Epistemology, Propositions

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Skepdick
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by Skepdick » Tue Dec 31, 2019 1:39 pm

Peter Holmes wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 12:38 pm
1 As far as I'm aware, there's been no demonstration of even the existence, let alone the nature, of any abstract thing
Errrrr? The Theory of Essence? All of Mathematics? All human languages?

Abstraction is the elimination of the irrelevant and the amplification of the essential --Robert C. Martin

Every time you categorise two things as being "the same" you are doing abstraction.

You recognise both English and Mathematics as languages. The essence of a "language" is abstract knowledge.

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A_Seagull
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by A_Seagull » Tue Dec 31, 2019 10:51 pm

Peter Holmes wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 12:38 pm
A_Seagull wrote:
Mon Dec 30, 2019 8:43 pm
Peter Holmes wrote:
Mon Dec 30, 2019 9:37 am

Thanks. The reason why I'm not inclined to read your book is because of the impression I get from what you say.

You seem to think that what we call knowledge is a thing of some kind that we 'create' with our brains, a thing with an esoteric nature of some kind, which you've managed to understand and explain.

And you seem to think that creating knowledge involves logical processes - when logic deals with language, not reality. And you seem to think that what we call ideas are things of some kind that can be created ex nihilo - whatever 'nothing' means in this context.

I'm sorry if this is to misinterpret your approach. But if not, then I think it's metaphysical non-sense.
You are quite right, that is exactly what I think.

Why do you think that it is 'nonsense'? It seems to me to make a lot of sense.
Okay - thanks. So here are your claims:

1 What we call knowledge is an esoteric thing of some kind that we create with our brains.
2 Creating what we call knowledge involves a logical process.
3 What we call ideas are things of some kind that can be created ex nihilo.

If that's correct, then here are two reasons to think these claims are metaphysical non-sense.

1 As far as I'm aware, there's been no demonstration of even the existence, let alone the nature, of any abstract thing, such as knowledge. The absence of such evidence may not not mean abstract things don't exist, but it does mean that to believe they do exist is irrational. And it follows that talk of brains creating such things is meaningless.

2 To use such words as 'thing', 'existence', 'create' and 'nature' with reference to supposed abstract things - outside their normal use with reference to real things - is to commit the fallacy of equivocation. And, as far as I'm aware, no new explanation of the use of those words with reference to supposed abstract things has yet been provided.
It seems that our point of difference is one between noumena and phenomena.

You seem to consider that we can obtain direct knowledge of noumena; by what process I do not know.

In contrast, I hold that we can only attain knowledge of phenomena. When people talk about 'trees' they are really referring to their concept of trees. It is not so much a fallacy of equivocation as it is a convenient abbreviation. Thought processes cannot incorporate trees per se, they can only incorporate concepts of trees.

It is the question of how can the concept of a tree be created from raw sense data that I attempt to answer in my book.

If you wish to hold to the view that direct knowledge of noumena can be attained, my question to you is : How can this be attained?

Peter Holmes
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by Peter Holmes » Wed Jan 01, 2020 10:55 am

A_Seagull wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 10:51 pm
Peter Holmes wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 12:38 pm
A_Seagull wrote:
Mon Dec 30, 2019 8:43 pm


You are quite right, that is exactly what I think.

Why do you think that it is 'nonsense'? It seems to me to make a lot of sense.
Okay - thanks. So here are your claims:

1 What we call knowledge is an esoteric thing of some kind that we create with our brains.
2 Creating what we call knowledge involves a logical process.
3 What we call ideas are things of some kind that can be created ex nihilo.

If that's correct, then here are two reasons to think these claims are metaphysical non-sense.

1 As far as I'm aware, there's been no demonstration of even the existence, let alone the nature, of any abstract thing, such as knowledge. The absence of such evidence may not not mean abstract things don't exist, but it does mean that to believe they do exist is irrational. And it follows that talk of brains creating such things is meaningless.

2 To use such words as 'thing', 'existence', 'create' and 'nature' with reference to supposed abstract things - outside their normal use with reference to real things - is to commit the fallacy of equivocation. And, as far as I'm aware, no new explanation of the use of those words with reference to supposed abstract things has yet been provided.
It seems that our point of difference is one between noumena and phenomena.

You seem to consider that we can obtain direct knowledge of noumena; by what process I do not know.

