I see two fundamental problems.I think, therefor I am.
-Descartes
i. one can not think less they exist, and
ii. one could not even begin to think less
having knowingly been born in the mind
as a thought: "I think, therefor I am!"
It is comically absurd to me.
But it highlights a fundamental problem with philosophy I would like to contribute a manner of thinking to: confusion as to what constitutes a conscious knowledge of self. To demonstrate this, I will render similar utterances honoring Descartes' beginning with a thought in-and-of-itself:
instead of a justification of being, becomes:I think, therefor I am.
which, while acknowledging the ability of the self, is still lacking a definitive knowledge of self as found in:I think, therefor I know I am able to think.
which accomplishes so much:I think not, knowing I am willing not to think.
i. makes a clear distinction between the philosopher-to-be and his own thought process (ie. I think not...)
ii. acknowledges presence of self (ie. ...knowing I am...)
iii. demonstrates power of will (ie. ...knowing I am willing not...)
rendering such utterances as:
all relatively certainly ignorantI think I am...(?)
I think therefor I am...(??)
I believe I am...(???)
as it is certainly possible to suffer
believing, thinking, hoping (etc.)
in anything, while merely being only desired-to-be,
rather than consciously acknowledged as-is,
which is certainly the blunder of Descartes
(and perhaps so-called infallible religious messengers)
identifying by way of (a) thought (and/or belief).
It is therefor in-and-of the philosophers' (or lunatic's) own mind
as a result of a practical ignorance of their own self.
By swapping "think" with "believe":
is equally absurd.I believe, therefor I am.
is certainly ignorant.I believe I am.
derives the same as "think": acknowledgement of the ability of self, however lacking knowledge of the self.I believe, therefor I know I am able to believe.
and this is just as sound as "think": satisfies a full conscious acknowledgement of self.I believe not, knowing I am willing not to believe.
is thus extremely absurd, as well. Knowledge is certainly distinct from belief thus:'All knowing is belief, but not all belief is knowing'.
and as to the contention that one must "believe" even in what one knows, it is the same kind as the blunder of Descartes: identifying by way of a "belief"-in-and-of-itself, rather than a distinctly practical knowledge absent any/all need for belief. Knowledge of (perhaps ones own) ignorance *is* such a knowledge necessarily requiring the absence of any such belief, recalling:belief - as defined by containing one (or more) degrees of uncertainty
knowledge - as defined by containing no degrees of uncertainty (as in: certainly *not*)
as being certainly ignorant, and arguably it would distinctly take a "thinker" and/or "believer" to "think" and/or "believe" that:I believe I am...
are somehow *not* otherwise much more suitable to attest to a conscious acknowledgement of self rather than merely "believing" and/or "thinking" (therefor!) to-be...I know I am willing to...
I know I am willing *not* to...
The implications of this should be clear: if a person attaches to (ie. identifies as) their own psychology (ie. ignorance of self) such that the self is taken *as* the psychology, this certainly explains lunacy viz. the kind that has people "believing" themselves to be final messengers of a god and that ones own thought process is the voice of an angel of said god. It would take a "believer" to "believe" such to be true.
I therefor offer recommendation to retry for absurdity:
to:All knowing is belief, but not all belief is knowing.
which correctly designates "belief" as fundamentally ignorant owing to its one (or more) degrees of uncertainty. In so knowing, so deriving the correction to Descartes'All belief is ignorance, but not all ignorance is belief.
as simply being backwards:I think, therefor I am.
and the backwards nature of Descartes' utterance is equally applicable to the "believing" religious lunatic who similarly identifies by way of their own psychology, while (as in: owing to) having a practical ignorance of their own self.I am, therefor I (may) think.
To close: it follows that the first fundamental knowledge/ignorance is certainly of ones own self. How can one even begin to try for a god knowing not the thing (ie. themselves) that exists in relation to it? If philosophy can correct this blunder of Descartes in like manner, it can lead to a discovery viz. broad-spectrum defense against the imposition of any/all "belief"-based ideologies as being necessarily ignorant for lacking conscious knowledge of the degrees of uncertainty pertaining to the "beliefs" upon which the ideologies themselves stand. Any less: "belief"-based ignorance, which is precisely what any/all belief *absent* conscious knowledge of its own uncertainties is - ignorance-in-and-of-itself.
Just enjoy your philosophy how ever which way you see it.