Questions for the friends of qualia.

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raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

Wyman wrote:
Ginkgo wrote:
raw_thought wrote:A materialist must say that,
1. The brain (or at least part of it ) must resemble a triangle.
OR
2. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey the same knowledge ( of knowing what a triangle is).
If he chooses 1, that is obviously absurd.
If he chooses 2, that is obviously absurd.
Therefore, his proposition that the triangle is represented physically is false.
Number 2 is the correct interpretation in my view. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey knowledge of a triangle because 'knowing' is not a single unified experience. Knowledge of any object is facilitated though many different modalities.in other words, different spatial and temporal mechanisms. Number 2 is not absurd.
And I would add that one could be true, replacing thee 'must' with 'may.' So ginko is 'obviously absurd' and I am obviously absurd plus a half.
So you are saying that if one visualizes green, one's brain turns green? That if you had a strong enough sound amplifier you could hear my thoughts???? That when I visualize a triangle, my neurons are firing in a triangular shape????
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

Ginkgo wrote:I guess it all depends on what the words, "resemble a triangle" means. When I have a cup of coffee the taste, smell and visual modalities combine to give me the experience of having a cup of coffee. All of our experiences appear not to be restricted to a single modality, yet these modalities appear to subsume themselves into a single coffee experience. I don't see any reason to think that visualizing a triangle is restricted to a single modality (visual cortex). All of this is in the area of neural binding and cascades.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/neural_binding
For the materialist there is no "experience". Only neurons firing.
raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

Ginkgo wrote:I guess it all depends on what the words, "resemble a triangle" means. When I have a cup of coffee the taste, smell and visual modalities combine to give me the experience of having a cup of coffee. All of our experiences appear not to be restricted to a single modality, yet these modalities appear to subsume themselves into a single coffee experience. I don't see any reason to think that visualizing a triangle is restricted to a single modality (visual cortex). All of this is in the area of neural binding and cascades.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/neural_binding
Are you saying that if I do not know what "blanco" ( Spanish. "white' in English) means, I still know what blanco means because I pronounce the word? Similarly, are you saying that if my neurons fire in an X shape ( and that is all I know) and someone tells me that that means that I am visualizing a triangle ( and I have no clue what a triangle is because I have never seen one) I know what a triangle is?
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raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

Scott Mayers wrote:I think the problem is resolved if we reduce the idea of 'qualia' to how the brain likely stores its data. Although I don't provide a precise means for this inside the brain, it can be described logically by analogy to 'C Computer Language' thing called a structure. To define this, you begin by pre-defining an array as a string of bits of any varying finite length. Then, a "structure" is a definition that describes a backbone of one or more arrays uniquely fit together. In a simplified example:

Definition of a Structure named "X":
-------An Array of "y" bits
-------A different Array of "w" bits
-------...

-------...
-------The last Array of "z" bits

Now each kind of sense (quale) would have a unique logical structure where the memory spaces represented as 'bits' are variable. So one (of a potential few co-ordinating structures in different areas of the brain) would have a unique logical structure.

To our consciousness, each of the particular similar structures have different values in their bit-combinations which are simply perceived as a unique phenomena without extra meaning. Color, for instance might be defined by the following imagined structure:

Definition of a Structure named "Color":
--------Array "Red" with 32 bits [unassigned]
--------Array "Green" with 32 bits [unassigned]
--------Array "Blue" with 24 bits [unassigned]......(I just made up the bit lengths as biology
----------------------------------------------------might arbitrarily through natural selection.)

Then, a particular realized sense can define pure white as:
Structure Color named "White": (ArrayRed[all bits '1'], ArrayGreen[all bits '1'],ArrayBlue[all bits '1'])

and black as:
Structure Color named "Black": (ArrayRed[all bits '0'], ArrayGreen[all bits '0'],ArrayBlue[all bits '0'])

All the other range of colors would be unique variations of the 'numbers' in these arrays where "number" means the number represented by the binary bits as a whole.


