Epistemology, Propositions

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RCSaunders
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Epistemology, Propositions

Post by RCSaunders » Fri Aug 09, 2019 2:59 pm

[NOTE: This article follows the article, "Epistemology, Concepts," which should be read before this one. It is not possible to understand what propositions are without understanding what concepts are.]

All knowledge is propositional. All we know is in the form of propositions.

The word, "propositions," is used throughout philosophy with many different definitions especially in relationship to logic. In this article a proposition is defined as follows: A proposition is a verbal statement or sentence that asserts something about something else.

The Simple Basic Structure Of Propositions

Very few of the sentences we use in every day speech, writing, or thinking will very closely follow the basic structure of propositions. While there are no rules for how propositions must be formed, because language is a human invention, a description of how basic propositions are formed will explain what a proposition must do to be knowledge.

Propositions are sentences or statements that assert a relationship or relationships between two or more existents. The existents and the relationships are identified by their concepts or descriptions, which are designated by the words, or phrases that designate them. The designating words in a proposition are called terms.

Every basic proposition consists of three terms, a subject, about which the assertion is being made; a predicate which is being asserted about the subject, and a copula, which specifies the exact relationship between the subject and predicate.

In the proposition, "coffee is a beverage," the terms are, "coffee," "is," and "a beverage." "Coffee," is the subject, "a beverage," is the predicate, and "is" is the copula. In basic propositions, the copula is usually a form of the verbs, "to be" or "has."

The copulas, "is," or "has," in basic propositions do not mean "equal to," or, "identical with," but simply that the existent identified by the subject term, "is or has," whatever quality, relationship, action, or category is indicated by the predicate term.

A proposition does not assert a relationship between the concepts or the terms of the proposition, but between the existents the concepts or descriptions identify. In the example proposition, it is not the term, "coffee," that is the term, "beverage, and it is not the "concept coffee" that is "the concept beverage" (you cannot drink concepts) it is the "actual black liquid" identified by, "coffee" that is "something you drink" identified by the universal concept "beverage."

The terms, "subject" and "predicate" in basic propositions is not identical with the same terms in English grammar. The subject may consist of any number of words as may the predicate. In the proposition, "the last person leaving the room is responsible for turning out the lights," "the last person leaving the room," is the subject, and, "responsible for turning out the lights," is the predicate.

Knowledge and Propositions

All knowledge consists of propositions which may be actual propositions or implied. All knowledge is knowledge about things. In propositions, the things that are known about are subjects, and the things known about subjects are predicates. The subject, "thing," is whatever existent or existents are identified by the concept or description identifying what it is the predicate is about. The predicate that is "what is asserted," about the subject, is a concept or description identifying what is asserted about the subject.

In the simplest propositions, the subject and predicate consist of single terms, such as, "plants are living," and "water is liquid."

Propositional Forms

Every proposition asserts something (the predicate) about something else (the subject). The usual form of a proposition is, "the subject is the predicate," or, "the subject has the predicate."

The subject (A) of a proposition may be a concept for or description of a single existent, a combination of existents, a category of existents (universal), material or epistemological including: existents, qualities, actions (events, behavior), or relationships. The predicate (B) may be a concept for or description of a category of existents (universal), a quality, an action (events, behavior), or relationship. A relationship (x) may be any kind of relationship, material or epistemological. The following are all the possible forms of propositions:

something is a referent of a universal. (A is a B)
something has a specific quality (A has quality B)
something is doing (or does) some action (A does B)
something has a specific relationship to something else (A has relationship x to B)

A proposition may assert the negative of any proposition:

something is not a referent of a universal. (A is not a B)
something does not have a specific quality (A has no quality B)
something is not doing (or does not do) some action (A does not do B)
something does not have a specific relationship to something else (A has no relationship x to B)

A proposition may assert a past version of any proposition:

something was a referent of a universal. (A was a B)
something had a specific quality (A had quality B)
something was doing (or did) some action (A did B)
something had a specific relationship to something else (A had relationship x to B)

A proposition may assert a past negative version of any proposition:

something was not a referent of a universal. (A was not a B)
something did not have a specific quality (A had no quality B)
something was not doing (or did not do) some action (A did not do B)
something did not have a specific relationship to something else (A has relationship x to B)

Future Propositions

Since everything a human being does must be consciously chosen, the thought processes used to make choices are always about the future, whether that future is the next moment or many years later. Propositions about the future are different from all others, because they are neither true or false.

