What does it feel like to be Enlightened?

[odysseus]

Atla wrote
I spent most of my life looking for answers, and think that you are misguided. You wanted a simple and dramatic answer, but ethics is also irrelevant in the grand scheme. There is nothing to explore there for me, except the psychology of annoying wishful thinking.

We aren't born to suffer and die. Yes there is birth, much suffering and death, those are all parts of the whole happening, but we are probably here for some wildly different, non-anthrophic reason. Yes whatever is going on here, we are caught up in it, the nature of our mind plays a central role in the happening, but still, the deep down reason is probably non-anthropic. It's easy to fall for the illusion of an anthropic reason, but you have to look deeper.

Then lets look deeply:

But what is anthropic? This is an empirical idea, and as such it fits among the many, the contingent. Metaethical thinking reveals something absolute and carries with an injunction that issues from this. The religious God is a contrived figure, but imagine if it were not, putting aside the complaints of silliness. What is it that God would have that would be so extraordinary? It would be that God would present into the human condition and that of all things, an absolute. The existential core of God is not about any of the, what I call the incidental things in a popular religion, but about an analysis of the material basis of religion, material meaning existential, there, in the fabric of things, no more dismissible than hurricanes or metamorphic rocks, but then, as an absolute, far more real, that is, far more imposing on belief. as logically logical form in the way of tautologies andn contradictions are the most coercive imaginable. Trouble is, they are also vacuous. Here, were Godto actually exist, it would constitute an epistemic imposition that issues from reality and not from abstract logic. The difference is momentous.

Now remove the silliness, and just consider the material (existential, a word that may be off putting) gravitas of God: a presence in the world that is actual and absolute, myths and narratives and metaphysics in abeyance.

Then we move toward what this "presence" is. Here, we invoke Wittgenstein and others. Especially John Mackie, who argues that there is no such thing as objectivity at the metaethical level of analysis. But then, are you reading with interest? Do you have any thoughts, specific ones that go to the way the argument is proceeding? Now is the time. Of course, if interest has dissipated I understand.

[Atla]

Atla wrote
I spent most of my life looking for answers, and think that you are misguided. You wanted a simple and dramatic answer, but ethics is also irrelevant in the grand scheme. There is nothing to explore there for me, except the psychology of annoying wishful thinking.

We aren't born to suffer and die. Yes there is birth, much suffering and death, those are all parts of the whole happening, but we are probably here for some wildly different, non-anthrophic reason. Yes whatever is going on here, we are caught up in it, the nature of our mind plays a central role in the happening, but still, the deep down reason is probably non-anthropic. It's easy to fall for the illusion of an anthropic reason, but you have to look deeper.

Then lets look deeply:

But what is anthropic? This is an empirical idea, and as such it fits among the many, the contingent. Metaethical thinking reveals something absolute and carries with an injunction that issues from this. The religious God is a contrived figure, but imagine if it were not, putting aside the complaints of silliness. What is it that God would have that would be so extraordinary? It would be that God would present into the human condition and that of all things, an absolute. The existential core of God is not about any of the, what I call the incidental things in a popular religion, but about an analysis of the material basis of religion, material meaning existential, there, in the fabric of things, no more dismissible than hurricanes or metamorphic rocks, but then, as an absolute, far more real, that is, far more imposing on belief. as logically logical form in the way of tautologies andn contradictions are the most coercive imaginable. Trouble is, they are also vacuous. Here, were Godto actually exist, it would constitute an epistemic imposition that issues from reality and not from abstract logic. The difference is momentous.

Now remove the silliness, and just consider the material (existential, a word that may be off putting) gravitas of God: a presence in the world that is actual and absolute, myths and narratives and metaphysics in abeyance.

Then we move toward what this "presence" is. Here, we invoke Wittgenstein and others. Especially John Mackie, who argues that there is no such thing as objectivity at the metaethical level of analysis. But then, are you reading with interest? Do you have any thoughts, specific ones that go to the way the argument is proceeding? Now is the time. Of course, if interest has dissipated I understand.

No idea what presence you are talking about. I've checked for absolute presence many times and found none, I only found illusions of absolute presence. 'Logic' typically refers to what normally formed human males do with their left hemispheres, and most women genuinely can't follow it. I haven't the slightest idea what kind of absolute epistemic imposition we are talking about.

