Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Known unknowns and unknown unknowns!

Moderators: AMod, iMod

User avatar
RCSaunders
Posts: 4704
Joined: Tue Jul 17, 2018 9:42 pm
Contact:

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by RCSaunders »

Peter Holmes wrote: Tue Mar 15, 2022 10:13 am But I don't think it would be fruitful to pursue our disagreement.
Just so!
Peter Holmes wrote: Tue Mar 15, 2022 10:13 am (Critical thinking: 'Critical thinking is the analysis of available facts, evidence, observations, and arguments to form a judgment. The subject is complex; several different definitions exist, which generally include the rational, skeptical, and unbiased analysis or evaluation of factual evidence.' It's the only rational approach - and applied to invented things, such as concepts, it usually demolishes them.)
You've been taken in as most of academia and intellectual world has been by post modernism and so-called, "critical theory." What you mean by, "critical thinking," is, "correct thinking," which evades gullibility and is objectively skeptical. That's not what is being promoted as, "Critical Thinking." The term is being used to put over the very kind of anti-objective ideological thinking you despise, emphasizing social values and sentiments over obejctive reason and evidence.

Have a look at the most influential source of material on critical thinking which almost every college, university, or educational organizations, government agency,and large corporations in the West relies on and refers to as, "the authority," when promoting or teaching critical thinking, the Foundation for Critical Thinking. The link is to their, "Defining Critical Thinking," page.

Near the beginning of their definition of critical thinking is this wonderful example:
Critical thinking — in being responsive to variable subject matter, issues, and purposes — is incorporated in a family of interwoven modes of thinking, among them: scientific thinking, mathematical thinking, historical thinking, anthropological thinking, economic thinking, moral thinking, and philosophical thinking.
These supposed authorities on critical thinking never once actually explain what thinking is but assure us there is thinking in science, math, history, anthropology, economics, morality (really?) and philosophy which are all different kinds of thinking. If you read the entire "definitions," you will also discover the words—logic, (although "logical" is now used twice), identity, identification, truth, true, false, incorrect, real, reality, mind, (though 'openmindedly' and 'fairmindedness' are used) consciousness, fact, facts, factual, contradict, contradiction, non-contradiction, order, objective, or subjective are never used in their definition of thinking—a feat that surpasses writing an article on chemistry without using the names of any elements or compounds.

The real purpose of critical thinking is revealed here:
Critical thinking varies according to the motivation underlying it. When grounded in selfish motives, it is often manifested in the skillful manipulation of ideas in service of one’s own, or one's groups’, vested interest. As such it is typically intellectually flawed, however pragmatically successful it might be. When grounded in fairmindedness and intellectual integrity, it is typically of a higher order intellectually, though subject to the charge of "idealism" by those habituated to its selfish use.
To suggest it is one's motives or attitude that determines whether one's thinking is correct or not is absurd. One can certainly reason correctly with all the wrong intentions, just as one can get everything wrong from the best of intentions. But it is not really the validity or reason critical thinking is about, it is a social/political agenda it is meant to put over.

What has, "fairmindedness," (whatever that is) to do with correct reasoning. Appatently any reasoning that favors one's own interests is, "selfish," unless it is the interest of the critical thinking crowd, of course. Their object is made more explicit, however.
People who think critically consistently attempt to live rationally, reasonably, empathically. ... They work diligently to develop the intellectual virtues of intellectual integrity, intellectual humility, intellectual civility, intellectual empathy, intellectual sense of justice ...
It is not thinking as you mean it the Critical Thinking movement is about. It is to put over a social political agenda, as they say on their, "Our Mission," page.
We seek to promote essential change in education and society through the cultivation of fairminded critical thinking.

Critical thinking is essential if we are to get to the root of our problems and develop reasonable solutions. ... Whereas society commonly promotes values laden with superficial, immediate "benefits," ...
It does not occur to these idiots, societies do not think at all, critically or otherwise. Only individuals think.

