophy does not possess the truth in the "power and the glory" sense of the term, only in the truth value of propositions sense, and this is simply factual and facts, the things analytical philosophers are so fond of, are absolutely without value (and, to listen to Derrida, no privileged center a all) . A fact simply does not matter at all as a fact. This brings the matter to what mattering" is all about, and this is the only philosophical question that, well, matters. You might say, I don't give one scintilla for the truth, but I USE truth to realize God. All that matters to me really is, when I stand in the openness of Being, have I taken down enough barriers that I can see more deeply into what I know to be the sublime nature of my existence. I know this center within is sublime because that is how I experience the world: it comes to my understanding like a romantic vision. I used to see a street with parked cars when I looked out the window. I'm clearer now, than that. Now I see the same street, only it is very different because my experiences do not issue from habit and familiarity. They are divested of what makes the world common.
Philosophers are simply a means to an end.
I think that is very nicely written and I accept it as it is, no argument.

David Godkin
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Re: reading Husserl, Fink....

Post by David Godkin » Sun Mar 01, 2020 2:59 am

If you haven’t read Hegel and have no plans to do so you have no business commenting on him.

tapaticmadness
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Re: reading Husserl, Fink....

Post by tapaticmadness » Sun Mar 08, 2020 6:25 pm

David Godkin wrote:
Sun Mar 01, 2020 2:59 am
If you haven’t read Hegel and have no plans to do so you have no business commenting on him.
To whom are you directing your criticism? Do you have something to say about phenomenology and all that? I love a good argument. I am a phenomenological realist.

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