Brent.Allsop wrote: ↑Sat May 23, 2020 8:31 pm
Impressive. Not only are you proving you understand, by repeating back in your own words what I’m trying to say, you appear to be taking me to where I haven’t yet been, and I’m having troubles keeping up. Let me see if I can do like you, and prove I understand at least some of what you are saying by repeating it back, before I ask for more detail.
You are asking the question: “Why is it possible that physical things and qualia are one and the same?” This seems to me, to be a different hard problem than the hard problem, which is bridging the explanatory gap, or effing the ineffable.
Is this different hard problem you are talking about like the fact that we know there is gravity, we just don’t know why there is gravity? Isn’t another way to illustrate this particular different ‘hard problem’ to ask: “Why is there something rather than nothing, even if this something is an Advaita that is everything?
Even with only this what you call a “simplification” of the hard problem, isn’t just isolating individual components of this Advaita like glutamate, and discovering that this is what has an intrinsic redness quality, won’t this enable us to do things like increase the resolution, and color depth of our knowledge, and computationally bind brains with Neural Ponytails? Sure, we don’t know why there is gravity, but doesn’t just knowing what gravity is allow us to dance in the heavens? Isn’t that the kind of ‘implication’ you are asking for?
How does Advaita resolve this different hard problem, and what additional “implications” does it provide beyond being able to do things like dance in the heavens? If “Substance Dualism”
is experimentally verified, would that falsify Advaita, which is predicting that all things are one? Also, it seems to me that the entire Advaita idea is 'qualia blind' in that it fails to distinguish between reality and knowledge of reality (which may admittedly be a subset of that reality)?
No, it's basically still the same hard problem, trying to bridge the explanatory gap between two (apparently) irreconcilable somethings.
I meant that we make it much simpler by discarding the dualistic interpretations of the Hard problem. Things like substance/property/aspect etc. dualisms, one can come up with infinitely many kinds of dualisms. Western "monisms" like physicalism or idealism, are also subtle forms of dualisms, but most Western philosophers aren't intelligent enough to see this.
The correct Hard problem is: in what sense are qualia and physical things identical, what does that mean?
The point here is nondual thinking, "nondual" in the Oriental sense. I'd say it's rather explicit in Advaita, and rather implicit in Mahayana Buddhism and Taoism, and maybe a few others. Maybe non-monistic Advaita and Zen Buddhism have nondual thinking in its purest form. Despite what many will claim, this kind of thinking seems to be simply missing from modern Western philosophy alltogether.
It's not about "what" to think, but about "how" to think. It's about thinking entirely without fundamental dichotomies.
This is easier said than done, because some made-up dichotomies can be inherently part of our thinking since centuries/millennia, and we simply don't notice them. (It's also easy to fall into abstract vs concrete dichotomies. Also, men may have more trouble with dichotomies, because they have less connected hemispheres, and there may be a lot of jumping back and forth between them, so to speak.)
If “Substance Dualism” is experimentally verified, would that falsify Advaita, which is predicting that all things are one?
Yes, "substance dualism" would refute Advaita.
But Advaita is not quite predicting that all things are one. It does so from our Western perpsective, you can sort of think of it as a form of monistic panpsychism. In one sense all things are one (non-separate), in another sense non-separateness doesn't mean sameness.
That's why it says "not-two" instead of "one", it's difficult to explain. It's what lies "beyond" a monistic panpsychism, from a Western perspective.
(Note that I was trying to eff the ineffable here, I'm trying to express nondualism in language, where language is inherently dualistic. This is an inherent problem, it can't be avoided.)