"Critical thinking," sounds very good, and the question is how could anyone be opposed to thinking critically. No one could, if critical thinking really meant that, and I would be the first to celebrate it. It is in fact a subtle perversion of what true thinking is. There is a reason it is called "critical thinking" and not "correct thinking." Thinking critically is only part of correct thinking, a necessary part. It is that healthy skepticism that refuses to accept anything as true without evidence or reasoning they can understand from that evidence. It is protection from superstition and gullibility. But thinking critically is only part of correct thinking which can only eliminate wrong thinking and belief, but cannot establish correct thinking and knowledge. "Critical thinking," distorts the nature of thinking by substituting one part of thinking for all of thinking opening the door replace positive thinking with emotionalism and ideology.

You need to apply what you mean by critical thinking to what is being promote and put over in academia and other intellectual circles as, "critical thinking." Yours comes from sound reason, the other from the critical theory of the cultural Marxists of the Franklin School. [I am quite aware Dewey's influence, also, in the development of what's called critical thinking.]
Iwannaplato
Posts: 6591
Joined: Tue Aug 11, 2009 10:55 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Iwannaplato »

Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jul 26, 2017 2:13 pm
The woman does not know her friend is there because she lacks objective knowledge of that feature of reality. And afterwards, apprised of the situation and her mistake, she would not say she knew her friend was there. That is not how we use the word 'know'. She would say she believed the stranger was her friend, but was mistaken.
I've tried to come at your position by reading various threads and links and I still feel confused, likely my shortcomings. But perhaps I can get somewhere by just looking at one piece so I took one.

Yes, she would no longer say she knew.

And this can be the case for knowledge found by any means. At least, we can find out later, in science for example, that what we considered knowledge was not correct.

This seems a potential for most knowledge if not all. We may decide later that what we thought was the case was not the case.

I think that is the positive side of JTB, since it considers knowledge a form of belief, just a set of beliefs that have been rigorously arrived at.

I get the sense that your objections to JTB include the idea that there is a category error invovled, but I don't get it precisely yet. So we could start here and see where we get.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

Iwannaplato wrote: Tue May 03, 2022 3:13 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jul 26, 2017 2:13 pm
The woman does not know her friend is there because she lacks objective knowledge of that feature of reality. And afterwards, apprised of the situation and her mistake, she would not say she knew her friend was there. That is not how we use the word 'know'. She would say she believed the stranger was her friend, but was mistaken.
I've tried to come at your position by reading various threads and links and I still feel confused, likely my shortcomings. But perhaps I can get somewhere by just looking at one piece so I took one.

Yes, she would no longer say she knew.

And this can be the case for knowledge found by any means. At least, we can find out later, in science for example, that what we considered knowledge was not correct.

This seems a potential for most knowledge if not all. We may decide later that what we thought was the case was not the case.

I think that is the positive side of JTB, since it considers knowledge a form of belief, just a set of beliefs that have been rigorously arrived at.

I get the sense that your objections to JTB include the idea that there is a category error invovled, but I don't get it precisely yet. So we could start here and see where we get.
Thanks. I think the JTB account of what we call knowledge is a conceptual mess for several reasons.

1 To explain any so-called abstract thing can be nothing more than to explain the way(s) we do or could use what we confusingly call an abstract noun - misattributively, because a noun isn't an abstract thing. So the question 'what is knowledge?' only seems to be asking for a description of a thing of some kind - perhaps a thing with properties or necessary and sufficient conditions, such as: justified true belief.

But then, what are belief, truth and justification? Cue more deluded debate and endless disagreement - because all we can show is the way(s) we do or could use those words. And explanations come to an end. A so-called theory of [insert abstract noun] is nothing like a theory of gravity or thermodynamics.

2 Like all so-called abstract things, propositions - merely manifested by token sentences - are fictions. And fictions can both be useful and lead us astray, as the JTB truth-condition demonstrates. In the claim, 'S knows that p iff p is true', the proposition is both the feature of reality (with no truth-value) and a description of it (which must be true) - muddling up what we say about things with the way things are.

