Questions for the friends of qualia.

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raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought » Tue Jul 07, 2015 12:40 am

So the proposition,
There is a dog on my property is not proven false if I prove that 1. It is not in my house and 2. it is not in my yard?????

raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought » Tue Jul 07, 2015 12:45 am

“I don't think it would matter if you came up with a valid syllogism because a materialist would simply deny one of the major premises. Namely, that the brain turns green or fires in the shape of a triangle. I don't know of any physicalist materialist who would make this claim.”
Ginko
Yes, he can deny premise one, but not both. I thought I made that clear.
“1. The brain ( or part of it, such as neurons firing in a triangular shape) resembles a triangle.
2. The brain does not have to resemble the triangle in order for it to present the same knowledge.
I proved 1 and 2 false. Therefore, the proposition (the materialist's proposition that the triangle is represented physically) must be false.”
ME
As I pointed out the materialist must say that the representation of the triangle resembles a triangle or it does not. I think that is fairly obvious. ( A or not A)
To say that the representation resembles a triangle is obviously absurd. To say that it still represents the triangle even tho it in no way resembles a triangle * is as silly as saying that if I pronounce the words in a book I understand the book.
* The neurons do not fire in the shape of the triangle etc. For example, does knowing that my neurons fire in the shape of an X mean that I know what a triangle is? Of course not.

raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought » Tue Jul 07, 2015 1:09 am

raw_thought wrote:.
1. Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.
2. Knowing what neurons are firing (when one visualizes a triangle) is not the same as knowing what a triangle is.
3. Therefore, there is knowledge that is not represented physically.
1 is pretty obvious. The neurons do not fire in the shape of a triangle. Similarly, when I visualize green my brain does not turn green. Nor when I think can anyone hear my thoughts with a sound amplifier.
To disagree with 2 is like saying that understanding a book only requires pronouncing the words. Obviously if you do not understand the language (the definitions/meanings of the words) you do not understand the book. If I know what neurons are firing when Einstein is thinking about Relativity, I do not necessarily understand Relativity.
Since the argument is valid and both premises (1 and 2) are true, the conclusion (3) follows.
"“Namely, that the brain turns green or fires in the shape of a triangle. I don't know of any physicalist materialist who would make this claim.”
Ginko

Note that proving the proposition " Visualized triangles are represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle." false is the same as proving the proposition " Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle." true. A positive premise can be expressed negatively. For example, the proposition, "all ravens are black" is equivalent to saying, " "anything not black is not a raven." *
You really should read my posts and not just skim over them. I have to keep repeating myself. I have said over and over that one's brain is not required to resemble a triangle ( according to the materialist) for it to represent a triangle!!!!! That is why I gave the materialist option [2] and proved that option false.
*
(1) All ravens are black.
In strict logical terms, via contraposition, this statement is equivalent to:
(2) Everything that is not black is not a raven.
It should be clear that in all circumstances where (2) is true, (1) is also true; and likewise, in all circumstances where (2) is false (i.e. if a world is imagined in which something that was not black, yet was a raven, existed), (1) is also false. This establishes logical equivalence.
FROM
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raven_paradox

Ginkgo
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Ginkgo » Tue Jul 07, 2015 9:45 am

raw_thought wrote:So the proposition,
There is a dog on my property is not proven false if I prove that 1. It is not in my house and 2. it is not in my yard?????
Yes, that is more than likely correct . It all depends on the domain of the discourse.
Last edited by Ginkgo on Tue Jul 07, 2015 11:51 am, edited 1 time in total.

