Neither apriority features of human minds, nor ethicality of human cultures are universal features of the world, what are you babbling about?
Apriority refers to apodictic principles that are intuitively coersive. Take causality, or take logic: these do not allow for the possibility of refutation, and this makes them universal and necessary in the very strongest sense. We also speak more loosely when we say, "racial discrimination is universal in racially heterogeneous societies." Here, such pronouncements are merely contingently true, not apriori. You see this? When it comes to ethics, the matter of apriority has a special application, for a statement that is ethical in nature is so because it deals in concrete value, that is, the miseries and the joys of our existence. Read John Dewey's Experience and Nature and his Art As Experience to get a good account of how this dimension of our affairs is ubiquitous: there is no experience without value in the concrete, for in everything we do and think there is caring (of course, Heidegger steps forward), interest, desire, need (incidently, this is one thing that sets existentialists/phenomenologists apart from analytic philosophy, this latter being solely devoted puzzling out the sense of concepts) It is here, in this caring-about-the-misery/well being-of-others that ethics has its foundation, and this puts the matter squarely in the hands of this concrete value-in-the-world: It is there, not in the language we use to contrive rationalizations about things, but "given," uninvented, uninvited (read Kierkegaard's Repetition for a wonderful presentation of this), just there, and we are thrown into this and an infant child is thrown into birth. Quite literally, actually.
Ethics is certainly about the way culture produces its own novel regard for a society's thoughts, feelings, principles. These are infamously variegated. But an examination of the basis of an ethical problem shows that it bears analysis: There is, for example, the rule in one society that says when a person grows to a certain age, s/he should leave willingly so as not to be a burden. Such a thing has existed. Then there are others who think caring for the elderly a privilege. One can conclude from this that ethics is "relative". But then, what is it about ethics that is really relative?
It is not the inherent concrete value features. What does this mean? The rule in a society that says old people should go off and die has to do with ideas passed through generations, contrived, institutionalized and thoughtlessly assimilated by all. This is how we become, to use Heidegger's term, human dasein: a body of language habits that is essentially caring and pragmatic which we "become" in living a life. These institutions are what entangle us in ethical dilemmas. But the foundation of this, the ouch's and yum's of the world remain what they are, untouched. The old man wandering off into the forest has his starvation and its ugliness in no way mitigated by the fact that he feels he is doing the right thing. He may find comfort in the knowledge that he is not a burden to his family, but this is yet another entanglement. Entanglements do effect changes in qualitative value experiences, but the "goodness" and "badness" here are not being measured according to society's rules. Here, it is the "metaethical" analysis of the "good". See John Mackie's ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong; see Wittgenstein Tractatus; see G E Moore's Principia Ethica. See many others.
So, regarding the moral realism, it is not about the relativity of societies' principles, but at the metaethical level of what "good" means when taken up in ethical issues. Here I direct you to the argument I made regardign the children being tortured adn the rest. Read that.
No, I'm saying this because you are a fool who read Being and Time, but you lack the basic intellectual abilities to treat it in context.
Again you are conflating different people's psychological experience of Being, with the universal Being. Universal Being is void of any known nature. You are merely talking about individual psychology/philosophy. No one asked for that, you are not doing 'Philosophy' with capital P.
Why on Earth would I care how a whiny ass like Heidegger personally felt about Being, or how he necessarily had to form the question and the possible answer using his given cognitive functions. I have my own take on 'personal Being' but that's not the kind of personal something that others would be interested in, and it's largely irrelevant.
When you actually consider this in the privacy of your own thoughts and not struggling to insult, remember that it is you who hasn't read this. I've read across the aisle, analytic as well as Continental. Time to grow up, and you do this by reading extensively. Take leave of these mindless postings and deploy your sitting powers. Foucault could sit for ten hours straight and read. That is how you get good.
If you don't even realize that human consciousness is representational (indirect realism) which is beyond debate in 2020, and you mistake the features of your own mind for the features of the world, then you really are just a sad fool stuck 200 years in the past. But this would actually explain your total confusion, you would be a weird kind of naive realist who is shocked to discover some representative features in the mind and misunderstand them. (and it doesn't matter how many nicks you use)
What a waste of time, he really turned out to have nothing at all. He didn't even make it to the starting line. Byez.
What's with all these people who think that understanding human cognition is the big goal, and not just a side-issue that's necessary to deal with.
The idea of representation in philosophy really brings in Kant. He didn't invent it, but he certainly did make it the center piece of philosophy for more than a hundred years and his idealism was really (read Robert Hanna's Foundations of Analytic Philosophy and his Fate of Analytic philosophy) never was refuted, only ignored. Philosophers got tired of trying to refute what was not refutable, so you have Russell, and Moore, and the positivists, and on and on to the dreary condition of analytic philosophy today.
So, to say you are an "indirect realist" is in itself seriously ambiguous, for it is simply filled with more questions about epistemology and ontology. It is vague beyond being useful. do you lean toward Kant? Do you think our ideas are really "about" what is exterior to intuitive space and time? What is real, then? How do we approach this matter of sorting our what we think and what we see and hear and the rest? Do you think there is any merit to the traditional analysis of primary and secondary qualities? How can idea of what is real take themselves beyond what idea can conceive?
And so on.