Frankly, I left your qualia thread because I think you argue in circles - 'Obviously A is true as any nitwit can see. So, If A then B and if B then A. See how I've proven A!'raw_thought wrote:“I still would be interested in responses as to whether there is one quale here or two qualia.”
See Tractatus (Wittgenstein) 5.5423
Two different facts are experienced differently. Therefore there are 2 different quales. As I said previously, the Necker cube is an argument for qualia.
“"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia….At first blush it would be hard to imagine a more quixotic quest than trying to convince people that there are no such properties as qualia; hence the ironic title of this chapter. But I am not kidding.
“… and the pleasure, of saying things that shock’
Are you saying that Dennett didn’t really mean what he said? If he meant what he said, how does his definition of “qualia’ differ from the definition of “experience”?
“Again , you seem to equate knowledge with experience.”
I am saying that knowledge is an experience http://web.calstatela.edu/faculty/dpitt/whatsit.pdf .
Similarly, I might say that all dogs are mammals. That does not imply that all mammals are dogs.
"As for the Mozart CD , when a master musician reads a written score, cant he or she be said to know what the symphony sounds like as well as if he heard it?”
Similarly, if one put the CD in a CD player one would hear Mozart’s music. However, the knowledge would be different.
Dennett makes a category error. (He likes doing that!) He combines the signifier with the signified. http://changingminds.org/explanations/c ... nified.htm The pattern of neurons are the signifier ( There is nothing abstract about neurons firing) and the concept “blue” is the signified. Of course Dennett can claim that there are no such things as concepts and that signifiers are signifieds. But then his whole position is absurd because it relies on concepts.
I understand Dennett’s objection to the Mary’s room argument. I have explained above why his objection is absurd. However, lets for the moment pretend that his argument is valid. Ironically, unless he wants to say that I cannot identify blue without a MRI he must admit that quales are real!
I think that it is fairly obvious that knowing which neurons are firing when I love my wife is different than knowing that I love my wife. My neurons firing are the signifiers and my love is the signified. *
Dennett is like the Mat Damon character above. He understands the signifiers but not the meaning (signified).
* I am using the term signifier because the neurons facilitate meaning.
But I'll give it another shot. You clearly in the above post distinguish at least two kinds of knowledge and claim that all knowledge is an experience (but not all experience is knowledge). You say knowledge of hearing Mozart's music is different from knowledge of reading the score and imagining the music. What is the difference? I agree that the experiences could be said to differ, but what makes both of these instances of knowledge and what makes them different types of knowledge?
Seems to me that simply hearing Mozart's music is something that anyone can do - even a dog. What makes it knowledge?
The ability to read a score and thereby reconstruct the symphony in imagination is something much different - such ability does not seem to me to be an experience. It seems more like a state or disposition or capacity.