Failure of Relativism

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have defined 'evil' in terms of evil acts like genocides, mass rapes, murders, etc.
These evil acts are [hu]man-made.
Human acts are controlled mainly in the brain.
Therefore we should understand the brain more precisely so we can take preventive actions to ensure humans do not commit evil acts [either eliminate or kept to the optimal minimum].

And why is "genocide, mass rape, murder" immoral when secular cultures argue for the necessity of them through action?

What sort of argument is that?
You cannot be that ignorant.

It is true there are the seculard [e.g. Pol pot] who are genocidal and there are also theists who are genocidal as inspired and commanded by their God [e.g. Islam].
But in general both secular and the theists are against genocides, mass rapes, and other evil acts.

If all of these are the result of the brain, and we must understand the nature of the brain through the brain, then we are left with an infinite regress.

Again you are lost on this.

Evil acts are the result of the brain activities.
Therefore if we change the brain activities, we can change the resultant acts from evil to good.
So the question is how do we do that?
There are many existing and potential ways to change a person's behavior.
So when there is a potential to stop evil acts, there is no question of infinite regression.

btw, your post is very messy to reply.
Can you reply like how everyone is doing it.

[Atla]

From one perspective, the moon existed before there were human beings, thus in this sense, the existence of the moon is independent of humans. I can agree with this as one perspective of reality.
However I do not agree with the philosophical realists who insist this is the only acceptable perspective.

The ace card I used is,
the conclusion of the above has to be made by humans, thus whatever its conclusion it has to be relative to humans.
ALL conclusions are made by humans
"The moon existed before there were humans" is a conclusion.
Therefore The moon existed before there were humans" is made by humans - thus relative.
Conclusion [judgment] in this case is not necessary only perception and syllogisms in the head solely but arrived at wholesomely taking all there is into account.

In another perspective we ask,
is there a real moon per se other than conceptualized by humans?
-the moon is merely a ball of rocks, earth and other physical materials,
-these materials are merely clusters molecules - conceptualized by humans,
-these molecules are bundles of atoms - conceptualized by humans,
-these atoms comprised of electrons and protons -conceptualized by humans,
-the reality of electrons are conditioned by humans via Wave Function Collapse,
-these protons are comprised and quarks and ??? -conceptualized by humans,
So is there a real moon that is independent of the human conditions.

In addition the use of "before" is time-based which is also human-based.

The term 'exist' is another complex term which cannot stand by itself and need to be predicated with human concepts [not idea btw].
If 'exist' is predicated with an idea, it would be a transcendental illusion, e.g. God.

So there is no room for humans to be so sure to insist the 'moon' is absolutely independent of human conditions.

One critical issue to bring in to reconcile the controversy is psychological just as Hume implied 'Cause and Effect' is psychological from habits, customs and constant conjunction.

So, Relativism is not a failure, it is the only 'realistic' reality.

To be honest my experience with Buddhists is that they are also lost in too much subjectivity, they just don't realize it. And this is what I see in your posts as well (but I may be totally wrong because maybe I just misunderstand). I'll try to explain it in more detail:

1. Human understanding tends to be relative and circular, so in that sense, everything is relative to us, yes. All concepts, all conclusions etc. are human-made and are usually defined in relation to each other. Everything we experience and everything we conceptualize are also extremely dependent on what kind of brain/mind and what kind of sense organs we have.

2. But what is human understanding "made of"? Human understanding is in the head, a part of the head (which some Buddhists seem to deny btw) and what is in the head is basically the same kind of whatever that the Moon is made of.

(Now I know that nothing is really "made of" anything specific, but we have to conceptualize it somehow, and Western philosophy is pathologically obsessed with made-up substances. I also know that 2. is also an inherently relative and circular conceptualization, but I would say it's the most likely picture based on what we can tell about the world.)

Now 2. is more fundamental, in other words there is a real Moon "out there" and there is a conceptualization of the Moon made by humans. There are always these two things, and my experience with Buddhists is that they somehow mix these two together, they take the less fundamental 1. understanding and override the 2. one with it. And then they end up seeing everything as relative in a highly subjective sense.

My point is that in the 2., more fundamental picture, it really makes no sense to call things "relative" in any meaningful sense of the word; here is where many Easterners are wrong. But things are always non-separable, there is no such thing as an independent reality; here is where Westerners are wrong (and this is the bigger mistake).

So the two contrary positions you listed

If it not relative then we have independent reality, i.e.

are both somewhat wrong. After we get out of the nonsense of Western philosophy, we also have to get out of this smaller nonsense of the Easterners.

But again, maybe I just misunderstood what you wrote.