Every future proposition is hypothetical. It is hypothetical in the sense that it is conditional, contingent on all things being what they are presently known to be. Future propositions are certain to the degree they are based on principles and whatever they are contingent on is known. A proposition that states the velocity of an object falling toward the earth is almost perfectly certain while a proposition about the tomorrow's weather is much less certain.

What Future Propositions Assert

Future propositions assert the same kind of relationships all propositions assert. All future propositions, however, imply the contingent context of what they assert, as, for example: "within the context of what is currently known," or, "all things remaining as they are currently known to be."

something will be a referent of a universal. (A will be a B)
something will have a specific quality (A will have quality B)
something will be doing (or will do) some action (A will do B)
something will have a specific relationship to something else (A will have relationship x to B)

A proposition may assert a future negative version of any proposition:

something will not be a referent of a universal. (A will not be a B)
something will not have a specific quality (A will not have quality B)
something will not be doing (or will not do) some action (A will do B)
something will not have a specific relationship to something else (A will not have relationship x to B)

Universal and conditional propositions based on principles are sometimes stated in future form but are not really future propositions. For example, "triangular braces will provide rigid support," or, "water will freeze at temperatures below minus 32 degrees F. are not future, but "timeless" propositions.

Propositions of intention may be in future form, "Tomorrow I'll see the doctor." Such propositions are not true if they are predictions, but are true if they are only intentions and really are what one intends, because they are then present propositions.

Variations Of Propositional Forms

Propositions must assert one of the above, but do not have to be in the exact form described. One of the most common forms of propositions uses the copula "equals" (=). In propositions, "equals," means, "has the specific quantitative quality." For example, "A equals B," means, "something A has the specific quantitative quality B," or, "something A has the same specific quantitative quality as B." "A equals B," may also be a relationship x, where relationship x is "has the same value as," "A = B" like the relationships, "has a greater value than," "A > B" and "has a lesser value than, "A < B." Quantitative propositions assume values are "counts" or "measurements in commensurable units."

The proposition, "something A is something B," (A is B), if A and B are both existents, the proposition is not possible, because no two things can be the same thing. Propositions of the form A is B, where A or B is a descriptive attribute (a quality, an action, or a relationship) like Bill is the "culprit" (a quality), or Fitzgerald is "the author of Gatsby" (an action), are not, as some ignorant philosophers have tried to claim, tautologies. A true tautology would be "A is B" where A and B are simply different "words" for the same concept, such as, "a home is a casa," which are just the English word and Spanish word for the same concept and is exactly the same in meaning as, "a home is a home," which might be interesting rhetoric, but is not a legitimate proposition.

The reason these twenty four basic propositions are all the possible propositions there are, is because existents, (physical entities and epistemological existents), events, attributes, and relationships are all there is. Events, attributes, and relationships exist, so are also existents, and can be identified by concepts and related to other existents in propositions. No attributes, events, or relationships, however, exists independently of the existents they are the actions of, the attributes of, or the relationships between. Any proposition that treats any attribute, action, or relationship as though it existed independently is an invalid proposition.

The basic propositions described are not some kind of law or ontological principles, they are the sum of reasoned observation. Epistemology is not dictated by some authority, it is discovered by human beings, just as all other disciplines, like the sciences, geography, or history. If some other suitable way of identifying the nature of propositions were devised, so long as it did not contradict how they are actually used and how they are actually constructed, it could be just as valid as the way they are here described and classified.

Common Propositions

Very few of the propositions we use when thinking, writing, or speaking will be in the exact form of basic propositions, but any proposition or statement we make, if it is true, will be able to be put into the form of a basic proposition or a set of basic propositions.

[NOTE: This is not some kind of philosophical rule or principle, but a way of understanding if what we think, write, and say is true or not. It is not only possible, but very common, to say things in ways that are so complex, convoluted, and ambiguous that, whether they are true or not, or even if they actually say anything, is difficult to determine. The virtue of the formal propositions is that what they assert is always explicit and whether what they assert is true or not is much easier to determine.]

Every proposition, basic or common, is an expression of a relationship or relationships. It is a statement that asserts something about something else, or simply a relationship between two things. The "things" may be single things, groups of things, classes of things, and may be any existent or existents identified by a concept or a description.

In the proposition, "the concert begins at eight o'clock," what is being asserted is not about the concert, but at what time the concert starts. To put the proposition in formal form it might be rewritten, "the start of the concert is eight o'clock," or, "the concert's beginning is at eight o'clock." It is now clear the subject is, "the concert's beginning, and the predicate is, "at eight o'clock." Whether the proposition is true or not is determined by whether or not the scheduled time for the beginning of the concert is really eight o'clock, which can be determined by checking the concert program schedule.