And anyway, the claim that we can know something is the case only if an assertion that it is the case is true - is patently ridiculous, and back-to-front. But the myth of propositions is potent and pervasive - as the description of omniscience as 'knowledge of all true propositions' demonstrates.

If you're interested, I set out the argument more fully, along with Gettier's misfiring criticism of the JTB, at http://www.peasum.co.uk/435531068 .
Iwannaplato
Posts: 6591
Joined: Tue Aug 11, 2009 10:55 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Iwannaplato »

Peter Holmes wrote: Wed May 04, 2022 6:31 pm Thanks. I think the JTB account of what we call knowledge is a conceptual mess for several reasons.
I'm critical of it also. I was thinking it might be useful as a focus point for me to understand your position in general.
1 To explain any so-called abstract thing can be nothing more than to explain the way(s) we do or could use what we confusingly call an abstract noun - misattributively, because a noun isn't an abstract thing. So the question 'what is knowledge?' only seems to be asking for a description of a thing of some kind - perhaps a thing with properties or necessary and sufficient conditions, such as: justified true belief.
I suppose I think of knowledge as a process not the possession of things. And I seem to be a sort of pragmatist. I don't want to argue for pragmatism, or say that I believe in pragmatism (or which version of it) but it seems like I tend to believe in things that work for me. This includes them often having justification and the criteria for 'working for me' vary. I have no neat and tidy system - and I rather doubt others do. I think most people are eclectic whatever their official position.
But then, what are belief, truth and justification? Cue more deluded debate and endless disagreement - because all we can show is the way(s) we do or could use those words. And explanations come to an end. A so-called theory of [insert abstract noun] is nothing like a theory of gravity or thermodynamics.
OK
2 Like all so-called abstract things, propositions - merely manifested by token sentences - are fictions. And fictions can both be useful and lead us astray, as the JTB truth-condition demonstrates. In the claim, 'S knows that p iff p is true', the proposition is both the feature of reality (with no truth-value) and a description of it (which must be true) - muddling up what we say about things with the way things are.
So what is your process for coming up with useful fictions and avoiding ones that lead you (or others) astray?
And anyway, the claim that we can know something is the case only if an assertion that it is the case is true - is patently ridiculous, and back-to-front.
I*ve often online been critical of this and think that JB makes more sense, if it includes some rigor for J and the extra condition of something else not having better J. But I think when people use the T, if you pressure them, they really mean that they have no stronger reason, in their system, for believing something else with better J. It would be silly for a scientist to say that person X has a very well justified belief that Y is the case, and so has knowledge Y, if this scientist through their expertise has even stronger J that Y is false. It's not a matter of me saying I believe X. X is well justified. And.....it is true. So it is true. It's more how the community looks at an individuals belief.
But the myth of propositions is potent and pervasive - as the description of omniscience as 'knowledge of all true propositions' demonstrates.
I think the omni qualities have caused all sorts of problems in philosophy.
If you're interested, I set out the argument more fully, along with Gettier's misfiring criticism of the JTB, at http://www.peasum.co.uk/435531068 .
I did look at that link before. I'll be upfront and say that I tend not to look through longer documents as part of participation in philosophy forums. I prefer online discussion in shorter text exchanges and read longer works on paper. It's a media-related laziness if you like, but I'd prefer to think of it as just being a 20th century person, really, and also someone who uses these forums for specific purposes. If you feel like you'd be redoing too much, I understand.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

Iwannaplato wrote: Thu May 05, 2022 7:14 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed May 04, 2022 6:31 pm Thanks. I think the JTB account of what we call knowledge is a conceptual mess for several reasons.
I'm critical of it also. I was thinking it might be useful as a focus point for me to understand your position in general.
1 To explain any so-called abstract thing can be nothing more than to explain the way(s) we do or could use what we confusingly call an abstract noun - misattributively, because a noun isn't an abstract thing. So the question 'what is knowledge?' only seems to be asking for a description of a thing of some kind - perhaps a thing with properties or necessary and sufficient conditions, such as: justified true belief.
I suppose I think of knowledge as a process not the possession of things. And I seem to be a sort of pragmatist. I don't want to argue for pragmatism, or say that I believe in pragmatism (or which version of it) but it seems like I tend to believe in things that work for me. This includes them often having justification and the criteria for 'working for me' vary. I have no neat and tidy system - and I rather doubt others do. I think most people are eclectic whatever their official position.
Okay. As I've said, I think the whole idea of a theory of truth is misguided. So that includes the pragmatism theory of truth. And I understand you don't subscribe to that theory anyway. But I think the 'it works for me' idea risks leaving the door open for an informal kind of pragmatism that, in my opinion, if not contradicts, at least subverts what we mean when we say a factual assertion is true.

