In Epistemology and specifically in internalism-externalism debate, there's a paradox called "McKinsey paradox". is there anyone who has heard anything about this paradox? what are the premises of it, what is the importance of this paradox and which theory does it specifically threaten?
thank you very much
What is this thing called Mckinsey Paradox?
Re: What is this thing called Mckinsey Paradox?
Here y go!
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a wonderful resource, both for people trained in philosophy, and for folks who (like me) are just exploring the subject. If you find it tough going, there are people on this site who can help, but I find it's best to struggle through it as far as you can, then ask specific questions when you need to. .
'What is the McKinsey paradox' is probably too broad a question to get any useful answers.
Good luck, and enjoy the hard work!
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a wonderful resource, both for people trained in philosophy, and for folks who (like me) are just exploring the subject. If you find it tough going, there are people on this site who can help, but I find it's best to struggle through it as far as you can, then ask specific questions when you need to. .
'What is the McKinsey paradox' is probably too broad a question to get any useful answers.
Good luck, and enjoy the hard work!
Re: What is this thing called Mckinsey Paradox?
Hi Thundril and thank you for your rersponse
I think there's something about that paradox in Stanford encyclopedia under the entry of externalism-inrenalism debate which I've read it Thundril, but the explanation I found at stanford was too short too general and too vague.
I mean, when I hear the name of a paradox, first thing I do is to expect 2 premises and 1 conclusion; thats it; 2 intuitively true premises and a validly derived conclusion which is apparently false
I think there's something about that paradox in Stanford encyclopedia under the entry of externalism-inrenalism debate which I've read it Thundril, but the explanation I found at stanford was too short too general and too vague.
I mean, when I hear the name of a paradox, first thing I do is to expect 2 premises and 1 conclusion; thats it; 2 intuitively true premises and a validly derived conclusion which is apparently false
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Veritas Aequitas
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Re: What is this thing called Mckinsey Paradox?
I am game for anything that is novel to me.
Here's what I gather from google.
"
MCKINSEY ONE MORE TIME
Crispin Wright
http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1187/mckinsey ... e_time.pdf
§1 It is not always true that recognizably valid reasoning from known, or otherwise
epistemically warranted premises, can be enlisted to produce knowledge, or other epistemic
warrant, for a conclusion. The counterexamples are cases that exhibit what I have elsewhere
called warrant transmission-failure. It is nowadays widely accepted that there are indeed such
counterexamples, though individual cases remain controversial. One such controversial case is
the so-called McKinsey paradox. The paradox presents as a simple collision between three
claims that many would find attractive:
1. That many ordinary types of intentional self knowledge, including in a wide class of
cases knowledge of what one thinks or believes, are immediately available to a
normal subject, without empirical investigation, (in the armchair, or “a priori” in one
loose and popular sense of the phrase).
2. That psychological content is conditioned by various forms of externalist constraints,
with the effect that many ordinary concepts are available to a thinker only when she,
or her speech community, has had certain kinds of historical interaction with items
lying in the extension of the concepts concerned; and moreover, that the fact that such
external constraints operate on certain specific contents is something that can be
appreciated a priori, by doing pure philosophy.
3. That it is not possible to know a priori, by armchair reflection alone, anything about
the historical interaction of oneself, or others in one’s speech community, with
particular objects and kinds.
Suppose water is a concept of which it may be recognized a priori that point 2 applies. And
suppose that ordinary intentional self-knowledge encompasses attitudes to simple contents
involving water. That sets up the following reasoning:
(A) I believe that water is wet
(A+) If I believe that water is wet, then I or others in my speech community have had
a history of interaction with water.
Hence
(B) I or others in my speech community have had a history of interaction with water
Each of the two premises may, on our assumptions, be known without elevation from the
armchair, yet the conclusion (B), accessible from them merely by a modus ponens step, may not
be so known if claim 3 is accepted.
It is a nice tight paradox.1 How to respond?
— Should we allow the possibility of some limited degree of armchair knowledge of human
history?2
"
Here's what I gather from google.
"
MCKINSEY ONE MORE TIME
Crispin Wright
http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1187/mckinsey ... e_time.pdf
§1 It is not always true that recognizably valid reasoning from known, or otherwise
epistemically warranted premises, can be enlisted to produce knowledge, or other epistemic
warrant, for a conclusion. The counterexamples are cases that exhibit what I have elsewhere
called warrant transmission-failure. It is nowadays widely accepted that there are indeed such
counterexamples, though individual cases remain controversial. One such controversial case is
the so-called McKinsey paradox. The paradox presents as a simple collision between three
claims that many would find attractive:
1. That many ordinary types of intentional self knowledge, including in a wide class of
cases knowledge of what one thinks or believes, are immediately available to a
normal subject, without empirical investigation, (in the armchair, or “a priori” in one
loose and popular sense of the phrase).
2. That psychological content is conditioned by various forms of externalist constraints,
with the effect that many ordinary concepts are available to a thinker only when she,
or her speech community, has had certain kinds of historical interaction with items
lying in the extension of the concepts concerned; and moreover, that the fact that such
external constraints operate on certain specific contents is something that can be
appreciated a priori, by doing pure philosophy.
3. That it is not possible to know a priori, by armchair reflection alone, anything about
the historical interaction of oneself, or others in one’s speech community, with
particular objects and kinds.
Suppose water is a concept of which it may be recognized a priori that point 2 applies. And
suppose that ordinary intentional self-knowledge encompasses attitudes to simple contents
involving water. That sets up the following reasoning:
(A) I believe that water is wet
(A+) If I believe that water is wet, then I or others in my speech community have had
a history of interaction with water.
Hence
(B) I or others in my speech community have had a history of interaction with water
Each of the two premises may, on our assumptions, be known without elevation from the
armchair, yet the conclusion (B), accessible from them merely by a modus ponens step, may not
be so known if claim 3 is accepted.
It is a nice tight paradox.1 How to respond?
— Should we allow the possibility of some limited degree of armchair knowledge of human
history?2
"
Re: What is this thing called Mckinsey Paradox?
Thank you so much for your comprehensive response Veritas!
I saw that article, but you know, at the first sight its very hard for me to see why this argument should be classified as a paradox, since none of its constituents are something commonsense would necessarily disagree; too soft to be called a paradox; but I think there's a point which professor Wright has had in mind and I'll see after reading several times a Crispin Wrightian article!
I saw that article, but you know, at the first sight its very hard for me to see why this argument should be classified as a paradox, since none of its constituents are something commonsense would necessarily disagree; too soft to be called a paradox; but I think there's a point which professor Wright has had in mind and I'll see after reading several times a Crispin Wrightian article!