[Veritas Aequitas]

To be honest my experience with Buddhists is that they are also lost in too much subjectivity, they just don't realize it. And this is what I see in your posts as well (but I may be totally wrong because maybe I just misunderstand). I'll try to explain it in more detail:

1. Human understanding tends to be relative and circular, so in that sense, everything is relative to us, yes. All concepts, all conclusions etc. are human-made and are usually defined in relation to each other. Everything we experience and everything we conceptualize are also extremely dependent on what kind of brain/mind and what kind of sense organs we have.

2. But what is human understanding "made of"? Human understanding is in the head, a part of the head (which some Buddhists seem to deny btw) and what is in the head is basically the same kind of whatever that the Moon is made of.

(Now I know that nothing is really "made of" anything specific, but we have to conceptualize it somehow, and Western philosophy is pathologically obsessed with made-up substances. I also know that 2. is also an inherently relative and circular conceptualization, but I would say it's the most likely picture based on what we can tell about the world.)

Now 2. is more fundamental, in other words there is a real Moon "out there" and there is a conceptualization of the Moon made by humans. There are always these two things, and my experience with Buddhists is that they somehow mix these two together, they take the less fundamental 1. understanding and override the 2. one with it. And then they end up seeing everything as relative in a highly subjective sense.

My point is that in the 2., more fundamental picture, it really makes no sense to call things "relative" in any meaningful sense of the word; here is where many Easterners are wrong. But things are always non-separable, there is no such thing as an independent reality; here is where Westerners are wrong (and this is the bigger mistake).

So the two contrary positions you listed

If it not relative then we have independent reality, i.e.

are both somewhat wrong. After we get out of the nonsense of Western philosophy, we also have to get out of this smaller nonsense of the Easterners.

But again, maybe I just misunderstood what you wrote.

There is Buddhism-proper and there are loads of different forms of interpretations of Buddhism-proper.
When you refer to your exposure of Buddhism, you have to qualify which main school, e.g. Theravada, Mahayana, Vajrayana. From any of the main school you will need to define the specific sect you are relying on your specific views.

I am not sure which school and sect of Buddhism you are referring to but yours is definitely not Buddhism-proper which is supported by Buddha's core principles.

As you had noted in your assessment, the Buddhists are wrong, the Westerners are also wrong.

However note Buddhism-proper is along the Middle-Way or Middle Path.

When you think Buddhism is wrong, it is likely you could be referring to a type of Buddhism that has veered off the Middle Path.
In Buddhism even when some one has veered off the Middle Path, it is not something negative as it could be optimal for the person to choose that particular path that is most suited to his circumstances. For example Zen is one extreme form of Buddhism via Mahayana Buddhism that flourish in China then in Japan.
On the other hand Mahayana Buddhism that flourish in India has a separate path that suits the Indian ideosyncrasies and proclivities.

What is critical is for a Buddhist practitioner to understand the Middle-Path and know why and how much he has veered off from the Middle-Path to suit his specific circumstances.

Not understanding the above become a problem for some. This is common when SOME of the followers of the Theravada School and the Mahayana School condemned the other as whose practice is better. Even among the Mahayana there is also dispute where SOME zen practitioners will condemn other Mahayanists.

[Atla]

There is Buddhism-proper and there are loads of different forms of interpretations of Buddhism-proper.
When you refer to your exposure of Buddhism, you have to qualify which main school, e.g. Theravada, Mahayana, Vajrayana. From any of the main school you will need to define the specific sect you are relying on your specific views.

I am not sure which school and sect of Buddhism you are referring to but yours is definitely not Buddhism-proper which is supported by Buddha's core principles.

As you had noted in your assessment, the Buddhists are wrong, the Westerners are also wrong.

However note Buddhism-proper is along the Middle-Way or Middle Path.

When you think Buddhism is wrong, it is likely you could be referring to a type of Buddhism that has veered off the Middle Path.
In Buddhism even when some one has veered off the Middle Path, it is not something negative as it could be optimal for the person to choose that particular path that is most suited to his circumstances. For example Zen is one extreme form of Buddhism via Mahayana Buddhism that flourish in China then in Japan.
On the other hand Mahayana Buddhism that flourish in India has a separate path that suits the Indian ideosyncrasies and proclivities.

What is critical is for a Buddhist practitioner to understand the Middle-Path and know why and how much he has veered off from the Middle-Path to suit his specific circumstances.

Not understanding the above become a problem for some. This is common when SOME of the followers of the Theravada School and the Mahayana School condemned the other as whose practice is better. Even among the Mahayana there is also dispute where SOME zen practitioners will condemn other Mahayanists.

From what I can tell the problem I described tends to be present in all main schools. I think it's less present in Zen. But I admittedly know little about the many variations, and there can always be exceptions of course.

Not sure what the Middle Path has to do with the 1. and 2. that I described though. If you mean that Buddhism-proper takes the Middle Path between 1. and 2. then that's the problem. You can't take a Midde Path between a more fundamental and a less fundamental understanding and mix them together, one overriding the other. You get nonsense this way.