But then, what are belief, truth and justification? Cue more deluded debate and endless disagreement - because all we can show is the way(s) we do or could use those words. And explanations come to an end. A so-called theory of [insert abstract noun] is nothing like a theory of gravity or thermodynamics.
OK
2 Like all so-called abstract things, propositions - merely manifested by token sentences - are fictions. And fictions can both be useful and lead us astray, as the JTB truth-condition demonstrates. In the claim, 'S knows that p iff p is true', the proposition is both the feature of reality (with no truth-value) and a description of it (which must be true) - muddling up what we say about things with the way things are.
So what is your process for coming up with useful fictions and avoiding ones that lead you (or others) astray?
Good question. I think a metaphor or fiction leads us astray when we take it literally; and mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things and events - which is and has always been metaphorical - is a prime example. It produced and endorsed the ancient dualism of mind/matter, or internal/external world - from which we're still suffering. We need to be able to talk about thoughts, feelings, ideas or concepts, and so on. But we go astray when we ask what those things 'really' are.

And a closely-related fiction is the existence of so-called abstract things. Again, some abstract nouns are among the most important words we use: truth, knowledge, justice, goodness, identity, beauty - and so on. But those aren't real things that exist somehow, somewhere - pace Plato and all platonists since.
And anyway, the claim that we can know something is the case only if an assertion that it is the case is true - is patently ridiculous, and back-to-front.
I*ve often online been critical of this and think that JB makes more sense, if it includes some rigor for J and the extra condition of something else not having better J. But I think when people use the T, if you pressure them, they really mean that they have no stronger reason, in their system, for believing something else with better J. It would be silly for a scientist to say that person X has a very well justified belief that Y is the case, and so has knowledge Y, if this scientist through their expertise has even stronger J that Y is false. It's not a matter of me saying I believe X. X is well justified. And.....it is true. So it is true. It's more how the community looks at an individuals belief.
I'm struggling a bit with what you mean here. My point is that, in this context, the only thing that can be true or false is a factual assertion - in old-speak, a proposition - and our knowing something is or was the case has nothing to do with the truth or falsehood of a factual assertion. (So-called propositional knowledge isn't knowledge of propositions. And Russell's knowledge by description is just knowledge by acquaintance with a description.) And I think what we call justification can be a-whole-nother can of worms. Perhaps you could explain exactly what you think justifies belief in the existence of something, or the truth of a factual assertion.
But the myth of propositions is potent and pervasive - as the description of omniscience as 'knowledge of all true propositions' demonstrates.
I think the omni qualities have caused all sorts of problems in philosophy.
Agreed.
If you're interested, I set out the argument more fully, along with Gettier's misfiring criticism of the JTB, at http://www.peasum.co.uk/435531068 .
I did look at that link before. I'll be upfront and say that I tend not to look through longer documents as part of participation in philosophy forums. I prefer online discussion in shorter text exchanges and read longer works on paper. It's a media-related laziness if you like, but I'd prefer to think of it as just being a 20th century person, really, and also someone who uses these forums for specific purposes. If you feel like you'd be redoing too much, I understand.
I hear you. It was just a thought. Very happy to keep discussing these things with you here. I find what you say interesting. And sticking with one issue at a time is a good idea!
Iwannaplato
Posts: 6591
Joined: Tue Aug 11, 2009 10:55 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Iwannaplato »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sun May 08, 2022 4:38 pm
Okay. As I've said, I think the whole idea of a theory of truth is misguided. So that includes the pragmatism theory of truth. And I understand you don't subscribe to that theory anyway. But I think the 'it works for me' idea risks leaving the door open for an informal kind of pragmatism that, in my opinion, if not contradicts, at least subverts what we mean when we say a factual assertion is true.