In contrast, I hold that we can only attain knowledge of phenomena. When people talk about 'trees' they are really referring to their concept of trees. It is not so much a fallacy of equivocation as it is a convenient abbreviation. Thought processes cannot incorporate trees per se, they can only incorporate concepts of trees.

It is the question of how can the concept of a tree be created from raw sense data that I attempt to answer in my book.

If you wish to hold to the view that direct knowledge of noumena can be attained, my question to you is : How can this be attained?
To my knowledge, no one has demonstrated the existence of noumena. Kant certainly didn't. So to believe they exist is irrational. Merely assuming they exist just doesn't work. If you have any evidence for them - please enlighten us.

Of course, if there are no noumena, the distinction between noumena and phenomena collapses. There's no reason to fantasise about the difference between a tree as it appears and as it really is. This re-hashed dualist nonsense belongs in the dustbin along with Platonism.

When we talk about trees, we are talking about trees, not our concept of trees. What and where is the concept of a tree? Again, merely mouthing these words does nothing to establish the existence of actual referents.

nothing
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by nothing » Wed Jan 01, 2020 4:38 pm

Skepdick wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 1:39 pm
Peter Holmes wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 12:38 pm
1 As far as I'm aware, there's been no demonstration of even the existence, let alone the nature, of any abstract thing
Errrrr? The Theory of Essence? All of Mathematics? All human languages?

Abstraction is the elimination of the irrelevant and the amplification of the essential --Robert C. Martin

Every time you categorise two things as being "the same" you are doing abstraction.

You recognise both English and Mathematics as languages. The essence of a "language" is abstract knowledge.
Very powerful response, and invariably true.

The quote from Robert C. Martin is beautiful.

To be fair, the concerned quote:
Peter Holmes wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 12:38 pm
1 As far as I'm aware, there's been no demonstration of even the existence, let alone the nature, of any abstract thing
There is certainly no abstract thing, thus no-thing to have a nature, however
the nature of abstraction (as a non-entity) certainly has coherence.

Finding any equivalence(s) between two (or more) objects/subjects approaches the need for
abstraction, as it begs the elimination of any/all irrelevancies (ie. "things") otherwise encumbering.

I may abstract a "tree" while having no conflict with a "real" one:
the abstraction owing to the need for hypotheses to be rooted in real nature
thus to invariably agree with the existence of the "real" natural tree to-begin (!)

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A_Seagull
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by A_Seagull » Wed Jan 01, 2020 9:02 pm

Peter Holmes wrote:
Wed Jan 01, 2020 10:55 am
A_Seagull wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 10:51 pm
Peter Holmes wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 12:38 pm

Okay - thanks. So here are your claims:

1 What we call knowledge is an esoteric thing of some kind that we create with our brains.
2 Creating what we call knowledge involves a logical process.
3 What we call ideas are things of some kind that can be created ex nihilo.

If that's correct, then here are two reasons to think these claims are metaphysical non-sense.

1 As far as I'm aware, there's been no demonstration of even the existence, let alone the nature, of any abstract thing, such as knowledge. The absence of such evidence may not not mean abstract things don't exist, but it does mean that to believe they do exist is irrational. And it follows that talk of brains creating such things is meaningless.

2 To use such words as 'thing', 'existence', 'create' and 'nature' with reference to supposed abstract things - outside their normal use with reference to real things - is to commit the fallacy of equivocation. And, as far as I'm aware, no new explanation of the use of those words with reference to supposed abstract things has yet been provided.
It seems that our point of difference is one between noumena and phenomena.

You seem to consider that we can obtain direct knowledge of noumena; by what process I do not know.

In contrast, I hold that we can only attain knowledge of phenomena. When people talk about 'trees' they are really referring to their concept of trees. It is not so much a fallacy of equivocation as it is a convenient abbreviation. Thought processes cannot incorporate trees per se, they can only incorporate concepts of trees.

It is the question of how can the concept of a tree be created from raw sense data that I attempt to answer in my book.

If you wish to hold to the view that direct knowledge of noumena can be attained, my question to you is : How can this be attained?
To my knowledge, no one has demonstrated the existence of noumena. Kant certainly didn't. So to believe they exist is irrational. Merely assuming they exist just doesn't work. If you have any evidence for them - please enlighten us.