[Atla]

I know that comment was not directed at me, but I am about as full down the relative line as you can get. Saying one views reality as more relative 'than it actually is' seems to be an assertion of a different premise. There is no way 'that it actually is' under relativism.

No, I kinda (?) meant what you meant, this apparent anthropocentrism, which I think may actually be a misplaced Eastern-type subjectivity.

I consider it more of an offense to science to be able to affect the past than the offense of having a way that things actually are. Apparently there are no valid metaphysical interpretations that support both.

I can't think of a valid (by valid I also mean without magical thinking) metaphysical interpretation that supports even one of these.
We can't ever know for sure how things "actually are" but that's so basic and obvious that I forget to mention it. By "how it actually is" of course I mean: the best, most probable / simplest, non-magical guess based on everything we know. That's what philosophy is about (to me).

Modern science assumes this, and the success of science since they made this assumption (compared to the lack of success before it) is testament to the likelihood of the truth of the assumption, but that isn't even close to a proof of any sorts. Anyway, I agree that we're not separate from it. I just think it biased to assert it like that.

I assume you didn't write this in the sense that things can ultimately only be falsified, not proven.

Well in that case, if 100% of what we know about the world supports it, then it is pretty much hard proven, until proven otherwise. If 100% isn't even close then what is.

I would say otherwise. I would say it was there relative to me before any humans existed, but that is not 'objectively'.

I don't find these fundamentally non-separable. Sure, the ancient moon exists to me, but I don't exist to it. It seems to be a one-way relationship of cause C (moon, a billion years ago) and effect E (me, now). That causal relationship means I have measured the billion-years-ago moon, and that makes it exist to me. It has not measured me, so I just plain don't exist to it. That asymmetrical relationship between two causally related events is the foundation upon which my view is based.

I don't understand what you mean. By "objectively" I mean that the Moon was there just as I am here right now. Both are there irregardless of any conceptualization.

But what do you mean by "relative to me"? The "me" is made of the same stuff the Moon is, what about it? Are you really taking the view after all that the human "I" has some Special Power? It doesn't, and you don't even exist the way you think you exist, you are just some circular psychological structure that thinks it's more than that: independent and autonomous. There is no "you" to do these special measurements and enter these special relationships you mention. There is also no sign of these special relationships known to science.

[Noax]

My stance is 'time' is relative to humans.

Pretty strange stance. When is 'a century before humans'? Where is the origin of this system?

It is acceptable to deliberate [philosophically] on the topics of metaphysics, i.e. specifically something beyond physics.
But one of the topics of ontology [in terms of substance theory] is not tenable at all.

OK, I looked at that. I didn't find the arguments supporting it to be very strong, but I thought the criticism against it pretty weak as well. I think perhaps I don't have a proper grasp on how it is important to ontology, but they say it is. You imply that substance theory IS ontology: "those who claimed ontology [substance theory] is something real", like there can't be ontology if you disagree with substance theory.

As for my relativism, I don't think a thing-in-itself can be real to some other thing except through its properties. Without properties, the relation doesn't exist, and the relation defines existence under relativism.

I have argued the idea of God is relative to humans.

The human idea of God is relative to humans. I don't think some other entity's idea of God would be relative to humans, especially if the other entity is unaware of humans.

I agree theism [hinges on ontology] is still a psychological critical necessity for the majority at the present.
But then theism has it cons.

It makes a society more fit than a non-theistic society. That's a big pro. That's why it has seemingly become built into our instincts. Calling it evil is what the unfit side does, but their argument falls apart since their stance denies evil.

The philosophical realist insist objects and reality [as an object] are independent of the human conditions. This is not tenable because humans are parts and parcel of reality.

But you've not demonstrated that they're a necessary part. Without that, we're just incidentally here, and the philosophical realist's position is tenable.

In addition there is no way to nail and object objectively that exists independent of the subject - this is the Philosophical anti-Realists' stance.

Yes, it is. But inability to nail it down is not proof of the lack of the thing being independently real. You have to show that independent existence is self-contradictory. You're attacking a mainstream view, so don't expect it to be simple.

In philosophical ontology, realism about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

Heck, by that definition, I'm a philosophical realist, although you are not. My relativism isn't grounded on conceptual schemes at all. It is grounded on relations. Things don't exist apart from relations, but limiting the relation to 'conceptual schemes' seems closer to idealism than relativism. The above definition seems to be one of 'not idealism', which doesn't eliminate a whole lot of alternate views that are not all considered realist views.
That is an unfair statement. Even an idealist is a realist, believing that only experience is real. 'realist' isn't a view. It is an adjective. So I think perhaps all views are realist views, just listing different things that are real. Philosophical realism eliminates a small subset of views that confine reality to only conceptual schemes.