Since everything has an ontological or epistemological context most of the propositions we use will either assume that context, or specify it with such terms as, "if (the context) then," which means under these conditions or within these limits. Any of the terms of a proposition may be limited or further defined by such modifiers as all, every, some, most, many, few, only, not all, not many, not a few, often, before, after, during, etc.

Propositions Only Epistemological

Propositions, like concepts, have no ontological or material existence. They only exist as the creation of and within the consciousness of human minds. Such arguments as, "since rocks actually exist, the proposition, 'rocks exist,' is true, independent of any mind," ignores the fact that propositions do not exist independent of any mind. Rocks, like all material existents exist and are what they are whether anyone is conscious of them or knows what they are, but that they exist and are what they are can only be known and stated by a conscious mind.

A similar spurious argument is sometimes made about mathematical concepts and propositions. The argument is that, "two plus two equals four," is a true proposition whether anyone knows it or not and is therefore, "mind independent." Actually 2+2=4 means nothing. 2, 4, +, and = are symbols, like words, for concepts, specifically for the two numbers, 2, which is how far a count gets if counting only two things, and 4, which is how far count gets if counting four things, and +, which is the symbol for adding things together and counting them, and =, which is the symbol meaning the same numeric value. There are no wild 2s, 4s, +s, or =s running around in nature, they only exist in human minds. Valid propositions must be about existents, they are not about the concepts that identify the existents. 2+2=4 means, any existents of which there are two, added to two other existents, when counted will be four existents. 2+2=4 sans existents means nothing. (This is perhaps the biggest mistake in math and logic theory.)

All Knowledge Propositional

Some attribute the human intellect to the ability to form concepts, and it is true, without that ability the intellect would be impossible. But philosophically, concepts are not knowledge, and concepts alone are not language.

All human knowledge is made possible by language and consists of propositions. Knowledge is about things: about existence itself, about the existents that are existence, and about their nature, their attributes, their actions, and their relationships to each other. It is by means of propositions that state what the nature of existents, attributes, actions, and relationships to each other are that all knowledge is expressed and held.

Though most philosophers consider concepts knowledge, and even though no knowledge is possible without concepts, concepts alone are not knowledge.

All supposed knowledge must be either true or false, and is only knowledge if it is true. Except by implication, no concept is either true or false. Concepts can be good or bad, that is, they may identify confused ideas, or be vague and poorly defined, or may identify what does not materially exist, (as though it did), as most mystic concepts do. What those concepts identify are fictions, but the concepts are neither true nor false. A concept only identifies things, and is just as valid when identifying fictional things as when identifying actual things.

Only propositions can be true or false. A proposition is a statement that asserts something about an existent or class of existents. For example, "Zeus is a god worshiped by the ancient Greeks," asserts something about Zeus. If what is being asserted is correct, the proposition is true; if what is being asserted is incorrect, the proposition is false. The assertion, in this case, and therefore the proposition, is true, even though the concept "Zeus" identifies a fictional existent. The same concept can be use in both true and false propositions. "The phoenix is a common bird found in the forests of Colorado," is false, but, "the phoenix is a mythical bird of ancient Egypt," is true.

Since only propositions can be true or false, knowledge consists entirely of propositions; but all propositions are constructed of concepts, without which no knowledge would be possible. Concepts identify the existents all our knowledge is about. Technically, concepts are not knowledge, but a definition, if correct, is knowledge because it is stated as a proposition.

One might say, all correctly defined concepts constitute a kind of knowledge, but notice, it is really only the definitions that are the knowledge, not concepts as identifiers, which is their only function. Concepts imply knowledge, and most concepts would be impossible without knowledge, but attributing knowledge to concepts themselves is an epistemological mistake. It is that mistake that is the source of such confused ideas as those that suggest knowledge somehow changes the meaning of concepts, so that what a child means by an apple, and what a botanist means by an apple are different things.

