Wyman wrote:
I am not nickpicking (I hope), but trying to make sure I have an understanding of how you and seagull are using terminology.
I understand 'ontology' as consisting of the objects (and relations of objects) of a deductive system or worldview or paradigm. So, I would say that physics does have an ontology. Newton takes gravity as an element or object of his system. Elements are not defined, they are 'posited' as part of an axiomatic system. In being posited, he does not further define it - he tells us he cannot.
Similarly, points and lines in geometry are undefined terms. Representing them as lines and dots on paper is called an 'interpretation.'
F=MA, is an axiom of Newton's physics. Force, Mass, Acceleration and the objects described by them are posits and part of his ontology. The posited objects of his ontology are interpreted, but not defined.
In mathematics, if the interpretation of the axioms (think simple geometry with points and lines) is true, then the interpretation is called a 'model.' This is important when we talk of 'counter examples.' If a theorem is proposed and it can be shown that it would contradict the model, then the theorem is necessarily false .
Physics tries to be a deductive system. But unlike geometry, it's sole purpose is to support a model of reality (not to entertain eggheads and torture high school students). And unlike geometry, the 'axioms' are not taken as true by fiat. If a 'counter example' is produced, then the theorem is false. But rather than stopping there, as we can do in geometry, scientists are free to tweak the whole system if the 'counterexample' is important enough - all the way down to the axioms in some cases (as in what is called by Kuhn a paradigm shift, I think), or in a fundamental shift in the interpretation of that system, or both.
So Newton's system and its interpretation is useful in a limited context. But it is not a model of reality because of its (implicit) misinterpretation of time as absolute. His paradigm was flawed.
Now, is your idea of a 'paradigm' and 'ontology' the same as mine - i.e. the deductive system (and its interpretation) of physics along with its posited elements?
I wanted to get this terminology straight so as to be able to meaningfully ask the following question: am I correct in my impression that you and seagull maintain the following:
that, although no one proposition within a paradigm (such as a physical theory) could be said to be 'absolutely' true, nonetheless, it is possible for the whole paradigm to be an 'accurate representation of reality' and therefore true with a capital 'T'?
I think you are getting close to the mark. What makes Newton so different to Aristotle is that he doesn't attempt to explain what gravity actually IS. To do so would be to fall to the Aristotelian trap of doing metaphysical ontology in relation to gravity. Physics just makes the assumption that gravity exists, or gravity is a physical law that affects objects. In other words, things such as gravity have the same ontological status as other physical things in the world. This is the non-metaphysical ontological conclusion that science makes.
I guess you could say that metaphysical ontology and non-metaphysical scientific ontology are paradigms that exist in distinct domains. Metaphysical ontology deals with questions as to what gravity actually is, while scientific ontology deals with putting labels on physical objects, and in the case of gravity this non-physical object needs a label. Scientific paradigms and metaphysical paradigms use different methodologies so there is no paradigm overlapping.