The 'sensation' is the particular definition without any actual meaning except the conscious brain creates these as distinct apparent phenomena that we interpret as unique 'quales'. While this may seem absurd to recognize this at first, it is the most rational means to explain all sensory data being perceived as qualia.

The intensities (how bright or dim) can also either have a separate structural definition or be represented by multiple contemporary memory spaces to which the structural definitions of each color apply.

This suggests that it may be likely too that what one perceives as "red" really can be shared identically. This is because if they fit the same logical form through its identical structure AND particular color definitions, the experiences are as to equal numbers in the rest of objective reality.

I could go on to describe "consciousness" but will leave this for a separate thread unless asked. Sorry if this type of explanation loses some of you.

[NOTE: you are welcome to use this idea of mine but simply give me a named credit if it is used for copyright purposes. This is my "poor-man's" Copyright as of publishing here now. And, I prefer a formal request if it is used in a profitable way. Credit this site too as the medium I used with respect. Thank you.]
I will have to ponder that. It seems that you are saying that if the brain and the triangle assume the same logical structure, they do not have to resemble each other in order for the subject to understand what a triangle is. I disagree. Are you saying that if I understand what Neurons are firing in Einstein’s brain when he is thinking about Relativity ( and I know no physics) I understand relativity?
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

“The symbol grounding problem is related to the problem of how words (symbols) get their meanings, and hence to the problem of what meaning itself really is. The problem of meaning is in turn related to the problem of consciousness, or how it is that mental states are meaningful. According to a widely held theory of cognition called "computationalism," cognition (i.e., thinking) is just a form of computation. But computation in turn is just formal symbol manipulation: symbols are manipulated according to rules that are based on the symbols' shapes, not their meanings. How are those symbols (e.g., the words in our heads) connected to the things they refer to? It cannot be through the mediation of an external interpreter's head, because that would lead to an infinite regress, just as looking up the meanings of words in a (unilingual) dictionary of a language that one does not understand would lead to an infinite regress. The symbols in an autonomous hybrid symbolic+sensorimotor system—a Turing-scale robot consisting of both a symbol system and a sensorimotor system that reliably connects its internal symbols to the external objects they refer to, so it can interact with them Turing-indistinguishably from the way a person does—would be grounded. But whether its symbols would have meaning rather than just grounding is something that even the robotic Turing test—hence cognitive science itself—cannot determine, or explain.”
FROM
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_grounding_problem
I realize that some are new to this thread and have not read the entire discussion. That is why I repeated the above.
There is a difference between “computation” and “ meaning”. Imagine a swinging pendulum that hits every second domino. Does that mean that it knows that 1+1=2? of course not! Does an on light switch know that the light is on????
Matter lacks intentionality ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ ) and therefore cannot refer to anything. Words are only splots of ink on paper for the materialist. .Knowledge requires intentionality and intentionality requires consciousness ( qualia) http://web.calstatela.edu/faculty/dpitt/whatsit.pdf
That was another reason why option 2 ( that knowing what neurons are firing when I visualize a triangle is identical to knowing what a triangle is) is absurd.
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

raw_thought wrote:“You have to understand the brain language of the very experiencer of the triangle; no general knowledge of brain is enough…”
Rilx
Agreed! The visualizer of the triangle knows everything about his/her particular brain.
Let’s temporarily, take the materialist stance. When I visualize a triangle I don’t see a triangle. * However , I know that when my neurons fire in a particular pattern ( let’s say X)I am visualizing a triangle. Isn’t that obviously self-contradictory?
……………….
“Meaning of a triangle COMES FROM how we relate ourselves with triangles of the world; how our brains prepare our muscles move us to handle triangles…Paraphrasing Nagel, this is what it is like to be me with triangles.”
Rilx
Nagel would never say that. He does not believe that the definition of “experience” is “neurons firing.”
There is a difference between knowing what caused something and knowing what it is. For example, the definition of “falling domino” is not “another domino hitting it.” Note the “COMES FROM” I never denied that neurons facilitate our perception of a triangle. However, “this pattern of neurons firing” is not the definition (meaning) of “triangle”.
As I said previously, to say that knowing what neurons are firing (when I visualize a triangle) is equivalent to experiencing the meaning of a triangle is as silly as saying that if I pronounce the words in a book I understand the book.
* Option [2], I do not see a triangle because there is no physical triangle, for a materialist only the physical exists.
To know the cause of something is not the same as knowing what it is. I may know that my computer has figured out a relativistic equation, but that does not mean that I know about relativity.
Impenitent
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Impenitent »