I very much resent the tone of philosophers who presume to tell others how they must view and express things. So long as someone understands that concepts identify existents and that all a concept means is those existents it identifies with all their attributes, known or unknown, and all that can be known or learned about them and that anyone who uses the concept identifies the very same existents, no matter how much or how little they know about those existents, it does not matter if they choose to consider the fact that one knows what a concept identifies means the concept is knowledge (or at least implies knowledge) or not. The important point is that a concept's function is to identify existents, and all our knowledge is about the existents that concepts identify, and it is only by means of propositions that our knowledge about existents is possible. In the case of most concepts, their meaning (what they identify) could not be known without the propositions which are their definitions. So long as it is understood that it is not a concept's definition that is the concept's meaning, how one chooses to understand the relationship between concepts and knowledge is not a serious philosophical issue.

Our knowledge, then, consists of all the propositions we understand and have stored in our memory that are true statements about any aspect of existence. By the time we are adults we have learned and stored thousands, possibly millions of propositions in memory.

Conceptual Relationships to Knowledge

A concept itself only identifies existents. It is the existents all our knowledge is about, not the concepts that identify those existents. Nevertheless, because a concept identifies existents and means those existents with all their attributes and all that can be known about them, the concept acts like a reference to all that we know about those existents.

The concept itself does not hold any of that knowledge or actually do the referencing, but our ability to ask and answer the question, "what do I know about the existents this concept identifies?" is made possible by the concept. In that sense every concept can be used like a key-word in a search engine that will find all the propositions we have in memory that begin, "this existent is ..." where the predicate of the proposition is something known about the concept's referents.

[NOTE: The key-word/search-engine explanation is only an analogy for the relationship between consciousness and memory. It is always what we are conscious of that prompts recall from memory. It is when we are consciously considering a concept that propositions we have in memory will be recalled, in most cases the ones we use or consider most often first followed by lesser used ones. Some propositions are very difficult to recall if not often used. An example is that case of thinking, "I'm sure there is something else I know about this but can't remember it."]

Using the concept "dog" for example, the answer to the question, "what do I know about dogs," can call up every proposition we can remembered that begins, "a dog is ..." where the predicate is some concept that is true about dogs in general, or any dog in particular.

Some of the propositions regarding dogs might be, "a dog is a mammal," "some dogs are dangerous," "some dogs are used to help people," "some dogs are pets," "dogs are not allowed in this building," "that dog bites." As each proposition is recalled, the concepts from which the propositions are constructed can begin a new series of recalled propositions. The concept "mammal" in the proposition, "a dog is a mammal," may act as a key-word to search for all that is known about "mammal" by means of the propositions, "a mammal is ...." Since there will be an indefinite number of possible such propositions for every concept indicating what is known about them in terms of other propositions, the interrelationships between concepts and propositions in this manner is indefinitely complex.

It is neither necessary or possible to identify or "unscramble" the nearly infinite complexity of the cognitive relationships between concepts and propositions, however, because concepts themselves are the means of maintaining the order and understanding those relationships. It is because all our propositional knowledge is only recalled in relation to concepts we are currently conscious of that propositional ideas always relate to what is currently important to our own thinking.

The Meaning of Propositions

What concepts mean are the existents they identify which are called their units, referents, or particulars. Since propositions assert something about something else, which specifically attributes the predicate of the proposition to the subject, the proposition means: "whatever is specified by the predicate concept is true of the existents identified by the subject concept."

A proposition is a "logical connection" between the existent or existents that are the referents of the subject concept and the existent or existents that are the referents of the predicate concept. A proposition is true if and only if the relationship described by the proposition is the actual case. A proposition is true if:

—... the predicate is a universal concept, and the existent or existents identified by the subject concept really are referents of that concept.
—... the predicate is a concept of a quality or qualities, and the existent or existents identified by the subject concept really have that quality or those qualities.
—... the predicate is a concept of action, actions, behavior, or behaviors, and the existent or existents identified by the subject concept really exhibit the action, actions, behavior, or behaviors.
—... the predicate is a concept for a specified relationship or relationships, and the existent or existents identified by the subject concept really have the specified relationship or relationships.

[NOTE: These, of course, apply to all the negative, past, and future forms as well.]

In most general terms, therefore, a proposition means the actual connection between the existents identified, that the predicate is true of the subject. A concept identifies existents. A proposition specifies a connection between existents.

[NOTE: It would not be incorrect to say a proposition "identifies" a "relationship" between existents, but I prefer "specify" to distinguish the operation from the function of concepts to "identify" existents, and I also prefer "connection" to "relationship" because one of the possible connections is relationship.]

nothing
Posts: 206
Joined: Mon Oct 14, 2019 9:32 pm

Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by nothing » Mon Dec 09, 2019 8:02 pm

___________________________________________________________________________
Propositions are only as good as the assumed tautology upon which they are established.