Note Russell once sounded in Problems of Philosophy in the pursuit of an independent object, e.g. a table out there;

The table seems to exist to the cup sitting on it, despite lack of the cup's conception of the table, or lack of human awareness of the situation. That's how I would put it at least.

Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all.

To other things, the table very much doesn't exist. I've named some. It doesn't exist to the ancient moon.

So the question is, is X really a table or what things it is?

I don't think you can demonstrate that a correct answer to that can be found.

[Eodnhoj7]

I have defined 'evil' in terms of evil acts like genocides, mass rapes, murders, etc.
These evil acts are [hu]man-made.
Human acts are controlled mainly in the brain.
Therefore we should understand the brain more precisely so we can take preventive actions to ensure humans do not commit evil acts [either eliminate or kept to the optimal minimum].

And why is "genocide, mass rape, murder" immoral when secular cultures argue for the necessity of them through action?

What sort of argument is that?
You cannot be that ignorant.

It is true there are the seculard [e.g. Pol pot] who are genocidal and there are also theists who are genocidal as inspired and commanded by their God [e.g. Islam].
But in general both secular and the theists are against genocides, mass rapes, and other evil acts.

And the communists did not commit genocides, rape, etc.?

You cannot be that ignorant.

If all of these are the result of the brain, and we must understand the nature of the brain through the brain, then we are left with an infinite regress.

Again you are lost on this.

Evil acts are the result of the brain activities.
Therefore if we change the brain activities, we can change the resultant acts from evil to good.
So the question is how do we do that?
There are many existing and potential ways to change a person's behavior.
So when there is a potential to stop evil acts, there is no question of infinite regression.

Evil is the result of brain activity, yet we use brain activity to measure evil...you do see the infinite regress correct?



btw, your post is very messy to reply.
Can you reply like how everyone is doing it.

The brain is adaptable.

[Noax]

No, I kinda (?) meant what you meant, this apparent anthropocentrism, which I think may actually be a misplaced Eastern-type subjectivity.

OK, We're sort of on the same page here then.

I consider it more of an offense to science to be able to affect the past than the offense of having a way that things actually are. Apparently there are no valid metaphysical interpretations that support both.

I can't think of a valid (by valid I also mean without magical thinking) metaphysical interpretation that supports even one of these.
We can't ever know for sure how things "actually are" but that's so basic and obvious that I forget to mention it. By "how it actually is" of course I mean: the best, most probable / simplest, non-magical guess based on everything we know. That's what philosophy is about (to me).

You seem to be talking about epistemology: the ability to know how things actually are. I'm just talking about consistency of metaphysical models, and there are very much models that support one principle or the other. Some models support the principle that one can speak meaningfully of the state of an unmeasured system (the cat is alive). Other models conform to the principle that a cause can only have effects in its future light cone. Some models discard both principles, but no model has both.

Modern science assumes <that we aren't separable from the rest of reality. We are it>, and the success of science since they made this assumption (compared to the lack of success before it) is testament to the likelihood of the truth of the assumption, but that isn't even close to a proof of any sorts. Anyway, I agree that we're not separate from it. I just think it biased to assert it like that.

I assume you didn't write this in the sense that things can ultimately only be falsified, not proven.

There is probably more than half the population of the planet that would disagree with this '>99% certainty', most of whom don't give a whole lot of in-depth thought about it. But there are those that do give it quite a bit of thought and consider science to have demonstrated no such thing.
So if you think the issue is put to rest, I ask what distinction there would be if we were actually separable from the rest of reality. I have some actual propositions myself on that question, but since I'm on the opposing side, my suggestions are dismissed as begging. Nevertheless, predictions are made, and nobody investigates them. The supernatural proponents seem to go out of their way to avoid obvious tests that would falsify the natural model against which they stand. The only reason I can see for that is that deep down, they know they're wrong, but they have a vested interest in keeping the idea alive.

I don't understand what you mean. By "objectively" I mean that the Moon was there just as I am here right now. Both are there irregardless of any conceptualization.

Yes, there regardless of any conceptualization, but not 'there' regardless of interaction. If X does not affect Y, then X does not exist to Y. The moon is not in fact there (in relation to nothing). That's what I mean when I say the relational view denies objective existence: existence independent of any relation.

But what do you mean by "relative to me"? The "me" is made of the same stuff the Moon is, what about it?

Relative to me just defines what is real in relation to me. Relative to my doorknob means that which is real in relation to the doorknob. I am no more special than the doorknob, being just a different arrangement of the same type of more basic stuff. So I can't ask if I exist (or the doorknob either), but I must ask if either of those things exists to some other entity. I exist to some entities, and don't exist to others.

Are you really taking the view after all that the human "I" has some Special Power? It doesn't, and you don't even exist the way you think you exist, you are just some circular psychological structure that thinks it's more than that: independent and autonomous. There is no "you" to do these special measurements and enter these special relationships you mention. There is also no sign of these special relationships known to science.