[odysseus]

Atla wrote
No idea what presence you are talking about. I've checked for absolute presence many times and found none, I only found illusions of absolute presence. 'Logic' typically refers to what normally formed human males do with their left hemispheres, and most women genuinely can't follow it. I haven't the slightest idea what kind of absolute epistemic imposition we are talking about.

Males and females don't enter into it. The real question is why this comes to mind at all. Left hemispheres? No, it's not that kind thinking, though I would add that your thoughts about women are rather atavistic.

To check for such a thing you have read things that are beyond Wikipedia might have to say. Think qualia. Read Dennett's paper on this. He rejects the notion of a "pure presence", and he's right. Wittgenstein essentially said the same thing long ago. Also look to G E Moore's Principia Ethica. Not a fan of Moore and his "hand raising" epistemology, but he did see metaethics in an enlightening way: He called the "good" a non natural quality. The argument I find compelling is, in part, this ( I have put this out before. As with all philosophy worth its ink, one has to attend to what is being argued, and try not to let extraneous counter arguments to interfere, like thoughts about brain hemispheres and gender differences. These things are entirely not at issue here):

The "good" is what ethics is about, as well and the "bad". There are two ways to think about these. One is the contingent sense that is very common in the way we talk about the world given a clear, demonstrable standard of assessment. A chair is a good chair when it conforms to descriptive qualities like comfort, size, other features one may want or not want. The idea is, we know why a chair is a good or bad one, and can tell you why. It is a discursive account, contingent on the criteria that may apply. Contingent judgments like this apply across the board in mundane assessments of people and things. To illustrate contingency, think of a knife: a good knife is a sharp knife, one might say. But then, if used for a production of Macbeth, a sharp knife would benot at all good as someone could get hurt. Now what was good, sharpness, is now bad.

Good knives are context dependent, and this makes the point nicely regarding what the opposite of contingent judgments are, for non contingent matters are NOT context dependent. They are absolutes. Kant comes close to what this is about, absolutes that is, when he talked about apriority, universally and necessary truths, though he doesn't use this term. Wittgenstein does when he talks about ethical judgments.

The best way to capture what W had in mind lies with an illustration of how an ethical absolute works: Say you were given the choice between twp alternatives, one in which a child is tortured for several minutes (strong examples are the most poignant), and another in which a thousand children are tortured much worse for an eternity. (Now, you have to forgive philosophy for weird examples like this. They do it to make a point.) Now there is a strong argument of utility that says torturing the one is the ethical choice, and I would agree. Of course, deontological views may counter, but there is really no contest.

Here is the rub: Contingent goods and bads are clear and there is no issue about the one cancelling the other, sharpness for dullness in a knife, say. But note how the ethical good and bad play out: even if choosing to have the one tortured over the thousand is defensible, the one being tortured is not mitigated at all. On the contingent side, the knife's sharpness virtue is more than mitigated; rather, what was good (sharpness) is now entirely bad (for the play), and the lost sharpness has altogether lost it virtue, for the virtue was contingent. But with the children, the torture of the one stands exactly as it did, entirely unaffected by the conditions of choice. The pain torture produces is not contingently bad, but absolutely bad. One way to look at an absolute is to see that it cannot be "defeated" as its qualities are stand alone, independent of counter examples, or any attempts to reduce it.

Think of pain, and try not to think at all about what science might have to say about it. Such things are entirely irrelevant. We look at pain as a phenomenon, a presence, even a qualia, if you like, but it is a special kind of qualia.

Do you understand this argument? There are those who think Wittgenstein is a phenomenologist, but don't think like this. Just look clearly at the presence of pain as such, pain simplicter, and resist the attempt to think about the claims evolution may have on why it survived the ages, or how brain activity produces it (or how big strong men may have a higher threshold!) If need be, do take a lighted match and apply it to your finger. There it is. It is not a simple fact, a "state of affairs" (Witt); it is something entirely other than this. It possesses an absolute.

The argument can only proceed if you see this.

[Atla]

Atla wrote
No idea what presence you are talking about. I've checked for absolute presence many times and found none, I only found illusions of absolute presence. 'Logic' typically refers to what normally formed human males do with their left hemispheres, and most women genuinely can't follow it. I haven't the slightest idea what kind of absolute epistemic imposition we are talking about.

Males and females don't enter into it. The real question is why this comes to mind at all. Left hemispheres? No, it's not that kind thinking, though I would add that your thoughts about women are rather atavistic.

