What is truth?

[creativesoul]

...'Use logic and prove for all of us to see, anything that is a fact yet not the truth, and anything that is the truth yet not a fact. You can't! Because it's impossible, because in the end, after all procedures are met, they are one in the same, requiring the same elements of thought to ensure their certainty.'

It's a fact that the Earth revolves around the sun;
It's true that the Earth revolves around the sun;
It's real that the Earth revolves around the sun.

It's a fact that there's a particular tree on a particular hill;
It's true that there's a particular tree on a particular hill;
It's real that there's a particular tree on a particular hill.

Must I go on? Show me otherwise. It's impossible!

It's not impossible.

What sorts of things are capable of being true, and exactly what makes them so?

[raw_thought]

It is true that the earth revolves around the sun. My pet is a dog. However, that does not mean that " pet" is another word for " dog". I also own a cat. Similarly , "truth" is not another word for " earth revolves around the sun."

[henry quirk]

"truth" is not another word for " earth revolves around the sun."

That's not what SoB (or I) said.

Truth is what is true, what is true is what is real, so: truth (the true[ful] statement) is that which describes what is real.

That's what I've been sayin' and, it seems to me, that's what SoB is sayin' (neither of us redfining words, imposing idiosyncratic meanings).

Now, a body can dick around, arguing over the precision of a truthful statement, but this is separate from the basic idea that truth, at heart, is what is real (whether described or not...that is: the true (truth) is that which we describe, not that which we make true through description).

You, for example, own and care for a dog. If I say you have a pet, I'm stating a truth. Not as precise a statement as 'you have a dog' but still true, still a description of what is real. If I say you have a cat (knowing damn well you have a dog) then my statement is untrue (a friggin' lie).

Another example: 'fire burns'...a true statement (truth). And it's true even if I never see, assess, and talk about the fire. Lightning strikes a tree in the woods and it burns just the same, unobserved, as would the oak in my back yard that I do observe.

So: language doesn't determine what is true, it (more specifically, the language user) merely describes what is true (with varying degrees of success).

I'm not seein' how any of this is difficult to grasp or disputable (but then, I'm not an 'academic' philosopher...me: just a guy livin' in the real world).

[Terrapin Station]

What's real and descriptions of what's real are two different things.

Unless you believe something akin to "Only descriptions exist."

[Hobbes' Choice]

What's real and descriptions of what's real are two different things.

Unless you believe something akin to "Only descriptions exist."

Does that mean, truth is only a description.
OR
Does that mean the truth is really out there?

[Terrapin Station]

What's real and descriptions of what's real are two different things.

Unless you believe something akin to "Only descriptions exist."

Does that mean, truth is only a description.
OR
Does that mean the truth is really out there?

It means that Henry's view has problems.

[raw_thought]

" so: truth (the true[ful] statement) is that which describes what is real."
Henry
So you finally agree that truth does not = reality. Truth is when a statement describes reality.

[Hobbes' Choice]

What's real and descriptions of what's real are two different things.

Unless you believe something akin to "Only descriptions exist."

Does that mean, truth is only a description.
OR
Does that mean the truth is really out there?

It means that Henry's view has problems.

That's a given. I was wondering what YOUR answer was.

[Hobbes' Choice]

" so: truth (the true[ful] statement) is that which describes what is real."
Henry
So you finally agree that truth does not = reality. Truth is when a statement describes reality.

That's the normative description. But truth is used validly to comply to a lesser standard too' such as religious truth, moral truth. You might even say of literature that it has a truthful account of friendship or human relations, when it is actually 100% fiction.
Truth is in fact when one statement or account complies with your view of the world.

[Londoner]

Now, a body can dick around, arguing over the precision of a truthful statement, but this is separate from the basic idea that truth, at heart, is what is real (whether described or not...that is: the true (truth) is that which we describe, not that which we make true through description).

Yes; I think everybody would want to say that must be right.

But the problem they are dealing with is how we connect with 'the real', in words or thought. You write:

You, for example, own and care for a dog. If I say you have a pet, I'm stating a truth. Not as precise a statement as 'you have a dog' but still true, still a description of what is real.

In all those sentences you are using general terms; 'a dog', 'a pet' etc. But the thing that is real, the thing you can see and touch is not a general category, it is something unique, something specific.

This seems a silly quibble. We can easily explain that by 'dog' we mean something with a particular set of physical features, that although we have to use such general terms as 'dog' to communicate, when we say 'the dog is real' we are not talking about words we use, but about experiences; we mean we can actually touch it etc.

But we get into similar problems describing experiences, like touching, which is also a general term. I cannot understand 'I touch the dog' without a general notion of 'touching' that isn't real, in that it doesn't represent an actual act of touching. We are trying to get to the point where 'what is true' exactly equates to some particualr physical experience, in a simple way, without the complications of language and logic.

Trouble is, we can't do it. So we are in this weird position of never being able to express a simple truth. As you put it, there is the basic idea about what truth must be 'at heart' yet we are still 'dicking around', arguing about truthful statements, and philosophers feel this is something we should have got sorted.

Because if we can't, then we have to conclude that although there may still be such a thing as 'truth', we can't talk about it!