Thus, the truest propositions derive from the truest "structure"
assumed by the creator-compiler(s) of the proposition(s)
that "truly" reflects the physical/metaphysical bases of existence.

For example:

Image

In this geometry:
√A = +A, -A

∴ A ≠ A

A = *A
_____________
*variability (+)/(-)
such variability built into the identity of the subject itself
allows for any/all conjugate relationships satisfying any toroidal 'form'
and allows *A to contain degrees of uncertainty: one-or-the-other, or "both" / "neither".

One, becomes two, becomes three etc. and all resolves back into one *A.

This basic geometry can be used to calculate
any relationship(s) between subjects incl.
the relationship a single subject might have with itself
viz. belief and knowledge: to believe to be something one is not,
or to know not to believe such. Similarly, *A can be +A or -A.

Peter Holmes
Posts: 562
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Epistemology, Propositions

Post by Peter Holmes » Tue Dec 10, 2019 11:15 am

Thanks for this. But I think the main premise is false. Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things such as concepts and propositions, to believe they exist is irrational. Abstract things are misleading fictions. What and where is an abstract thing? Is it a concept in a mind - more abstract things?

The idea of propositional knowledge is absurd - why should knowing something is the case have anything to do with a linguistic expression? The identification of a feature of reality with a factual assertion - S knows that p iff p is true - shows the ancient myth of propositions at work. And correspondence theories of truth recycle the myth.

It's time to recognise this delusion - this mistaking what we say about things for the way things are - and free ourselves from it once and for all. By way of response to the OP, below is an extract from a paper I'm working on.

2 Abstract things

Nouns are the names of things. So it seems that what we call abstract nouns must be the names of abstract things, such as knowledge, truth, justice, beauty, goodness, identity, being, and so on.

In fact, the expression abstract noun is a grammatical misattribution, because words are real things: sounds, marks on paper or screen, gestures, and so on. So in the expression abstract noun, the modifier abstract actually refers to the supposed thing that the abstract noun supposedly names.

But pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, there is no reason to believe they exist. More likely, we mistake abstract nouns for things which, therefore, we can try to describe. And this delusion has persisted for centuries – hence the perennially insoluble nature of philosophy’s so-called problems.

For example, the question ‘What is [knowledge] and where does it come from?’ can fool us into thinking knowledge is a thing with properties that can be described. [Insert the abstract noun of choice.] So we produce rival so-called theories of [knowledge]. Or we conclude such abstract things are difficult to describe, or even mysterious.

And talk of concepts in minds – more abstract things – gets us nowhere. They are just mysteries invented to explain mysteries. A dog chasing its tail needs to re-think the premise.

3 Facts

We can use the word fact to mean ‘state-of-affairs’ or ‘feature of reality’. But we also think of facts as things that are true. And the following definitions demonstrate the two different meanings.

‘fact: noun a thing that is known or proved to be true’ (Google dictionary.)

‘fact: n. 1 a thing that is known to have occurred, to exist, or to be true’ (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, page 482.)

Now, if a fact is a state-of-affairs, then it has no truth-value. A state-of-affairs, and the things that constitute it, just are or were, neither true nor false. And such features of reality can often be known and shown to be or have been the case.

But if instead a fact is a thing that is true, then the only thing it can be is an assertion – typically a linguistic expression – because, given the meaning of the word true in the above definitions, only assertions are true or false.

Of course, linguistic expressions are real things – features of reality. They are sequences of sounds, marks on paper or screen, gestures, and so on. But assertions are the only features of reality that can have truth-value.

So we use the word fact in two completely different ways, to mean ‘a state-of-affairs’ or ‘a true description of a state-of-affairs’. And while dual and even multiple word-uses are not uncommon, I think this example is highly significant.

We can mistake what we say about things for the way things are – a description for the described. And the way we ordinarily use the word fact both demonstrates and maintains the delusion. In effect, we can conflate the two meanings of the word fact, so that the description and the described seem to be one and the same thing.

In practice, when we identify a fact, what we actually do is produce an assertion that describes a feature of reality, given the way we use the words or other signs involved. And we have no choice but to do so. If you disagree, try identifying a fact that is not an assertion of some kind.

For this reason, I define a fact as ‘a true factual assertion’: factual, because it claims something about reality that may or may or may not be the case; and true, because what it claims is indeed the case. (A factual assertion may be true or false.)

One advantage of using the expression factual assertion is that it allows us to distinguish between factual assertions, which have truth-value, and non-factual assertions, which do not. For example, moral and aesthetic assertions are non-factual, because they express judgements or opinions, rather than make factual claims.