To check for such a thing you have read things that are beyond Wikipedia might have to say. Think qualia. Read Dennett's paper on this. He rejects the notion of a "pure presence", and he's right. Wittgenstein essentially said the same thing long ago. Also look to G E Moore's Principia Ethica. Not a fan of Moore and his "hand raising" epistemology, but he did see metaethics in an enlightening way: He called the "good" a non natural quality. The argument I find compelling is, in part, this ( I have put this out before. As with all philosophy worth its ink, one has to attend to what is being argued, and try not to let extraneous counter arguments to interfere, like thoughts about brain hemispheres and gender differences. These things are entirely not at issue here):

The "good" is what ethics is about, as well and the "bad". There are two ways to think about these. One is the contingent sense that is very common in the way we talk about the world given a clear, demonstrable standard of assessment. A chair is a good chair when it conforms to descriptive qualities like comfort, size, other features one may want or not want. The idea is, we know why a chair is a good or bad one, and can tell you why. It is a discursive account, contingent on the criteria that may apply. Contingent judgments like this apply across the board in mundane assessments of people and things. To illustrate contingency, think of a knife: a good knife is a sharp knife, one might say. But then, if used for a production of Macbeth, a sharp knife would benot at all good as someone could get hurt. Now what was good, sharpness, is now bad.

Good knives are context dependent, and this makes the point nicely regarding what the opposite of contingent judgments are, for non contingent matters are NOT context dependent. They are absolutes. Kant comes close to what this is about, absolutes that is, when he talked about apriority, universally and necessary truths, though he doesn't use this term. Wittgenstein does when he talks about ethical judgments.

The best way to capture what W had in mind lies with an illustration of how an ethical absolute works: Say you were given the choice between twp alternatives, one in which a child is tortured for several minutes (strong examples are the most poignant), and another in which a thousand children are tortured much worse for an eternity. (Now, you have to forgive philosophy for weird examples like this. They do it to make a point.) Now there is a strong argument of utility that says torturing the one is the ethical choice, and I would agree. Of course, deontological views may counter, but there is really no contest.

Here is the rub: Contingent goods and bads are clear and there is no issue about the one cancelling the other, sharpness for dullness in a knife, say. But note how the ethical good and bad play out: even if choosing to have the one tortured over the thousand is defensible, the one being tortured is not mitigated at all. On the contingent side, the knife's sharpness virtue is more than mitigated; rather, what was good (sharpness) is now entirely bad (for the play), and the lost sharpness has altogether lost it virtue, for the virtue was contingent. But with the children, the torture of the one stands exactly as it did, entirely unaffected by the conditions of choice. The pain torture produces is not contingently bad, but absolutely bad. One way to look at an absolute is to see that it cannot be "defeated" as its qualities are stand alone, independent of counter examples, or any attempts to reduce it.

Think of pain, and try not to think at all about what science might have to say about it. Such things are entirely irrelevant. We look at pain as a phenomenon, a presence, even a qualia, if you like, but it is a special kind of qualia.

Do you understand this argument? There are those who think Wittgenstein is a phenomenologist, but don't think like this. Just look clearly at the presence of pain as such, pain simplicter, and resist the attempt to think about the claims evolution may have on why it survived the ages, or how brain activity produces it (or how big strong men may have a higher threshold!) If need be, do take a lighted match and apply it to your finger. There it is. It is not a simple fact, a "state of affairs" (Witt); it is something entirely other than this. It possesses an absolute.

The argument can only proceed if you see this.

There are no ethical absolutes, you can't be serious about this.

I'm a sadistic psychopath God, I have time to torture up to 1000 children a day, before I start raping the virgins. Whether one child suffers shortly, or a thousand children suffer for eternity, makes no absolute difference to me as neither case triggers a bad feeling me in me, as I lack emotional empathy. Pain may be bad for those who experience it, that's its very function, but what these silly humans never understand is that they can't construct absolute ethics based on that. (Such philosophy only paints a target on their back, for psychopathic predators, makes them easily manipulable.)

On the other hand, it sure is enjoyable as hell to make them suffer and watch them suffer, and only torturing one child can ruin my whole day, that sure is bad for me. I'll take the thousand children over the one, that's good for me, thank you.

[odysseus]

Atla wrote
There are no ethical absolutes, you can't be serious about this.