It may well do that, but I find people are also, when it comes down to it, pragmatists for many of their beliefs. I mean everyone. I don't mean formal pragmatists, but I'll go with your informal pragmatist label.
Good question. I think a metaphor or fiction leads us astray when we take it literally; and mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things and events - which is and has always been metaphorical - is a prime example. It produced and endorsed the ancient dualism of mind/matter, or internal/external world - from which we're still suffering. We need to be able to talk about thoughts, feelings, ideas or concepts, and so on. But we go astray when we ask what those things 'really' are.
Isn't one then left with an informal pragmatic solution. We talk about them but don't decide on t he truth of what they 'really' are? I am not sure how to avoid not taking metaphors literally. So much of our language is dead metaphors and so much of the way we think about life is metaphorical through ways we do not speak about it. We repeatedly use certain schemas that at root are metaphorical. So, the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, but also things like the fascinating, to me anyway, Conduit metaphor of language, by Reddy
http://www.biolinguagem.com/ling_cog_cu ... taphor.pdf
I mean prepositions can mess us up if we are looking to clean house of metaphors.
And a closely-related fiction is the existence of so-called abstract things. Again, some abstract nouns are among the most important words we use: truth, knowledge, justice, goodness, identity, beauty - and so on. But those aren't real things that exist somehow, somewhere - pace Plato and all platonists since.
Sure, not like rocks or even particles in superposition. They seem to me to be reified adjectives. Which would allow me to say that they are real, but not things. facets of things or some things. I am exploring this is not a position I have worked out.

I*ve often online been critical of this and think that JB makes more sense, if it includes some rigor for J and the extra condition of something else not having better J. But I think when people use the T, if you pressure them, they really mean that they have no stronger reason, in their system, for believing something else with better J. It would be silly for a scientist to say that person X has a very well justified belief that Y is the case, and so has knowledge Y, if this scientist through their expertise has even stronger J that Y is false. It's not a matter of me saying I believe X. X is well justified. And.....it is true. So it is true. It's more how the community looks at an individuals belief.[/quote]
I'm struggling a bit with what you mean here. My point is that, in this context, the only thing that can be true or false is a factual assertion - in old-speak, a proposition - and our knowing something is or was the case has nothing to do with the truth or falsehood of a fa ctual assertion. (So-called propositional knowledge isn't knowledge of propositions. And Russell's knowledge by description is just knowledge by acquaintance with a description.) And I think what we call justification can be a-whole-nother can of worms. Perhaps you could explain exactly what you think justifies belief in the existence of something, or the truth of a factual assertion.
Ah, small questions...
Let's go back to the beginning...
I sort of arise in the middle of my life at a very early age. I become aware that I am someone and not others or other things (or I am told this and go with this idea).
I end up getting a LOT of hand me down ideas. I am sure you know the sources, there are several.
At some point I begin to doubt some beliefs, find myself torn between hand me down beliefs, experience anomolies that make me think other things exist then are generally accepted or might exists or some things are supposed to exist seem not to. And so on.
So, I arrive to myself with a lot of beliefs.
So, for me epistemology and mine seems to be eclectic is not applied everywhere equally. Curiosity, problems, seeming contradictions that elicit one of those first two, anomolies and so on along with my goals, desires lead me to question some things and not others. Some beliefs just don't seem to work on only cover some situations. Other beliefs come to seem like bullshit.

Some stuff I may never have decided was true due to some rigorous analysis by me or others, but I have no current problems and they get left alone - part of my defacto pragmatism, for example.

From there, deciding to explore experientially, talking to people, trying out stuff, reading, to some degree formal education, and other activities give me reasons to no longer believe certain things, to be agnostic about others, to take on new beliefs
and also new priorities in exploration.