raw_thought wrote:
Ginkgo wrote:I guess it all depends on what the words, "resemble a triangle" means. When I have a cup of coffee the taste, smell and visual modalities combine to give me the experience of having a cup of coffee. All of our experiences appear not to be restricted to a single modality, yet these modalities appear to subsume themselves into a single coffee experience. I don't see any reason to think that visualizing a triangle is restricted to a single modality (visual cortex). All of this is in the area of neural binding and cascades.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/neural_binding
For the materialist there is no "experience". Only neurons firing.
for some reason this put Madonna in my head... "Living in a material world..."

of course she would stop and say something lewd about neurons...

-Imp
Scott Mayers
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Scott Mayers »

raw_thought wrote:
Scott Mayers wrote:I think the problem is resolved if we reduce the idea of 'qualia' to how the brain likely stores its data. Although I don't provide a precise means for this inside the brain, it can be described logically by analogy to 'C Computer Language' thing called a structure. To define this, you begin by pre-defining an array as a string of bits of any varying finite length. Then, a "structure" is a definition that describes a backbone of one or more arrays uniquely fit together. In a simplified example:

Definition of a Structure named "X":
-------An Array of "y" bits
-------A different Array of "w" bits
-------...

-------...
-------The last Array of "z" bits

Now each kind of sense (quale) would have a unique logical structure where the memory spaces represented as 'bits' are variable. So one (of a potential few co-ordinating structures in different areas of the brain) would have a unique logical structure.

To our consciousness, each of the particular similar structures have different values in their bit-combinations which are simply perceived as a unique phenomena without extra meaning. Color, for instance might be defined by the following imagined structure:

Definition of a Structure named "Color":
--------Array "Red" with 32 bits [unassigned]
--------Array "Green" with 32 bits [unassigned]
--------Array "Blue" with 24 bits [unassigned]......(I just made up the bit lengths as biology
----------------------------------------------------might arbitrarily through natural selection.)

Then, a particular realized sense can define pure white as:
Structure Color named "White": (ArrayRed[all bits '1'], ArrayGreen[all bits '1'],ArrayBlue[all bits '1'])

and black as:
Structure Color named "Black": (ArrayRed[all bits '0'], ArrayGreen[all bits '0'],ArrayBlue[all bits '0'])

All the other range of colors would be unique variations of the 'numbers' in these arrays where "number" means the number represented by the binary bits as a whole.


The 'sensation' is the particular definition without any actual meaning except the conscious brain creates these as distinct apparent phenomena that we interpret as unique 'quales'. While this may seem absurd to recognize this at first, it is the most rational means to explain all sensory data being perceived as qualia.

The intensities (how bright or dim) can also either have a separate structural definition or be represented by multiple contemporary memory spaces to which the structural definitions of each color apply.

This suggests that it may be likely too that what one perceives as "red" really can be shared identically. This is because if they fit the same logical form through its identical structure AND particular color definitions, the experiences are as to equal numbers in the rest of objective reality.

I could go on to describe "consciousness" but will leave this for a separate thread unless asked. Sorry if this type of explanation loses some of you.