I'm a sadistic psychopath God, I have time to torture up to 1000 children a day, before I start raping the virgins. Whether one child suffers shortly, or a thousand children suffer for eternity, makes no absolute difference to me as neither case triggers a bad feeling me in me, as I lack emotional empathy. Pain may be bad for those who experience it, that's its very function, but what these silly humans never understand is that they can't construct absolute ethics based on that. (Such philosophy only paints a target on their back, for psychopathic predators, makes them easily manipulable.)

On the other hand, it sure is enjoyable as hell to make them suffer and watch them suffer, and only torturing one child can ruin my whole day, that sure is bad for me. I'll take the thousand children over the one, that's good for me, thank you.

A closer reading is required.

[Atla]

A closer reading is required.

Like what? The truth is that you think that torturing a child is bad, because it's always bad for YOU. Same here, torturing a child is always bad for me. We have empathy. But we are doing philosophy here, not personal psychology.

Nothing about the world is intrinsically good/bad or ethical. We, normally formed people, have these psychological features or illusions woven into everything we experience, to the point where these features can go entirely unnoticed unspoken, but they are always there. Some of the world appears to have an inherent goodness/badness about it. You seem to have brought these features to the surface, so what?

As I said we should avoid falling for psychological illusions. I had encounters with psychopaths, tried to stare deeply into their 'minds' if you can call it that, to absorb their nature or lack thereof, that turned out to be the simplest way to destroy this illusion of inherent goodness/badness/ethicality. The phenomena a psychopath experiences aren't interwoven with these features at all, in any moral/ethical sense, there is a total void in that regard. What may be good for THEM, you may consider amoral at best or true evil at worst.

So much for ethics. Apart from this, we can only say that pain is pain, but that's not saying anything more than: red is red, good is good, bad is bad. Such qualia are real, in direct experience we only ever encounter qualia actually, but they lack absolute implications.

[odysseus]

Atla wrote
Like what? The truth is that you think that torturing a child is bad, because it's always bad for YOU. Same here, torturing a child is always bad for me. We have empathy. But we are doing philosophy here, not personal psychology.

Nothing about the world is intrinsically good/bad or ethical. We, normally formed people, have these psychological features or illusions woven into everything we experience, to the point where these features can go entirely unnoticed unspoken, but they are always there. Some of the world appears to have an inherent goodness/badness about it. You seem to have brought these features to the surface, so what?

As I said we should avoid falling for psychological illusions. I had encounters with psychopaths, tried to stare deeply into their 'minds' if you can call it that, to absorb their nature or lack thereof, that turned out to be the simplest way to destroy this illusion of inherent goodness/badness/ethicality. The phenomena a psychopath experiences aren't interwoven with these features at all, in any moral/ethical sense, there is a total void in that regard. What may be good for THEM, you may consider amoral at best or true evil at worst.

So much for ethics. Apart from this, we can only say that pain is pain, but that's not saying anything more than: red is red, good is good, bad is bad. Such qualia are real, in direct experience we only ever encounter qualia actually, but they lack absolute implications.

But empathy is not at issue at all. Not sure why you think the actuality of suffering can be contained in talk about how we feel about it. Put a lighted match to your finger and leave it there. THAT is what this argument is about. Stare at that until the question dawns on you that this is no less what the world is and does than anything the hard sciences have to say.

The same goes for the "psychology features or illusions": Is suffering an illusion?? And this notion of inherent goodness or badness you link to psychology? Illusions in psychology?: plague, starvation, being burned alive, bliss, love, ecstasy are illusions? Does this make sense at all? And on the tail end of this I would ask you to recall that there is not a philosophy worth its ink that thinks like this.

And now you're staring into psychopaths eyes?? Did you read the argument? None of this is even remotely related. It is about statements that are contingent vis a vis those of ethics.

[Atla]

Atla wrote
Like what? The truth is that you think that torturing a child is bad, because it's always bad for YOU. Same here, torturing a child is always bad for me. We have empathy. But we are doing philosophy here, not personal psychology.

Nothing about the world is intrinsically good/bad or ethical. We, normally formed people, have these psychological features or illusions woven into everything we experience, to the point where these features can go entirely unnoticed unspoken, but they are always there. Some of the world appears to have an inherent goodness/badness about it. You seem to have brought these features to the surface, so what?

As I said we should avoid falling for psychological illusions. I had encounters with psychopaths, tried to stare deeply into their 'minds' if you can call it that, to absorb their nature or lack thereof, that turned out to be the simplest way to destroy this illusion of inherent goodness/badness/ethicality. The phenomena a psychopath experiences aren't interwoven with these features at all, in any moral/ethical sense, there is a total void in that regard. What may be good for THEM, you may consider amoral at best or true evil at worst.