If I have a belief and it seems to lead to me interacting with reality as if I do not understand it, I am likely to question and perhaps drop it. This all takes time and generally experience.

I certainly read and appreciate scientific research, but I do not restrict myself to the conclusions of science (and no one does - I realize this can seem provocative, but really who does not have ideas about the opposite sex or how society should be organized or how to improve one skill at ___________ and so on that they have arrived at via non-scientific methodologies).

Works is a broad term of evaluation. I have to say I follow my intuition a lot. Not blindly (when I am aware of the belief) but I do not have to have anything remotely like proof for me to live as if and at time believe X. I also think that people are less aware of what they believe than they realize and also think it is binary or at best trinary. That is either you believe or don't believe. That's the binary. Forgetting that one might not be sure or agnostic technically or very significantly or ambivalent. Which is then trinary.

But I find what I would call believe shifts up and down over time, with periods of doubt or unsureness and other periods of greater certainty. I also think, implied above that belief are not necessarily conscious. I can remember turning thirty and realizing I was stunned I was still alive. I realized that I had not believed I would survive that long. But I had no memory of thinking that way. The shock at managing to survive rang clear as a bell. I also realized, later, that I had had previously beliefs about myself, life, other people, etc. that I had not been aware of.
I hear you. It was just a thought. Very happy to keep discussing these things with you here. I find what you say interesting.
OK, good and likewise.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

Iwannaplato

Thanks. I'll need time to mull this all over - so, sorry for the delay.

Btw, can you share the reason for your handle? (I definitely don't wannaplato. One was bad enough.)

No worries if not!
popeye1945
Posts: 2119
Joined: Sun Sep 12, 2021 2:12 am

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by popeye1945 »

Truth to the individual is experience, and truth to the group is agreement, all of which is arrived at through the experience of biological consciousness. There is no truth other than what is the property of biological consciousness. Propositions come as secondary information from trusted sources of the experience of other biological conscious subjects. While personal experience is not infallible the collective tends to be more reliable as the collective experience. You might say the collective experience is once removed from the personal experience but sharing the same common biology one is inclined to give it tentative belief. This is one reason morality should be based upon our common biology to serve the self-interests of that common biology.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

popeye1945 wrote: Sun May 08, 2022 11:54 pm Truth to the individual is experience, and truth to the group is agreement...
Erm. What we mean when we say a factual assertion is true constitutes what we call truth. And that's it. These claims are incoherent. There's no such thing as 'truth to the individual'; experience can easily lead us to believe falsehoods; and the consensus theory of truth is patently incorrect.

...all of which is arrived at through the experience of biological consciousness. There is no truth other than what is the property of biological consciousness.
Again, this is overstatement. To bring it down: the only things that have truth-value are factual assertions - typically, linguistic expressions. And humans have highly-developed languages with which to make factual assertions. There's no need to appeal to 'biological consciousness'; and anyway, it raises complications, such as which species (all of them 'biological') have consciousness? Is truth the property of dogs?

Propositions come as secondary information from trusted sources of the experience of other biological conscious subjects. While personal experience is not infallible the collective tends to be more reliable as the collective experience. You might say the collective experience is once removed from the personal experience but sharing the same common biology one is inclined to give it tentative belief. This is one reason morality should be based upon our common biology to serve the self-interests of that common biology.
Okay. But this is an opinion, not a fact. And, as always, facts about our 'common biology' can't entail moral conclusions. Those are always decisions or choices.
popeye1945
Posts: 2119
Joined: Sun Sep 12, 2021 2:12 am

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by popeye1945 »

Peter,

language is in serves to the individual not the other way around, when one speaks of the intricacies of linguistics it is still the biological consciousness that decides whether the assumed complexities are kosher or not. Truth like all meanings has but one source and that is a conscious subject. It is true that perception and judgement of that perception are not infalliable but it is the best we have. Group agreement about the truth of a perception is kind of a safe guard though not infalliable itself. Factual assertions are when experience of a conscious subject is double checked with the physical reality, but, if there is illusion and/or delusions in the works the same biology that made the error cannot then do the checking only to make the same error. The meaning innate to a linguistic expression can only be understood by a conscious subject, truth, meanings are not available to us but though the cognitive processes of the understanding.

