Questions for the friends of qualia.

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raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

"That is - 'I am trying to prove that something non-physical exists: imaginings are non-physical QED' That's not an argument, that's a statement."
wyman
If you had read my posts you would have seen that I proved that the visualized triangle is not represented physically.
Unless, of course you can show how premise 1 and/or 2 are false. I really do not see how you can.
raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

raw_thought wrote:1. Socrates was a man.
2. All men are mortal.
3. Therefore, Socrates was mortal.
Disagreeing with the truth value of a premise does not make an argument circular. Even if Socrates was not a man, that makes the argument untrue, not circular.
Similarly, you may object to premise 1 and 2 below, but that does not make my argument circular.
1. Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.
2. Knowing what neurons are firing (when one visualizes a triangle) is not the same as knowing what a triangle is.

3. Therefore, there is knowledge that is not represented physically.
1 is pretty obvious. The neurons do not fire in the shape of a triangle. Similarly, when I visualize green my brain does not turn green. Nor when I think can anyone hear my thoughts with a sound amplifier.
To disagree with 2 is like saying that understanding a book only requires pronouncing the words. Obviously if you do not understand the language (the definitions/meanings of the words) you do not understand the book. If I know what neurons are firing when Einstein is thinking about Relativity, I do not necessarily understand Relativity.
Since the argument is valid and both premises (1 and 2) are true, the conclusion (3) follows.
Premise 1 and 2 in the bold print.
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Hobbes' Choice
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Hobbes' Choice »

raw_thought wrote:1. Socrates was a man.
1. Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.
2. Knowing what neurons are firing (when one visualizes a triangle) is not the same as knowing what a triangle is.
3. Therefore, there is knowledge that is not represented physically..
1. This is a premise you cannot make.
2. Obviously true.

3. A complete an utter non-sequitur even if premises 1 and 2 were unimpeachable, you do not get to conclude 3.

What you have said is not a classic syllogism. It's more like.
1. Giraffes are tall.
2. John Cleese is tall.
3. Therefore there is a tribe of tall people in the Masai Mara.
raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

If premises 1 and 2 are true, one must reach the conclusion 3.
Simple basic logic. ( I can send logic sites)
There are only two ways that a person can claim that knowledge ( in the case of the visualized triangle) is represented physically. 1. That there is the physical form of the triangle in the brain. 2. That there is not a physical form of the triangle, but it does not matter because the same knowledge ( what a triangle is) is represented by neurons firing which are physical.
Since 1 and 2 are both impossible ( the only two options, there is the physical form of a triangle or there is not the physical form of a triangle) , 3 follows.That there is at least one example of knowledge that is not represented physically.
Your example of a fallacy syllogism has NOTHING to do with what we are talking about and shows that you are totally confused.
Here is what i wrote to Wyman. Hopefully, this will cure your confusion,

What makes you think that the only way one could describe seeing green as physical is by claiming that your brain must turn green?"
wyman
I am not claiming that. See above post. there are two options.
1. Visualized triangles are represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.
2. Knowing what neurons are firing (when one visualizes a triangle) is the same as knowing what a triangle is.
I showed that both * options cannot be true .
Therefore, it follows that some knowledge is not represented physically.
* There are only two options. Either the triangle takes the form of a triangle in a person's brain or it does not. Either my brain turns green or it does not.
Last edited by raw_thought on Tue Jun 16, 2015 7:25 pm, edited 4 times in total.
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

I cannot make the premise that Socrates was a man because it is obviously true?????????????????????????????
Or are you referring to this,
“1. Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.”

Isn’t it obvious that the neurons do not fire in the shape of a triangle? Similarly, when I visualize green my brain does not turn green. Nor when I think can anyone hear my thoughts with a sound amplifier.
But then you said that that was obvious. You are really hard to follow!
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

Much of twentieth century analytic philosophy dealt with theory of meaning. Your blurb on signifier/signified is simplistic and barely scratches the surface of the subject matter.”
Wyman
You honestly fail to understand that there is nothing abstract about neurons firing? Or that meaning requires concepts?
I am not currently writing a book about analytical philosophy and will not explore every aspect of analytical philosophy. However, the scratch (as you put it) fulfills the purpose of showing that knowing what neurons are firing is not the same as knowing what a triangle is.
Wyman
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Wyman »

raw_thought wrote:"
What makes you think that the only way one could describe seeing green as physical is by claiming that your brain must turn green?"
wyman
I am not claiming that. See above post. there are two options.
1. Visualized triangles are represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.
2. Knowing what neurons are firing (when one visualizes a triangle) is the same as knowing what a triangle is.
I showed that both * options are false.
Therefore, it follows that some knowledge is not represented physically.
* There are only two options. Either the triangle takes the form of a triangle in a person's brain or it does not. Either my brain turns green or it does not.
Since when was this about knowledge - you are making a metaphysical statement that nonphysical 'things' exist.
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Rilx
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Rilx »