(I discuss the non-factual nature of moral assertions in An argument against moral objectivism (May 2019) at http://www.peasum.co.uk/441761408.)

4 Propositions

Aiming for clarity, many philosophers distinguish between states-of-affairs, which they call facts, and things said about them, which they call propositions. And this would be a useful distinction, were it not for the problem of what a proposition is supposed to be.

A proposition is supposedly what a statement states, an assertion asserts, a declarative declares, and so on. So it is supposedly an abstract thing which can be embodied, expressed or represented by different so-called token sentences.

But, pending evidence for abstract things, belief that they exist, though ancient and pervasive, is irrational. And that we do not also speculate about the abstract things that questions ask, commands command and exclamations exclaim points to the strangeness of thinking that what a statement states is an abstract thing of some kind.

Like other abstract things, propositions are misleading fictions. We mistake the abstract noun proposition for a thing of some kind that can be described. But as it turns out, propositions consist of subjects and predicates. And some are true or false, because they describe features of reality that may or may not be the case. So they are just like real declarative sentences.

And a symbolic representation of a proposition is nothing more than another linguistic expression – a codified translation. The so-called logical form of an assertion is just another assertion.

But though propositions are just linguistic expressions, they have played an ambiguous role in philosophy similar to the role played by facts in everyday language. And I call this phenomenon the myth of propositions.

One example of the myth is evident in a definition of omniscience as ‘knowledge of all true propositions’ – the idea that knowledge of everything is identical to knowledge of all true assertions about everything.

And another example of the myth of propositions at work is the widely-used definition of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’, along with Gettier’s criticism of the definition.

6 Justified true belief (JTB)

According to the JTB definition, the three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge are truth, belief and justification for the belief. And in one version of the definition, the so-called truth condition is as follows.

S knows that p if and only if p is true.

The proposition p has two different functions here. The second p is an assertion with a truth value. But the first p seems somehow to be or stand for the state-of-affairs that the second p asserts. So the proposition p is both the thing described and the description, just we use the word fact to mean ‘a state-of-affairs’ and ‘a true description of a state-of-affairs’.

(I analyse the JTB definition more fully in Justified true belief: knowledge and the myth of propositions (July 2017) at http://www.peasum.co.uk/435531068.)

The JTB definition casually identifies a state-of-affairs with a proposition. And its truth condition is that we can know something is the case if and only if an assertion asserting it is true – an absurd idea derived from the myth of propositions.

And the confusion deepens. The justified true belief definition includes truth as a necessary condition for knowledge. But the only things that can be true or false are factual assertions. So the expression true belief is another grammatical misattribution, rather like the expression abstract noun.

As an acceptable shorthand, we do use the expressions true belief and false belief, and ordinarily their meanings are clear. But belief is an attitude of acceptance or trust, just as disbelief is the withholding of acceptance. So the modifier true in true belief actually refers to a factual assertion. Simply believing (accepting) that a feature of reality is the case has nothing to do with truth or falsehood.

7 The Gettier problem

Recycling the confusion in the expression true belief, Gettier pointed out that, sometimes, justified true belief does not amount to knowledge, so that the JTB definition is incorrect or at least inadequate. And discussion of the so-called Gettier problem and possible solutions continues. But the assumed necessity of the truth condition often remains an unrecognised difficulty.

For anyone unfamiliar with Gettier cases, here is an example I have used elsewhere.

A woman sees a group of people and mistakes one of them, a stranger, for her friend. So she believes her friend is there. And as it happens, her friend really is there, but hidden. So what she believes is the case. But does she know her friend is there?

The problem for the woman is not that she believes something that, unbeknown to her, happens to be true – a proposition. She simply believes a state-of-affairs is the case for reasons that do not objectively justify the belief. The problem is her lack of knowledge of the actual state-of-affairs – knowledge which we Gettier-spectators have.

In the post-match debriefing, a Gettier-protagonist would simply say they made a mistake. They would never say they knew the actual state-of affairs to be the case. That is not how we use the word know and its cognates.

To put it simply: the main condition for our knowing something is the case is that is indeed the case. Our justification for believing it is the case is a separate, though disputed, matter – and we can be mistaken. But none of this has anything to do with language, and therefore anything to do with truth or falsehood.

We may confuse ourselves by saying it is true that a state-of-affairs is the case. But a state-of-affairs is neither true nor false. Reality is not linguistic.

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