Of course, if there are no noumena, the distinction between noumena and phenomena collapses. There's no reason to fantasise about the difference between a tree as it appears and as it really is. This re-hashed dualist nonsense belongs in the dustbin along with Platonism.

When we talk about trees, we are talking about trees, not our concept of trees. What and where is the concept of a tree? Again, merely mouthing these words does nothing to establish the existence of actual referents.
Well, I agree noumena do not actually exist, however the concept of noumena is emergent from the analysis of phenomena.

And when people talk about trees they are referring to their concept of trees. The idea that trees actually exist is nothing more than an idea that is emergent from the phenomena associated with 'trees'.

Systematic
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by Systematic » Thu Jan 02, 2020 3:08 am

nothing wrote:
Mon Dec 09, 2019 8:02 pm
Propositions are only as good as the assumed tautology upon which they are established.
No, the truth of propositions is independent of whatever tautology you derive their proof from, when the tautology is false.

Besides, who proved that proofs are best represented in metaphor by architecture?

Impenitent
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by Impenitent » Thu Jan 02, 2020 12:10 pm

tree...

which tree is the ideal tree?

elm, oak, cedar?

family?

labels ... never that which is perceived...

-Imp

Peter Holmes
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by Peter Holmes » Thu Jan 02, 2020 12:29 pm

nothing wrote:
Wed Jan 01, 2020 4:38 pm
Skepdick wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 1:39 pm
Peter Holmes wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 12:38 pm
1 As far as I'm aware, there's been no demonstration of even the existence, let alone the nature, of any abstract thing
Errrrr? The Theory of Essence? All of Mathematics? All human languages?

Abstraction is the elimination of the irrelevant and the amplification of the essential --Robert C. Martin

Every time you categorise two things as being "the same" you are doing abstraction.

You recognise both English and Mathematics as languages. The essence of a "language" is abstract knowledge.
Very powerful response, and invariably true.

The quote from Robert C. Martin is beautiful.
Beautiful? Maybe. But also wrong. All talk of such things as relevance and essence is precisely that: talk. There is no such thing as an inherently relevant or essential description. So the claim that 'abstraction' is 'the amplification of the essential' is incoherent, because the essential could be anything at all.

To be fair, the concerned quote:
Peter Holmes wrote:
Tue Dec 31, 2019 12:38 pm
1 As far as I'm aware, there's been no demonstration of even the existence, let alone the nature, of any abstract thing
There is certainly no abstract thing, thus no-thing to have a nature, however
the nature of abstraction (as a non-entity) certainly has coherence.
So there is no abstract thing, but there is something called 'abstraction' that is nonetheless coherent. Maybe here is the heart of the confusion: what exactly is 'abstraction' supposed to involve?


Finding any equivalence(s) between two (or more) objects/subjects approaches the need for
abstraction, as it begs the elimination of any/all irrelevancies (ie. "things") otherwise encumbering.
Re-phrasing this nonsense doesn't improve it.

We use the word 'tree', by agreement, to talk about those things that we call trees. But those things don't identify, name or describe themselves. A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target. There's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices. There are no categories in reality, but only things that can be categorised in different ways for different purposes.

But to use the word 'tree' is not to invent or imagine an abstract thing - a form or a universal. That's the ancient dualist delusion of metaphysics: mistaking what we say about things for the way they are. And the word 'tree' is not the name of a concept - another fantasy abstract thing - that somehow exists in the big daddy abstract fiction of them all: the mind.

I may abstract a "tree" while having no conflict with a "real" one:
the abstraction owing to the need for hypotheses to be rooted in real nature
thus to invariably agree with the existence of the "real" natural tree to-begin (!)
Perhaps we agree after all. My point is that we have to distinguish sharply and completely between features of reality and whatever is or can be said about them. - And that fantasies about abstract things, concepts, essences - and so on - all derive from mistaking what we say for the way things are: the myth of propositions and propositional knowledge.

Skepdick
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by Skepdick » Thu Jan 02, 2020 1:49 pm

Peter Holmes wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 12:29 pm
Beautiful? Maybe. But also wrong. All talk of such things as relevance and essence is precisely that: talk. There is no such thing as an inherently relevant or essential description.
But Peter, you are the one who vehemently rejects objective morality. Is adherence to your own philosophical principles too much to ask from you?

According to you all talk of such things as right or wrong is precisely that: talk. There is no such thing as an inherently right or wrong description.