You seem to be under the mistaken impression that I am advocating that I'm special, despite my expressed distaste for anthropocentrism. OK, I am frequently the subject in the examples of the moon being real to me, but the moon needs to be real to any rock in the same way. You can substitute 'rock' for 'me' in any of those examples. Consciousness, conceptualization, life, and all that play no special role in this. I think VA would differ on this point.

[Veritas Aequitas]

From what I can tell the problem I described tends to be present in all main schools. I think it's less present in Zen. But I admittedly know little about the many variations, and there can always be exceptions of course.

Not sure what the Middle Path has to do with the 1. and 2. that I described though. If you mean that Buddhism-proper takes the Middle Path between 1. and 2. then that's the problem. You can't take a Midde Path between a more fundamental and a less fundamental understanding and mix them together, one overriding the other. You get nonsense this way.

Your views do not appear to represent the core principles of Buddhism-proper.

The practice of Middle Path is something like a person balancing and walking on a 100 meter tightrope across a 1000 feet canyon.

The principle of ensuring survival is to make sure one is walking along the middle with one's center of gravity.
But where circumstance varies one may have to tilt to one side but at all times mindful to revert to the middle. Thus a person will tilt to either the left or right depending on which direction the wind blows.

If the wind [slight] is consistently blowing from one side [right] only throughout, then the person will have to optimize and tilt in one direction and not in the middle all the way.
The critical thing is not to tilt too far over the optimal point and fall into the bottom of the canyon.
What is most critical is to ensure one revert to the middle-path and adapt wherever the circumstance changes.

Thus in Buddhism-proper one is fully aware of the 4 Noble Truth & Noble 8Fold Paths as the Middle Path and one will adapt either side [obviously cannot be on both sides at the same time] depending on one's current micro and macro situations.

Thus where a Buddhist-X claim my school's or sect's Buddhism is the ONLY way and insist it represent the middle path, then that Buddhist-X is not practicing the genuine Middle Path.

[Veritas Aequitas]

My stance is 'time' is relative to humans.

Pretty strange stance. When is 'a century before humans'? Where is the origin of this system?

It is not a strange stance. The debate whether 'time' is absolute or relative comprised of two camps with many supporters on each side.

It is acceptable to deliberate [philosophically] on the topics of metaphysics, i.e. specifically something beyond physics.
But one of the topics of ontology [in terms of substance theory] is not tenable at all.

OK, I looked at that. I didn't find the arguments supporting it to be very strong, but I thought the criticism against it pretty weak as well. I think perhaps I don't have a proper grasp on how it is important to ontology, but they say it is. You imply that substance theory IS ontology: "those who claimed ontology [substance theory] is something real", like there can't be ontology if you disagree with substance theory.

As for my relativism, I don't think a thing-in-itself can be real to some other thing except through its properties. Without properties, the relation doesn't exist, and the relation defines existence under relativism.

Nope I did not insist 'substance theory IS ontology.
The general definition is 'Ontology is substance theory.' On a more refined perspective, it depend on one's definition of 'ontology.'
Heidegger defined 'ontology' as the study of the 'Being of beings' not on the basis of substance theory.
As you will note there is no absolute meaning to a word, i.e. relativity again.

I have argued the idea of God is relative to humans.

The human idea of God is relative to humans. I don't think some other entity's idea of God would be relative to humans, especially if the other entity is unaware of humans.

But the point,
"I don't think some other entity's idea of God would be relative to humans.."
IS relative to humans. How else can one get out of this loop?
Point is one need to break into a paradigmatic shift to realize the reality of this 'loop'.

I agree theism [hinges on ontology] is still a psychological critical necessity for the majority at the present.
But then theism has it cons.

It makes a society more fit than a non-theistic society. That's a big pro. That's why it has seemingly become built into our instincts. Calling it evil is what the unfit side does, but their argument falls apart since their stance denies evil.

Theism was net-pro or net positive in the past and in the present, but the trend is the cons [negative] are outweighing the pros as we move into the future.
We cannot stick with the net-positive of theism all the time.
Non-theistic society has the potential to eliminate all sorts of evils to the minimal to a point of near-elimination. [this require a long discussion and debates]

The philosophical realist insist objects and reality [as an object] are independent of the human conditions. This is not tenable because humans are parts and parcel of reality.

But you've not demonstrated that they're a necessary part. Without that, we're just incidentally here, and the philosophical realist's position is tenable.

Reality is all there is.
Humans are parts of all there is.
Humans are therefore parts and parcels of reality.

In addition there is no way to nail and object objectively that exists independent of the subject - this is the Philosophical anti-Realists' stance.

Yes, it is. But inability to nail it down is not proof of the lack of the thing being independently real. You have to show that independent existence is self-contradictory. You're attacking a mainstream view, so don't expect it to be simple.