So much for ethics. Apart from this, we can only say that pain is pain, but that's not saying anything more than: red is red, good is good, bad is bad. Such qualia are real, in direct experience we only ever encounter qualia actually, but they lack absolute implications.

But empathy is not at issue at all. Not sure why you think the actuality of suffering can be contained in talk about how we feel about it. Put a lighted match to your finger and leave it there. THAT is what this argument is about. Stare at that until the question dawns on you that this is no less what the world is and does than anything the hard sciences have to say.

The same goes for the "psychology features or illusions": Is suffering an illusion?? And this notion of inherent goodness or badness you link to psychology? Illusions in psychology?: plague, starvation, being burned alive, bliss, love, ecstasy are illusions? Does this make sense at all? And on the tail end of this I would ask you to recall that there is not a philosophy worth its ink that thinks like this.

And now you're staring into psychopaths eyes?? Did you read the argument? None of this is even remotely related. It is about statements that are contingent vis a vis those of ethics.

Let's face it, you don't know what the fuck you are talking about. None of this has any 'universal' implications, and now you even freely admit this. So you never had a point to make in the first place, except that qualia are qualia are qualia. Well no shit.

[Atla]

Pure analytics - lacks the direct subjectivity, the immediate experience of life's joys and sorrows and all else. Pure experience - lacks the great objective theories of the world that try to explain it all. Philosophy to me doesn't even really begin until we've unified these approaches into one.

[odysseus]

Atla wrote
Pure analytics - lacks the direct subjectivity, the immediate experience of life's joys and sorrows and all else. Pure experience - lacks the great objective theories of the world that try to explain it all. Philosophy to me doesn't even really begin until we've unified these approaches into one.

The "objective theories of the world"? Have at it then. Give me an objective theory of the world. One will do, one that you think is there, at the foundation of things where the inquiring philosophical mind should be looking.

[Atla]

Atla wrote
Pure analytics - lacks the direct subjectivity, the immediate experience of life's joys and sorrows and all else. Pure experience - lacks the great objective theories of the world that try to explain it all. Philosophy to me doesn't even really begin until we've unified these approaches into one.

The "objective theories of the world"? Have at it then. Give me an objective theory of the world. One will do, one that you think is there, at the foundation of things where the inquiring philosophical mind should be looking.

Pseudo-objective theories of everything (not dependent on personal psychology and opinion), not talking about foundations.
I said several times that it's pretty basic philosophy that there is no true objective foundation of things. Not in science, not in phenomenology. I don't know why it should be admirable that you are repeating this mistake with phenomenology. You don't know what you're talking about.

[odysseus]

Atla wrote

Pseudo-objective theories of everything (not dependent on personal psychology and opinion), not talking about foundations.
I said several times that it's pretty basic philosophy that there is no true objective foundation of things. Not in science, not in phenomenology. I don't know why it should be admirable that you are repeating this mistake with phenomenology. You don't know what you're talking about.

For a very, very good reason. You have no doubt read ABOUT Kant,, Hegel, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Husserl, and others, but you have not engaged them AT ALL. You are clueless, and I don't mean this insultingly. But this is simply the way it is. On the outside you literally cannot even imagine what it would be like to conceive the world phenomenologically. Trying to get things through to you is like going back in time, meeting up with Anaximander and reporting that gravitational pull is REALLY the curvature of spacetime. All there is is pure astonishment and incredulity.

Look, you will not do the work and you conclude it is all without merit. Then MY astonishment and incredulity steps in. Withou reading, no, studying Kant, to begin with, you will never get this. You can, however, approach it so that you might find interest and motivation to then go further. But you insist there is nothing there, that Heidegger, Wittgenstein and the rest are all just bonkers, and that you don't need to read. This is because you don't see that your common sense, what you seek to satisfy, is a construct that dogmatically insists on an interpretation of the world be made on its terms. You will not step out of this.

The only way to proceed with the possibility of progress would thus be through Socrates, the eternal opposition. You tell me what YOU think is a good model for thinking about the world philosophically, and I tell you why this is fails utterly. This should lead to the inevitable aporia that is supposed to inspire one to look elsewhere and only this can bring you forward.

Keep in mind that I delivering you constructions of thought that issues through the last 150 years or so of existential philosophy, and this stands on the foundation of German idealism and a lot more.