raw_thought wrote:1. Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.
2. Knowing what neurons are firing (when one visualizes a triangle) is not the same as knowing what a triangle is.
3. Therefore, there is knowledge that is not represented physically.
1 is pretty obvious. The neurons do not fire in the shape of a triangle. Similarly, when I visualize green my brain does not turn green. Nor when I think can anyone hear my thoughts with a sound amplifier.
To disagree with 2 is like saying that understanding a book only requires pronouncing the words. Obviously if you do not understand the language (the definitions/meanings of the words) you do not understand the book. If I know what neurons are firing when Einstein is thinking about Relativity, I do not necessarily understand Relativity.
Since the argument is valid and both premises (1 and 2) are true, the conclusion (3) follows.
I really can't say whether we agree or disagree raw_thought. Your post I quoted above is quite ambiguous. Seems that it boils down to the concept representation. I haven't read all your posts though.

In my opinion, if we think it primarily from the viewpoint of physicalism, your premise 2 is false. What neurons are firing, forms the physical representation of a triangle. It doesn't have triangular shape, of course. You have to understand the brain "language" of the very experiencer of the very triangle; no general knowledge of brains is enough, because the uniqueness of both genetic brains and lifetime experiences have created an unique dialect. It's practically impossible to find the representation, but it exists for sure. That's the physical level of this case, concerning structural brains.

Now to the qualia level, concerning functional brains. Painting with a broad brush we can say that our "thinking brain" (mostly frontal cortex) consists of interneurons between sensory and motor functions. As in the animal kingdom, our life is about perceiving and acting in the world. In this case, perceiving triangles to act in the world of triangles. :) Meaning of a triangle comes from how we relate ourselves with triangles of the world; how our brains prepare our muscles move us to handle triangles. This triangle-preparedness fires the appropriate neurons. Paraphrasing Nagel, this is what it is like to be me with triangles.

Naturally there can be other kind of representations of triangles in the visual cortex and possibly elsewhere, but above is my opinion when it concerns "full qualia" of triangles.


"Experience is not what happens to you; it's what you do with what happens to you."
~ ~ Aldous Huxley
raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

Do you agree that a physical representation either [1] resembles what it represents and/or [2] does not resemble what it represents?
Do you agree that [1] is silly because it is obvious that when one visualizes a triangle one’s neurons do not fire in a triangular shape? Similarly, do you think that it is silly to say that one’s brain turns green when one visualizes green?
Do you agree that [2] is silly because it is obvious that knowing what neurons are firing (when visualizing a triangle) is different than knowing what a triangle is? * To say that the knowledge is identical is as silly as saying that one understands a book by merely pronouncing the words. That is why I compared neurons firing to signifiers.
Wyman, when you wrote, “ what makes you think that the ONLY way we could describe seeing green as physical is by claiming that your brain turns green” I realized that you are only skimming over my posts. If you had taken the time to read my posts it would have been obvious that I gave more than one option for the materialist and that when I mentioned https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_grounding_problem I was exploring option [2].
*Actually, I never called anyone stupid. I wrote that it is silly to believe that your brain turns green when you visualize green…etc.
PS: My argument was not circular. Its form was,
1. Visualized triangles are not represented physically. (I proved that by showing that the only options for the materialist [1] and [2] are untenable.
2. Materialists believe that everything (including knowledge) is represented physically.
3. Therefore, since there is at least one thing (the visualized triangle) not represented physically, the materialist’s position must be false. There is knowledge that is not represented physically (qualia)!
raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

Wyman wrote:
raw_thought wrote:"
What makes you think that the only way one could describe seeing green as physical is by claiming that your brain must turn green?"
wyman
I am not claiming that. See above post. there are two options.
1. Visualized triangles are represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.
2. Knowing what neurons are firing (when one visualizes a triangle) is the same as knowing what a triangle is.
I showed that both * options are false.
Therefore, it follows that some knowledge is not represented physically.
* There are only two options. Either the triangle takes the form of a triangle in a person's brain or it does not. Either my brain turns green or it does not.
Since when was this about knowledge - you are making a metaphysical statement that nonphysical 'things' exist.
And I proved that "metaphysical" statement. See above!
Also and at the risk of repeating myself ( I have to because you only skim over my posts)
http://web.calstatela.edu/faculty/dpitt/whatsit.pdf
PS: Do you know that "metaphysical' does not( in the philosophical sense) refer to anything mystical? It is meta-knowledge. Knowledge about knowledge, for example, metalanguage concerns such things as Chomsky http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archive ... in-lingui/ etc. Metaphysics refers to such questions as why are the laws of physics the way they are.
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