As I have mentioned the Philosophical Realist versus Philosophical Anti-Realist debate has been going on for a very long time even before the ancient philosopher of the Greeks.
The Philosophical Realist position is the default one where humans has evolved with since millions of years ago.
The philosophical anti-realist position is a later rebelling one in view of the problems arising from the philosophical realist views and its consequences. It is like Quantum Physics countering Newtonian Physics but the differences are not so clear-cut.

In philosophical ontology, realism about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

Heck, by that definition, I'm a philosophical realist, although you are not. My relativism isn't grounded on conceptual schemes at all. It is grounded on relations. Things don't exist apart from relations, but limiting the relation to 'conceptual schemes' seems closer to idealism than relativism. The above definition seems to be one of 'not idealism', which doesn't eliminate a whole lot of alternate views that are not all considered realist views.
That is an unfair statement. Even an idealist is a realist, believing that only experience is real. 'realist' isn't a view. It is an adjective. So I think perhaps all views are realist views, just listing different things that are real. Philosophical realism eliminates a small subset of views that confine reality to only conceptual schemes.

There are refine arguments and views on the above issues.

According to Kant,
A philosophical realist is actually an empirical idealist and at the same time a transcendental realist. [heavy stuff here].
A philosophical idealist [anti-realist] is an empirical realist and yet a transcendental idealist.

Note Russell once sounded in Problems of Philosophy in the pursuit of an independent object, e.g. a table out there;

The table seems to exist to the cup sitting on it, despite lack of the cup's conception of the table, or lack of human awareness of the situation. That's how I would put it at least.

It is odd to relate the table existence to the cup's being or consciousness.
That 'perhaps there is no table at all' should trigger one to do further philosophical exploration which will culminate towards philosophical anti-realism and ultimately to psychology [like what Hume did with the Problem of Induction/ cause and effect].
Btw, Russell did not end up with philosophical anti-realism.

Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all.

To other things, the table very much doesn't exist. I've named some. It doesn't exist to the ancient moon.

This is not relevant note my point above.

So the question is, is X really a table or what things it is?

I don't think you can demonstrate that a correct answer to that can be found.

Kant did demonstrate that in his Critique of Pure Reason.
Note - one need 3 years full time [.. I have done this] or 5 years part time to grasp fully and understand [not necessary agree with] Kant's philosophy within the CPR.

[Noax]

Pretty strange stance. When is 'a century before humans'? Where is the origin of this system?

It is not a strange stance. The debate whether 'time' is absolute or relative comprised of two camps with many supporters on each side.

My wording it as '12.8 billion years after the big bang' is also relative, just not relative to humans. 'Humans' is not a point in time, so I don't see how it would work as a relative system. Again, when is 'a century before humans'? You didn't answer that.
Perhaps you refer to A-series of time vs B-series, but that is a notation, not a philosophical stance. There isn't one that is more correct or more wrong. Both use relative terms. I cannot think of a system that isn't relative.

The general definition is 'Ontology is substance theory.' On a more refined perspective, it depend on one's definition of 'ontology.'

I'll admit to not having a clear definition beyond 'the study of what exists', and 'exist' having a basic literal definition of 'to stand out'.

But the point, "I don't think some other entity's idea of God would be relative to humans.."
IS relative to humans. How else can one get out of this loop?

No it isn't. I was talking about some other entity's idea of God, not the human conception of some other entity's idea of God. Please tell me you're not another idealist that doesn't know the difference.

But you've not demonstrated that they're a necessary part. Without that, we're just incidentally here, and the philosophical realist's position is tenable.

Reality is all there is.
Humans are parts of all there is.
Humans are therefore parts and parcels of reality.

Again, you've not shown how humans are a necessary part. Sans humans, reality would still be all there is.

As I have mentioned the Philosophical Realist versus Philosophical Anti-Realist debate has been going on for a very long time even before the ancient philosopher of the Greeks.
The Philosophical Realist position is the default one where humans has evolved with since millions of years ago.

I think you're describing the evolution vs. creation/design debate here. The acceptance of human evolution is not held only by those you categorize as philosophical realists here, and there are such realists that nevertheless deny evolution.

According to Kant,
A philosophical realist is actually an empirical idealist and at the same time a transcendental realist. [heavy stuff here].
A philosophical idealist [anti-realist] is an empirical realist and yet a transcendental idealist.

I cannot follow this. A transcendental realist is somebody who believes the transcendental (spirit realm?) is real, and yet I've never associated that stance with the term 'philosophical realist'. Kant is using different definitions of some things? Did you get the quote right?

It is odd to relate the table existence to the cup's being or consciousness.

