Skepdick wrote: ↑
Fri Jul 03, 2020 4:40 pm
The No True Scotsman fallacy?
That's a fallacy about a fallacy.
The "No True Scotsman" fallacy depends on one claiming a criterion unrelated to being a Scotsman. But to argue "No true Scotsman isn't from Scotland" is not a fallacy but a definition.
In the same way, "philosopher" has a definition, one that begins with Greek etymology and proceeds through the entire tradition of philosophy. It's "lover of wisdom," and more expansively, "one who pursues knowledge through the application of rationality."
Thus, to say that nobody who does that is a real "philosopher" is merely definitional. One can only avoid it by pretending there are no criteria for being a "philosopher."
To insist that the is-ought gap applies to morality in particular is special pleading.
Not at all. It's what Hume himself, who first proposed the gap, thought was the case.
Now, unless you want to argue that "It ought to rain tomorrow" or "You ought to paint your house" are freighted with moral import, then you've got "oughts" there that are uninvolved in morality. So for me to say, "A philosopher ought to use rationality" is not a moral claim. I'm not saying that they will be morally bad people if they are not philosophers, or if they don't use rationality. I'm only pointing out that they will not fit the definition, held by everybody from Socrates to Sartre, of what a "philosopher" is.
No special pleading. No "Scotsman" fallacy.