“In my opinion, if we think it primarily from the viewpoint of physicalism, your premise 2 is false. What neurons are firing, forms the physical representation of a triangle. It doesn't have triangular shape, of course.”
Rilx
So you are saying that knowing what neurons are firing (when you visualize a triangle) and knowing what a triangle is are the same knowledge?*
I am not saying that it has to resemble a triangle. I took both ( resemble and does not resemble) into account. option [1]= resembles [2]= does not resemble.
* If I only pronounce the words in a book, does that mean that I understand the book?
Ginkgo
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Ginkgo »

raw_thought wrote: 1. Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.
2. Knowing what neurons are firing (when one visualizes a triangle) is not the same as knowing what a triangle is.

3. Therefore, there is knowledge that is not represented physically.
Raw thought, I would suggest you cannot have a syllogism with two negative premises.
Last edited by Ginkgo on Thu Jun 25, 2015 12:58 pm, edited 1 time in total.
raw_thought
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

????
So , if the only way that a proposition can be true is if premise 1 and/or premise 2 are true and I prove that both are false, I have not proven the proposition false?????????????
A materialist must claim that
1. The brain ( or part of it, such as neurons firing in a triangular shape) resembles a triangle.
2. The brain does not have to resemble the triangle in order for it to present the same knowledge.
I proved 1 and 2 false. Therefore, the proposition (the materialist's proposition that the triangle is represented physically) must be false.
I can supply you with logic and critical thinking sites.
Last edited by raw_thought on Tue Jun 30, 2015 1:08 am, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by raw_thought »

“You have to understand the brain language of the very experiencer of the triangle; no general knowledge of brain is enough…”
Rilx
Agreed! The visualizer of the triangle knows everything about his/her particular brain.
Let’s temporarily, take the materialist stance. When I visualize a triangle I don’t see a triangle. * However , I know that when my neurons fire in a particular pattern ( let’s say X)I am visualizing a triangle. Isn’t that obviously self-contradictory?
……………….
“Meaning of a triangle COMES FROM how we relate ourselves with triangles of the world; how our brains prepare our muscles move us to handle triangles…Paraphrasing Nagel, this is what it is like to be me with triangles.”
Rilx
Nagel would never say that. He does not believe that the definition of “experience” is “neurons firing.”
There is a difference between knowing what caused something and knowing what it is. For example, the definition of “falling domino” is not “another domino hitting it.” Note the “COMES FROM” I never denied that neurons facilitate our perception of a triangle. However, “this pattern of neurons firing” is not the definition (meaning) of “triangle”.
As I said previously, to say that knowing what neurons are firing (when I visualize a triangle) is equivalent to experiencing the meaning of a triangle is as silly as saying that if I pronounce the words in a book I understand the book.
* Option [2], I do not see a triangle because there is no physical triangle, for a materialist only the physical exists.
Ginkgo
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Re: Questions for the friends of qualia.

Post by Ginkgo »

raw_thought wrote: ]1. Visualized triangles are not represented in the brain in the physical shape of a triangle.
2. Knowing what neurons are firing (when one visualizes a triangle) is not the same as knowing what a triangle is.
3. Therefore, there is knowledge that is not represented physically.

Rational wiki
Rules of validity

Hundreds of different kinds of syllogisms can be arranged, but the vast majority of these are invalid. To be considered valid, a syllogism must follow six basic rules.

1. A syllogism must contain exactly three terms. The violation of this rule is called the fallacy of four terms.
2.A syllogism must have exactly three propositions.
3.The middle term must be distributed at least one time. Violating this rule results in the fallacy of the undistributed middle. (When checking for this and the next rule, it is useful to mark the distribution of every term in the syllogism.)
4.No term that is undistributed in the premise may be distributed in the conclusion. The violation of this rule is either the fallacy of the illicit major or the fallacy of the illicit minor depending on whether the minor or major term contains the fallacy. (See illicit process.)
5.A syllogism cannot have two negative premises.
6.If a syllogism contains a negative premise, the conclusion must be negative; conversely, if it contains a negative conclusion, it must contain a negative premise. [/quote]

Number 5 ???

Raw thought, I don't think it would matter if you came up with a valid syllogism because a materialist would simply deny one of the major premises. Namely, that the brain turns green or fires in the shape of a triangle. I don't know of any physicalist materialist who would make this claim.
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