I certainly did not mention the cup's consciousness, and did not really refer to the cup's being either. Not sure what you consider that to be. What I stated is straight out of science (and maybe not so much out of Kant that you reference so much), and I find it not odd at all.

[Atla]

Your views do not appear to represent the core principles of Buddhism-proper.

The practice of Middle Path is something like a person balancing and walking on a 100 meter tightrope across a 1000 feet canyon.

The principle of ensuring survival is to make sure one is walking along the middle with one's center of gravity.
But where circumstance varies one may have to tilt to one side but at all times mindful to revert to the middle. Thus a person will tilt to either the left or right depending on which direction the wind blows.

If the wind [slight] is consistently blowing from one side [right] only throughout, then the person will have to optimize and tilt in one direction and not in the middle all the way.
The critical thing is not to tilt too far over the optimal point and fall into the bottom of the canyon.
What is most critical is to ensure one revert to the middle-path and adapt wherever the circumstance changes.

Thus in Buddhism-proper one is fully aware of the 4 Noble Truth & Noble 8Fold Paths as the Middle Path and one will adapt either side [obviously cannot be on both sides at the same time] depending on one's current micro and macro situations.

Thus where a Buddhist-X claim my school's or sect's Buddhism is the ONLY way and insist it represent the middle path, then that Buddhist-X is not practicing the genuine Middle Path.

Ok I don't know what you're addressing. I roughly know that that's how the Middle Path is, but I'm not a Buddhist, didn't claim to be a Buddhist, never was a Buddhist. I thought we were talking about relativism, not the Middle Path.

I don't really know what you're trying to say, but the Middle Path can't be applied to the 1. and 2. I described, they are not sides. They are two understandings from fundamentally different levels; the 2. one contains the 1. one and both are true on their own level. Applying the Middle Path to this leads to nonsense.

I don't know how to put it. 6 is an integer and 6 is also a rational number. But what is 6 really, when we apply the Middle Path between integers and rational numbers?

[Atla]

You seem to be talking about epistemology: the ability to know how things actually are. I'm just talking about consistency of metaphysical models, and there are very much models that support one principle or the other. Some models support the principle that one can speak meaningfully of the state of an unmeasured system (the cat is alive). Other models conform to the principle that a cause can only have effects in its future light cone. Some models discard both principles, but no model has both.

Yeah I guess I'm not interested in the models you speak of, they are only interesting to me as long as I decide which principles should be seen as magical thinking and which shouldn't.

There is probably more than half the population of the planet that would disagree with this '>99% certainty', most of whom don't give a whole lot of in-depth thought about it.

Waay more than half

But there are those that do give it quite a bit of thought and consider science to have demonstrated no such thing.

And I'd say they are wrong. 100% of science is consistent with it. Neuroscience and QM, and well physics and biology in general have demonstrated it very directly. There is not a single known counter-example. Absolutely nothing.

So if you think the issue is put to rest, I ask what distinction there would be if we were actually separable from the rest of reality. I have some actual propositions myself on that question, but since I'm on the opposing side, my suggestions are dismissed as begging. Nevertheless, predictions are made, and nobody investigates them. The supernatural proponents seem to go out of their way to avoid obvious tests that would falsify the natural model against which they stand. The only reason I can see for that is that deep down, they know they're wrong, but they have a vested interest in keeping the idea alive.

I guess the simplest counter-example would be if we would find "mental states" that don't "correlate" with "physical stuff in the head", in other words they aren't the same thing said twice.

Yes, there regardless of any conceptualization, but not 'there' regardless of interaction. If X does not affect Y, then X does not exist to Y. The moon is not in fact there (in relation to nothing). That's what I mean when I say the relational view denies objective existence: existence independent of any relation.

This makes no sense to me at all. Interactions, "X affecting Y" don't exist, these are delusions from the Newtonian worldview. Since QM we know that there are only correlations and non-separability, not interactions (I used the word "correlate" in a different sense here than a few sentences earlier).
The way I see it you use at least 3 different magical concepts here: interaction, relation, exist/doesn't exist.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Pretty strange stance. When is 'a century before humans'? Where is the origin of this system?

It is not a strange stance. The debate whether 'time' is absolute or relative comprised of two camps with many supporters on each side.

My wording it as '12.8 billion years after the big bang' is also relative, just not relative to humans. 'Humans' is not a point in time, so I don't see how it would work as a relative system. Again, when is 'a century before humans'? You didn't answer that.
Perhaps you refer to A-series of time vs B-series, but that is a notation, not a philosophical stance. There isn't one that is more correct or more wrong. Both use relative terms. I cannot think of a system that isn't relative.

'a century before humans' is too vague because we do not know when humans emerged precisely to be humans per se.

Let say, what is 3+ billion years before humans.
According to evolutionary science and biology there were only single cells living things then i.e. 3+ billion years before humans.
But the point here is evolutionary science and biology are relative to human beings.
Therefore that there were single cells living things 3 billion years ago has to be relative to human beings.
As I had mentioned the basis of 'time' we used is also relative.

