Arising_uk wrote:Just so far,
I think this is wrong, "Descartes claimed he had unshakable certainty in the Cogito because the existence of a good and active God would not deceive him.". The 'God' bit was to allow him to return to the external world and others with certainty, not for his Cogito as that appears to be one of your 'deductive justifications' as denying it leads to a logical contradiction.
This is a bad analogy,
"The totality of the sensory input is like a basic camera taking a picture. A basic camera’s shutter merely experiences the input; the camera cannot identify. The picture takes on no identity without the ability to part and parcel this picture into things. This “picture” is the totality of undefined experience. ..." . The senses don't work like this, perception is more complicated, it's a hard read but try Mearleu-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception.
" Because I do not know if other people even exist, their opinions and language are not considered." But you do know, as if you are using a language to think or write with then there must be an other. This was my take on how Descartes could have reconnected without needing a 'God'.
Thanks for some feedback! You are correct in your assessment of Descartes. A reason Descartes' gives for the cogito is that is a clear and distinct idea in his mind. However, when it is no longer clear and distinct, or a memory, how does one know what they remember as clear and distinct is not a lie by a deciever? This is where God comes in. We can clearly and distinctly perceive that God exists, therefore God would not allow our memories of clear and distinct experiences to be deceived. Therefore we can believe that our memories of clear distinct perceptions are in fact, correct. I THINK that's the gist of it. Regardless, I pass over this point too easily and if I plan to do anything with this paper, I will rewrite it to reflect a more accurate portrayal.
As for the "bad analogy", you may be correct if it is not accurately portraying what I am trying to convey. At this time, I am building up deductive justifications. I am trying to state that the simplest way of viewing sensory input is the brain interpreting the light as undefined sensation. The ability to discretely experience that light into separate identities is the next step I make. The separation of "sensation" and "interpretation of sensation", pointss out I observe a separation between the input, and my interpretation of that input. In a way, it could be argued that a non-interpretation of input, is an interpretation of input. However, I tried to create clear and separate identities for clarity. I see a difference that is pertinent for communication, and I think makes digesting the ideas easier. I am trying to state that the simplest way of viewing sensory input is the brain interpreting the light as undefined sensation. If my analogy does a poor job of imparting this, I'll take suggestions, or try cracking my brain at a better analogy.
If you think my identification of these two parts of sensation is incorrect, feel free to point out why within the logic of the paper. Because I conclude that I discretely experience, and realize I can identify what I experience as I see fit, can I, with knowledge only of the self-subjective, be incorrect in my conclusion?
My comment on "not knowing other people exist" is an attempt, like Descartes, to conclude only what I can know immediately from what I have concluded as prior knowledge. At this point in the paper, I have no way of knowing other people exist, so cannot address that. I will eventually arrive at a point I can know other people exist, but that can only happen after other building blocks are established.