You've made your bed, now lie in it.
Peter Holmes wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 12:29 pm
So the claim that 'abstraction' is 'the amplification of the essential' is incoherent, because the essential could be anything at all.
Indeed - it could be anything at all. The abstraction symbol we call "numbers one".

A quark.
An atom
A molecule.
A cell.
A cat.
A planet.
A universe.

Most 3 year olds know how to count - why are you struggling with the abstract concept of "quantity"?

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attofishpi
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by attofishpi » Thu Jan 02, 2020 2:44 pm

Skepdick wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 1:49 pm
Peter Holmes wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 12:29 pm
So the claim that 'abstraction' is 'the amplification of the essential' is incoherent, because the essential could be anything at all.
Indeed - it could be anything at all. The abstraction symbol we call "numbers one".

A quark.
An atom
A molecule.
A cell.
A cat.
A planet.
A universe.

Most 3 year olds know how to count - why are you struggling with the abstract concept of "quantity"?
Indeed and ultimately everything is a binary consideration...ultimately there is a 3rd party doing the switching of it ALL. :twisted:

nothing
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by nothing » Thu Jan 02, 2020 4:05 pm

Peter Holmes wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 12:29 pm
Beautiful? Maybe. But also wrong. All talk of such things as relevance and essence is precisely that: talk. There is no such thing as an inherently relevant or essential description. So the claim that 'abstraction' is 'the amplification of the essential' is incoherent, because the essential could be anything at all.
All relative inability to penetrate the depth of the implications would render 'talk' of it precisely that: talk.
There is certainly such thing as an inherently relevant or essential description. Take: breathing.

Is breathing essential to life?
Yes/No.
Obviously: yes, otherwise one is as good as dead.

Take the variable body A. Is A breathing, thus alive?
What is relevant here? What is essential here?
That A be granted the capacity to breath.
How can we capture breathing as an intrinsic property of A?
To breathe in (+) and to breath out (-).

√1 = +1, -1
√A = +A, -A

A = +A, thus not breathing.

Now in light of this, consider the Aristotelian Identity Law
A = A (reminding that A implies +A and excludes -A (!) )
viz. contains an intrinsic assumption: motionless
and/or suspended in only one modality: +A. Where is -A?

viz.
A = A is describing a motionless object/subject,
which by construction excludes animated bodies.
A = A is thus conditional.

A ≠ A (excludes animated bodies)
√A = +A, -A
A = *A
____________________________
*variability allows motion (+)(-)

Now *A satisfies the observable universe: *A has the intrinsic capacity
for 'in/out' which satisfies all basic toroidal field modalities:

Image
So there is no abstract thing, but there is something called 'abstraction' that is nonetheless coherent. Maybe here is the heart of the confusion: what exactly is 'abstraction' supposed to involve?
This is precisely why I indicated the quote was beautiful,
it summarizes the fruit of any such inquiry. Perhaps it is only
something that resonates with people who use abstraction
thus can appreciate the truth value of the statement.

Thus leaving the quote unharmed, I render my own attempt, succeed or fail as I may.

Space and time are not "things". They are in-and-of-themselves thus ABSTRACT.
Thus, any/all considerations to/of "space" and/or "time"
including a "model" of the universe according to Einstein's GTOR
insofar as it both relies on, and/or discards Newtonian PM,
is ABSTRACT, thus sustained by way of ABSTRACTION.

These no-thing ABSTRACTIONS are (like) the blank canvas of creation whose paint is the light (spectrum).
You are given a "space". You are given a "time". You live thus abstractly by way of LIGHT in-and-of SPACETIME.

Genesis 1:3...
Image
...is the equation of the light.
Perhaps we agree after all. My point is that we have to distinguish sharply and completely between features of reality and whatever is or can be said about them. - And that fantasies about abstract things, concepts, essences - and so on - all derive from mistaking what we say for the way things are: the myth of propositions and propositional knowledge.
What is the difference between KNOWLEDGE and BELIEF?
Whereas belief is imaginary, thus imaginary would be any tree derived by way of,
knowledge is by way of abstraction of real living "tree": a real tree of the true way of living.