You seem to think consciousness is the sole property of humans. It might help in your understanding to know that there is only one biology and that is a carbon based biology. The essences of life is the same across the board only the form and function of species differ, structures change to adapt to particular niches within the environment. Is a dog conscious, undoubtedly, where there is life there is consciousness you are surrounded by it and it constantly regenerates itself. Morality, decisions and choices, all meanings and the property of a conscious subject. There is no objective meaning to the physical world which is not bestowed upon it by a biologically conscious subject. Where all meaning belongs to a conscious subject wherelse is one to look for morality, as previously stated, all meaning is bestowed upon a meaningless world, biology is the measure of all things.
Advocate
Posts: 3467
Joined: Tue Sep 12, 2017 9:27 am
Contact:

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Advocate »

[quote=popeye1945 post_id=571734 time=1652102989 user_id=21999]
Peter,

language is in serves to the individual not the other way around, when one speaks of the intricacies of linguistics it is still the biological consciousness that decides whether the assumed complexities are kosher or not. Truth like all meanings has but one source and that is a conscious subject. It is true that perception and judgement of that perception are not infalliable but it is the best we have. Group agreement about the truth of a perception is kind of a safe guard though not infalliable itself. Factual assertions are when experience of a conscious subject is double checked with the physical reality, but, if there is illusion and/or delusions in the works the same biology that made the error cannot then do the checking only to make the same error. The meaning innate to a linguistic expression can only be understood by a conscious subject, truth, meanings are not available to us but though the cognitive processes of the understanding.

You seem to think consciousness is the sole property of humans. It might help in your understanding to know that there is only one biology and that is a carbon based biology. The essences of life is the same across the board only the form and function of species differ, structures change to adapt to particular niches within the environment. Is a dog conscious, undoubtedly, where there is life there is consciousness you are surrounded by it and it constantly regenerates itself. Morality, decisions and choices, all meanings and the property of a conscious subject. There is no objective meaning to the physical world which is not bestowed upon it by a biologically conscious subject. Where all meaning belongs to a conscious subject wherelse is one to look for morality, as previously stated, all meaning is bestowed upon a meaningless world, biology is the measure of all things.
[/quote]

Man is the measurer of all things, not the measure of all things. Biology is universally important to all known beings, but that's only a local bubble at this time.
Iwannaplato
Posts: 6591
Joined: Tue Aug 11, 2009 10:55 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Iwannaplato »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sun May 08, 2022 5:25 pm Iwannaplato

Thanks. I'll need time to mull this all over - so, sorry for the delay.

Btw, can you share the reason for your handle? (I definitely don't wannaplato. One was bad enough.)

No worries if not!
Once long ago a friend of mine and I remade Who's on first?' using philosophers names.
'Tell me whose on second.' 'Can't' Why not? Why not what? Tell me whose on second? Kant.
Plato was in there somewhere either with a terrible pun on Play too, which only works if you fudge the pronounciation, but it helps if you have a New York accent, or perhaps if use it as Play to. I Kant remember.
Other horrible jokes with Hume....And I throw it to whom? No, he's in left field.
Adorno...which in Bronxese sounds a lot like 'I don't know.'
Dewey - Well we gotta have someone playing catcher. Dewey. Of course we do. We do what? Need someone to play catcher. Dewey?.........
More - we have to have more playing. Sure, right field. No, I mean, we don't have enough players. Of course we do.
There was some horrendous question with
Can't X play to Hume? That's our infield!

Anyway I can't remember the dialogue well at all but when I registered the sad pun on Plato popped into my head and I used it.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

The aim of my OP was to challenge the JTB definition of knowledge by pointing out its reliance on the myth of propositions. But I've come around to thinking that this is one manifestation of a very deep and general philosophical confusion.