If all you want to do is toss around trifles in posts, then forget it. Don't bother with any of this and move on to the next juvenility. This club is for little else than that (though it can be a sounding board for things, if a very limited one).

[Atla]

Atla wrote

Pseudo-objective theories of everything (not dependent on personal psychology and opinion), not talking about foundations.
I said several times that it's pretty basic philosophy that there is no true objective foundation of things. Not in science, not in phenomenology. I don't know why it should be admirable that you are repeating this mistake with phenomenology. You don't know what you're talking about.

For a very, very good reason. You have no doubt read ABOUT Kant,, Hegel, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Husserl, and others, but you have not engaged them AT ALL. You are clueless, and I don't mean this insultingly. But this is simply the way it is. On the outside you literally cannot even imagine what it would be like to conceive the world phenomenologically. Trying to get things through to you is like going back in time, meeting up with Anaximander and reporting that gravitational pull is REALLY the curvature of spacetime. All there is is pure astonishment and incredulity.

Look, you will not do the work and you conclude it is all without merit. Then MY astonishment and incredulity steps in. Withou reading, no, studying Kant, to begin with, you will never get this. You can, however, approach it so that you might find interest and motivation to then go further. But you insist there is nothing there, that Heidegger, Wittgenstein and the rest are all just bonkers, and that you don't need to read. This is because you don't see that your common sense, what you seek to satisfy, is a construct that dogmatically insists on an interpretation of the world be made on its terms. You will not step out of this.

The only way to proceed with the possibility of progress would thus be through Socrates, the eternal opposition. You tell me what YOU think is a good model for thinking about the world philosophically, and I tell you why this is fails utterly. This should lead to the inevitable aporia that is supposed to inspire one to look elsewhere and only this can bring you forward.

Keep in mind that I delivering you constructions of thought that issues through the last 150 years or so of existential philosophy, and this stands on the foundation of German idealism and a lot more.

If all you want to do is toss around trifles in posts, then forget it. Don't bother with any of this and move on to the next juvenility. This club is for little else than that (though it can be a sounding board for things, if a very limited one).

Due to unusual circumstances I wrestled with unusual states of mind for decades, I know more about mental phenomena than you ever will. You can't tell this about me because I usually write similar to a materialist. I know for a fact that phenomenology is little more than a gimmick for people who are bad at psychology and bad at putting things into perspective. Your self-assuredness is bordering on pathology and you don't know the first thing about me. Go make love to Heidegger one more time.

[odysseus]

A

tla wrote
Due to unusual circumstances I wrestled with unusual states of mind for decades, I know more about mental phenomena than you ever will. You can't tell this about me because I usually write similar to a materialist. I know for a fact that phenomenology is little more than a gimmick for people who are bad at psychology and bad at putting things into perspective. Your self-assuredness is bordering on pathology and you don't know the first thing about me. Go make love to Heidegger one more time.

Gimmick? Do continue. When you find yourself with nothing to say to confrontations like this, you then face your own deficits. This is how it goes when people talk out of their hats.

I am appreciative of your struggling" but it is the dearth of your thoughts that strikes me most. You make no contribution to ideas in play beyond the critical, which is frankly, easy. If you have in reserve resources that counter what has been put forth, then let them fly. Out with it, argue, analyze and tear apart. Show me your reductio's and your competing body of thought.

I await the enlightenment of your theory!

[Atla]

A

tla wrote
Due to unusual circumstances I wrestled with unusual states of mind for decades, I know more about mental phenomena than you ever will. You can't tell this about me because I usually write similar to a materialist. I know for a fact that phenomenology is little more than a gimmick for people who are bad at psychology and bad at putting things into perspective. Your self-assuredness is bordering on pathology and you don't know the first thing about me. Go make love to Heidegger one more time.

Gimmick? Do continue. When you find yourself with nothing to say to confrontations like this, you then face your own deficits. This is how it goes when people talk out of their hats.

I am appreciative of your struggling" but it is the dearth of your thoughts that strikes me most. You make no contribution to ideas in play beyond the critical, which is frankly, easy. If you have in reserve resources that counter what has been put forth, then let them fly. Out with it, argue, analyze and tear apart. Show me your reductio's and your competing body of thought.

I await the enlightenment of your theory!

But you haven't put forth anything so far, except vague references about foundations within phenomenology, even though anyone with some grip knows that philosophy has no foundations deep down.