It is thus knowing all not to believe
(as equivalent to truth of the way of the living)
involves metaphysical questions being addressed
(such as by those who say "life is a test...?")
yet they know not from which tree they even eat
for BEING: believers, in-and-of some imaginary thing.

eg. take the inverse of any proposition, real or imagined, against itself:
+A: Religion X is a religion of peace. (<-propositional)
-A: Religion X is a religion of perpetual conflict. (<-propositional inverse)
________________________________________
which appears more true?
(+A or -A)

See again the geometry which models this logic to adapt to the universality of motion.

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attofishpi
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by attofishpi » Thu Jan 02, 2020 5:45 pm

nothing wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 4:05 pm
All relative inability to penetrate the depth of the implications would render 'talk' of it precisely that: talk.
There is certainly such thing as an inherently relevant or essential description. Take: breathing.

Is breathing essential to life?
Yes/No.
Obviously: yes, otherwise one is as good as dead.
No. Breathing is NOT essential to life.

One of the most pro_found experiences I have had, is when I did not need to breath. I sat on a hill outside a marquee where writers were being quizzed about their form of art....and no, I had no requirement to breathe.

Perhaps the 'God' system was channeling oxygen to my brain...but it freaked me out, sat there on the hill on a sunny day. Didn't matter how long I refused to breathe, I still existed, and I still didn't need to breathe.

nothing
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by nothing » Thu Jan 02, 2020 5:49 pm

attofishpi wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 5:45 pm
nothing wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 4:05 pm
All relative inability to penetrate the depth of the implications would render 'talk' of it precisely that: talk.
There is certainly such thing as an inherently relevant or essential description. Take: breathing.

Is breathing essential to life?
Yes/No.
Obviously: yes, otherwise one is as good as dead.
No. Breathing is NOT essential to life.

One of the most pro_found experiences I have had, is when I did not need to breath. I sat on a hill outside a marquee where writers were being quizzed about their form of art....and no, I had no requirement to breathe.

Perhaps the 'God' system was channeling oxygen to my brain...but it freaked me out, sat there on the hill on a sunny day. Didn't matter how long I refused to breathe, I still existed, and I still didn't need to breathe.
+A: Perhaps the 'God' system was channeling oxygen to my brain...
-A: Perhaps the 'God' system was obstructing oxygen from my brain...

Hmmm...

Peter Holmes
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by Peter Holmes » Fri Jan 03, 2020 10:37 am

Skepdick wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 1:49 pm
Peter Holmes wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 12:29 pm
Beautiful? Maybe. But also wrong. All talk of such things as relevance and essence is precisely that: talk. There is no such thing as an inherently relevant or essential description.
But Peter, you are the one who vehemently rejects objective morality. Is adherence to your own philosophical principles too much to ask from you?
This is about descriptions of features of reality, none of which is inherently 'relevant' or 'essential'. A definition of a feature of reality is nothing more than a description. Moral rightness and wrongness - like all values - are not features of reality at all - so they're not things that can be described.

According to you all talk of such things as right or wrong is precisely that: talk. There is no such thing as an inherently right or wrong description.
See the previous correction. Same mistake.

You've made your bed, now lie in it.
Peter Holmes wrote:
Thu Jan 02, 2020 12:29 pm
So the claim that 'abstraction' is 'the amplification of the essential' is incoherent, because the essential could be anything at all.
Indeed - it could be anything at all. The abstraction symbol we call "numbers one".

A quark.
An atom
A molecule.
A cell.
A cat.
A planet.
A universe.

Most 3 year olds know how to count - why are you struggling with the abstract concept of "quantity"?
To repeat: if to abstract is to emphasise the relevant or essential, it remains a linguistic exercise. It is not to identify a thing of some kind. Essentialism is an ancient dualist delusion.

Skepdick
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Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by Skepdick » Fri Jan 03, 2020 11:56 am

Peter Holmes wrote:
Fri Jan 03, 2020 10:37 am
This is about descriptions of features of reality. Moral rightness and wrongness - like all values - are not features of reality.
Peter, these are your exact words:
Peter Holmes wrote:
Sat Dec 14, 2019 11:01 am
Language is language - the use of signs, which are real things.
You are conceding that language is a feature of reality, and then you go on to describe that feature of reality as "wrong"!

You keep rejecting objective morality, yet you keep making moral judgments about real language. Fucking hypocrite!
Peter Holmes wrote:
Fri Jan 03, 2020 10:37 am
See the previous correction. Same mistake.
It's hardly a "correction" is it? There's no way to dig yourself out of your philosophical grave.

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