A common claim in our debates is 'there's no such thing as X'. And the following are some values for X in dichotomies.

reality-as-it-really-is / a thing-in-itself vs reality as we perceive, know and describe it
absolute truth vs any contextual, contingent truth-claim
universals vs particulars
abstract things vs real things

But a dichotomy requires two options, with a contrast between them. So if we deny the existence of one option, there's no longer a dichotomy.

For example, some anti-realists deny the existence of reality-as-it-really-is - rejecting the dichotomy - but then in effect invoke it to attack realism and the idea that we can have knowledge of what we call reality.

And, for example, we can't both deny the existence of absolute truth, and at the same time criticise the contingency of contextual truth-claims for not being absolute but merely 'relative' - for not being truly true.

And, for example, if there are no so-called universals, there's no distinction between them and so-called particulars. (What are Platonists and nominalists arguing about?)

The argument-pattern is the same: entertain a (fantasy) option (X), then both dismiss it and use it to reach a conclusion.

My point is that a so-called eliminativst position in a philosophical debate always makes an unnecessary concession.

I think instead we should ask these questions: The existence of exactly what is being denied? Are reality-as-it-really-is, absolute truth, universals and abstract things - things that could exist but (perhaps) happen not to? If the answer is no, then denying their existence is pointless and confusing.

(Why say 'all models are wrong, but some are useful'? What would a model that's right look like?)
Iwannaplato
Posts: 6591
Joined: Tue Aug 11, 2009 10:55 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Iwannaplato »

Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Jun 09, 2022 4:43 pm For example, some anti-realists deny the existence of reality-as-it-really-is - rejecting the dichotomy - but then in effect invoke it to attack realism and the idea that we can have knowledge of what we call reality.

And, for example, we can't both deny the existence of absolute truth, and at the same time criticise the contingency of contextual truth-claims for not being absolute but merely 'relative' - for not being truly true.
And this becomes even more hypocritical (ironic) when they invoke explicitly or implicitly realist models of perception. External object sensed by senses which send messages to brains that then create some kind of virtual filtered copy. That model includes all sorts of ding an sich, even if they are very intimate one.

The whole mirror neurons show that morals are facts, is a hilarious justification for an anti-realist to use. They don't see to realize that brains (if not minds) are objects, especially other brains. But they will happily talk about the objects of research (neurons for example) when it (seemingly) bolsters antirealism - since the relation between subject and object is mediated or in our homegrown antirealist's case the objective reality of moral facts due to the objects of research called mirror neurons.

And notice how often they focus on color, which is not a facet of the object, but tend not to talk about mass, volume, texture, size, shape.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3711
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions

Post by Peter Holmes »

Iwannaplato wrote: Thu Jun 09, 2022 8:43 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Jun 09, 2022 4:43 pm For example, some anti-realists deny the existence of reality-as-it-really-is - rejecting the dichotomy - but then in effect invoke it to attack realism and the idea that we can have knowledge of what we call reality.

And, for example, we can't both deny the existence of absolute truth, and at the same time criticise the contingency of contextual truth-claims for not being absolute but merely 'relative' - for not being truly true.
And this becomes even more hypocritical (ironic) when they invoke explicitly or implicitly realist models of perception. External object sensed by senses which send messages to brains that then create some kind of virtual filtered copy. That model includes all sorts of ding an sich, even if they are very intimate one.

The whole mirror neurons show that morals are facts, is a hilarious justification for an anti-realist to use. They don't see to realize that brains (if not minds) are objects, especially other brains. But they will happily talk about the objects of research (neurons for example) when it (seemingly) bolsters antirealism - since the relation between subject and object is mediated or in our homegrown antirealist's case the objective reality of moral facts due to the objects of research called mirror neurons.

And notice how often they focus on color, which is not a facet of the object, but tend not to talk about mass, volume, texture, size, shape.
Agreed. And your point has a bearing on the truth-value of the claim that there's no absolute truth. The intellectual contortion and hypocrisy is similar. I'm inclined to say they're two sides of the same counterfeit coin.
Post Reply