[NOTE: you are welcome to use this idea of mine but simply give me a named credit if it is used for copyright purposes. This is my "poor-man's" Copyright as of publishing here now. And, I prefer a formal request if it is used in a profitable way. Credit this site too as the medium I used with respect. Thank you.]
I will have to ponder that. It seems that you are saying that if the brain and the triangle assume the same logical structure, they do not have to resemble each other in order for the subject to understand what a triangle is. I disagree. Are you saying that if I understand what Neurons are firing in Einstein’s brain when he is thinking about Relativity ( and I know no physics) I understand relativity?
I don't know how you interpreted me here. If a "triangle" is defined as a closed figure of three straight lines, this definition acts as a 'structural' formulation in analogy. The brain organizes this more precisely by how I explained it above. Each 'bit' within the arrays can represent a single neuron while the structural form describes how this information is organized (how the neurons connect). This helps to understand how the brain defines an elemental phenomena based upon how a sensor, like the eye, can provide a distinct and unique interpretation within a class of similar phenomena, like 'color'. The structure defines the kind of sensory data while the various bit information of the same structure differentiates differences within the same class, such as what 'redness' is among the many different colors within the same structure.
raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

I am saying that knowing the structure ( pattern of neurons firing) that cause one to visualize a triangle is not the same as knowing what a triangle is. *
For example, the logical structure of the writing in a book corresponds to the logical structure of the subject it is explaining. However, pronouncing the words is not the same thing as understanding the book.
Below is me from a previous post.
"Similarly, are you saying that if my neurons fire in an X shape ( and that is all I know) and someone tells me that that means that I am visualizing a triangle ( and I have no clue what a triangle is because I have never seen one) I know what a triangle is?"
* Yes, the brain's neurons firing and the triangle may have the same logical structure. Similarly, a CD of Mozart has the same logical structure as his music. However, hearing Mozart is different then holding a Mozart CD.
raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

“1. The brain (or part of it) must resemble a triangle.
OR
2. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey the same knowledge (knowing what a triangle is).
If he chooses 1, that is obviously absurd.
If he chooses 2, that is obviously absurd.
Therefore, his [the materialist’s] proposition that the triangle is represented physically is false.”
ME
“And I would add that one could be true, replacing the “must” with “may”.
Wyman
I used the word “must” because either a part of the brain resembles a triangle or it does not. So you are saying that it might resemble a triangle? Let’s temporarily assume that possibility. When one visualizes a triangle the matter in one’s brain assumes the shape of a triangle and that is what one sees. I do not see my neurons or even them firing. Do you???
……………………….
“When I have a cup of coffee, the taste, smell and visual modalities combine to give me the experience of having a cup of coffee.”
Ginko
For the materialist there is no “experience.” Only neurons firing.
ME
“"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia….At first blush it would be hard to imagine a more quixotic quest than trying to convince people that there are no such properties as qualia; hence the ironic title of this chapter. But I am not kidding.”
Dennett
FROM
http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm
Ginkgo
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Ginkgo »

raw_thought wrote:????????????????????
You are saying that a materialist is not saying either of the below 2?????????????
1. The visualized triangle resembles a triangle.
2. The visualized triangle does not resemble a triangle.
Either the visualized triangle looks like a triangle or it does not. What is the third possibility that you propose??????????????
I don't propose it at all. I don't have to because it is well documented in the literature. It can be found under cascades and neural synchrony. Your 1 and 2 serves to draw a false dichotomy.
Ginkgo
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Ginkgo »

Ginkgo wrote: ……………………….
“When I have a cup of coffee, the taste, smell and visual modalities combine to give me the experience of having a cup of coffee.”
Ginko
For the materialist there is no “experience.” Only neurons firing.
ME
“"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia….At first blush it would be hard to imagine a more quixotic quest than trying to convince people that there are no such properties as qualia; hence the ironic title of this chapter. But I am not kidding.”
Dennett
FROM
http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm[/quote]