[raw_thought]

We can easily explain that by 'dog' we mean something with a particular set of physical features, that although we have to use such general terms as 'dog' to communicate, when we say 'the dog is real' we are not talking about words we use, but about experiences; we mean we can actually touch it etc.

But we get into similar problems describing experiences, like touching, which is also a general term. I cannot understand 'I touch the dog' without a general notion of 'touching' that isn't real, in that it doesn't represent an actual act of touching. We are trying to get to the point where 'what is true' exactly equates to some particualr physical experience, in a simple way, without the complications of language and logic.

Trouble is, we can't do it. So we are in this weird position of never being able to express a simple truth. As you put it, there is the basic idea about what truth must be 'at heart' yet we are still 'dicking around', arguing about truthful statements, and philosophers feel this is something we should have got sorted.

Because if we can't, then we have to conclude that although there may still be such a thing as 'truth', we can't talk about it!

I agree. Abstractions are not tangible. There is an interesting subject called cognitive phenomenology.* Basically, it is about how it feels to know something. Since all experiences are ineffable, all experiences are quales. Since all we have are quales ( experiences ) everything is a quale.
That is why some deny that "qualia" has any meaning. Similarly, one could say that "existence" is meaningless ( the word doesn't refer to anything in particular) . However, we all know that things exist and that we feel pain etc. Perhaps there is knowledge not based on language ( ineffable)!
* http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/a ... gy_web.pdf

[raw_thought]

" so: truth (the true[ful] statement) is that which describes what is real."
Henry
So you finally agree that truth does not = reality. Truth is when a statement describes reality.

That's the normative description. But truth is used validly to comply to a lesser standard too' such as religious truth, moral truth. You might even say of literature that it has a truthful account of friendship or human relations, when it is actually 100% fiction.
Truth is in fact when one statement or account complies with your view of the world.

However, even then "truth" is a correspondence ( ironically and this is interesting as I mentioned previously the correspondence theory of truth has problems) between a proposition and reality. For example, I can lie and say that I am sad. My statement is not the truth because it doesn't correspond to my state of mind.

[raw_thought]

I love the fact that this site enflames the passion for fundamental questions such as, what is truth!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BtckVng_1a0

[Scott Mayers]

I don't know if I already commented in this particular thread at some point. So I apologize up front.

"Truth" is just a relative 'value' label we assign to any two things (minimal) that 'fit' into the same logical Universal, as a third factor in common.

To logic, this is just the 'validity' of the connections between things ignoring the semantic meaning of the inputs. Then, if such inputs (premises) are ALSO 'fit' to the same identical 'universal' (like our universe, as one such contingent 'universal'), we say that the data and its logical connections are "sound" (semantically) as well as "valid". Then the 'truth' value, is the preferential FAVOR we hold to our understood and hopefully shared, 'fitness' in that universal.

If A implies C, and B implies C, A is 'fit' with B in C.

That is given each A, B, and C, where C is the relative Universal and the others are relative parts or members, when each of these are established AND fit to that conditional, A relating to C and B relating to that same C makes each of A and B CONSISTENTLY 'fit' together to which we assign the 'value', True, between their common relationship.

If either A or B does NOT 'fit' collectively in C, we assign a 'value', not-True to their common 'fitness' in C.


In kind, the literal values of A and B may be equally 'unfit' to C, which means they are EQUALLY 'unfit' in kind. This form of "coinciding" fitness, makes them True by their common link, "NON-C". That is, they both belong to the class outside of C, and so still SHARE their common fitness to C, as a universal. This makes what is "TRUE" a function of COINCIDING fitness.

"True" and "not-True" are thus relative values we assign to those things we deem IDENTICAL in 'value' relative to some Universal.

Interesting though, for any 'absolute' value to something to ALL reality, only what is NOT-True, encapsulates or 'completes' what is both 'True and not-True' but never the case if you only assume all reality as 'absolutely' originating as having a default "True" value.

This can be summed up by saying that if we begin with absolute 0, 0 = 0 & 1. This 'contradiction' is alright though beginning in absolute 0.

But if we begin with some absolute 1, then 1 = 1 & Not 0. But if 'not 0', then absolutely EVERYTHING is 'true' making 'truth' values themselves assure that there is no meaning to say that even anything is 'false' (not-true) somewhere. This proves that beginning in absolute 0 (absolute nothing), the nature of 'contradiction' is the FORCE of any 'value' to have meaning.

This is like instead of assuming "God creating everything default to 'good' ", since it leads to the problem that it must then be responsible for EVIL; But beginning in the reverse, that "God created everything defaulted to 'evil' ", this is alright because then what is 'good' is merely an IMPROVEMENT we approach to the 'fitness' in that domain. That is, a 'god' would be wiser to find purpose in us if it could throw out everything as possible to begin with and then to sort out those things that 'fit' with its intended ideal like evolution favors the 'fitness' of those things by selecting the things that fit by equally eliminating those that don't. But as we know, the 'extinct' things are not somehow LESS significantly valid at some point even though their present value is 'not-true'.

[raw_thought]

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence/#Cri