Ginkgo
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Ginkgo » Tue Jul 07, 2015 10:08 am

raw_thought wrote:
Note that proving the proposition " Visualized triangles are represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle." false is the same as proving the proposition " Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle." true. A positive premise can be expressed negatively. For example, the proposition, "all ravens are black" is equivalent to saying, " "anything not black is not a raven." *
You really should read my posts and not just skim over them. I have to keep repeating myself. I have said over and over that one's brain is not required to resemble a triangle ( according to the materialist) for it to represent a triangle!!!!! That is why I gave the materialist option [2] and proved that option false.
And, I am saying over and over again, no physicalist/materialist is making such a claim.
*

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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought » Fri Jul 10, 2015 8:51 pm

????????????????????
You are saying that a materialist is not saying either of the below 2?????????????
1. The visualized triangle resembles a triangle.
2. The visualized triangle does not resemble a triangle.
Either the visualized triangle looks like a triangle or it does not. What is the third possibility that you propose??????????????

raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought » Fri Jul 10, 2015 8:57 pm

To say that my brain ( or part of it) resembles a triangle is silly. The neurons are not firing in a triangular shape. Similarly when I visualize green my brain does not turn green.
To say that my neurons firing do not resemble a triangle but present the same knowledge as knowing what a triangle is , is as silly as saying that if I pronounce the words in a book I understand the book.

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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought » Fri Jul 10, 2015 8:58 pm

Ginkgo wrote:
raw_thought wrote:
Note that proving the proposition " Visualized triangles are represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle." false is the same as proving the proposition " Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle." true. A positive premise can be expressed negatively. For example, the proposition, "all ravens are black" is equivalent to saying, " "anything not black is not a raven." *
You really should read my posts and not just skim over them. I have to keep repeating myself. I have said over and over that one's brain is not required to resemble a triangle ( according to the materialist) for it to represent a triangle!!!!! That is why I gave the materialist option [2] and proved that option false.
And, I am saying over and over again, no physicalist/materialist is making such a claim.
*
See the part that I made bold!!!!!!!!!!!!!Please at least read the posts that you quote!
Last edited by raw_thought on Fri Jul 10, 2015 9:06 pm, edited 1 time in total.

raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought » Fri Jul 10, 2015 9:02 pm

A materialist must say that,
1. The brain (or at least part of it ) must resemble a triangle.
OR
2. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey the same knowledge ( of knowing what a triangle is).
If he chooses 1, that is obviously absurd.
If he chooses 2, that is obviously absurd.
Therefore, his proposition that the triangle is represented physically is false.

Ginkgo
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Ginkgo » Sat Jul 11, 2015 12:16 am

Sorry Bob,I must have missed it... which parts are in bold?

Ginkgo
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Ginkgo » Sat Jul 11, 2015 2:00 am

raw_thought wrote:A materialist must say that,
1. The brain (or at least part of it ) must resemble a triangle.
OR
2. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey the same knowledge ( of knowing what a triangle is).
If he chooses 1, that is obviously absurd.
If he chooses 2, that is obviously absurd.
Therefore, his proposition that the triangle is represented physically is false.
Number 2 is the correct interpretation in my view. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey knowledge of a triangle because 'knowing' is not a single unified experience. Knowledge of any object is facilitated though many different modalities.in other words, different spatial and temporal mechanisms. Number 2 is not absurd.

Wyman
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Wyman » Sat Jul 11, 2015 2:56 pm

Ginkgo wrote:
raw_thought wrote:A materialist must say that,
1. The brain (or at least part of it ) must resemble a triangle.
OR
2. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey the same knowledge ( of knowing what a triangle is).
If he chooses 1, that is obviously absurd.
If he chooses 2, that is obviously absurd.
Therefore, his proposition that the triangle is represented physically is false.
Number 2 is the correct interpretation in my view. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey knowledge of a triangle because 'knowing' is not a single unified experience. Knowledge of any object is facilitated though many different modalities.in other words, different spatial and temporal mechanisms. Number 2 is not absurd.
And I would add that one could be true, replacing thee 'must' with 'may.' So ginko is 'obviously absurd' and I am obviously absurd plus a half.