In the 4th paragraph Dennett tells us he is not denying the reality of conscious experience:

"Which idea of qualia am I trying to extripate? Everything has real properties and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's state of consciousness have properties of something happening in them at the time....."
Scott Mayers
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Scott Mayers »

raw_thought wrote:I am saying that knowing the structure ( pattern of neurons firing) that cause one to visualize a triangle is not the same as knowing what a triangle is. *
For example, the logical structure of the writing in a book corresponds to the logical structure of the subject it is explaining. However, pronouncing the words is not the same thing as understanding the book.
Below is me from a previous post.
"Similarly, are you saying that if my neurons fire in an X shape ( and that is all I know) and someone tells me that that means that I am visualizing a triangle ( and I have no clue what a triangle is because I have never seen one) I know what a triangle is?"
* Yes, the brain's neurons firing and the triangle may have the same logical structure. Similarly, a CD of Mozart has the same logical structure as his music. However, hearing Mozart is different then holding a Mozart CD.
The structure is what enables the experience. Your comparison to a CD doesn't fit. The CD format is a predetermined type of structure but the analogy to the physical CD itself being unplayed in the present is not. Also, Mozart represents the contingent data placed into the predefined structure of the format, not a structure itself.

The brain first creates a matrix of neurons that have no given structure. Then a deeper brain function lower down the stem, provides a genetically pre-evolved 'program' that assigns a structure format (like color) to specific areas in the higher brain areas by pruning the connections within the matrix to create a unique set of spaces when the eyes first send data. If no information is sent when the window is open for brain development in specific areas, the area gets unassigned and remains in its matrix to allow it to be utilized by a different potential sense or other use.

Then, when these 'blank' structures are formed, the baby doesn't 'see' color yet until each color structure gets specifically assigned a value. When this process is complete, the color information from the eye can then interpret specific colors, like red or green. Then when one is experiencing a scene 'live' the particular color structures receive from the eyes first, then pass this on to another general but contingent set of structures that deal with associating things like the present experience of various other structures, like spatial location. Each level higher is more flexible than the ones before it. The lowest structures specifically define the exact feeling of an elemental form and become hardwired (cannot be easily erased). The next higher structures act as flexible memory structures (erasable) and connect the various structures being experienced relating to each other. There, for instance, it might connect the red/color structure to the location or specific address like 3_pixels_left,_4_up/space structure to be later erased and reused again. This is how we interpret reality consciously.

The particular feeling of 'red' (quale) is NOT actually 'red'. It is just a data assignment in a unique structural format. It is likely that all people who have identical structures 'feel' this the same way. But this may not be necessary. All that matters is that each 'feels' something similar to what they can appear to effectively communicate between each other what they mean to refer to in the environment. The structure must at least have a minimal set of memory spaces in order to agree to the same phenomena. Full color recognition, for instance, requires at least three arrays to cover the scope of potential colors; Sound at least needs one array for pitch and one for intensity (loundness).
raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

Ginkgo wrote:
Ginkgo wrote: ……………………….
“When I have a cup of coffee, the taste, smell and visual modalities combine to give me the experience of having a cup of coffee.”
Ginko
For the materialist there is no “experience.” Only neurons firing.
ME
“"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia….At first blush it would be hard to imagine a more quixotic quest than trying to convince people that there are no such properties as qualia; hence the ironic title of this chapter. But I am not kidding.”
Dennett
FROM
http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm
In the 4th paragraph Dennett tells us he is not denying the reality of conscious experience:

"Which idea of qualia am I trying to extripate? Everything has real properties and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's state of consciousness have properties of something happening in them at the time....."[/quote]
Ginko
Either this computer is messing up or PN is. Everything above this line should have been in the shaded quote box.
........................................................
Which shows his dishonesty! He denies subjective experience and then says that he never denied subjective experience! Dennett once was at my university and admitted that he says outrageous things that he does not believe in order to get publicity.
Subjective experience = qualia.,
" I grant moreover that each person's state of consciousness have properties of something happening in them...
Dennett ( the quote you gave)
In other words subjective!
Dennett is famous for contradicting himself.So he says that conscious experience has properties. OK, what? subjectivity? Nope,according to him. Oh yeah, he DEFINES consciousness as a brain state. IN other words he redefines "consciousness" . Cute trick, but it is VERY dishonest! Academic philosophers have renamed his book (Consciousness explained) Consciousness denied. Dennett should use the established definition of consciousness and simply admit that he does not believe that consciousness exists.
To say that pain is and only is C fibers firing is to say that pain does not hurt. Most philosophers regard Dennett as either slightly mentally ill ( Searle) OR A CON MAN.
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raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

Scott Mayers wrote:
raw_thought wrote:I am saying that knowing the structure ( pattern of neurons firing) that cause one to visualize a triangle is not the same as knowing what a triangle is. *
For example, the logical structure of the writing in a book corresponds to the logical structure of the subject it is explaining. However, pronouncing the words is not the same thing as understanding the book.
Below is me from a previous post.
"Similarly, are you saying that if my neurons fire in an X shape ( and that is all I know) and someone tells me that that means that I am visualizing a triangle ( and I have no clue what a triangle is because I have never seen one) I know what a triangle is?"
* Yes, the brain's neurons firing and the triangle may have the same logical structure. Similarly, a CD of Mozart has the same logical structure as his music. However, hearing Mozart is different then holding a Mozart CD.
The structure is what enables the experience. Your comparison to a CD doesn't fit. The CD format is a predetermined type of structure but the analogy to the physical CD itself being unplayed in the present is not. Also, Mozart represents the contingent data placed into the predefined structure of the format, not a structure itself.

The brain first creates a matrix of neurons that have no given structure. Then a deeper brain function lower down the stem, provides a genetically pre-evolved 'program' that assigns a structure format (like color) to specific areas in the higher brain areas by pruning the connections within the matrix to create a unique set of spaces when the eyes first send data. If no information is sent when the window is open for brain development in specific areas, the area gets unassigned and remains in its matrix to allow it to be utilized by a different potential sense or other use.

Then, when these 'blank' structures are formed, the baby doesn't 'see' color yet until each color structure gets specifically assigned a value. When this process is complete, the color information from the eye can then interpret specific colors, like red or green. Then when one is experiencing a scene 'live' the particular color structures receive from the eyes first, then pass this on to another general but contingent set of structures that deal with associating things like the present experience of various other structures, like spatial location. Each level higher is more flexible than the ones before it. The lowest structures specifically define the exact feeling of an elemental form and become hardwired (cannot be easily erased). The next higher structures act as flexible memory structures (erasable) and connect the various structures being experienced relating to each other. There, for instance, it might connect the red/color structure to the location or specific address like 3_pixels_left,_4_up/space structure to be later erased and reused again. This is how we interpret reality consciously.

The particular feeling of 'red' (quale) is NOT actually 'red'. It is just a data assignment in a unique structural format. It is likely that all people who have identical structures 'feel' this the same way. But this may not be necessary. All that matters is that each 'feels' something similar to what they can appear to effectively communicate between each other what they mean to refer to in the environment. The structure must at least have a minimal set of memory spaces in order to agree to the same phenomena. Full color recognition, for instance, requires at least three arrays to cover the scope of potential colors; Sound at least needs one array for pitch and one for intensity (loundness).
“The particular feeling of 'red' (quale) is NOT actually 'red'. It is just a data assignment in a unique structural format.”
Scott Mayer
I disagree. I experience red, pain, heat….
You are explaining how brain states correlate to experiences ( I never denied that they do) . You did not explain how they create experiences. As a matter of fact “conscious experience” never enters your discussion. It even seems that your explanation as to how the brain creates consciousness ( experiences) is to deny that experiences exist.
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