In the above in one perspective, yes, it is very obvious humans are independent of time and existence 3+ billion of years ago.
But in the final analysis, whatever the perspective inevitably human are involved.

But the point, "I don't think some other entity's idea of God would be relative to humans.."
IS relative to humans. How else can one get out of this loop?

No it isn't. I was talking about some other entity's idea of God, not the human conception of some other entity's idea of God. Please tell me you're not another idealist that doesn't know the difference.

Another of which idealist?
Mine is transcendental idealism and is an empirical realist.

But you've not demonstrated that they're a necessary part. Without that, we're just incidentally here, and the philosophical realist's position is tenable.

Reality is all there is.
Humans are parts of all there is.
Humans are therefore parts and parcels of reality.

Again, you've not shown how humans are a necessary part. Sans humans, reality would still be all there is.

This is the same points as the 3 billion years single cell living thing.

As I have mentioned the Philosophical Realist versus Philosophical Anti-Realist debate has been going on for a very long time even before the ancient philosopher of the Greeks.
The Philosophical Realist position is the default one where humans has evolved with since millions of years ago.

I think you're describing the evolution vs. creation/design debate here. The acceptance of human evolution is not held only by those you categorize as philosophical realists here, and there are such realists that nevertheless deny evolution.

Nope. You do not seem to be well versed with ancient Greek philosophy.
Note Plotinous's 'Man is the measure of all things' and Heraclitus [stepping into a river ..] versus Parmedes.

According to Kant,
A philosophical realist is actually an empirical idealist and at the same time a transcendental realist. [heavy stuff here].
A philosophical idealist [anti-realist] is an empirical realist and yet a transcendental idealist.

I cannot follow this. A transcendental realist is somebody who believes the transcendental (spirit realm?) is real, and yet I've never associated that stance with the term 'philosophical realist'. Kant is using different definitions of some things? Did you get the quote right?

As I had mentioned I have spent a lot of time on Kant.
I don't insist you take my words but you will have to read up Kant if you disagree with me.

Generally if Kant an philosophical anti-realist is a transcendental idealist, then the philosophical realist is a transcendental realist. That is very logical. Question is how to justify it. You will have to read Kant to understand it.

Kant also claimed theists and philosophical realists are both transcendental realists, albeit of different degrees of objectivity.
I have explained somewhere this is due to the Reality Gap.

The point is for the transcendental realists what is real [physical or spiritual things] is only in their head based on sense data or pure reason.

[-1-]

Yes, there regardless of any conceptualization, but not 'there' regardless of interaction. If X does not affect Y, then X does not exist to Y. The moon is not in fact there (in relation to nothing). That's what I mean when I say the relational view denies objective existence: existence independent of any relation.

This makes no sense to me at all. Interactions, "X affecting Y" don't exist, these are delusions from the Newtonian worldview. Since QM we know that there are only correlations and non-separability, not interactions (I used the word "correlate" in a different sense here than a few sentences earlier).
The way I see it you use at least 3 different magical concepts here: interaction, relation, exist/doesn't exist.

"The relational view denies objective existence." This is easy to explain.

To a blind mole (a mammal living mainly under the atmosphere in the dirt) the moon does not exist. The moon does not affect the mole, and the mole has no knowledge of the moon. Humans are affected by the moon (they can see in moonlight, for instance, or they can see the moon when they look up on a clear sky), and therefore to them the moon exist.

To you, Atla, what we sense exists. But they exist to us humans inasmuch as they affect us. However, there are things in reality (hic) that we can't sense, because they don't affect us, much like a mole has no knowledge of the moon. A mole knows how an earthworm tastes, since it eats it; but to a hummingbird the taste of earthworms does not exist. Etc.

So in effect, the relational view can't be divorced from experience; and experience is limited; therefore the relational view can't be objective. There are things there in objective reality that are not in relation to the observer, and the observer will never learn that part of reality, or even have any concept that that part of reality exists. Hence, the observer's sense of reality can't ever be objective.

Newtonian world view is not an anachronistic atavism. It is very much with us and very valid to this day. QM has a different set of rules, because it is a different Movement Type. Biological movement is again different from Newtonian movement. A lot of movement types still have "X affects Y" type of relationships. To deny that on basis of QM not having it, is to deny the understanding of the difference between Movement Types.

Movement Types are a relatively new term in the natural sciences, but it covers very useful conceptual differences. While all physical objects must and do follow their own movement type's laws, or rules, they also have to comply with the movement types "below" them, but not with the types "above" them. This hierarchy is obvious when you think of how a change in DNA structure changes appearance, abilities and other characteristics. The characteristics have to comply with the DNA changes, but the DNA changes are not hinging upon the characteristics.