Ginkgo
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Ginkgo » Sun Jul 12, 2015 3:54 am

I guess it all depends on what the words, "resemble a triangle" means. When I have a cup of coffee the taste, smell and visual modalities combine to give me the experience of having a cup of coffee. All of our experiences appear not to be restricted to a single modality, yet these modalities appear to subsume themselves into a single coffee experience. I don't see any reason to think that visualizing a triangle is restricted to a single modality (visual cortex). All of this is in the area of neural binding and cascades.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/neural_binding

Scott Mayers
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Scott Mayers » Sun Jul 12, 2015 9:38 am

I think the problem is resolved if we reduce the idea of 'qualia' to how the brain likely stores its data. Although I don't provide a precise means for this inside the brain, it can be described logically by analogy to 'C Computer Language' thing called a structure. To define this, you begin by pre-defining an array as a string of bits of any varying finite length. Then, a "structure" is a definition that describes a backbone of one or more arrays uniquely fit together. In a simplified example:

Definition of a Structure named "X":
-------An Array of "y" bits
-------A different Array of "w" bits
-------...

-------...
-------The last Array of "z" bits

Now each kind of sense (quale) would have a unique logical structure where the memory spaces represented as 'bits' are variable. So one (of a potential few co-ordinating structures in different areas of the brain) would have a unique logical structure.

To our consciousness, each of the particular similar structures have different values in their bit-combinations which are simply perceived as a unique phenomena without extra meaning. Color, for instance might be defined by the following imagined structure:

Definition of a Structure named "Color":
--------Array "Red" with 32 bits [unassigned]
--------Array "Green" with 32 bits [unassigned]
--------Array "Blue" with 24 bits [unassigned]......(I just made up the bit lengths as biology
----------------------------------------------------might arbitrarily through natural selection.)

Then, a particular realized sense can define pure white as:
Structure Color named "White": (ArrayRed[all bits '1'], ArrayGreen[all bits '1'],ArrayBlue[all bits '1'])

and black as:
Structure Color named "Black": (ArrayRed[all bits '0'], ArrayGreen[all bits '0'],ArrayBlue[all bits '0'])

All the other range of colors would be unique variations of the 'numbers' in these arrays where "number" means the number represented by the binary bits as a whole.


The 'sensation' is the particular definition without any actual meaning except the conscious brain creates these as distinct apparent phenomena that we interpret as unique 'quales'. While this may seem absurd to recognize this at first, it is the most rational means to explain all sensory data being perceived as qualia.

The intensities (how bright or dim) can also either have a separate structural definition or be represented by multiple contemporary memory spaces to which the structural definitions of each color apply.

This suggests that it may be likely too that what one perceives as "red" really can be shared identically. This is because if they fit the same logical form through its identical structure AND particular color definitions, the experiences are as to equal numbers in the rest of objective reality.

I could go on to describe "consciousness" but will leave this for a separate thread unless asked. Sorry if this type of explanation loses some of you.

[NOTE: you are welcome to use this idea of mine but simply give me a named credit if it is used for copyright purposes. This is my "poor-man's" Copyright as of publishing here now. And, I prefer a formal request if it is used in a profitable way. Credit this site too as the medium I used with respect. Thank you.]

raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought » Wed Jul 15, 2015 5:05 pm

Ginkgo wrote:
raw_thought wrote:A materialist must say that,
1. The brain (or at least part of it ) must resemble a triangle.
OR
2. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey the same knowledge ( of knowing what a triangle is).
If he chooses 1, that is obviously absurd.
If he chooses 2, that is obviously absurd.
Therefore, his proposition that the triangle is represented physically is false.
Number 2 is the correct interpretation in my view. The brain does not have to resemble a triangle to convey knowledge of a triangle because 'knowing' is not a single unified experience. Knowledge of any object is facilitated though many different modalities.in other words, different spatial and temporal mechanisms. Number 2 is not absurd.
Scroll back!
2 is absurd for many reasons. For example, to say that to know what neurons are firing is the same as knowing what a triangle is, is as absurd as saying that one understands a book by merely pronouncing the words.

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